

## Maritime Terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea


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SERVING AS THE CROSSROADS OF THREE CONTINENTS, THE MEDITERRANEAN Sea has carried warships, commerce, and culture since the dawn of civilization.<sup>1</sup> It was at the very center of the ancient Western world and enabled the earliest surges of globalization. In the twenty-first century, the Mediterranean still makes it possible for much of the world to share the benefits of human development, but it also conveys the consequences of insecurity. Refugees from war and migrants seeking a better life (and criminals exploiting both) ply its waters day and night, creating a host of security issues for the region's governments. The imperatives of traditional maritime security, pitting empires and superpowers against each other, have been replaced by circumstances that compel European governments to cooperate in the pursuit of human security for people on the move, and for their own citizens.<sup>2</sup> The origins of and statistics about this human tide are well documented. This article evaluates the vulnerability of European societies to terrorist activity on and from the Mediterranean Sea as a consequence of the current refugee and migrant crisis.

Since 1985, the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* by four Palestinian gunmen has been the emblem of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean region. The conventional wisdom was (and still is, to some degree) that terrorists wishing to attack Europeans would launch those attacks from European soil rather than accept the operational risks associated with maritime operations. The flow of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe, coupled with relative freedom of movement *within* much of Europe, has reinforced the notion that terrorists will continue to exploit European security weaknesses ashore. The Paris attacks of November 2015 seemed to support this theory until it was discovered that at least one of the terrorists may have entered Europe by sea via a refugee center on the Greek island of Leros.<sup>3</sup> As European border protection authorities attempt to seal off eastern approaches, the rise of ISIS's influence in Libya is focusing attention on a reemergence of the central Mediterranean as a route for terrorist operatives to reach Europe.<sup>4</sup>

People's conception of maritime terrorism has expanded with the new century. In the aftermath of 9/11, the mayor of Boston banned the entry of liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers into the port for three weeks, fearing the ships could be used as floating bombs to attack the city.<sup>5</sup> Within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, an Egyptian man, thought to be a member of al Qaeda and carrying airport maps and security passes, was discovered living in a shipping container bound for Canada.<sup>6</sup> Attacks on the USS *Cole* (2000) and MV *Limburg* (2002) in Yemen caused American and French authorities to examine the vulnerabilities of ships both in port and at sea more thoroughly.<sup>7</sup> In 2004, the Philippine Abu Sayyaf terrorist group effectively sank *SuperFerry 14* with only a small amount of explosive placed inside a television set.<sup>8</sup> The Mumbai attacks of 2008 added two more dimensions to the image of maritime terrorism:

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The *Achille Lauro*



USS Cole

the potential for using ship hijacking as a means to infiltrate maritime terrorists into a target location and the extreme vulnerability of port cities to terrorists coming from offshore.<sup>9</sup> A catastrophic accidental explosion aboard the *Deepwater Horizon* oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 2011 and its devastating environmental impact caused terrorism experts to consider the destructive potential and environmental hazard of deliberate attacks on such infrastructure.<sup>10</sup> In 2013, Malaysian insurgents attacked the towns of Zamboanga City and Lahad Datu using dense maritime traffic in the Sulu Sea to mask their tactical approaches.<sup>11</sup> Using a surface-to-surface missile, small boats from Yemen's Houthi militia destroyed a high-tech logistics ship belonging to the United Arab Emirates while it was underway near the Bab al-Mandab Strait in October 2016. This attack could presage other such operations in the Mediterranean.<sup>12</sup>

