From the Editor

“ISIS is losing. ISIS is definitely losing, and that’s why they’re striking at more soft targets abroad.” That was the sort of left-handed reassurance coming from the media chatterati after the worst mass shooting in US history (and that’s saying a lot) over the weekend of 11–12 June at a gay bar in Orlando, Florida. Mid-massacre, the young gunman dedicated the bloodshed to ISIS, just before the final shootout that killed him.

Is there a connection between ISIS and this killer? Does it mean something that the shooter’s parents are Afghan immigrants? Did ISIS orchestrate the mayhem? The question of whether this attack was another local act of violence by an “ordinary” American psychopath or an act of anti-American terrorism by a violent lone-wolf jihadist—or maybe both—will likely remain open for some time to come. Indeed, the belated self-congratulation that ISIS issued may have been purely opportunistic, once the group’s leaders discovered their name had been mentioned.

More attacks went down in Istanbul (29 June), Dhaka (1 and 7 July), and Baghdad (3 July) over the 10 days before I finished this letter. Here’s the dilemma: in modern liberal democracies—and everywhere else—how do we parse domestic terrorism? Can we really hope to separate the personal grievances of individuals from their susceptibility to the ethnic or political or religious grievances that so many terrorist and insurgent groups cultivate? If you can convince someone who is filled with frustration and a personal sense of impotence not only that his rage is justified, but also—most importantly—that his impulse to violent retaliation is justified, then you might have yourself a terrorist.

For instance, this issue begins with an investigation by Major Eric East of the ways in which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has used his personal background and education, the consolidation of territory and populations, and a professional bureaucracy to establish his own legitimacy as “caliph” and normalize the status of the Islamic State as a “caliphate.” Based on a theory of horizontal (popular) and vertical (institutional) legitimation, MAJ East describes the ways in which Baghdadi has carefully crafted his image to win and maintain support, and inspire his cadres to extraordinary violence.
Next up is Captain Marius Kristiansen’s exploration of radicalization in Norway. While the number of Norwegians who have gone to Syria to fight alongside ISIS extremists remains small, the challenges confronting the Norwegian government are significant. CPT Kristiansen makes clear that rewriting Norway’s national guidelines on deradicalization and counter-terrorism represents a vital first step.

Our next two articles take us to the Asia-Pacific region and focus on two kinds of domestic terrorism. The first essay is a reminiscence by Brigadier General (Ret.) Hiran Halangode about an episode in Sri Lanka’s long, bloody civil war between the separatist Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Army. BG Halangode describes how, over the course of a week in mid-1990, several isolated, understaffed army encampments fought to repel waves of well-armed LTTE attackers who sought to annihilate them. The second essay is by Lieutenant Commander Gilbert Villareal, who examines the plight of the Philippines’ indigenous populations on the island of Mindanao. These mostly poor, isolated communities are forced to choose sides between a chronic violent neo-Maoist insurgency and the armed forces of a too-often unresponsive government.

For our final feature article, Michael Tierney describes the innovative way in which Canada has reorganized its counter-terrorism community in the wake of a notorious intelligence failure. The goal of the reforms has been to find the right balance between honoring each agency’s mandates and enabling vital collaboration.

The CTAP interview brings back Brian Fishman to discuss the history, current status, and future prospects of ISIS. In conversation with Dr. Doug Borer, Fishman delves into the important questions of what makes ISIS different from al Qaeda and other predecessors, and what its enemies need to understand if we are to defeat it.

Finally, in the occasional column State of the Art, designer Ryan Stuart explores the artwork of Terminal Lance: The White Donkey, a graphic novel based in Afghanistan. She uses her professional art background to explore how the combination of drawing and text opens up layers of meaning that neither one can quite achieve on its own.

We have several publication announcements for you, so be sure to check those out.

Follow Global ECCO on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/GlobalECCO/. We welcome your feedback! Write to us at CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org. You can also send your essays, artwork, and movie and book reviews for possible publication to CTXSubmit@GlobalECCO.org.

ELIZABETH SKINNER

Managing Editor, CTX
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
### Inside This Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Da’esh, Legitimacy, and the Rise of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</td>
<td>Major Eric East, US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Radicalization and Deradicalization: Norwegian Foreign Fighters in Syria</td>
<td>Captain Marius Kristiansen, Norwegian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>The 1990 Siege of Batticaloa: A Tribute to the Warriors of the Gemunu Watch</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.) Hiran N. Halangode, Sri Lankan Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>The Lumads of the Philippines: Struggling from Conflict toward Peace</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander Gilbert G. “Billy” Villareal, Jr., Philippine Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Assessing Canada’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams: Can the Concept of INSETs Be Exported?</td>
<td>Michael Tierney, University of Waterloo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>CTAP Interview</td>
<td>Brian Fishman, Center for International Security and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERVIEWED BY DOUGLAS BORER, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>STATE OF THE ART</td>
<td>How to Read a (War) Comic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERVIEWED BY DOUGLAS BORER, US NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL</td>
<td>Ryan Stuart, US Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>PUBLICATIONS AND BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Doug Borer is an associate professor of Defense Analysis at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), in Monterey, California. He earned his PhD in political science from Boston University in 1993. Dr. Borer's academic postings include the University of the South Pacific, the University of Western Australia, Virginia Tech, the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and the US Army War College. In 2007, he co-founded (with Dr. Nancy Roberts) the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab at NPS. In 2011, he and Dr. Leo Blanken created the Combating Terrorism Archive Project.

Major Eric East is a foreign area officer in the US Army. He currently serves as a regional specialist for the Army’s Strategic Assessments and Operations Research Division. He earned his BA in English at the Virginia Military Institute in 1999, and an MA with honors in Strategic Security Studies from the National Defense University. He has deployed to Baghdad and Kirkuk Province, Iraq, where he partnered with and advised local security forces. In 2015, MAJ East joined the Army’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, studied Pashto, and deployed to Afghanistan. He advised local security forces in Ghazni Province and Kabul City’s senior police commander and staff.

