The Haqqani Network: Pursuing Feuds under the Guise of Jihad?
By: MAJ Lars W. Lilleby, Norwegian Army
In addition to its unique terrain, RC-East had the Haqqanis.
——General Stanley McChrystal, USA1
The intersection of tribes, corruption, insurgency, poppy, tyranny, family feuds, and loyalties makes conducting counterinsurgency in eastern Afghanistan highly complicated.2 Few terrorist organizations in this region have had the kind of sustained success over a period of years and the ability to adapt and increase their threat as the Haqqani Network (HQN). From its beginnings as a subgroup in the Afghan insurgency with ties to al Qaeda, the network has risen to become one of the most effective, feared, and hard-core elements of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.3 When counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategists categorize the HQN as a transnational jihadi group, however, their well-intended countermeasures often fuel the network instead of defeating it. The overall goal for the HQN is to tie the region together in a financial web, using every aspect of the black, white, and grey markets to benefit the HQN organization in ways not necessarily related to jihad. Therefore, it's important to make a distinction between the HQN financial structure and its ideological ambitions. This article makes the case that HQN disguises its financial motivations with nationalist jihadist rhetoric primarily when doing so fits the leadership's purpose.4
As one area expert has noted, "Many of the most prominent jihadi groups in the world today are nationalist in their orientation, framing their irredentist struggle as being one of regaining lost lands from a foreign (usually infidel) occupier. Because they are essentially nationalist groups, these jihadi organizations tend to have significantly higher levels of popular support."5 The fighters who eventually joined the HQN first fought as mujahedeen following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1981, operating in eastern Afghanistan along the Khost-Miranshah corridor into Pakistan. These men were regarded as some of the fiercest and most dedicated fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top mujahedeen leader who had ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), met in the early 1980s with U.S. CIA agents on the Afghan-Pakistani border, in a bid to win their support against the Soviet invaders. Looking for ways to connect with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the CIA had turned to the ISI for help and were offered Jalaluddin, by then a respected and trusted leader within the ISI who could be relied on to "deliver" when asked. Jalaluddin became a prominent leader among the mujahedeen in eastern Afghanistan for several reasons. Initially, he was a nationalist and a royalist who sought to reinstate Mohammad Shah, the deposed king, as the rightful leader of Afghanistan. In addition, as a nationalist and Pashtun, he was outraged by the brutal repression imposed by the Soviet occupiers, and their violations of Muslim traditions and norms. This nationalist stance sparked wide support among the Zadran tribe, which is the dominant tribe in the Afghan-Pakistani border area and the tribe of the Haqqani family.
Soviet efforts to impose a communist system on the tribal culture in Afghanistan sparked wide resistance, not only in Afghanistan but also internationally. Muslim culture, values, and traditions were important and brought different families and tribes together in every part of Afghanistan in a unified fight against the Soviet invaders. It was natural for the Zadran tribe to organize themselves under Haqqani leadership due to their demographics, tribal structure, and strong family ties. Jalaluddin was the family elder and tribal leader among the different Zadran families. He also had support and funding from different foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and the ISI, which gave him significant power and influence compared to other potential mujahedeen leaders.