## Mediterranean Targets

The Mediterranean Sea and its long littoral are expansive enough to contain a limitless supply of potential targets but compact enough to make most of them vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Maritime commerce is literally the lifeblood of the Mediterranean economy, while tourism adds significant revenue to most state coffers. Cruise ships carrying thousands of passengers to port cities near zones of conflict are difficult to sink but relatively easy to hijack.<sup>13</sup> The Mediterranean passenger ferry network is dense, connecting countries and cities on the sea's rim as well as its myriad islands.<sup>14</sup> Ferries are not difficult to sink, and the 1994 *MS Estonia* and 2014 *Sewol* disasters reminded European officials that these ferries are dangerous even in the absence of deliberate attacks.<sup>15</sup> Maritime-critical infrastructure is everywhere, and large cities have proliferated in the coastal zone. Crude oil carriers and liquefied gas tankers crisscross the sea, and petroleum pipelines line the shore. Recent uncertainty in the Middle East and Russia has prompted European nations to expand LNG facilities in the Mediterranean, and more are planned.<sup>16</sup> With crowded beaches on all shores, the region is awash in human targets vulnerable to maritime attacks.<sup>17</sup> Finally, the Mediterranean Sea, like all vast maritime spaces, provides terrorists with easy access to Europe through an environment that is largely ungoverned and very difficult to monitor.<sup>18</sup>

“TERRORISTS CAN RENT SAILBOATS AT NUMEROUS MARINAS THAT CATER TO THE INTERNATIONAL “BAREBOAT” VACATIONING SET.”

Attacking ships underway with small boats is a well-established tactic, tracing back to the Sea Tigers of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers insurgency in the 1980s.<sup>19</sup> It is most effective when a target ship is in the process of transiting a choke point, especially if the ship has to slow down. A fast boat rigged with explosives could hide at one end of a narrow passage, leaping the distance to its target before the crew would be able to react. The Mediterranean passages that are most obviously vulnerable to this mode of attack include the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal.<sup>20</sup> Others include the straits of Messina and Bonafacio, as well as the narrow channels separating mainland Turkey from the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Leros, and Kos, where humanitarian operations at sea are ongoing. In a wide-ranging tourist economy, fast boats can be rented near the site of a planned attack. Terrorists can also rent sailboats at numerous marinas around the Mediterranean that cater to the international “bareboat” vacationing set.<sup>21</sup> Rented boats can bring attackers ashore on remote beaches, away from airports and border checkpoints, perhaps to be met by accomplices already in place, affording them access to a wide variety of tactical objectives.

The Mediterranean region is a smorgasbord of targets for terrorists with maritime expertise. So, what explains the relative paucity of maritime terrorist attacks to date? The answer is complex, but to start with, terrorists are conservative by nature; they stay with what works. The abundance of European targets ashore—coupled with the poor track record of law enforcement—has focused the attention of most attackers on operations they can launch from hotel rooms and apartments. By contrast, maritime expertise is outside the normal skill set of even the most successful terrorist organization; anything that increases the already high risk of failure will be avoided. Moreover, maritime targets are often remote, lying beyond the effective range of the live media coverage that has become de rigueur for modern terrorism. There are, however, circumstances that may drive certain terrorist organizations to consider making maritime attacks a regular option, especially in the Mediterranean region.

First of all, successful maritime attacks in other regions provide “best practices” that can be duplicated elsewhere with some confidence. The wildly successful Mumbai attacks taught violent extremists everywhere that using the sea for infiltration is not really very difficult, especially for suicide missions. Properly trained terrorists wishing to attack cities and critical infrastructure along the Mediterranean coast can have it both ways: mayhem *and* live coverage.<sup>22</sup> A second factor that could drive terrorists toward the sea is the improved counterterrorism measures now being applied by law enforcement authorities across Europe. The re-imposition of national border controls, as well as heightened scrutiny of migrants and refugees, has made traditional targeting more difficult. Terrorists, like lightning, take the path of least resistance. As European nations become more successful at blunting continental attacks, that path could become increasingly maritime.

One additional reason to expect maritime attacks is the emerging competition in brutality between al Qaeda and ISIS, now most prevalent in Africa.<sup>23</sup> Maritime attacks, especially against crowds and critical infrastructure, could raise the bar in a recruiting contest between the two organizations, which have suffered significant operational setbacks. The most extreme outcome would be the use of a nuclear weapon or radiological device (a “dirty bomb”), which would be delivered most easily from the high seas. European authorities must not allow the intense focus on continental security to blind them to what may be in store for the maritime realm. History teaches us that terrorist organizations become most violent and particularly creative as they begin to feel that they are losing.