Brian Fishman is a counterterrorism research fellow with the International Security program at New America, a Washington, D.C., think tank, and a fellow with Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He previously was a fellow with the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, where he served as the director of research and was a founding editor of the CTC Sentinel. Mr. Fishman also built and led Palantir Technologies’ disaster relief and crisis response team, which develops technology for humanitarian organizations. His recent book is Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (Routledge, 2011), co-edited with Assaf Moghadam.

Brigadier General (Ret.) Hiran Halangode joined the Sri Lankan Army in January 1973 and was commissioned into the 1st Battalion of the Gemunu Watch in March 1974. He served in the battalion as a platoon commander, adjutant, company commander, and second-in-command, and was the battalion’s 13th commanding officer, serving from December 1988 to February 1991. BG Halangode was an officer instructor at the Officer Cadet School, Infantry Training Centre, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence Academy, and the Sri Lankan Army Command and Staff College. He has been awarded for gallantry in combat and for over 27 years of dedicated service to the Sri Lankan Army.

Captain Marius Kristiansen has been a member of the Norwegian Armed Forces since 2001. He earned his BA at the Norwegian Military Academy in 2010 and is currently studying toward an MS in Defense Analysis at NPS.

Ryan Stuart is the layout and design director for the Combating Terrorism Exchange. She is a voracious reader on many subjects and is one of Goodreads’s Top 100 Reviewers. She earned her BA in English from California State University, Sacramento, and has taught English as a Second Language, as well as classes in fiction and non-fiction writing.

Michael Tierney is a researcher in security and counterterrorism, and is currently serving as an anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing investigator. Mr. Tierney earned a BA in political science from the University of Windsor and holds an MA in political science, with an emphasis in national security studies, counterterrorism, and public safety.

Commander Gilbert G. “Billy” Villareal, Jr., is an officer in the Philippine Navy, where he has served with the Naval Special Warfare Group for over 13 years. He earned his master’s degree in Defense Analysis from NPS in June 2016.

COVER PHOTO

Albuquerque vigil for the Orlando nightclub shooting victims by Ryan Kaldari (via Wikimedia, licensed under CC 1.0).

DISCLAIMER

This journal is not an official DoD publication. The views expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any governmental or nongovernmental organization or agency of the United States of America or any other country.

TERMS OF COPYRIGHT

Copyright © 2016 by the author(s), except where otherwise noted. The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) is a peer-reviewed, quarterly journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. Copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research, or educational purposes free of charge and without permission, except if otherwise noted. Any commercial use of CTX or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The copyright of all articles published herein rests with the author(s) of the article, unless otherwise noted.
In early July 2015, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Da’esh (also known as ISIS), issued an important order to his chieftains regarding Da’esh’s grotesque prisoner execution videos.1 The explicit order quickly passed down throughout the organization’s lowest levels: fighters must no longer release any footage of violent and graphic executions.2 This order was issued less because of the crimes being committed in the videos and more to ensure that Da’esh was being considerate of all Muslims and their children, especially those who might find the videos disturbing. It followed on the heels of a new Da’esh video release that showed a child of about 10 years beheading a captured Syrian officer and another child shooting a prisoner in the head at point-blank range.3 With so many radical insurgents under his command, it is a mystery to most Westerners how Baghdadi has managed to garner the respect of and establish such legitimacy as a leader among people who can behave so barbarically.

Explaining al-Baghdadi’s Rise to Power

The CIA reports that Baghdadi has approximately 32,000 fighters under his command, while Kurdish forces that are engaging Da’esh on the ground give even larger numbers.4 What are the key factors behind Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s meteoric rise to power and the establishment of his legitimacy as leader among his followers? Insurgent groups such as Da’esh are not exempt from addressing issues like legitimacy of rule. To gain the attention of the international community and draw people to him, Baghdadi has focused on three interwoven strategies: Islamic legal precedence, territorial ownership, and the Ba’athist nexus.

First, Baghdadi uses his knowledge of Islamic legal precedence extensively to legitimize both his rule and the violence Da’esh commits against others. Through his reading of the Qur’an’s texts, he has validated his ascension as the leader of all Muslims.5 Even conservative sects of Islam that adhere to a stricter interpretation of the Qur’an, such as the Salafists, believe there is merit in some of Baghdadi’s rhetoric, although many have strong reservations about his timing and methods.6 Second, Baghdadi’s legitimacy as caliph is closely tied to the importance of territory. Territorial control is a classic strategy of most traditional states or non-state armed groups for gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Baghdadi controls a large swath of land across Iraq and Syria, which allows him to do what he and his followers consider necessary to strengthen his legitimacy and Da’esh’s role within the proclaimed state.

Finally, Baghdadi’s connection with former Saddam Hussein loyalists and Ba’ath Party loyalists is an equally vital aspect of his and Da’esh’s legitimacy. In 2015, investigative reporter Christoph Reuter brought to light Da’esh documents indicating that former Ba’athists have been instrumental in establishing Baghdadi’s legitimacy.7 Reuter contends that the melding of these two groups resulted in one of the most tightly hierarchical and well-structured insurgent groups ever seen. Arguably, the former Ba’athists, with their skills, knowledge,
and experience, comprise one of the most important cogs in the jihadist machine that is sweeping the Middle East. Ba’athists work behind the scenes running the organization’s operations—implementing religious norms, establishing service, shaping culture, and handling military operations—which gives Baghdadi a physical manifestation of political legitimacy as he works to build a functioning state. 

