Learning From History: What Is Successful Interrogation?
By: LTC Ronny Kristoffersen, RNN
As long as military units have taken prisoners in wartime, captors have agonized over how to entice or force their prisoners to share what they know. Often the default has been to use torture. Recent history has shown, however, that although torture may get prisoners to talk, there is no guarantee that what they say is the truth. This article introduces two highly successful interrogators from World War II who explicitly rejected torture, and explores the methods they used to get vital information from prisoners.
History cannot give us a program for the future, but it can give us a fuller understanding of ourselves, and of our common humanity, so that we can better face the future. — Robert Penn Warren
Many military units, particularly Special Operations Forces and air crews, receive some sort of training on survival, evasion, resistance against interrogation, and escape (known as SERE) techniques. The training on resisting an enemy's interrogation techniques is designed to make trainees aware of the various potential interrogation methods that could be used against them. Thus, participants in the training actually experience coercive and often illegal—by Geneva Convention standards—treatments, such as being forced into so-called "stress positions" (e.g., forced to stand in one place for hours, or to stand leaning against a wall, or to kneel with hands over the head), suffering through acts of personal humiliation, and being denied food or proper sleep. In addition, thousands of soldiers have been waterboarded during SERE training.1 Some controversial reports have claimed that soldiers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have used the methods they were exposed to during SERE training when interrogating captured insurgents.
The history of interrogation used in warfare can provide a clear picture of the effectiveness of various interrogation methods. This article describes the methods used by two very different men, Hanns Joachim Scharff and Sherwood Ford Moran, who were among the most effective interrogators during the Second World War. It begins with descriptions of Scharff and Moran, who they were, and the techniques they so effectively used. It then compares and contrasts the two men's methodologies, and offers some insights into why they both had such success despite their differences.
While this article does not discuss torture directly, it can contribute to the ongoing discussion of this difficult subject, and help soldiers deployed to conflict zones gain a better understanding and knowledge of successful, legal interrogation procedures.
Hanns Joachim Scharff
Hanns Joachim Scharff was born in 1907 in East Prussia. His father, Hanns-Hermann Scharff, was an army officer who left the military to join his father-in-law as a partner in a textile factory in Greiz, south of Leipzig, Germany.2 The Scharff family lived at Villa Jahn in Greiz, and Scharff began formal training in textiles when he was a teenager.3 After several years spent learning every aspect of his trade, Scharff went to Johannesburg, South Africa to gain experience in sales, and was so successful in the company's foreign office that he was promoted and stayed there several years before returning to Germany.
While in South Africa, Scharff met and married Margaret Stokes, a British South African with whom he had three children.4 The family was living back in Greiz when World War II started; Scharff was drafted into the Army and assigned to a Panzergrenadier regiment, an infantry component of a Panzer division.5 After a transfer, Scharff became assistant to an army interrogator, and when he demonstrated a remarkable ability to gain the trust and cooperation of prisoners of war, soon became an interrogator himself.
In his book The Interrogator, Raymond F. Toliver describes Scharff as "the interrogator that managed to get every pilot he questioned to give him the answers he had to have. In many instances, the prisoners of war being questioned never realized that their words, small talk or otherwise, were in one way or another of great value to Germany's war machinery."6 To the Americans, Scharff became known as "Poker-Face" or "Stone-Face" Scharff.
How Scharff Worked
After the war, Scharff testified on behalf of several American military men who stood accused of the most flagrant treason because of the information they disclosed to him while prisoners of war. During testimony in 1948, Scharff explained that the training and indoctrination the American soldiers received about how to behave if they were taken prisoner became very useful to him in his role as an interrogator.