## Target Analysis

Let us assume that terrorist operatives acting for al Qaeda or ISIS, or some other group not yet on Europe’s radar, have decided to add maritime attacks in southern Europe to their operational portfolios. How would they determine which targets to select? Despite the abundance of targets, terrorist planners would want to maximize their return on financial and political investments. Even if terrorists are well-resourced, the specter of failure haunts them. In a competition for the allegiance of the young and the zealous, operational success must build upon operational success, while governments must be made to look weak and ineffective. In a bleed-to-bankruptcy strategic competition, terrorists can easily lose, because states, especially when they act together, have an enormous resource advantage.

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”

To engineer a successful long-term campaign, any terrorist organization would have to use some kind of target analysis process.

What might the target analysis process for a terrorist organization look like? One way to imagine this would be to examine the process known as CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability), used by US SOF units. This acronym, now woven into the mentality of trained American saboteurs, breaks down into a series of judgments based on certain assessment criteria and the assignment of raw scores.<sup>24</sup> For terrorists, the same general methodology, modified for very different strategic objectives, would seem to offer an effective guide. With the benefit of experience—and some strategic imagination—the author has developed a putative terrorist target analysis model. Called CARVES, this tool is based on a list of assessment criteria similar to, but not the same as, the US SOF model.<sup>25</sup>

“**TERRORIST ATTACKS ARE THE ULTIMATE “EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS.”**”

**Criticality.** From a terrorist perspective, the criticality of a target to the infrastructure system that serves people is significant but not crucial. In wartime, conventional forces would target such a system to deny the enemy some military advantage, but terrorists would be more interested in spreading fear through the population, and even a short-term blackout would accomplish that.

**Accessibility.** With their limited resources, terrorists must consider accessibility more than conventional armies need to. A government might be able to render a target so difficult to approach that terrorists decide to strike somewhere else—and there are always plenty of other targets.

**Resilience.** In the context of modern terrorism, “resilience” has come to mean more than just the time it takes to get a system back online. The term also assesses the time it takes for the people themselves to recover. Terrorists would consider both aspects of resilience, but the latter might dominate.

**Vulnerability.** Assuming terrorists can gain access to the target, vulnerability measures the ease with which the critical node(s) in a system can be taken out. Often a target will be vulnerable but inaccessible, or it can be accessible but largely invulnerable to destruction. Terrorists thrive on vulnerability; therefore, governments must work to reduce it for likely targets.

**Effects.** Terrorist attacks are the ultimate “effects-based operations.”<sup>26</sup> Terrorists want to create widespread public fear, and that fear can be amplified by random



acts of violence—even when the odds suggest there is little danger to individual citizens. Therefore, this assessment criterion should be one of the most important considerations in the terrorist target analysis process.

**Symbolism.** The target analysis process used by terrorists would have to include an evaluation of the potential target’s symbolic value. Political statements are strengthened through symbolism, but how important is symbolic value relative to the other assessment criteria? That will depend on the threat group’s strategic objectives.<sup>27</sup>

One application of the CARVES assessment criteria is found in table 1. This depiction is a starting point from which to calculate the “attractiveness” of generic maritime targets to a known threat group. Specific targets can be substituted as more is known about terrorist intent, motivation, and methods. Panels of experts would have to be commissioned to adapt the table for a particular group and then to propose raw scores for each assessment criterion. The different weighting factors assigned to each criterion indicate that not all the assessment criteria have the same importance. The weighting factors suggested in table 1 can be modified according to the collective views of a panel of experts, but they are a good place to begin. Multiplying raw scores (1–10) by weighting factors (held constant for each assessment criterion) produces total scores that can be rank-ordered. The example shown in table 1 lists 10 generic Mediterranean targets to analyze in this way.<sup>28</sup>