Defining Insurgency and Legitimacy

This article defines Da’esh as an insurgency, but insurgency is an admittedly murky concept. For my purposes, an insurgency is a violent rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, a government recognized by the United Nations) where those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. Peter Thompson, in his book *Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat*, characterizes armed groups as international actors that constrain or expand state policies but alternately can threaten stability, challenge legitimacy, kill or injure citizens, and prevent states from achieving sought-after goals. While these definitions seem relatively accurate, Da’esh boasts thousands of fighters, a structured organizational model, and strict internal discipline, and therefore seems to be much more than a textbook insurgency.
Vertically or horizontally. Vertical legitimacy rests on institutionalized authority, consent of the governed, and loyalty to the political foundations of the state, such as a formal constitution. Where vertical legitimacy defines itself around formal structures like contracts, elections, political institutions, and public organizations, horizontal legitimacy is less formal and more reliant on customs and norms. It centers on the people, community, and a set of shared beliefs—the nature of the community being ruled. Baghdadi is not an internationally recognized leader, nor is his state a formally recognized entity. Nevertheless, both the leader and his proclaimed state rely on the same sources of legitimacy that UN-recognized bodies claim.

The Roots of Baghdadi’s Legitimacy as Caliph

Da’esh is no mere collection of radicals led by a random terrorist. It is a thoroughly Muslim group, prideful in its strict interpretation of the Qur’an and led by a man who has anointed himself through his interpretation of Islamic history and jurisprudence. Baghdadi has all of the necessary ideological and theological credentials to be the first caliph since the Ottoman Empire crumbled nearly 100 years ago. Journalist Graeme Wood points out that Baghdadi has not only territory to rule but also the will of the people behind him. Territorial control and Islamic legal precedence, however, are only pieces of the larger puzzle concerning Baghdadi’s legitimacy.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Da’esh are entirely unique from past insurgent groups. They do not seek international legitimacy within the UN framework of nation-states. The opinions of kafirs (all non-believers) and apostates (any Muslims who do not agree with them) do not matter to them. How the international community labels Da’esh is also irrelevant, and this is precisely what makescountering the group’s rhetoric so difficult: Baghdadi and Da’esh seek legitimacy from Allah and the ummah (the community of believers) alone. In Baghdadi’s view, the group’s course has been plotted and its legitimacy established strictly by following the Qur’an, and any person or governing body that diverges opposes not only Da’esh but Islam itself. Despite his indifference to the world’s opinion, however, Baghdadi’s behavior indicates that his legitimacy to current and prospective followers is one of his central concerns. Without a willing citizenry, his power base vanishes.

The care Baghdadi puts into his image is apparent in something as seemingly minor as his name. Born Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri, Baghdadi, at the age of 39, took his now famous nom de guerre, a double homage to his faith and his native land. Abu Bakr was Muhammad’s father-in-law and, after the Prophet’s death, the first caliph. Baghdad was the capital of the grandest caliphate in early Islam, the Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids swept to power in the eighth century using clever apocalyptic propaganda and clandestine networks to mobilize popular anger against the ruling regime in Damascus.

The widespread lack of education in the area where Da’esh operates contributes to Baghdadi’s carefully managed image. Where there is little education, religion is an influential weapon and one that Baghdadi does not hesitate to brandish.

“Baghdadi’s behavior indicates that legitimacy is one of his central concerns.”
whenever he can. His fundamentalist ideology adheres strictly to the words written in the Qur’an and stated by the Prophet Muhammad.

Baghdadi knows the environment he operates in. The largest common denominator across the Middle East is Islam. Through shari’a law and the Qur’an, Baghdaddi offers his subjects justification for why he leads and why they should follow.

Islamic Shariah (divine law) recognises the legitimacy of the ruler as long as he gains power by one of three ways: choice, allegiance, or conquest (as in giving legitimacy to something that cannot be alleviated, not as in setting up laws that make conquest possible). ... If ... he issues rulings that coincide with Shariah, then his rulings must be followed, and if he goes against Shariah, he shall not be obeyed, and his ruling shall be protested according to the rules that govern disobedience in Shariah.17

His method for commanding respect is a multifaceted attack on his followers’ sensibilities, calibrated to achieve maximum results. Backed by Islamic texts and scripture, he validates his rule, galvanizes and legitimizes his followers, shames them with the threat of hellfire to secure their pledge of bay'a (allegiance), levies protection taxes on Christians, and explicitly commands archaic punishments to scare people into obedience.18

Another angle Baghdaddi uses to bolster his legitimacy is his family lineage. According to scripture, the caliph must be descended from the same tribe, the Qurayshi, as the Prophet, and Baghdaddi is indeed Qurayshi.19 William McCants, a fellow at Brookings, explains,

The Islamic State’s spokesman proclaimed the return of God’s kingdom on earth, the caliphate, and Baghdaddi reverted to his given name, preceded now with the ultimate title: Caliph Ibrahim. To justify this outsized claim, supporters circulated the genealogy of his tribe, which traced its lineage back to Muhammad’s descendants. This was considered an important qualification, for some Islamic prophecies of the End Times say a man descended from the Prophet will one day rule as caliph—an office that hasn’t existed since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.20

To further draw on his followers’ emotions, Baghdaddi paraphrased a part of the speech the first caliph gave when he took power after Muhammad died: “I was appointed to rule you, but I am not the best among you. ... If you see me acting truly, then follow me. If you see me acting falsely, then advise and guide me. ... If I disobey God, then do not obey me.”21

Baghdadi uses Islam to reverse-engineer his own legitimacy by boosting the standing of his followers, a people largely uneducated and both economically and politically marginalized. In three separate speeches, he referred to scripture almost 40 times, expertly choosing ideas and phrases that would be most galvanizing for the people who were listening. Much in these speeches entails the need for Muslims to follow, fight, and expand Muslim lands. If the people follow Baghdaddi, who is justified and of God, he told them, they gain legitimacy in the eyes of God. If they join Da’esh, they gain legitimacy. If they fight and kill...
the *kafir* and apostates, they gain legitimacy. As the self-legitimacy of his followers is bolstered, Baghdadi's standing as both their leader and the spokesman of God is bolstered as well, because he provides the vehicle for their rise. This type of community-unifying rhetoric exemplifies Holsti's horizontal axis of legitimacy, which rests on the people and their traditions rather than on formal institutions.  

