

THE CTAP INTERVIEW

Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations

*Interviewed by MAJ Anders Hamlin,
US Army Special Forces*

THIS INTERVIEW IS TAKEN FROM THE COLLECTION OF THE COMBATING Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).¹ On 21 March 2018, noted military historian Max Boot visited the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, where he and Major Anders Hamlin discussed Boot's recently published biography of Edward Lansdale and the legacy of Lansdale's efforts to establish and support stable governments in the Philippines and Vietnam between 1950 and 1957.²

Anders HAMLIN: Your previous books covered subjects such as America's history of involvement in small wars, the history of guerilla warfare, and the impact of technological change on war and society. *The Road Not Taken* is your first biography.³ Students of Edward Lansdale have access to his memoirs, along with Cecil Currey's biography and a number of other works that touch on Lansdale's career and legacy.⁴ What does *The Road Not Taken* bring to the table?

Max BOOT: There is a lot of new research in this book that other people did not have access to, including the love letters that Ed Lansdale wrote to Pat Kelly, his longtime mistress, who eventually became his second wife. These were previously unavailable to any scholar. The letters that Lansdale was writing, often simultaneously, to his first wife, Helen, were also unavailable until I acquired them from family members. Some new documents have been declassified only in the last couple of years. So, together, all of this enabled me to offer the fullest and most in-depth portrait of Ed Lansdale and his storied career, which really goes beyond a lot of the myths and clichés and legends that have grown up around him over the decades. The new material enabled me to tell his story and have access to his innermost thinking in a way that previous authors have not had, and I put it all into the context of the most recent scholarship on the Vietnam War. So I think this is the most in-depth and most up-to-date treatment of Ed Lansdale that you are going to see anywhere.

HAMLIN: What made you choose to write about Ed Lansdale, especially in the Vietnam context?

BOOT: I was initially fascinated by Lansdale years ago, when I met one of his closest collaborators in New York, Rufus Phillips. Rufus was a wonderful guy. He joined the CIA right out of Yale and was sent to Saigon in 1954, where he went to work for Ed Lansdale and became one of his closest colleagues and friends. Rufus is now in his mid-80s and lives with his wife in northern Virginia. I wrote a couple of chapters about Lansdale in my last book, *Invisible Armies*.⁵ My editor and I were talking about what I should do for an encore, and he suggested writing about Lansdale. I was initially skeptical, but I am very glad that he convinced me to do it, because there was a lot of new material there and a fascinating story. Getting this deep into the material made me realize how superficial a lot of the previous writing on him has actually been. So I think I bring a new perspective to the table.

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Max Boot



Edward Lansdale


HAMLIN: How did your perspective change as you moved from writing about him as part of a case study in your previous work to writing a whole book about him?

BOOT: That's a great question. I learned a lot more about him, and I gained both a greater appreciation for some of those insights and a greater understanding of his limitations. You see both of those in the course of the book. I learned about the extent to which he immersed himself in local society and how hard he tried to learn about the culture that he was in, as a prelude to becoming an effective counterinsurgent or an effective operative in the realms of psychological and political warfare. But I also learned a lot about his limitations. He had a tendency to alienate his superiors. He clashed with various bureaucratic foes, often in ways that were ultimately counterproductive. There are a lot of episodes that I didn't write about at all in my previous book, including his involvement in Operation Mongoose to overthrow or kill Fidel Castro, which I detail pretty closely in this book.

HAMLIN: In the Philippines, Lansdale had an ideal partner in Ramon Magsaysay and faced an insurgency generally isolated on the island of Luzon. How much of Lansdale's famous success in the Philippines was a function of those fortunate circumstances?