The notional values in this example tell us quite a bit about the experts who assigned them as well as the targets themselves. For instance, the consensus appears to be that crowds on beaches, LNG terminals, and other industrial plants ashore pose the greatest defensive challenges. The experts were clearly worried about passenger ferries. A more thorough examination illustrates the two prime sources of value for our analytical method: better resource distribution and deep thinking about what terrorists might be planning. The table (and the collective judgment it represents) is “possibilistic” rather than simply probabilistic, injecting experience and imagination into a government’s planning efforts.

“ THE SUGGESTED ANALYTICAL PROCESS ENCOURAGES OFFICIALS TO THINK LIKE THE TERRORISTS WHO MIGHT TARGET THEM. ”



Table 1: CARVES Table  
Maritime Targets for Mediterranean Sea Region

Intended Target	Criticality (x3)	Accessibility (x5)	Resilience (x2)	Vulnerability (x5)	Effects (8)	Symbolism (7)	Total
Oil or Gas Tanker	(1-10) x 3	(1-10) x 5	(1-10) x 2	(1-10) x 5	(1-10) x 8	(1-10) x 7	?
Offshore Platform							
LNG Terminal							
Passenger Ferry							
Cruise Ship							
Cargo Ship in Port							
Cargo Ship Underway							
Industrial Plant Ashore							
Crowds Ashore							
NATO Warship Underway							

**Using the Table:**

1. Confirm list of generic Mediterranean targets
2. Assign/confirm weighting factors (x3, etc)
3. Assign raw scores
4. Multiply weighting factors times raw scores
5. Total each line-item
6. Compare total scores
7. List targets in order of attractiveness to specific terrorist organization
8. Repeat the process for specific Mediterranean targets
9. Use data generated to plan defensive strategies

Terrorists seeking tactical success must adhere to a planning cycle that calls for evaluating generic targets before analyzing specific ones. We should suppose that specific targets will be analyzed in similar fashion. Using the table for specific maritime targets in and along the Mediterranean Sea would indicate where governments—individually or collectively—might apply more (or fewer) resources and the highest (or lowest) levels of security.<sup>29</sup> No government can protect all potential targets simultaneously. Some system of “strategic triage” is needed to distribute precious resources in the defense against active terrorist threats. The suggested CARVES analytical process encourages responsible officials to think like the terrorists they believe might target them, and enables them to develop the most effective and efficient defensive strategies.<sup>30</sup>

### Tactics and Tradecraft

How might terrorists actually use the information gleaned from such an analytical process?<sup>31</sup> Assuming the attackers can generate the capability to operate in a maritime environment—or contract their operations to pirates and smugglers who already have it—they have a rich menu from which to choose, first generally and then specifically, as shown in table 1. Using table 1 as a guide, we can list some of the targets terrorists might select to achieve their basic objectives of causing the most harm and creating widespread fear on Europe’s southern fringe.

**Oil and gas tanker.** Tankers carrying liquid or gas hydrocarbons to and from Mediterranean ports are vulnerable to hijacking, standoff weapons, and small

boats laden with explosives. Hijacked tankers could also be used to ram pier facilities, shoreside power plants, and coastal developments.

**Offshore platform.** Offshore energy platforms in the Mediterranean are prevalent, exposed, and increasing in number. Terrorists could easily approach these structures with recreational craft rented from local marinas. The platforms could be damaged with standoff weapons or by positioning non-threatening-looking boats loaded with explosives underneath the structure.

**LNG terminal.** Liquefied natural gas is transported between export terminals, where the gas is converted into liquid, and import terminals, where it is converted back into a gas. Both ends of this trade are vulnerable to standoff weapons, but the real threat would be ramming a ship—perhaps even an LNG tanker—into the facilities.