After successfully defeating the Soviet occupation in 1989, the mujahedeen maintained strong relationships among their different groups. HQN members had established a reputation as fighters and loyal jihadis, which gave them access to money and support far beyond the border area where they lived. Jalaluddin and his close associates in the HQN had increased their personal credibility and status as well, both within the Zadran tribe and among their different international supporters. Now that the war was over, however, the HQN needed to create new and different business opportunities to keep money flowing and build resiliency into the organization. Jalaluddin used his influence and leadership to transform his mujahedeen and military organization into a political and economic franchise. By 1994, the HQN was recognized as a tanzim, or distinct Muslim organization, by foreign jihadis. Today the HQN consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, and is viewed as a sophisticated and highly respected organization by the ISI and supporters on the Arabian Peninsula.6
Ideology and Finance
Although some experts argue that the HQN is a transnational jihadi group along the lines of al Qaeda, the official HQN ideology is to ensure a secure Afghan state under shari'a rule and establish a reformed, nationalist Afghan government.7 The unofficial HQN economic agenda is to keep the network flourishing by promoting growth and resiliency in the black, grey, and white markets. At the same time, the HQN will look to develop new ventures in any segment where economic opportunities arise, not only in South Asia but also in Africa, South and Central America, and Europe. The top tier of the HQN organizational structure reflects this focus.8 Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin, is currently the undisputed leader. Under him, Nasiruddin (also a son of Jalaluddin), Khalil (brother of Jalaluddin), and Ibrahim (brother of Jalaluddin) are all primarily involved in financial matters. Only Badruddin Haqqani (another son of Jalaluddin, now deceased) was mostly involved with military operations. For example, Badruddin was actively involved in directing and advising the terrorists who attacked the Intercontinental hotel in Kabul in 2009, an operation that was probably funded at least in part by outside Arab support. Most of the HQN's terrorist operations come at a low cost for the network due to their use of highly motivated local fighters. The three family members involved in financial matters seem less interested in directly supporting jihad than in building a financial empire similar to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra.9
HQN founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, now a senior mentor to the organization, and his son Siraj have sworn faithful support to the Taliban and Mullah Omar.10 That does not mean, however, that they necessarily share the same goals or ideology. The groups have agreed to not fight each other, divided up areas of operations, decided who will be involved in the different business ventures, and pledged to support each other when it is operationally and financially beneficial to them. The pact between the Kandahari Taliban and the HQN on drug smuggling in eastern and southern Afghanistan might be such an agreement.11
The HQN modus operandi seems to indicate that the HQN plays a specific role in the Taliban-led insurgency.
When a terrorist group functions alongside a well-established guerilla group, it can play an even more important role. In such instances, terrorists function for guerilla movements almost as special operations forces do for regular armies. Terrorists can destroy a rival's command and control structure. They can provide logistic and financial support for guerillas. Perhaps most important, they can also threaten individuals who collaborate with a regime, making it hard for a government to elicit regular and reliable intelligence about a guerilla movement.12
The HQN's Foreign Fighters (FF) units,13 ISI support, safe houses, facilitators, and infiltration routes from Miranshah to Kabul all serve as valuable force multipliers for the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, these assets indirectly support the group's long-term financial goal, which is to develop a resilient regional economic base in both the legal and illegal sectors, so that the HQN can live on. By keeping significant pressure on Kabul with highprofile terrorist attacks, the HQN helps to emphasize the Afghan government's lack of control over the country and diminishes the ability of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to uphold the law and fight crime. The strategy of the HQN is a mix between attrition and intimidation. Both the Taliban and the HQN embrace attrition as their overall strategy in their fight against the central government and its international backers for two reasons. First, attrition makes it costly for both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the ANSF to stay in the region. Second, the attrition strategy seeks to change the government in Afghanistan into a reformed and nationalistic government under shari'a law.
The most important task for any terrorist group is to persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy yields to the terrorists' demands. The attrition strategy is designed to accomplish this task. In an attrition campaign, the greater the costs a terrorist organization is able to inflict, the more credible its threat to inflict future costs, and the more likely the target is to grant concessions.14
In Afghanistan where the government is struggling with legitimacy, corruption, and its inability to provide substantial security for the population, an attrition strategy works well.
The other strategy that the HQN uses is intimidation.
Intimidation is akin to the strategy of deterrence, preventing some undesired behavior by means of threats and costly signals. It is most frequently used when terrorist organizations wish to overthrow a government in power or gain social control over a given population. It works by demonstrating that the terrorists have the power to punish whoever disobeys them, and that the government is powerless to stop them.15
This fits the picture of how the HQN conducts operations in Kabul. The city of Kabul has no particular historical value, but as the capital, it is the center of gravity for the ANSF and the national government led by Hamid Karzai. If the ANSF is unable to secure even Kabul and its population, it will lose credibility among its own population and the international community, who might begin to believe that they would be better off with another government— presumably one that is pro-HQN and Taliban. Even as ruthless as the Taliban was when in power, it was able to provide some security for the population through shari'a courts, and most Afghans will put their trust in whoever can provide security for tomorrow.