BOOT: There is no question that circumstances were much more favorable for Lansdale in the Philippines than they were subsequently in Vietnam, but remember, it's always easy to conclude in hindsight that things would have worked out because they did work out. But when Lansdale went back to the Philippines on a second tour in 1950, the situation looked pretty dire, and many in the US government assumed that the Philippines could fall to the Huks—the communist insurgents—at any time. So I would push back on the notion that it was an easy situation or that success was foreordained. There is no question, however, that because the insurgents lacked outside support, and because Lansdale was working within a culture that he understood very well, and because he had a protégé and partner in the very charismatic and successful politician Ramon Magsaysay, he found much more favorable terrain for his operations in the Philippines than he would subsequently in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, he was dealing with a state that was next door to the enemy and an insurgency that received growing amounts of support from North Vietnam. Initially, he also faced a lot of problems in Vietnam with the French, who were supporting various political and religious sects against the central government. And the man he had to work with, Ngo Dinh Diem, was far from charismatic—a reclusive scholarly guy who was authoritarian by disposition. Lansdale also didn't speak any language but English and had to communicate with Diem through a translator. All of that makes what he was able to achieve in the next couple of years even more impressive in some ways, because he did manage to set up the state of South Vietnam in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. When he left Vietnam at the end of 1956, the new state appeared to be on a fairly solid footing. His achievement was not destined to endure, but I think what he tried to forge in South Vietnam might have been more lasting if he had been allowed to go back and continue working with Diem. But he never had the opportunity to do so.



HAMLIN: John Paul Vann is perhaps even more famous than Lansdale as the archetypal American advisor in Vietnam. Vann considered Lansdale to be a hero, but by 1972, Vann was coordinating B-52 strikes and fighting the type of war that Lansdale had sought to avoid. Was John Paul Vann the anti-Lansdale?

BOOT: No, I wouldn't say he was the anti-Lansdale. They were friends and saw eye to eye on a lot of things. Both of them opposed a heavy-handed use of force to put down an insurgency. I would say that Vann was more focused on the purely military sphere of operations, whereas Lansdale was much more focused on politics. During the Easter Offensive, Vann and other US advisors did a tremendous job of bolstering the the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) by calling in air strikes that enabled the South Vietnamese to repel the North Vietnamese invasion.⁶ In some ways, I think that Vann and the other US advisors were making up for the weaknesses of the ARVN's leadership—factionalism, corruption, and favoritism. The critical contribution that Vann and other advisors made in 1972 was to backstop the ARVN officer corps and essentially step in when ARVN officers didn't get the job done. The American officers stepped forward and provided very effective leadership to the ARVN troops and also, of course, very effective liaison work with American air power. If we had managed to keep 5,000 advisors and air power on call after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, South Vietnam might have continued to exist. I think the role that Vann and the other advisors played was a critical one in 1972.

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Junction City Supply Drop



HAMLIN: In *The Road Not Taken*, you quote Rufus Phillips saying about Lansdale, “We shall not see his like again, but his ideas shall never die.” Do you think that this is true? Is it possible that Lansdale’s ideas, if not dead, have been forgotten in some ways?

BOOT: His ideas continue to live to some extent—I certainly hope that I am keeping them alive and introducing them to a new generation. Lansdale handicapped himself because he did not set out his methods in a very persuasive format, in the way that T.E. Lawrence, David Galula, and other writers did.⁷ As a result, these strategists became more influential because people can consult their writings today. I have tried to make up for that gap with this book, by laying out his life and how some of his ideas might have salience today. Although Lansdale was not cited in the Army/Marine COIN Manual, General David Petraeus [commander, US forces in Iraq] was certainly aware of his ideas, and Lansdale’s approach to politics, above all, certainly played a role in the [2007 Iraq troop] surge. I think his ideas are the basis of modern COIN 101, but now there is a bit of a disconnect between COIN theory and actual COIN practice. In COIN practice, we tend to concentrate a lot of resources on leadership targeting, the targeting of terrorist groups, using decapitation strategies—killing insurgents rather than

trying to pursue a favorable political end state, which is what Lansdale was all about. Of course, we do that because it’s much easier. We know how to do leadership targeting. We have a lot of trouble doing the politics, so we default to killing insurgents in the hope that this strategy will kill the insurgency, and we are usually disappointed. We are constantly forced to confront the truths that Lansdale put out there: it’s not enough to kill insurgents, you have to offer a better alternative. I think that’s the biggest challenge we face in the war on terrorism, just as it was the biggest challenge that the United States faced battling communist insurgencies in places like the Philippines and Vietnam.