**Passenger ferry.** Terrorists using the refugee flow as a “cover for status” can easily board oceangoing ferries that connect Greek and Italian islands to mainland Europe. If they are able to smuggle explosives aboard or wear suicide vests, it would be possible for them to sink the ferries and kill large numbers of innocent people. Such an attack could be timed to coincide with leaving or arriving in a crowded port.

**Cruise ship.** The Mediterranean Sea is full of cruise ships treating tourists to the sights and pleasures of Western civilization. Although difficult to sink, they offer a symbolic target that—for those skillful enough to climb aboard from an assaulting boat—could be used as a mass killing field. After that, the ship could be used as a weapon to ram into another target.

**Cargo ship in port.** There are ships filled with hazardous cargoes in most European ports. Terrorists could gain access to these ports and ships unnoticed from small boats or by embedding themselves into shipping containers with false walls to hide them. Cyber systems can also be hacked to enable terrorists to control—and thereby smuggle—large amounts of explosive into proximity with volatile materials, causing widespread damage. Sinking a ship at the pier or mouth of a small harbor could block port operations for some time.

**Cargo ship underway.** Non-tanker cargo ships at sea, particularly those in restricted waters, could be hijacked by terrorists trained in ship-boarding techniques, similar to the Somali pirates who ply the Gulf of Aden. In fact, increased levels of security on tankers and other high-value targets might mean that ordinary cargo ships would become more vulnerable. If terrorists do not wish to develop such capabilities, they could contract the work to maritime criminals or conduct joint operations. Once seized, any ship can also be used as a weapon.

**Industrial plant ashore.** Once inside a port facility, terrorists could sabotage oil and gas storage tanks, oil refineries and petrochemical plants, electricity generation and distribution facilities, and cargo handling systems. The abundance of critical infrastructure in port districts would be attractive to terrorists bent on causing maximum disruption but not on killing large numbers of people.

**Crowds ashore.** Beaches and coastal resorts expose large numbers of vacationing Europeans to mass casualty attacks by terrorists coming from over the horizon.

“ THE HIJACKED VESSEL,  
NOW RIGGED AS  
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No government has enough resources to protect all these crowds all the time, as the truck attack in Nice, France, so brutally demonstrated.<sup>32</sup> Terrorists could use sailing yachts, motorboats, or jet skis as covers for status and action, allowing them to get close to their targets without raising alarm. In position, terrorists could rake crowded beaches with gunfire and grenades without even coming ashore.

**NATO warship underway.** Warships from the NATO Alliance are now being deployed to interdict human smugglers in the narrow passages between mainland Turkey and the closer Greek islands.<sup>33</sup> These restricted waters render such oceangoing ships vulnerable to ramming attacks from fast boats rigged with explosives. With the reemergence of smuggling in the central region, NATO warships will redeploy and be exposed to such attacks around the Italian islands and Malta as well.<sup>34</sup>

With a surfeit of terrorist targets ashore, accessible by land and air routes, many would say that maritime terrorism is a low-probability event. But European governments do not have the luxury of planning for only the most likely scenarios; they must prepare for that which exposes the largest number of people to the highest risk—even if those outcomes are unlikely. They must think beyond what is probable and examine what is possible. Security officials would do well to “rehearse the future” by developing a series of planning scenarios based on feasible acts of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean.<sup>35</sup> The following four scenarios might be the beginning of a strategic conversation regarding some of the most devastating contingencies imaginable.

**Scenario 1.** Despite operational setbacks, ISIS maintains its “beachhead” in and around Sirte, Libya. Increased pressure on human smugglers in the Aegean Sea has created a second wave of smuggling across the central Mediterranean, and ISIS moves to control this lucrative enterprise. The group places a four-person team of operatives into the immigrant stream, posing as refugees from Syria. Unnoticed, they are carrying explosives in their luggage. At the other end of the transit near the Italian island of Lampedusa, two humanitarian relief vessels approach the rubber boat filled with refugees to offload them safely. The terrorists detonate their explosives, killing almost 100 refugees and rescuers.<sup>36</sup>