The HQN's Pakistani and Arab Connections
The cities of Khost in Afghanistan and Miranshah in Pakistan, which lie about 40 km apart on either side of the mountainous border, are important to the HQN, and are under strong influence from the network. One reason for this is the deep ties to the Zadran tribe in these areas, along with the nationalist jihad ideology that has been passed from father to son since the Afghan-Soviet war. In the Pakistani tribal areas, the central government's law and authority have little importance. Tribal ties are strong, and loyalty to one's tribe is more important than loyalty to the state. The HQN's operational security against spies and journalists is dependent on this tribal relationship. The support that the HQN is enjoying in the province of Khost is unique even given the strong pressure being put on this area by the ISAF and ANSF. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his men became heroes and liberators for the people in and around Khost, and are still considered heroes there today. The locals in Khost see both the ISAF and the ANSF as just more intruders that the HQN eventually will defeat. The HQN is known to have mobilized as many as 500 local fighters to launch large-scale attacks on government buildings in and around Khost, such as the one that took place in May 2009, when HQN fighters staged a complex, multistaged attack on the Khost City provincial governor's compound, the police headquarters building, and a nearby administrative building.16
The Foreign Fighters' Units
The differences in goals between the HQN and the Taliban have occasionally led the HQN to accuse the Taliban of being too extreme in their ideology. Disagreements have arisen over the games children are allowed to play, the Taliban's ban on music, and whether girls should be allowed to go to school. Operational disputes have been reported as well. HQN leaders have condemned the Taliban's and FF's excessive use of violence in operations that have killed several innocent civilians, including children. Local fighters in the tribal areas often object to the FF units coming into their area because the members of the FF bring tactics and attitudes that conflict with local tribal customs. Although Pakistanis mainly comprise the FF, North Africans, Arabs, Europeans, Uzbeks, and Chechens have been identified as FF members fighting in Afghanistan as well.
A considerable number of FF members who come to Afghanistan from the Arabian Peninsula rely on HQN support. Their need for safe houses, guides for crossing the border, and facilitators who provide equipment for operations makes HQN support for the FF essential. Jalaluddin traveled frequently during the Soviet-Afghan war and made strong connections with supporters of the Afghan jihad on the Arabian Peninsula. It is reasonable to assume that Arab sponsors offered the HQN both money and eager, dedicated jihadi fighters who wanted to gain combat experience while fighting for the cause in Afghanistan. Once this pipeline was established, the HQN's canny marketing of its operations has kept the flow of money and fighters coming. In addition, Jalaluddin's second wife is from the United Arab Emirates, and her marriage with the Haqqani leader helped establish credibility and trust between the HQN and potential Arab beneficiaries. It is reasonable to assume that she had an important role in connecting the HQN with the Arabian network.
The FF brings valuable experience and weapons such as modified IEDs that have proven effective in other conflicts. "Intelligence analysts believe this is evidence of an AQ [al Qaeda] affiliated information network linking Jihadist movements in multiple theaters of operation with loose operational coordination on a global scale and of a capability to move at least small numbers of personnel from one operational theater to another."17 This does not mean, however, that the HQN is part of a larger transnational network of jihadis, but rather that it uses the existing information and personnel networks for its own benefits.
Operations and Activities
While the Taliban is fighting the ISAF and ANSF primarily in the valleys and the rural areas, the HQN focuses its attacks on Kabul. Between 2002 and 2004, the HQN reconstituted its operations in its historical stronghold of Loya Paktia, which encompasses the provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika in southeastern Afghanistan. During this period, loyal supporters and sponsors reemerged to support the nationalist jihad and the HQN. Between 2005 and 2009, the HQN was able to expand its influence beyond Loya Paktia towards Kabul, which gave the network the ability to execute attacks in Kabul itself. "From 2008 to 2009, the network launched an offensive aimed at strengthening their positions in Loya Paktia, while projecting suicide bombers into Kabul to launch some the most lethal attacks of any insurgent group in Afghanistan."18 It may be that this division of activities was worked out between the HQN and the Taliban to maximize the effect of the larger insurgency. Similar agreements among insurgent factions regarding operational areas are well known, such as that between the Kandahari Taliban and the HQN regarding the smuggling of opium and the chemicals used to process narcotics.