For those individuals who do not fight or are skeptical about the new caliph's rule, Baghdadi uses their devotion to God to shame them into submission. According to one expert on the rise of Baghdadi, there is "a Prophetic saying, that to die without pledging allegiance [to the Caliphate] is to die *jabil* (ignorant) and therefore die a 'death of disbelief.'"\(^{23}\) Baghdadi uses this fear of dying apostate and going to hell in an all-encompassing way that works against both his followers and opponents. Their religious zeal is the linchpin. If the people Baghdadi is targeting were not so devout, this tactic would likely falter, but because of their devotion to Islam, he engages in a form of psychological warfare to garner legitimacy, and it is quite effective.

Baghdadi's harsh coercive tactics can carry over into the macabre. He uses brutal Qur'anic punishments both to prove how closely he follows the Prophet's teachings and to terrorize people into submission. Until Da'esh assumed its current form in 2010, many of these violent punishments, such as chopping hands off for stealing or crucifying apostates, were considered barbaric and outdated. Al Qaeda's leaders warned the lower tiers of their organization against using these harsh forms of punishment against fellow Muslims. Baghdadi, however, felt it was a way of legitimizing the new state he was founding as truly Islamic.  

Baghdadi takes advantage of poverty and lack of education to bolster his legitimacy among the populations under his control. The combination of these two elements makes the subjects of tyranny easier to manipulate. Many Muslims in prosperous countries live modern lives: men are monogamous, women drive cars and own property, and Muslim children attend coed schools and classes. In wealthy Western countries, religion has largely lost its social centrality. Western Iraq and eastern Syria, by contrast, are not modern. Much of the population still subsists on farming and animal husbandry as they have for centuries. This has led to poverty and literacy rates of approximately 19 percent and 80 percent, respectively.\(^{25}\) What Muslims in these countries do not lack, however, is closeness to God. The Prophet Muhammad is their foundation, not Facebook, Twitter, or other modern "excesses." Through the caliph, the poor become rich by a closer, more obedient relationship with the Prophet Muhammad.  

With faith as a Muslim's bedrock, what enemy can stand in the way of God, his proven caliph, and the momentum of thousands of other believers? More simply put: if God is for them, then who can stand against them? To a devout Sunni Muslim in Iraq or Syria, any opposition to Baghdadi and his interpretation of the Qur'an is likely to draw a large amount of hatred from the community. Hatred itself has a tendency to unite people for one cause. This is where Baghdadi gets especially dangerous with religion: his legitimacy in the eyes of his subjects leads to an unquestioning and unified following that is internally self-policing. As Holsti points out, "In ancient states (and even in some contemporary states), the mysteries of religion were used to manufacture loyalty and compliance among subjects. Resistance was sacrilege and punishable by death."\(^{26}\) As long as
he keeps using Islamic jurisprudence as a tool to cow his followers, Baghdadi’s horizontal legitimacy is in no danger of diminishing.

**Territorial Ownership, Security, and Provision of Services**

Military officers, analysts, and government think tanks are at odds over whether Da’esh is a legitimate state and whether Baghdadi is the legitimate leader of a state. Those arguing against the idea note that the United Nations does not recognize either, that the group claimed power illegally, and that Da’esh is accused of committing genocide against religious minorities in Iraq.28 Da’esh’s control of territory across Syria and Iraq, however, is evidence enough to undermine arguments against Baghdadi’s and Da’esh’s legitimacy.

Holding territory provides Baghdadi with a lot more than simply the prestige of land ownership. With territory, he can implement many secondary, supporting initiatives that bolster his legitimacy among his followers. Most importantly, it allows him to provide security, law, government, and services at the grassroots level of society. As of 2016, Baghdadi controls roughly 78,000 square kilometers (30,000 square miles) of territory in Syria and Iraq.29 Within this large swath of land, Baghdadi invests heavily in the people, providing services and installing a responsive Islamic government. In one of his first addresses to the public after declaring himself Caliph, Baghdadi encouraged migration to the caliphate by calling for “people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations.”30 Clearly he wanted to make improvements to infrastructure, health care, government, and security.

It should be remembered that Baghdadi is concerned with services, amenities, security, laws, and the general welfare of the people because he holds the territory they live in. Without land, there would be no citizens, and there would be no concern for their welfare. Without land and the people who live on it, there would be no need for security and no reason to impose a government. Without land and people, in other words, there is no legitimacy. Journalist Graeme Wood asserts, “Control of territory is an essential precondition for [Da’esh’s] authority in the eyes of its supporters. ... Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications.”31

Sources such as Vice News and CNN’s Jürgen Todenhöfer (the first Western journalist to visit Da’esh and report from Raqqa, Syria) indicate that the group has indeed improved upon the standards of living in its area of control.32 While many Western critics may argue against this conclusion, Baghdadi has given the people living under him a sense of predictability, with standards and rules to live by. People know what to expect. Under Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the former prime minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, there was little or no predictability to government actions or the availability of services, especially for marginalized Sunnis. Hence, even if some residents of Raqqa and Mosul disagree with some of Da’esh’s questionable actions, Sunni Muslims, at least, have also experienced many positive outcomes. According to a book on Da’esh by Arab journalist Abel Bari Atwan, Da’esh government operations are in place at both high and low levels. This includes a Shari’a Council that sets penalties, local shari’a courts, and a shari’a police force that is charged with protecting the virtues of Islamic law.33
Both civilians and police can bring complaints before the courts, which handle all judicial issues, religious and civil. Citizens in rural areas where the central government has been largely absent find these courts very useful. Shari’a courts process cases efficiently and relatively fairly, and their justice is said to be impartial.\textsuperscript{34} In the Iraqi and Syrian territories under Da’esh’s control, where, historically, corruption has run rampant, even those in positions of authority are now subject to the same punishments as the civilian population. Additionally, polls conducted in Raqqa and Mosul indicate a consensus that crime is virtually non-existent, largely because of the deterrence posed by extreme methods of punishment. Societal stability and a general lack of crime lend credence to a ruler’s claims of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{35}