**Scenario 2.** The refugee agreement between the European Union and Turkey has broken down. Syrian refugees have

resumed boat crossings to Kos, despite the overcrowded refugee camps there. Two ISIS fighters have arrived on the island, using the renewed Syrian refugee flow as cover. Partisans from ISIS, having already infiltrated Kos on a remote beach under cover of darkness using their own rubber boat, meet clandestinely with the fighters, passing them clothing with explosives sewn into the material. The terrorists ride the ferry west. As the vessel approaches the pier in Piraeus, passengers line up to disembark. The bombers detonate themselves, one in the back of the crowd and one in the front. More than 50 passengers and crew are killed, with many more injured.

**Scenario 3.** Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorists hijack a harbor tugboat just off the Moroccan city of Tangier, killing the crew. After dark, the tugboat makes a rendezvous with several explosive-laden rubber boats at a remote beach down the coast. The explosives are

“**ONE SUCCESSFUL MARITIME ATTACK IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION COULD ESTABLISH A TREND.**”

transferred to the tug before it crosses the Strait of Gibraltar. The hijacked vessel, now rigged as a floating bomb, enters the harbor of Gibraltar and rams a Maltese-flagged tanker filled with crude oil, killing the terrorists and several members of the tanker crew. Thick, black smoke from the resulting fire persists for several days as the world watches. Having demonstrated what it can do, AQIM threatens to attack other ships in the area.

**Scenario 4.** Working from a hijacked Turkish fishing vessel, terrorists acting on behalf of ISIS climb aboard a gas platform operated by the American company Noble Energy in the “Leviathan” exploration block off the coast of Cyprus. After killing everyone on the rig, they attach explosives to the underside of the platform, set timers, and steam away toward the nearby Syrian coast. A large explosion destroys the rig, but enough of the structure remains above the surface to burn in full view of airborne media for many days. A steady stream of natural gas condensate is leaking from the wellhead, fouling the clear waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and threatening area beaches.<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

While European authorities are focused on protecting inland cities, maritime targets may become more attractive to terrorists who had initially avoided them. Even though maritime attacks are low-probability events—at least for now—such actions can bring very serious consequences.

One successful maritime attack in the Mediterranean region could establish a trend toward the kinds of attacks discussed here. The menu for maritime terrorism has expanded; terrorist exploitation of this target set is simply a matter of time. European governments, working with their counterparts in southern and eastern Mediterranean states, can avoid the worst outcomes by developing three interlocking lines of strategic effort: defense, offense, and prevention.

Defensive strategies begin with the risk assessment process previously discussed, but resources allocated for defense have to be balanced with those allocated for the other two strategies. Offensive strategies require assets to “find, fix, and finish” terrorists who wish to attack governments, while preventive strategies oblige governments to diminish, and perhaps eliminate, the root causes of terrorism. Unless all three strategies are pursued together, terrorists will continue to score tactical successes against the governments that oppose them. Governments—especially when they act together—have enormous advantages over terrorist organizations. Consequently, creative terrorists (using a new form of “divide and conquer”) work to exploit the political divisions that obstruct national and regional cooperation. The exodus of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe may be the best example of this.

The Mediterranean Sea and its periphery offer the most natural circumstances for regional cohesion found anywhere in the world. European governments should take the lead in strengthening that cohesion by promoting the collective pursuit of Mediterranean maritime security. Together, all 20 governments, including those now at war with themselves, must identify and extinguish the root causes of terrorism in the region. At the same time, they must continuously defend against the possibility of maritime attacks, pre-emptively neutralize the forces that threaten them, and maintain a high level of readiness to deal with the consequences of maritime terrorism that they cannot prevent. The sea itself is what united this region; perhaps securing the sea can bring it back together. ❖

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**CAPT Paul Shemella (Ret.)** was the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) program manager for the Center for Civil-Military Relations until his retirement in 2015.