Scharff developed an understanding of the POW "state of mind"—what he called "barbed-wire psychosis," which is a prisoner of war's sense of guilt about surviving and being on the sidelines until the end of the war. He used that knowledge, along with his perception of how it felt to be a POW, to behave very differently from the way the American soldiers had been taught to expect.7 Instead of torturing or degrading prisoners, Scharff offered them, and captured pilots in particular, courtesy and what appeared to be consideration. Instead of attempting to coerce or persuade with offers of booze and prostitutes, Scharff and his fellow officers took prisoners to whatever cinema shows were available at camp, and even shared tea and coffee with them, when they could get it.8 Every enemy aviator the Germans captured was brought to Oberusel, the Luftwaffe's interrogation and evaluation center, which made it easier to consolidate, control, and use the information the interrogators obtained.9
According to Scharff, POW interrogations should consist of three phases. First is to help the POW relax and feel comfortable by making small talk about anything at all. Second, after he's loosened up, the questioner should try to get the prisoner to reveal any military information or plans that he might know, ideally without letting him realize he has said anything of value. Third, the interrogator must write an evaluation report that is truthful, and that contains any and all information that might be useful to commanding officers in the field.10
Scharff proved to be a master at "perspective taking," the ability to discern the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of others, and he seemed to be able to enter and understand the minds of those he interrogated. These skills enabled him to elicit important information from prisoners without force or coercion.11 Furthermore, he was very good at concealing the nature of the information he sought, and never revealed any success or failure to his target. Prisoners thus often believed they had given Scharff nothing, certainly nothing of importance.
Scharff's Interrogation Techniques
In initial interrogations, which were handled not by Scharff but by officers in the primary screening room, interrogators routinely asked three questions: What is your name? What is your rank? What is your serial number?13 The prisoner was then taken back to his cell for a while. His second meeting would be with "Stone Face" Scharff, although the POW and Scharff might have met previously because Sharff often escorted prisoners to and from formal interrogations.
Prisoners were often surprised by Scharff's office and his reception, especially the fact that Scharff was a private, not an officer. Scharff maintained proper military courtesy and respect for the pilots, and he had an expert command of English; these were not the characteristics prisoners expected of a German interrogator. After receiving a prisoner, Scharff would leave him alone for a little while in his office, which was purposely furnished with American magazines, cigarettes, and posters of pin-up girls; the furnishings and decorations were all designed to make a prisoner feel more "at home," so he would relax and begin to lower his guard.
When Scharrf returned, his next moves were designed to get information beyond a prisoner's name, rank, and serial number. Prisoners were often dressed in civilian clothes, which they had put on to try to evade capture. Scharff would tell a prisoner he needed some proof or confirmation that the man really was a pilot, not a spy, and thus entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war. Scharff would go on to say that if he didn't get that confirmation, the prisoner might be treated as a spy. At that point, instead of making threats, Scharff would ask the POW to imagine how a spy might be treated. The POW knew a spy was likely to be shot, while a combat soldier was entitled to all the rights and privileges offered by the Hague and Geneva Conventions.14
Scharff did not work alone. One of the most important people in his organization was Frau Biehler, who headed a bureau called BUNA-Beute und Nachrichten Abtilung.15 Toliver describes Biehler this way: She was a tireless, obliging, and proud manageress. Her knowledge was paramount and with the information she and her staff gathered about Air Forces from all countries; units stationed in Africa, England, or wherever; names, medals, letters, newspaper clippings, identification papers forged by the French underground, photographs, etc., they were able to establish where the POWs came from, their units, if they flew fighters or bombers, and type of aircraft, and other identification factors.16
Scharff used the information that Frau Biehler and her staff provided to create a "we already know everything" illusion for the prisoner. Rather than ask questions, Sharff would proceed to tell the POW all about his unit and its leadership, and anecdotes about its mission, leading the POW to believe that Scharff knew it all. A prisoner who believes that the interrogator already knows everything believes he has nothing to lose by answering questions; since the interrogator has the answers it makes little sense to deny the information.17
After Scharff had obtained the information requested by his superiors, he would carefully transcribe the conversations that would be of value to higher command and aviation staff.18 Typical information requested could include: "What orders are given pilots to govern bombings and strafing attacks upon our railroad trains? What is the significance of the shooting of ten white tracer bullets in quick succession during air combat? When do fighters discharge their belly tanks?"19
According to analyst Pär Anders Granhag, Scharff's technique consisted of five basic tactics: 1) creating the "we-already-know-everything" illusion; 2) taking a friendly approach; 3) not pressing for information; 4) confirming and disconfirming information; and 5) ignoring important information as it was obtained. "The Scharff-technique," he concluded, "is an umbrella concept" involving a number of tactics, whose combination was of key importance.20 Many books and manuals that have come out since the Second World War recognize the significance of Hanns Joachim Scharff's interrogation technique, a method which proved to be very effective.