The HQN leaders, and Jalaluddin in particular, are well known for exploiting the media to their advantage. The HQN produces a significant amount of propaganda from its operational successes; this material is translated into Pashto, Dari, and Arabic to market the HQN and gain support and recruits. Attacks in Kabul give the group a significant advantage when it comes to getting the news media's attention, due to the number of media companies located in the capital.
Extortion and assassinations are also among the HQN's tactics. In September 2006, HQN operatives assassinated Paktia's governor, Hakim Taniwal. At Taniwal's funeral a couple of days later, another bomber sent by the HQN detonated his device, killing 39 and injuring four of President Karzai's ministers.19 In Kabul the HQN is using Fedayeen tactics, based around mobile attack teams. The Fedayeen ("those who sacrifice themselves") originally were Palestinians operating from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon who, after 1948, formed small, autonomous teams to attack Israeli targets. Their tactics, which can but don't necessarily include suicide bombs, have since been modified and adapted by several terrorist and insurgent groups around the world. The Fedayeen model is based on a small team of several terrorists, each with a specific task, who launch a coordinated attack on an identified target. The HQN used something akin to Fedayeen tactics when they attacked the Kabul Serena Hotel in 2008, the Afghanistan International Bank in 2009, the Hotel Inter-Continental Kabul in 2011, and the Spozhmai Hotel in 2012 (all located in Kabul). The FF units bring valuable experience to these command operations and often work as force multipliers together with the local fighters.
The HQN and the ISI
The strong ties between the HQN and Pakistan's ISI remain intact today.20 Pakistan needs a means to influence the political situation in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis fear that a strong and nationalistic Afghanistan will put Pakistan in a squeeze between Afghanistan and India. As long as it is receiving money, weapons, and intelligence from the ISI, the HQN will keep launching highprofile attacks in Kabul intended to destabilize the government.21 This is in accordance with nationalist jihadi ideology: to fight the near enemy. At the same time, the situation enhances the HQN's financial ambitions, because an unstable Afghanistan attracts international support that helps the HQN business empire to expand. Millions of dollars are flowing into Afghanistan for counterinsurgency projects such as reconstruction, road building, digging wells, providing schools, and so on. HQN front companies often win these contracts, or HQN fighters protect the workers from attack (or both). Either way, the HQN profits directly from these projects, not unlike the Italian Mafia's control of trucking, construction, and garbage disposal in southern Italy. Everybody knows who is running these businesses, but it is very hard to stop them without causing even greater problems.
A weak and corrupt central Afghan government also makes it easier for the HQN to deal profitably in the grey and black economic markets. ISI support to the HQN is not limited to support inside Afghanistan, however; the ISI also protects financial interests for the HQN in Pakistan. By helping to facilitate the export and import of resources and products for the HQN, the ISI plays an important part in the larger HQN business empire. Two examples of this are the import of chemicals to process narcotics and fertilizers for bomb making. Normally the export and import of these kinds of dual-use precursor chemicals are controlled under international trade regulations. When a known terrorist group like the HQN is able to engage in this trade, it seems reasonable to assume that the ISI is helping the HQN avoid normal import controls and customs checkpoints.
The HQN also relies on ISI support when its members travel to other countries for fundraising: the ISI sees to it that HQN leaders slip through security checkpoints at Pakistani airports, and lets them travel on fake passports around the world.22 Arguably, ISI support is one of the reasons why the HQN is more sophisticated and violent than any other group in Afghanistan. At the same time, HQN leaders have successfully exploited the weakness of the Pakistani government and been able to establish safe havens on the Afghan-Pakistani border.