Security and governance have improved since Baghdadi took over Da’esh, but education, job opportunities, and even modernist ideals like equality are also on the rise. According to Bari Atwan’s interviews with non-extremist residents in Mosul, there is a renewed focus on youth education in the city. Baghdadi’s Education Councils oversee the majority of the religious curriculum. Most sciences are now offered, although those that don’t fit with Islam, such as evolutionary biology, are cast aside. What is more, though schoolteachers once went months without pay, they now receive monthly salaries.\textsuperscript{36}

Western media vilify Da’esh for practices that promote inequality, but shockingly, reports indicate that Baghdadi has become slightly more “progressive.” In a break from many traditional Middle Eastern societies, in which women have very limited access to education or the societal roles enjoyed by their male counterparts, Baghdadi has opened all-female schools and universities for regular attendance.\textsuperscript{37} Whether his administration creates civilian-sector jobs for newly educated women remains a question, but Da’esh has established an all-female shari’a police brigade called al-Khansa to go along with the all-male Hizbeh police force.\textsuperscript{38}

Baghdadi’s investment in the people of this territory boosts his legitimacy as a ruler not only at the community and state level, but also to some outsiders, for whom Da’esh and Baghdadi could appear to be a legitimate option for regional governance. Security, stability, services, education, and ethnic representation are highly enticing opportunities in an area of the Middle East where these basic elements of civil life have long been scarce. Baghdadi’s hold on this territory allows him to operate freely within it, including taking the necessary steps to normalize his and his organization’s legitimacy for current and future followers. Based on the provision of basic services, increased social stability, and the imposition of the rule of law—however severe, Baghdadi is a strong candidate for placement on Holsti’s horizontal axis of legitimation, while his ability to hold territory and the military might he wields place him on the vertical axis as well.\textsuperscript{39}

The Baghdadi-Ba’athist Nexus

One other way that Da’esh’s leader has been able to establish his legitimacy within the territories under his control is what can be called the “Baghdadi-Ba’athist Nexus.” Until the beginning of 2015, little was known about the inner workings and structure of Baghdad’s organization, but intelligence sources indicate that he maintains a tight relationship with the people working under him, many of whom are former bureaucrats and officials of Saddam Hussein’s

Baghdadi has ensured that Da’esh manifests itself outwardly through the Ba’athist leaders’ successes.
Ba’athist Party. These government professionals were turned out of office and ostracized by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Baghdad met many of his Ba’athist followers while he was incarcerated at the US-run prison in Iraq called Camp Bucca. The prisoners laid the groundwork for the Islamic State as it is today—an organization that is extremely hierarchical and highly disciplined across its lines.

Baghdadi delegates some decision making and command authority to his Ba’athist followers, which takes the administrative burden off of him and the operational cadres of Da’esh; ensures against stove-piped leadership; and allows his closest functionaries to feel empowered—something very important in many Middle Eastern cultures. Through this decentralized structure and shared responsibility, Baghdadi ensures that Da’esh will maintain legitimacy even if he is killed. The effect this has on the organization is significant; legitimacy no longer stops with the titular leader but includes the group’s upper echelons of leadership, which in turn boosts resolve, output, and organizational sustainment. By building his team and entrusting Da’esh’s future to it, Baghdadi has ensured that Da’esh manifests itself outwardly through the Ba’athist leaders’ successes.

According to American and Iraqi intelligence analysts, Baghdadi delegates authority to his cabinet, or shura council, which includes ministers of war, finance, religious affairs and others. The Islamic State’s leadership under Mr. Baghdadi has drawn mainly from two pools: veterans of Al Qaeda in Iraq who survived the insurgency against American forces with battle-tested militant skills, and former Ba’athist officers under Saddam Hussein with expertise in organization, intelligence, and international security. It is a merger of these two skill sets that has made the organization such a potent force, the officials say. ... “Baghdadi is to a certain extent a religious figurehead designed to grant an aura of religious legitimacy and respectability to the group’s operations, while the real power brokers are a core of former military and intelligence officials.”

If, as argued here, legitimacy is one important byproduct of a citizenry’s loyalty, which in turn is based on a ruler’s shaping of the physical and emotional environment, then this is exactly what the Ba’athist nexus does for Baghdadi. The former Iraqi officials heavily influence or manipulate the environment under Da’esh control, and Baghdad gets the credit without having to manage the nuanced operations of religious cleansing, the provision of services, and future military planning. If well-trained Ba’athist leaders were not managing operations and helping to make Da’esh legitimate in the eyes of those it governs, it is possible that Baghdadi would not have succeeded in the same manner over such a relatively short period of time.

Conclusion

Baghdadi’s legitimacy is complex and has been established across several axes of his organization and territory. The international community must target several focal points on each axis to defeat him. Though his ideological influence is huge and somewhat intangible to many observers in the West, much of Baghdadi’s
legitimacy relies on factors that are readily visible, such as territory, organization, and societal infrastructure. The ideological standing that he has established on the basis of religious zealotry, however, is the factor that Western countermeasures are least likely to affect. Individuals from abroad who join Da'esh are called “radicalized” for a reason.