Sherwood Ford Moran
I consider that since they are out of the combat for good, they are simply needy human beings, needing our help, physical and spiritual. ——Sherwood F. Moran
Sherwood Ford Moran was born October 8, 1885, in Covington, Kentucky, where his father, William Joel Moran, was stationed as a clerk for the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps.21 From there, the family moved to Flatbush, New York, where Sherwood Moran graduated from the Brooklyn Latin School. In 1911, at age 26, he enrolled in Oberlin College in Ohio, a parochial Congregational college, where Moran majored in philosophy.22 During that time, he had the opportunity to travel around the world as secretary to Sherwood Eddy, a well-known pacifist and founder of YMCA branches overseas, specifically in Asia. In 1915, Moran married Ursul Reeves, a woman he had met in college. They became missionaries and were sent to Tokyo, Japan, where they focused on setting up religious institutions; their three children were born in Tokyo. The Morans were on furlough in Boston in 1941 when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and Moran quickly realized that his fluency in Japanese could prove very useful to the American military. So, at age 56, he decided to join the Marines, which he admired for their "style, vigor, discipline, and goal setting." On August 8, 1942, Moran, now a senior language intelligence officer, was with the First Marine Division when it landed on Guadalcanal.
How Moran Worked
In the study, "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field," Moran described three aspects of his work that are of prime importance when it comes to being "an interpreter" or "interviewer," the terms he preferred over "interrogator."23 Moran credited his success to his character, his experience, and his temperament. It is from these, he said, that the interpreter will gradually develop his personal technique.24 As he described it, Moran's own approach was built on the assumption that few if any prisoners are likely to possess decisive information about imminent plans. Rather, it is the small and seemingly inconsequential bits of evidence that prisoners may give away once they start talking—about training, weapons, commanders, tactics—that, when assembled into a larger mosaic, build up the most complete and valuable picture of the enemy's organization, intentions, and methods.25
To Moran, attitude was of prime importance, and thus he often began an interrogation by telling the prisoner just what his attitude was: "I consider a prisoner (i.e., a man who has been captured and disarmed and is in a perfectly safe place) as out of the war, out of the picture, and thus, in a way, not an enemy."26
By "a perfectly safe place," Moran meant that it was important for the prisoner to understand that there was "no hope of escape, that it is all over, and that they should forget the ‘enemy' stuff, and the ‘prisoner' stuff." He talked to them simply as one human being to another.27 Furthermore, Moran considered the Japanese soldiers people to be pitied rather than hated. Speaking from that perspective, he would tell them "they had been led around by the nose by their leaders; that they do not know, and have not been allowed to know for over ten years what has been going on in the world," just as in the saying, "The frog in the well knows nothing about the ocean."
Another aspect of prime importance, he believed, was the "character" of the interrogator. He must be absolutely sincere. It was not enough to just assume that attitude in order to gain the prisoner's confidence and get him to talk. The interrogator must by his expressions, eyes, and tone of voice convince the prisoner that he really saw the Japanese as humans, not enemies; and that he really cared for their well-being. It is in all respects "a gentleman's approach."
One of Moran's greatest advantages in interrogating Japanese prisoners was that he had lived in Japan for many years, and so he knew not only the language, but also the country's culture, including such seemingly simple things as popular names and familiar places. "If you know anything about Japanese history, art, politics, athletics, famous places, department stores, eating places," noted Moran, "a conversation may be relatively interminable."
In sum, Moran explains the characteristics of a successful interpreter this way:
An interpreter should be a man of culture, insights, resourcefulness, and with real conversation ability. He must have "gags"; he must have a "line"; he must be alive; he must be warm; he must be vivid. Above all, he must have integrity and sympathy, yet he should be firm and wise ("wise as serpents but harmless as doves.") He must have dignity and a proper sense of values, but should be friendly, open and frank.28
Moran described his interrogation techniques in Guadalcanal as "slambang- methods, where, right in the midst of things we had what might be called ‘battle-field interpretation,' where we snatched prisoners right off the battlefield while still bleeding and the snipers were still sniping, and interviewed them as soon as they were able to talk."29 After their battlefield interview, prisoners were brought to the back bases where the interviewing continued. Here, more advanced, specific questions were asked, such as questions about the prisoner's "submarine equipment, radar questions, range finders, bombsights, etc. If the interpreter did not fully master the language, both technical terms and a large general vocabulary, he would not make an effective interviewer: language was most important."