A Financial Empire
The HQN's financial interests are far more impressive than the group's terrorist acts, but draw less attention. The business side, comprising both legal and illegal ventures, involves more people and operations than the jihadi side, and stretches into the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and Europe. HQN businesses range from illegally exporting high-value minerals like chromite to China to legally investing in real estate all over Asia and the Middle East. Besides the chromite, the HQN gets much of its revenue from the smuggling of precious jewels and other metals, and from timber smuggling.23 Extortion of local and regional businesses is another important source of income for the HQN. Those who fail to pay are punished, in classic gangland style.
Fundraising in the Gulf Region, and the support of wealthy donors, going back 30 years to Jalaluddin's early fundraising trips to the Arabian Peninsula, remain very important to the HQN. These sponsors help raise money for the HQN and at the same time reward the leadership for conducting high-profile attacks in Kabul. Madrassas and mosques in Loya Paktia also do fundraising for the HQN. The imams and clerics preach jihadi ideology supporting HQN activities, and help with community support and recruitment to the jihad.24
The group also takes part in drug trafficking, but not in the same way as the Taliban. The HQN is cleverly organized to deal only with the precursor chemicals used for processing raw opium into heroin.25 These same chemicals can be used in legal pharmaceutical manufacturing and in hospitals as well, which gives the HQN both great cover for buying these products and a secondary market for their resale even when heroin production is low. In this way the HQN avoids being harmed by fluctuating opium prices. Kidnaping for ransom is another HQN business venture. By kidnaping people like David Rohde (a New York Times journalist), Bowe Bergdahl (a sergeant in the U.S. Army), and Abdul Khaliq Farahi (an Afghan diplomat to Pakistan), the HQN has gained credibility within the Afghan insurgency because of the media attention these cases receive. Smuggling and taxation of people in the border area are common ways of gaining income for the lower ranks of the HQN.
As mentioned earlier, the HQN financial structure is not made up solely of illegal activities. Like other mafia-style ventures, the HQN needs legal enterprises to launder money and ensure resiliency in its business structure.26 Examples of this legal side include supporting and running hospitals and madrassas in the border areas, and real estate development projects in Dubai. Classic mafia-friendly enterprises like the trucking and transportation companies that operate daily across Afghanistan and Pakistan are also part of the HQN legal/illegal economic structure. HQN-affiliated construction companies, which are primarily contracted by the ISAF, are another such scheme; in this case, by hiring these contractors, the ISAF is directly fueling the HQN structure. Many of these HQN companies have shadow structures, so it is hard to directly trace them back to the HQN. According to Gretchen Peters, who lived in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan for five years, the HQN controls between 10 percent and 25 percent of all the business conducted in their area, legal and illegal. Of the total amount of money spent on the Gardez-Khost Road, for example, about US$12 million to $30 million ended up in HQN-affiliated bank accounts. At the same time, the ISAF relies on these companies because they are an important part of the legal economy that people in the region are dependent on. The instability in Afghanistan benefits every part of the HQN business empire, and as long as instability is in its favor, the HQN will continue the fight.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The HQN is a subgroup in the broader Afghan Taliban insurgency, but it is far more financially sophisticated and economically motivated than the other jihadist groups, and resembles a mafia organization in this regard. Going after the HQN financial structure would therefore likely be a more effective counterterrorist strategy than using a classic counterinsurgency strategy. An information operations campaign should target the HQN's financial network and highlight its less ideological reasons for fighting in Afghanistan. This might help drive a wedge between the different jihadi groups fighting the ISAF and the Afghan government. The HQN has specialized in spectacular attacks in Kabul while leaving the countryside to the Taliban, a "division of labor" that must be taken into consideration when countermeasures are planned.
What Can Be Done
ISAF-ANSF information operations should reflect the fact that the HQN's high-profile attacks in Kabul are conducted for economic reasons rather than for defensive jihad, and that sponsors and supporters pay for these operations. HQN leaders know that they can play on the nationalist jihadi ideology to gain support in Afghanistan and other like-minded countries. In the Gulf Region, wealthy private sponsors, who want to see the apostate Karzai government in Kabul crippled and rendered ineffective, support jihad around the world by sending money to groups like the HQN. A way in which the allies who are fighting to stabilize Afghanistan can counteract these forces is to drive a wedge between the local fighters and the HQN leadership. This can be done by highlighting the fact that it is financial motivations rather than ideology that drive the HQN's top-level decision making. A cleverly planned information operation designed to expose the true identity and motivations of the HQN leadership would be one way to create this wedge. Another way to weaken the network is to reduce the support coming from wealthy Arab benefactors, not only by informing them of the Haqqanis' avarice, but by focusing at the same time on ways to trace and target the money coming from these sponsors.