HAMLIN: Who are the Lansdales of today, those who know the answers and should be listened to?

BOOT: That’s a great question. There certainly are some SOF operators, FAOs [foreign area officers], and advisors who have spent some time out there. There are also various civilian experts such as, for example, Carter Malkasian, a historian who worked with the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan; and Sarah Chayes, a former National Public Radio reporter who lived in Kandahar

for years and worked with the US command in Afghanistan. These are people who have that very specific, on-the-ground knowledge that Lansdale possessed. But the challenge is similar to the challenge that Lansdale faced: how do you translate these insights into the Washington policy process? How do you make people in Washington pay attention to what you know—what you are learning on the ground? I think that, in many ways, that's the biggest challenge that these latter-day Lansdales confront.

HAMLIN: The Philippines are still troubled by the communist New People's Army in the north and of course, by various Islamist terrorists and insurgents in the south. What would Lansdale do if he were advising the Philippine government today?

BOOT: That would be a tall order, because I think it would be very hard to make [Philippines president] Rodrigo Duterte listen to anybody, much less an American. But I think what Lansdale would certainly do is focus on the government and try to link the government with the people to address people's needs. That's not happening because Duterte is pursuing a strongman strategy of sending out vigilantes to kill supposed drug dealers. In some ways, it's a little reminiscent of [former Philippines president] Ferdinand Marcos, whom Duterte greatly admires. Lansdale was not in the Philippines by the time Marcos declared martial law in the early 1970s and became a dictator. Lansdale was retired and back in Washington, but he still had a lot of friends in the Philippines, and they were telling him, "This guy Marcos is going to come to grips with the insurgency; he is going to impose law and order and crack down on crime, so it will be a great thing." Lansdale was very skeptical because he was concerned that Marcos would become a self-serving strongman. Of course, those fears were amply vindicated.

Lansdale would probably have a very similar concern about Duterte today, who is also this wannabe strongman who cracks down on insurgents and crime and so forth. But he is going about it in such a heavy-handed fashion that it's almost certain to backfire. Under his direction, the Philippine army has used massive force to try to defeat ISIS offshoots in the southern Philippine islands with some limited success, but I don't think this policy is actually going to bring lasting peace. I believe that the fundamental reason you have insurgencies is bad government. The countries that are well governed don't have insurgencies. Nobody worries about an insurgency in Switzerland. But in the Philippines, as long as you have this bad government, you are going to have insurgencies, whether they're Islamic, or communist, or what have you.

HAMLIN: What would Lansdale suggest for Afghanistan in 2018?

BOOT: Again, I suspect that Lansdale would focus on trying to make the Afghan government less corrupt, more accountable, and more effective, and he would work closely with the leadership in Kabul to try to achieve those aims. I think one of the big failures in our Afghanistan policy is that we became alienated from our ally [former president] Hamid Karzai, just as we became alienated from our Vietnamese ally Ngo Dinh Diem in the early 1960s. We were at loggerheads with Karzai, and we didn't have anybody on our side who could influence him in a positive direction, at least not after [Zalmay] Khalilzad stepped down [as US ambassador to Afghanistan]. So I think Lansdale would have focused on trying to find somebody who could work very closely with [Afghan president]

Lansdale would focus on the government, and try to link the government with the people to address people's needs.

Ashraf Ghani in a supportive fashion and help align the efforts of the US and Afghan governments so that we don't wind up at loggerheads again. I think Lansdale would probably be cheered by some of Ghani's attempts to crack down on corruption and put some corrupt generals and officials on trial. He would want to put the US government behind those efforts, and he would probably be dismayed to see that other branches of the US government are often working at odds with that focus on corruption. The CIA and others, including Special Operations Forces, have basically hired their own private Afghan armies. That has achieved some immediate tactical effects against the Taliban, but it also comes at a cost of fostering corruption and warlordism, and undermining the authority of the central governments. Lansdale would be concerned about some of those developments and would want to focus more on trying to increase people's faith in the government, this being the ultimate route by which to defeat the Taliban.