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## NOTES

- This article is derived from Paul Shemella, *Global Responses to Maritime Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016), chapter 3. A version of this article appeared in Denis Caleta and Paul Shemella, eds., *Comprehensive Approach to Counter Radicalism and Extremism: Future Challenges for Counter Terrorism Process* (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institute for Corporative Security Studies, April 2016).
- Human security is security at the individual level, generally understood to be the freedom from fear and want.
- See Nicholas Vinocur, “Passport Points to Syria, but Officials Urge Caution,” *Politico*, 14 November 2015: <http://www.politico.eu/article/paris-attacker-slipped-into-europe-with-refugees-isil-molins-france-syria-greece-migrants>
- ISIS militants, faced with resource shortages in Libya, have begun moving in on the lucrative human smuggling trade. See Eric Schmitt, “US Scrambles to Contain Growing ISIS Threat in Libya,” *New York Times*, 21 February 2016: [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-contain-growing-isis-threat-in-libya.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-contain-growing-isis-threat-in-libya.html?_r=0)
- See Jason Schwartz, “Safe Harbor?” *Boston*, July 2010: <http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2010/06/safe-harbor>
- Philip Shenon, “After the War: Security; US Widens Checks at Foreign Ports,” *New York Times*, 12 June 2003: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/12/world/after-the-war-security-us-widens-checks-at-foreign-ports.html>
- The tactic of suicide boat attacks was pioneered in Sri Lanka during the 1980s by the Sea Tigers wing of the Tamil Tigers insurgent group, reminding us that terrorists can mimic each other.
- See Peter Chalk, “Maritime Terrorism,” in *Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do about Terrorism*, ed. Paul Shemella (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011), 85.
- See Thomas Mockaitis, “Terrorism, Insurgency, and Organized Crime,” in Shemella, *Fighting Back*, 317–31. Also see David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- United States Coast Guard, National Response Team, *On Scene Coordinator Report: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill* (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security, September 2011). James Petroni presents a full discussion of this topic in “Managing Maritime Incidents,” in Shemella, *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, 179–99.
- Shemella, *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, 251–56.
- “Yemeni Rebels Destroy UAE Military Logistics Ship in Red Sea,” Reuters, 3 October 2016: <http://gcaptain.com/yemen-rebels-destroy-uae-military-logistics-ship-in-red-sea/>