The continued failure to recognize the fact that the HQN is not a transnational jihadi organization but rather a nationalist, mafia-style group can serve to enhance the network instead of harming it. Traditional development and reconstruction projects often indirectly and directly benefit the HQN. Targeting the financial structure and revenues of the HQN would cripple the group more than traditional counterinsurgency operations. As it is, doing no development work in Khost would be better than the current ISAF strategy of project building, because a lot of the funding coming from the ISAF is directly fueling the HQN. To counter extortion, the ISAF should develop a corps of engineers within the ANSF. The ISAF would then be channeling money in the right direction, and the ANSF would have an opportunity to win the trust of the population while at the same time reducing the influence of the HQN. The main problem for the HQN is that it is running out of time. The population that is loyal to the Haqqanis is getting tired of war. Presenting the HQN leadership as primarily motivated by money could cause its ideology-based relationships with both fighters and wealthy donors to suffer.
About the Author(s): MAJ Lars W. Lilleby is currently serving in the Norwegian Army as a company commander.
1. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 304.
2. Ibid., 319.
3. Jeffrey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Report 6 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, 2010): http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_0.pdf
4. Gretchen Peters, a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC), describes how, after over three decades of war, the Haqqani Network (HQN) has evolved into an efficient, transnational jihadi industry. See Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, July 2012): http://www. ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_ Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf
5. Glenn Robinson, "Jihadi Information Strategy, Sources, Vulnerabilities and Opportunities," in Information Strategy and Warfare, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2009), 86–112.
6. Dressler, The Haqqani Network. Also see Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 41–77, 65. Different sources state that the HQN controls between 4,000 and 20,000 fighters. HQN leaders have claimed that they control more than 10,000 fighters, but never as many as 20,000. My estimate therefore falls somewhere in between.
7. In their recent book, Fountainhead of Jihad, Don Rassler and Vahid Brown assume that the HQN's support to al Qaeda is driven more by ideological motives than economic ones because the HQN did not benefit economically from helping al Qaeda. This argument neglects the importance of alliances, trust building, and long-term investments. A character like Jalaluddin plays on a lot of different strings. Investing in friendship and alliances that can benefit him in the future is a highly likely strategy, even if the alliance does not immediately pay off. See Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (New York: Columbia/Hurst, 2013); also see Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 2011).
8. Gretchen Peters describes how the sons and close relatives have taken on certain roles in the network related to operations and financing. See the section "Key Financial Personalities and Organization," in Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 24–31.
9. Ibid., 12.
11. Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 45–46.
12. Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 21, no. 2 (April– June 1998): 149–169: http://www.polsci.wvu. edu/faculty/hauser/Summer2011InternalConflict/BymanLogicEthnicTerrorismStudConfTerrorism1998.pdf
13. These Foreign Fighters (FF) units are made up of jihadists who come into Afghanistan from Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere specifically to join the fight against Western forces. FF members from the Arabian Peninsula come in to fight alongside the HQN, while members of the Pakistani Taliban often fight alongside the Afghan Taliban. Most FF members join for ideological reasons (jihad), but the host they are fighting for may have different objectives. For example, the HQN is mostly financially motivated, while the Taliban is said to be primarily motivated by nationalism and religion.
14. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49–80, 60.
15. Ibid., 66.
16. Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 25.
17. Johnson and Mason, "No Sign," 65.
18. Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 3.
19. Ibid., 21.
20. All of the following information regarding Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) support to the HQN comes from Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 2–5.
21. Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 9, 32.
22. Ibid., 45–46.
23. Ibid., 56–57.
24. Ibid., 51–53.
25. Ibid., 45–46.
26. The information in this paragraph was gathered from Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 9–11.