HAMLIN: In your book *War Made New*, you touched on the growing proliferation of UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles.⁸ In the years since that book was written, we have come to rely more and more on these and other high-tech tools for prosecuting our counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns. What would Lansdale say about this reliance and about the associated focus on leadership targeting?

BOOT: Oh, Lansdale would be very skeptical about trying to find technological solutions to fundamentally human problems. This reminds me of his encounter with [then-US secretary of defense] Robert McNamara in, I think, 1962. McNamara called him into his office and asked for his help in trying to computerize the Vietnam War, to reduce everything down to a matter of numbers and calculations that could be fed into a computer. Lansdale said to him, "Well, that's great, Mr. Secretary, but don't lose sight of the X factor." McNamara began to write "X factor" on his graph paper and asked, "What is that?" Lansdale said, "That's something that can't actually be calculated. It's the feelings of the people. It's the sentiments of the people about whom they want to be governed by. That's ultimately going to determine the course of this conflict." I think it's important to keep that insight in mind today, because the reason why these Islamist terrorist groups find a foothold among various populations, whether it's the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, the Sunnis in Iraq or Syria, or groups in Somalia, Libya, and Nigeria—in so many other places—is because the government is alienating

Islamist terrorist groups find a foothold among various populations because the government is alienating some substantial sector of its own citizens.

some substantial sector of its own population. That's not a problem you are going to kill your way out of.

To move away from channeling Lansdale for a second and give my own view, I would say that drone strikes and the use of drones for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and all of this other stuff is useful. I am not saying we shouldn't do it, but it's not the solution, and we're fooling ourselves if we think it is. It can be part of an integrated strategy, but it should not be the whole strategy. Drones are used for everything these days, including a lot of ISR, but if you are talking about kinetic drone strikes, with Reapers and stuff like that, that's basically a version of what JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] has been doing since 2001. Remember that JSOC became the world's greatest manhunting machine under [former JSOC commanding general Stanley] McChrystal.

JSOC killed a lot of people in Iraq between 2003 and 2006—a lot of people who deserved killing—but the decapitation strategy didn't really achieve any larger strategic affect. At most, it can achieve some short-term tactical effects, disrupt some terrorist operations, which could be a good thing, but it certainly is not going to defeat the insurgents. You are basically mowing the lawn. You didn't see violence actually start to come down until the surge in 2007–2008, when General Petraeus implemented a much more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, of which leadership targeting was one aspect. You also had political aspects and providing security to the people—there was a lot more going on.

HAMLIN: Earlier, you mentioned that the difficulty that modern Lansdales face is translating their expertise and ideas into the policy process. You also mentioned that Lansdale's biggest limitation was in clashing with the bureaucracy and alienating supporters. To what extent is this an internal bureaucratic problem?




BOOT: Well, it is a long-lasting problem. In some ways, Lansdale's travails mirror those of T.E. Lawrence, who was very successful at winning over the Bedouin tribesmen, but not so successful at winning over the statesmen in Whitehall. Lawrence was very frustrated by the results of the post–World War I peace settlement, which undid a lot of what he was trying to achieve in terms of fostering Arab independence. Instead, of course, the French and British governments carved up the Middle East between them into new colonies. So I think there are a lot of similarities

with Lansdale, who achieved some success on the ground but then was stymied because he was ultimately ignored by the powers that be in Washington, who went ahead with the Diem coup in 1963 against his advice. Also against his advice, they Americanized the war effort, sent in vast numbers of troops, tried to bomb the North into submission—they did all of these things that Lansdale warned would not work. So I think this is an enduring problem. It's especially tough because kinetic actions brief so well. When I was sitting in on some of these battle update assessments in Baghdad and Kabul, every morning the commander would be briefed on the JSOC "jackpots" of the previous night: here is the bad guy they took down. That's an obvious metric of success that briefs well. Things like key leader engagements are just not as sexy because this work of trying to build a long-term relationship doesn't necessarily produce immediate results. Trying to influence local leaders is important and people recognize that, but again, it doesn't translate into an obvious metric of success. So I think there is always a tendency to fall for the sexier kinetic approach and to neglect the unsexy, long-term, often frustrating work of building up these relationships that ultimately may prove more important in defeating the insurgency.