Moran's Interrogation Techniques
Moran quickly learned that every soldier had a story to tell, and he believed the interrogator's job was to facilitate and provide the atmosphere that allowed the prisoner to tell his story. He offered these tips:
Begin by asking him things about himself. Make him and his troubles the center of the stage, not you and your questions of war problems. If he is not wounded or tired out, you can ask him if he has been getting enough to eat. … You can ask if he has had cigarettes, if he is being treated all right, etc. If he is wounded you have a rare chance. Begin to talk about his wounds. Ask if the doctor or corpsman has attended to him. Have him show you his wounds or burns.30
Also important, Moran said, is for the interrogator to not be "too systematic in the questioning." However, in the interrogator's mind there must be a mode of approach: "the interrogator must know exactly what information he wants and come back to it repeatedly."31 Contrary to most interrogators, Moran tried to create an atmosphere that downplayed the idea that the prisoner was in the presence of his conqueror, because that atmosphere tended to put the prisoner "in a psychological position of being on the defensive."32
Another successful technique that Moran used, especially toward prisoners who refused to give any information except their name, rank, and serial number, was to shame the prisoners. To do this, he played on his knowledge about Japanese culture. For example he would tell a prisoner that he had lived in Japan for many years, had many Japanese friends, and had enjoyed many good and intimate conversations with them. You too could "have a conversation with me," Moran would tell a difficult prisoner, "but never have [I] met anyone so offish and on guard as you," even though "we have treated you well, far better than probably we would have been treated," if Americans were taken prisoner in Japan.33 This tactic would upset and offend many prisoners, and they would respond by talking. In addition, Japanese captives often feared going back to their families because they felt humiliated and ashamed, and believed that their capture was a disappointment to their families.34 When they saw other Japanese prisoners, however, they often were relieved to find they were not alone, and would start talking.35
Moran believed that interrogator–prisoner conversations should be made interesting, in a way that captures the prisoner's imagination. Questions should build upon each other, ending in a way that impels the prisoner to either tell his part of the "story" that the interviewer had started, end the story, or correct it because some facts were wrong.36 The primary goal of an interrogator's questions is to gather pertinent information. In Moran's case, he needed information that would be useful to U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces. Often, a prisoner was too tired or seriously wounded to be questioned at length. Because Moran was usually stationed on the front lines and his interrogations were often interrupted by bombing raids, he stuck to questions that dealt with imperative information, such as:
When did you arrive at Guadalcanal? Where did you land? (Very important.) How many landed with you? What kind of a ship did you come in? (Don't ask a leading question, such as, "Did you come on a warship?" ...) Ask the name of the ship. How many troops were on the ship? If, for instance, he says he came on a destroyer, ask how many troops usually travel on a destroyer. ... How many other ships were with yours? What kind of ships? Where did you sail from and when? Were there many ships in that harbor? When did you leave Japan? Where were you between the time you left Japan and the time you landed on Guadalcanal? When you landed were any munitions landed? Artillery? Food supplies, medical supplies? After you landed where did you go? Where were you between the time you landed and the time you were captured? What experience in actual combat warfare have you had; your company, battalion, or regiment? How is the present food supply in your unit? Sickness? What was the objective of your attack last night? ... 37
In his writings, Moran observed that an interrogator who is genuinely tough has the confidence to know that he will always have the advantage, even while being nice. "Enlightened hard-boiled-ness," Moran called it. He concluded that "the most important characteristic of a successful interrogator is not his experience or even his linguistic knowledge; it is his own temperament and his own character."38
Similarities and Differences between the Two Interrogators
Despite coming from opposite sides of a terrible war, an analysis of the interrogation techniques Hanns Scharff and Sherwood Moran used reveals more similarities than differences. Some of the differences between the two men's techniques were determined by the differences in the circumstances and the settings of the interrogations. Scharff was located outside the battlefield environment, in Oberusel, the famous Luftwaffe Interrogation and Evaluation Center, while Moran worked on the front lines, under palm trees, while enduring continual bombing raids. Therefore, Scharff had much more time to carry out his interrogations, and also had the opportunity to interrogate prisoners several times. Moreover, Moran often needed to obtain "time critical" information that might reveal the next ambush, number of enemies in the area, conditions of enemy units—tactical information that could immediately help the Marines in the field. He knew that the prisoners, because of their capture, likely did not possess information about current plans.