There is, however, an ebb and flow to any regime’s legitimacy. To go back to Holsti’s schema of legitimacy: “Legitimacy is thus a variable rather than a constant. Its vertical and horizontal dimensions are critical components of a state’s strength, but that strength may wax and wane” depending on numerous factors. Rooted as it is in the towns and cities Da’esh controls, tackling Baghdadi’s societal, cultural, and Islamic legitimacy is harder than retaking ground. Undermining his standing cannot be done through air power and air strikes alone; it must be done with ground troops. Whether local forces are up to the challenge is debatable. Until the international community makes the conscious decision to take back Baghdadi’s territory (and fully embrace everything encompassed in that decision), resolve within Da’esh will not weaken. Baghdadi and his followers also know the United States is reluctant to undertake the kinds of stability operations that will be imperative should Da’esh be defeated. This only increases Baghdadi’s strength and allure.

Land is important to Baghdadi. If his opponents are going to take away the legitimacy Baghdadi has already established, it is imperative to take away the thing he covets most—his real estate. Within the bounds of Da’esh’s territory, he has the ability to do many things that will help normalize his command and legitimacy in the eyes of his followers, the population he controls, and the outside world: project military strength, accrue more of it, secure the people under him, maintain a command structure, and do the things necessary to bolster social welfare at the local level, such as provide services. Without a caliphate, the self-proclaimed caliph is merely a low-level, power-hungry jihadist, and Da’esh is just a rebel faction unknown to the international community.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJ Eric East currently serves as a foreign area officer in the US Army.

This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

NOTES

1 Editor’s note: In this essay, the author prefers to use the Arabic name  
Da’esh for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria rather than the  
English acronym ISIS.
3 Ibid.
5 See "This is the Promise of Allah," Daesh’s declaration from 2014: https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf
7 Christopher Reuter, "Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State," Der Spiegel, 18 April 2015: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
This is based on the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “insurgency.”


Ibid., 87–90.


McCants, “The Believer.”


Ibid.


McCants, “The Believer.”

Ibid.


McCants, “The Believer.”


Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 91.

This is based on the author’s discussions with other military professionals and graduate school instructors.

This area is about the size of the Czech Republic or a little less than the area of the US state of South Carolina. (These numbers do not account for the areas under Da’esh control in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East.) Total population estimates for the areas of Syria and Iraq under recent Da’esh’s control range widely, from 5.25 million to 10 million. About two-thirds of this population is in Iraq.

Musa Cerantonio, comment on Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”


No one knows what is said behind closed doors; however, coercion has played a large part in Iraq’s culture up until now and may continue to do so even under Da’esh.

Ruthven, “Inside the Islamic State.”


Ibid.


Reuter, “Secret Files.”


Haykel and McCants, “The Islamic State.”

Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 90.
A distinctive feature of certain armed conflicts over the last 30 years is the involvement of unpaid, radicalized Muslim foreign fighters who do not have any personal stake in the conflict besides a particular kind of religious belief. People become foreign fighters for reasons that depend on several factors that differ from one conflict to another.

Norway, a relatively small country with only five million inhabitants, is one of several European countries that have seen a substantial number (per capita) of their citizens leave to become foreign fighters in Syria. The Norwegian government has developed a comprehensive plan to prevent radicalization, with some success, but radical beliefs that lead to extremism or even violent action are not limited to certain Muslims or a particular end of the political spectrum. Norway and other countries must do more first to understand why some people become radicalized enough to take violent action in the name of any cause, and then to develop policies to counteract those processes. It is difficult to find scholarly sources for this topic, especially on the profiling of Norwegian foreign fighters, mainly because they are still such a new phenomenon. Adding to the difficulty, most of the research in this area has been conducted by the Norwegian Police Security Service and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, and is therefore classified. Available open sources include social media statements, pictures, and blogs. In the process of writing this article, I was fortunate to be able to discuss the topics of profiling and assessment with some leading terrorism researchers at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the University of Oslo.

Profile of a Norwegian Jihadi

The conflict in Syria had drawn 30 to 40 Norwegian foreign fighters to the region by the end of December 2013, according to several reports. By late 2015, that estimated number had grown to more than 80, and as of mid-2016, the numbers are still higher. Most of these individuals are men, but at least two women are also known to have joined the fight in Syria. These foreign fighters are using violence in an unlawful manner and can therefore be categorized as terrorists from both a Norwegian and an international perspective. It is possible to profile several of these Norwegian fighters and analyze their radicalization process, because some of them have made official statements to the media and spoken at public events organized by semi-official organizations. The group with the most active profile and a record of official appearances is called Profetens Ummah (“The Prophets’ Community”), whose leaders have connections with recognized international radical Muslim communities and individuals. One well-known radical British imam, Anjem Choudary, for example, has been working alongside his Norwegian counterparts and has supported their efforts to widen their influence in Norway.

The education level of the Norwegians who commit to jihad and become foreign fighters varies, but most do not possess a college degree. Many of them had jobs
in Norway, but some were entirely dependent on the Norwegian welfare system. Young men aged 20 to 30 from the eastern part of Norway predominated in this jobless group, and most of them were affiliated with Profetens Ummah. Several of those who went to Syria are related, and most of them are friends who have known each other for a long time. Most of the Norwegian foreign fighters have ethnic connections to the northern parts of Africa and are therefore Muslim by birth and family culture, but the group also includes a few ethnic Norwegians, several of whom converted to Islam. It may be worth noting that a number of the most overt participants in this cohort come from one city, Fredrikstad, and were part of a close football (soccer) community there. This finding was echoed in a documentary presented in 2015 by the Norwegian television broadcaster Norsk Rikskringkasting (NRK). One Norwegian killed while fighting in Syria, for example, was a close friend of one of Norway’s most famous football players.

Why Do Norwegians Become Foreign Fighters in Syria?

There are a number of reasons why people devote themselves to becoming foreign fighters. It may take a long time for a person to become so committed to the jihadi cause that he is willing to sacrifice his life for it, but this process can happen quickly in some circumstances. This holds true for the Norwegian foreign fighters as well. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the University of Oslo have tried to identify the reasons that Norwegians go to Syria and, in a preliminary conclusion, highlight four major motivations.