HAMLIN: Your books *Savage Wars of Peace* and *Invisible Armies* look respectively at American experiences with small wars and the history of guerillas, terrorists, insurgents, and counterinsurgents.⁹ As we approach 18 years of involvement in Afghanistan, what historical lessons are most applicable for Special Operations and conventional forces serving in Afghanistan, and for policy makers in Washington?

BOOT: The first lesson that jumps out at me is the historical importance of cross-border sanctuaries for determining the failure or success of any insurgency. In the case of Afghanistan, the support the Taliban receive from Pakistan makes it virtually impossible to defeat them, and certainly impossible with the levels of force that we have in Afghanistan. That's going to remain an eternal source of frustration because I don't think that cross-border support is going to change anytime soon. The government of Pakistan isn't going to give up on the Taliban.

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Other forces that contribute to the success of the Taliban have to do with the corruption and brutality of the Afghan government and the warlords who are aligned with it. Again, that's part of the historic norm, because insurgencies flourish when governments are dishonest, corrupt, and abusive, and lose the support of the people. I think most Afghans support their own government, but there is a substantial minority, concentrated especially in Pashtun areas in the south and east, who don't. The ineptitude of the government and the prevalence of cross-border sanctuaries are the two most important factors that have shaped the war in Afghanistan. US troops have done the best they could, but they could not overcome these huge adversities.

HAMLIN: How do you think the United States should engage with the world over the next 10 years? How should we use the elements of our national power, especially with respect to peer competitors like Russia and China?

BOOT: Lansdale actually offers a pretty decent model of how to interact with the rest of the world. He tried to interact empathetically, sympathetically with foreigners, and treated people with respect and dignity. Those are good hallmarks of the way we should conduct ourselves. Unfortunately, I don't think [US] President [Donald] Trump understands the importance of soft power, but soft power has been the secret sauce of American foreign policy. The United States is the richest country and has the most powerful military, but our military is still outnumbered by all of the other militaries in the world. If we had been a threatening, aggressive power like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union or Napoleonic France, we would have seen a big coalition of states ganging up to contain and eventually bring us down. That hasn't happened because we have been a relatively benign power. There is a coalition of states that is against us, but we also have allies all over the world, far more than do countries like China and Russia, which are very threatening to their neighbors and have almost no real friends. We have a lot of real friends, and I think that is truly the secret of American success in the world: we are able to mobilize this huge free-world coalition of like-minded states. My concern is that we fritter that away with this "America First" foreign policy, which I think needlessly alienates the rest of the world and undermines America's core strengths as a country that stands for human freedom and dignity, in the way that Lansdale did. I suggest that we should continue the approach that American policy makers have taken since 1945: being relatively benign in our approach to the world, not taking full advantage of any relationship, transforming former foes into friends, defending democracies, promoting free trade, and standing for democratic freedom—all of these things that our country is all about. I think they have stood us in great stead all around the world, and I hope they remain the defining characteristics of American foreign policy.

HAMLIN: Where do you think Lansdale's legacy is most felt? In the CIA? The Air Force? Special Operations?