In contrast, because he was not with troops in the field, Scharff tried to get more general strategic information. His questions pointed toward gaining some larger understanding of the enemy and its tactics as a whole. Scharff, like his American counterpart, also assumed that prisoners would not have information about imminent plans.
Moran's questions, because of a lack of time and because the prisoners were often tired or wounded, had to be direct, whereas Scharff could spend more time talking all around a question, thereby concealing the nature of the information he was actually seeking. Indeed, many prisoners later said that they never knew what information Scharff was after, but they were confident they had not given him anything valuable, even when, as it turned out, they had.
Perhaps the greatest difference between Scharff's and Moran's experiences as interrogators was that Scharff, who was interrogating mostly American or British combatants, had a large intelligence apparatus to work with. Frau Biehler in the BUNA Bureau, for example, provided Scharff with the background information that made it possible for him to create a "we-alreadyknow- everything" illusion.39 Moran, who was interrogating Japanese soldiers on the battlefield, had only the intelligence he and the others with him were able to gather. Nonetheless, Moran had the advantage of being able to draw on his personal knowledge of Japanese culture, names, places, and customs to create a bond with—or manipulate—prisoners, and get the information he needed.
Both Moran and Scharff based their approaches on the assumption that few, if any, prisoners were likely to possess decisive information about imminent plans. More important, both men viewed the prisoners more as human beings than as enemies. Because both Moran and Scharff had knowledge of the prisoners' culture, language, history, politics, attitudes, and customs, they could use that knowledge to orchestrate productive conversations. In this regard, Moran proved especially masterful since he had actually lived in Japan for several years.
Both men took pains to make the prisoners feel comfortable and welltreated, so they were more likely to engage in conversation. As a result, prisoners sometimes even felt they owed their interrogator, whether Scharff or Moran, an answer to his questions. A key factor of both Scharff's and Moran's techniques, given today's military-interrogation climate, is that neither used either coercive methods or torture to make prisoners to talk. To the contrary, both regarded torture as counterproductive and an actual deterrent to obtaining useful information.
Ultimately, because each man's attitude was one of sincere respect and caring for his opponents, each created, in very different circumstances, a perfect atmosphere for successful interrogations. Prisoners perceived them as gentlemen thanks to the empathy they showed. Both were also true masters of conversation: friendly, open, and apparently frank.
Although Moran had to ask more direct questions because of the "lack of time" factor, he still tried to not be too obviously systematic in his approach. He had a method for building up his questions to get the needed information. It helped that many Japanese soldiers were actually happy to fall into American hands, which was heaven compared to what they endured defending Guadalcanal.40 They got clean clothes, food, a nice interrogator, and kindness, which caused some to question their own loyalties, and to turn around and support the United States.
Like Moran, Scharff also tried to covertly elicit information. The American pilots he questioned had been taught in training that they would surely be tortured if captured. Instead they met Scharff, a polite, kind gentleman who treated them with respect. This was not the interrogation context they were familiar with from their training, and its very unexpectedness made them more likely to talk. To the prisoners, both Scharff's and Moran's presence was a relief from stress, and thanks to their warmth, the interrogators became identified as "friends." Furthermore," the very fact that Scharff and Moran created a less stressful environment helped prisoners remember more and be more willing to talk.41
Both Scharff and Moran used techniques consistent with Robert Cialdini's recent formulation of "six principles of persuasion:" 1) liking, 2) authority, 3) reciprocity, 4) commitment / consistency, 5) social validation (proof ), and 6) scarcity.42 Cialdini concludes that tactics based on these principles are particularly powerful because they are often subtle and hard to detect. They encourage people to respond in habitual, fairly automatic ways with little thinking, which makes such tactics often difficult to resist.