Political and religious idealism: Several of the individuals who have stated that they are going or are likely to go to Syria to fight think it is the right thing to do based on a political or religious conviction. Many people in this group are fighting against the Syrian regime because of their perception that the government violates human rights, while others regard the Syrian civil war as a fight between good and evil. This group includes those who are motivated by martyrdom.

A shift from humanitarian ideals to jihad: A small number of the Norwegians who are fighting in Syria were originally motivated to go there to provide humanitarian aid, not to fight. Because of various circumstances, however, this motivation changed, and instead of becoming aid workers, they became fighters.
Attention, recognition, and fame: Some of the Norwegians who went to fight in Syria were purely motivated by a desire for recognition or fame. Most of the people belonging to this group are not Muslims by birth, but are ethnic Norwegians who converted to Islam before traveling to Syria. A few were not at all religious when they went but were attracted to the fight by some romantic idea of their own. Several of the people in this category use social media extensively, because they seek the attention that a high media profile can potentially give them. A comparison could be made between these fighters and participants in reality TV shows. This group is responsible for the birth of the so-called “Paradise Hotel jihadist.”

A window of opportunity: A few of the Norwegian contingent of fighters in Syria are motivated by the fact that they can do things in Syria they would not be able to do elsewhere without being punished, such as killing people or using drugs. Others in this group want to become terrorists, but they do not want to conduct acts of terrorism in their own “neighborhood.” The majority of the expatriate group simply want to go to Syria and do things without anybody controlling them. Young people who have been living under a strict religious regime imposed by their parents constitute the majority of this group.

Similarities with Radicalization in Other Parts of Europe

In his chapter of the book, Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe, Petter Nesser presents three general motivational paths to jihad through radicalization that are prevalent in Europe. He describes them as: “entrepreneurs and protégés,” who seem to be motivated mainly by ideology and activism, and who often act as recruiters in the radicalization process; “misfits,” whose main motivation appears to be personal grievances, problems, and frustrations; and “drifters,” who appear to be well-functioning individuals but who frequently have mixed motivations for joining and may be easily swayed by relatives and friends who are extremists. These paths correlate to a large extent with the Norwegian radicalization process outlined in this article.

Radicalization Triggers for Potential Norwegian Foreign Fighters

Two key triggers explain why some people from Norway radicalize to the extent that they become foreign fighters in Syria.
First, in Norway, there has been a competition for influence among several semi-official Islamic organizations, led by Profetens Ummah and Islam Net. These two organizations have been using official media and unofficial blogs to argue against one another for years. The Syrian conflict represents an opportunity for members from both organizations to show that they are brave enough to participate in a real war in the name of Allah. Before either one reached the threshold of actually sending members to Syria, the two organizations escalated the level of rhetorical conflict in Norway by publicly provoking each other to the point of no return. The result was that some Norwegians devoted themselves to the fight in Syria to prove their faith. In my assessment, this ideological contest became the main reason for such extreme radicalization.

Second, despite the fact that the Syrian civil war is one of the most devastating conflicts seen in many years, the international community does not appear willing to become involved. Millions of children, along with their families and others, have become refugees in their own country. The fact that the rest of the world, including Norway, is apparently indifferent to the suffering of the Syrian people is a potential source of frustration and anger in groups that are susceptible to radicalization. In combination with some of the other motivational factors described in this article, I believe such a sense of outrage is likely to be a significant factor, or even a trigger, in the radicalization of Norwegians who go to Syria as foreign fighters.

Norway’s Plan for Deradicalization

The Norwegian government’s general plan for deradicalization is currently being reconstructed. The current “Action Plan to Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism” states that the issues of radicalization and deradicalization are domestic problems that fall under the mandate of the police. If radicalization takes place in an “international context,” that is, outside of Norway, then the responsibility belongs to the Norwegian Intelligence Service. The main goal of this plan is to develop a preventive dialogue to influence persons who could potentially become radicalized. Local police, it says, should try to prevent radicalization through dialogue with the individuals or groups that are assessed to be susceptible, while Norwegian society as a whole is urged to motivate young people to complete school and higher education. Both leading researchers and leading police officials have criticized the current plan quite extensively. When it was first presented, one prominent researcher, Brynjar Lia, denounced it as nothing more than a “PR move” by the Norwegian government.

Triggers That Have Deradicalized Norwegian Foreign Fighters

Norwegians who traveled to Syria as foreign fighters have reacted differently to their experiences. Some individuals who returned to Norway became even more radicalized, while several others turned away from radicalism altogether. A few of those who renounced jihad received help from public authorities to complete the process, an option that is included in the Norwegian government’s current “Action Plan.” The ones who did not require any external influence to give up jihad did so because of a change in motivation, which came about for two main reasons. The first came from the fighters’ realization that their perception of the conflict in Syria was far from its reality. They did not change their opinion of what is right and wrong regarding violent jihad, but things in Syria were not
what they expected. The second group did change their opinion of what is right and wrong after experiencing what is actually taking place in Syria.

Conclusion

In my opinion, Norway clearly faces serious challenges regarding radicalization, and the problem extends far beyond the current hot topic of religious extremism. The Norwegian challenge, as I see it, comes not only from religious extremism, but reaches across the political spectrum from neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists on the one hand, to animal-rights proponents and left-wing extremists on the other. It is high time for the Norwegian government to reconstruct Norway’s approach to the challenges that every kind of radicalization presents.