BOOT: I don't think he left a lasting imprint on the CIA or the Air Force, because he was such an outlier in both organizations. In some ways, his legacy may be most alive in the Special Forces, because one of his bureaucratic successes in the late 1950s or early 60s was in convincing the Special Forces to take on the counterinsurgency mission, which, of course, remains a hallmark of the SOF to this day. A lot of the thinking on counterinsurgency—COIN 101 these days—is based on concepts that Lansdale developed in the early 1950s and which he

relentlessly promoted from the late 1950s on. Some of the things that he taught endure to this present day, primarily within the Army and Marine Corps, which are the two services that are most focused on counterinsurgency. But what he was teaching about the importance of politics and political advising and working with foreign leaders—that aspect of his teaching is largely neglected. It's a positive development that the Army is standing up these security forces assistance brigades, because that's in the Lansdalian vein: recognizing the importance of advise-and-assist missions to promote our security interests. But there is not really a comparable effort on the political/civilian side of advising. That remains a gap in US capabilities, and we could learn something from Lansdale's day. I think that in today's war on terror, we could really use an army of Lansdales out there, but they don't exist.

HAMLIN: What advice do you have for Special Operations officers here at NPS who are preparing to return to the force?

BOOT: I would focus on two pieces of advice. The most potent weapon system you are ever going to possess is the one between your ears. The more I read and learn about the history of warfare, the more I am convinced that there is nothing more powerful than a good idea. You have to think your way to victory before you can achieve actual victory on the battlefield. The military tends to place a lot of emphasis on the martial virtues of strength and bravery and that kind of stuff, and obviously those are important, but at the end of the day, the most important attribute is being smart and savvy—that ultimately trumps everything else. If you look at the success that Ed Lansdale enjoyed, it wasn't because he was a crack shot or good at martial arts or anything like that. As far as I know, he never killed an enemy in battle, but he managed to achieve a lot of national security objectives just by thinking about war in a different way. So that's a big lesson.

The second lesson, again drawing from Lansdale's experience, is about the privacy of politics. I assume that everybody reading this knows the famous dictum from [military strategist Carl von] Clausewitz about war being a continuation of politics by other means. It's one thing to hear that, and it's another thing to internalize it and really grasp what that means in practice. Too often, we treat warfare as an engineering exercise, a targeting exercise, a technical exercise: putting steel on target and eliminating enemies of one kind or another. We forget that, ultimately, what counts is building up a political system. We should keep in mind that in the past, whenever we've failed in the political realm, we have squandered whatever gains we won on the battlefield, whether it was in World War I, or more recently in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq. That's a lesson that we should have learned time and time again. On the home front, the military is supposed to be non-partisan, and abroad they feel that politics isn't really their job; the State Department or somebody else should step in and do it. But as I am sure you realize, when you look behind you, increasingly, you don't see anybody there. So, if the military doesn't focus on the politics of whatever country it is deployed to, more often than not, nobody else is going to do it either. It's going to be a vacuum that gets filled by our enemies. Effective political engagement is imperative.

One of Lansdale's insights was that the US military has a huge political impact wherever it goes because we bring all of these resources and troops, and we have a huge impact on local society. But most of the time we don't realize it—we are

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mindless about it. You have certainly seen that in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, where we constantly empower certain factions of society and disempower others. It's often done with tiny stupid little things we didn't even think about, like giving out contracts to provide concrete for blast barriers for our bases. We don't normally think about who is going to provide that concrete and whom is he aligned with politically. Where is the money going to go? Is it going to fuel corruption? You have to do a deep level of analysis to even begin to understand the political impact that you are having on a society, but most of the time we don't do that. So that would be my final bit of advice: think about the political impact that you have when you engage. That's crucially important. ❖

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NOTES

- 1 The Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) aims to collect and archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by military and other security personnel from around the world in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts constitute an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in the future.
- 2 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the official positions of the US Naval Postgraduate School, the US Department of Defense, the US government, or any other official entity.
- 3 Max Boot, *The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).
- 4 Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1988).
- 5 Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013).
- 6 The 1972 Easter Offensive, also called the Eastertide Offensive, was a large conventional invasion of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese.
- 7 T.E. Lawrence is better known as Lawrence of Arabia. His most famous book, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, is still in print (London: Penguin Classics, 2000). David Galula was a French military officer and scholar whose work on counterinsurgency draws on the lessons learned from 130 years of French colonial warfare. He published two books: *Pacification in Algeria* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1963) and *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 1964).
- 8 Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006).
- 9 Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).