This review of the interrogation methods used by Hanns J. Scharff and Sherwood F. Moran offers a series of basic principles for successful interrogation under differing circumstances. Adapting their techniques for the training of today's soldiers would increase the potential for successful interrogations and reduce the tendency to implement coercive and illegal methods. "Either of these two interrogators could have used torture if they believed torture was effective. However, both men knew their goal was not just to get their prisoners to talk—but to provide truthful information that met their intelligence needs."43 Both used non-coercive methods that drew out the truth, while treating the prisoners as fellow human beings. Learning from history what works—and what does not—can make a world of difference in terms of future interrogation practices.
In sum, Hanns Joachim Scharff and Sherwood Ford Moran were especially gifted and successful interrogators because, first and foremost, they viewed their prisoners as human beings deserving of respect and decent treatment. Both men had excellent conversational skills and cultural knowledge acquired through personal experience, and they used these skills to their advantage in the interrogation setting. When assigning people as interrogators, these should be crucial factors still.
About the Author(s): LTC Ronny Kristoffersen is the second in command at the Norwegian Coastal Rangers Command in the Royal Norwegian Navy. He has a Master's degree in Special Operations from the Defense Analysis department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
1. LTC Ronny Kristoffersen is the second in command at the Norwegian Coastal Rangers Command in the Royal Norwegian Navy. He has a Master's degree in Special Operations from the Defense Analysis department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.1 Alex Kingsbury, "Bush Lawyers Used U.S. Military Training to Justify CIA Interrogation Techniques," U.S. News Weekly, April 17, 2009: http://www.usnews.com/news/ articles/2009/04/17/bush-lawyers-used-us-military-trainingto- justify-cia-interrogation-techniques/. Although some in the U.S. political and military establishments continue to claim that waterboarding is not torture, there is now considerable agreement among experts in the field that it is. In the article "Waterboarding Is Illegal" in the May 2008 Washington University Law Review, for instance, Wilson R. Huhn states that, "Regardless of its utility or lack of utility as a method of interrogation, waterboarding violates both the letter and the spirit of the Torture Act, the War Crimes Act, and the Prohibition against Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment. Accordingly, waterboarding is illegal."
2. Raymond F. Toliver, The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Joachim Scharff, Master Interrogator of the Luftwaffe (Atglen, Penn.: Schiffer, 1997), 18.
4. Ibid., 21.
5. Ibid., 19.
7. Hanns Joachim Scharff, "Without Torture," Argosy Magazine, 1950: 55.
9. Toliver, The Interrogator, 49.
10. Ibid., 80.
11. See R. M. Schneiderman, "New Research Suggests Enhanced Interrogation Not Effective," The Daily Beast, May 25, 2012: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/25/newresearch- suggests-enhanced-interrogation-not-effective.html
13. Scharff, "Without Torture," 57.
14. Ibid., 59.
16. Toliver, The Interrogator, 64.
17. Schneiderman, "New Research Suggests."
18. Scharff, "Without Torture," 65.
19. Ibid., 62.
20. Schneiderman, "New Research Suggests."
22. The biographical information in this paragraph comes from ibid.
23. Sherwood Ford Moran, "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field," Division Intelligence Section, Headquarters, First Marine Division, 17 July, 1943.
25. Stephen Budiansky, "Truth Extraction,"Atlantic Monthly, June 2005, 1.
26. Moran, "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters," 1.
27. The descriptions of Moran's techniques in the rest of this section comes from ibid. 2, 3.
28. Ibid., 2
29. Ibid., 3.
30. Budiansky, "Truth Extraction," 2.
31. Moran, "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters," 4.
32. Ibid., 5.
34. Prof. Randy Burkett, conversation with the author, Monterey, California, January 25, 2012.
36. Moran, "Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters," 5.
37. Ibid., 7.
38. Budiansky, "Truth Extraction," 3.
39. Schneiderman, "New Research Suggests."
40. Burkett, conversation.
41. Prof. Randy Burkett, class lecture, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, January 31, 2012.
42. Robert Cialdini, Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies, Study on Educing Information, Intelligence Science Board, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 14: available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/isb/interview.pdf
43. Burkett, conversations with the author, Monterey, California, June 7, 2012.