- 13 There is even a cruise ship “tracker” available on the internet that would allow potential hijackers to monitor a ship’s position. One such website can be viewed at <http://www.cruisin.me/cruise-ship-tracker>
- 14 There are hundreds of operators and thousands of ports in the Mediterranean ferry network. For instance, the Greek city of Piraeus, the busiest ferry port in Europe, has 108 connections. For a complete list of ferries in southern Europe, see <http://www.ferrylines.com/operators/europe-south>
- 15 For a riveting account of the *Estonia* sinking, see William Langewiesche, *The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime* (New York: North Point Press, 2004), 127–95. For more on the Sewol tragedy, see Steven Borowiec, “Pain and Anger in South Korea Two Years after the Sewol Ferry Tragedy,” *Los Angeles Times*, 15 April 2016: <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-korea-ferry-20160415-story.html>
- 16 For a current listing of LNG gasification and regasification facilities worldwide (operating, planned, and proposed), see <http://www.globalnginfo.com/world%20lng%20plants%20&%20terminals.pdf>
- 17 At least one terrorist killed 38 tourists on a Tunisian beach in June 2015. See Matthew Weaver, “Tunisia Beach Attack: Witnesses Say More Than One Gunman Involved,” *Guardian*, 30 June 2015: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/tunisia-beach-attack-sousse-witnesses-say-more-than-one-gunman-involved>
- 18 For an extended discussion, see John Green, “Welfare of Seafarers Is Important to Security,” *Financial Times*, 12 February 2016: <https://www.ft.com/content/9f61718e-ce8f-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377> ; Sam Jones, “Europe’s Ports Vulnerable as Ships Sail without Oversight,” *Financial Times*, 4 February 2016: <https://www.ft.com/content/4d71dc5e-c8ec-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0>
- 19 Editor’s note: For a detailed description of these operations, see LT Malaka Chandradasa, “Learning from Our Enemies: Sri Lankan Naval Special Warfare against the Sea Tigers,” *CTX* 2, no. 2 (May 2012): <https://globecco.org/learning-from-our-enemies-sri-lankan-naval-special-warfare-against-the-sea-tigers>
- 20 Narrow straits can also be mined with improvised explosive devices (or simply inert devices, claimed to be mines). Standoff weapons can also be effective, even against warships. For an example, see “Egypt Navy Ship ‘Hit by Sinai Militants’ Missile,” BBC News, 16 July 2015: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33557180>
- 21 There are many charter companies seeking tourist business, especially in Greece and Italy. A passport and certificate of competency are required, but security checks are not taken seriously. There are so many options online that brokerage websites offer to simplify the traveler’s choice.
- 22 Counterterrorism expert David Kilcullen and others have pointed out that the world is becoming more coastal and more urban, providing an ever-expanding set of maritime targets. See, for example, Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*.
- 23 See Thomas Joscelyn, “Terrorism in Africa: The Imminent Threat to the United States,” FDD’s Long War Journal, 29 April 2015: <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/terrorism-in-africa-the-imminent-threat-to-the-united-states.php>
- 24 For a complete description of the Special Forces target analysis model, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Special Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare and Operations*, FM 34-36 (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1991), Appendix D: <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-36/toc.htm>
- 25 Not all assessment criteria are equally important. While the US model does not adjust for this, the CARVES model assigns “weighting factors” to each criterion, adding a degree of precision to the process.
- 26 Now a NATO term of art.
- 27 For example, al Qaeda is focused on attacking non-Muslims and avoiding publicity, while ISIS attacks everyone and promotes its “Caliphate” openly. These differences and others would affect the weighting criteria used.
- 28 For a detailed description of how to use the model, see Shemella, *Global Responses to Maritime Violence*, 30–48.
- 29 A good example of what happens when government planners do not think like those who wish to attack them can be seen in the story of the Norwegian and British sabotage of the German-controlled Vemork heavy water plant in 1943. For an account of the raid and a gripping lesson in target analysis, see Neal Bascomb, *The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler’s Atomic Bomb* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016).
- 30 The numbers themselves are less important than the discussion required to defend the numbers. Multiple panels of experts, each with a variety of experience and perspectives, can be convened to lay the foundation for defensive strategies.
- 31 Many terrorist operatives, especially from the major threat groups, are more than just tacticians; they are also spies. With this new identity, they must practice what intelligence agencies call “trecraft,” generally understood to mean working undercover to recruit new members, conduct business for needed income, survey targets, and execute attacks.
- 32 French president François Hollande stated that even the tightest security measures could not have stopped the attack in Nice. He explained that Bastille Day has symbolic value for the enemies of freedom. See Alissa J. Rubin et al., “France Says Truck Attacker Was Tunisian Native with Record of Petty Crime,” *New York Times*, 15 July 2016: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/world/europe/attack-nice-bastille-day.html>
- 33 Where they are not deliberately deployed, warships are bound by international law to render assistance to any refugees they encounter.
- 34 Terrorist attacks on warships underway are not unprecedented. Sri Lankan navy ships were attacked repeatedly by the Sea Tigers’ “swarms” of small boats.
- 35 For a genuinely readable guide to scenario planning, see Peter Schwartz, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World* (New York: Random House, 1996).
- 36 Second- and third-order effects might include restrictive Italian government policies such as turning refugees away, stopping lifeboats farther out to sea, or curtailing civil liberties for refugees already ashore.
- 37 Second- and third-order effects in this case might include long-term environmental consequences for the Eastern Mediterranean, leading to international lawsuits and the further weakening of international cooperation.