The work has started, but it is far from finalized. My hope is that the results of Norway’s efforts to fight radicalization will be more than another general plan for which only the Ministry of Justice has responsibility. A broader, whole-of-government approach will not be easy, nor are there likely to be any quick fixes in this matter. I do believe, however, that what Norway needs to cope with the challenges that radicalization presents is a comprehensive plan involving a number of ministries, departments, and other governmental agencies. Although it is outside the scope of this article to describe such a plan in detail, I want to emphasize that any plan that has sufficient magnitude to produce the needed effects will require a heartfelt commitment from all levels of Norwegian society and the Norwegian people as a whole.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CPT Marius Kristiansen serves in the Norwegian Armed Forces.

NOTES


Min Sønn, Fremmedkrigeren [My son, the foreign fighter], TV documentary, directed by NRK Brennpunkt (Oslo: Norsk Rikskringkasting [NRK], 2015).

Stein-Erik Stormoen, "Tarik Hedret Sin Døde Venn Etter Matchvinnermålet" [Tarik honored his late friend after scoring the winning goal], Verdens Gang, VG, sec. Sporten, 8 January 2013.


Hegghammer, "Conference: Norwegian Foreign Fighters in Syria."

"Paradise Hotel" is a popular reality TV show in Norway and other parts of Europe, in which attractive young people engage in self-indulgent behavior while sequestered in a luxury hotel for several weeks. Lia, "Conference: Norwegian Foreign Fighters in Syria."


Government of Norway, Department of Justice, "Vil Bli Bedre På Forebygging Mot Radikalisering" [Norway's Department of Justice would like to improve prevention of radicalization], Regjeringen, 28 November 2013: http://www.regjeringen.no/sub/radikalisering/aktuelt/vil-bli-bedre-pa-forebygging-mot-radikal.html?id=746890
The rifleman fights without promise of reward or relief. Behind every river there’s another hill and behind that hill, another river. After weeks or months in the line, only a wound can offer him the comfort of safety, shelter, and a bed. Those who are left to fight, fight on, evading death but knowing that with each day of evasion they have exhausted one more chance for survival. Sooner or later, unless victory comes, this chase must end on the litter or in the grave.
— General Omar N. Bradley

Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) is an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the southeast tip of India. Most of the land is flat and rolling, with mountains in the south-central region rising to over 8,000 feet (2,438 meters). The two nations are separated by the Palk Strait, which is only 18 miles (29 kilometers) wide at the closest point between Rameswaram in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and Talaimannar in northern Sri Lanka.

Indo-Aryan emigration from India in the fifth century BCE led to the formation of the largest ethnic group on Sri Lanka today, the Sinhala. Tamils, the second-largest ethnic group on the island, were originally from the Tamil region of South India and emigrated between the third century BCE and 1200 CE. The Tamils, primarily Hindus, claimed the northern section of the island while the Sinhala, who are predominantly Buddhist, controlled the rest of Ceylon. Beginning in 1505, Ceylon became a colony, first of the Portuguese empire, then of the Dutch East India Company (1658–1796), and eventually, of the British Empire (1802–1948). The British brought indentured labor from South India to work their coffee, tea, and rubber plantations, thereby displacing many Sinhala in the central highlands of Kandy. On 4 February 1948, after 443 years of colonial rule and under pressure from Ceylonese nationalist leaders, Ceylon became a self-governing dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations. The name was changed to Sri Lanka (“Resplendent Island”) in 1972.

The Ceylon Army (first instated on 10 October 1949) was deployed in 1951 to assist the police in preventing illicit immigration and smuggling between Ceylon and Tamil Nadu in India. This was in addition to its other task of assisting the government in maintaining essential services. The problem of poaching and smuggling in the shallow waters off the northern coast continues to this day and has had a profound impact on relations
between the two countries. Such illicit activities also remained a center of dispute during the civil conflict.

Ever since independence, the Tamil minority in the north of Sri Lanka has harbored resentment towards the Sinhalese majority due to political, economic, and social differences, exacerbated by the differences in culture and religion. The Tamils claimed that Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike championed Sinhala nationalism and further marginalized the Tamil minority when he made Sinhala the country’s official language and institutionalized state support of Buddhism in 1956.²

In the 1970s, the insurgent group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) arose in the country’s north, with the goal to win independence for the majority Tamil regions of Sri Lanka and create a greater Eelam (“Precious Land”) aligned with the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.³ In 1975, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna was killed by the separatists simply for holding a government office. After a government crackdown in the north, some Tamils crossed to Tamil Nadu as refugees, many moderate Tamils who had been living among the Sinhala in other parts of the country fled to the north, and a few migrated to Western countries and formed the Tamil diaspora. The Tamil Nadu government supported, financed, and gave refuge to Tamil rebel groups, allowing them to operate clandestinely from Indian territory. The Indians also helped train and arm certain Tamil guerrilla groups to fight the Sri Lankan Armed Forces after Sinhala racial riots in July 1983 that resulted from the ambush of a Sri Lankan Army patrol in the north.

The first of a series of five peace talks and many ceasefires was arranged by the Indian government in Thimpu, Bhutan, in 1985. At this meeting, the five main Tamil rebel groups presented four demands to the Sri Lankan government:

1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.
2. Recognition of the right of the Sri Lankan Tamils to an identified homeland.
4. Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka.

The government of Sri Lanka rejected outright the four demands put forward by the Tamil rebels but agreed to recognize the right to citizenship of the descendants of the indentured labor force brought from India by the British in the nineteenth century.⁴ It was this situation that led to the commencement of violence and the initial stages of the long civil conflict. During the mid-1980s, the LTTE pushed out the other Tamil rebel groups and took charge as the sole representatives of Sri Lanka’s Tamil people and the dominant Tamil militant group in northern Sri Lanka.

In the face of brutal terrorist attacks on civilians and India’s continued support for the insurgency, the Sri Lankan government launched a major military operation in 1987 to liberate the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. After it successfully completed that operation, it was then poised to liberate the town of Jaffna and nearby areas, but the LTTE fighters fled to Tamil Nadu. Continued support for the insurgency from India forced the two sides into what is known as the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, which secured India’s national interest but sadly didn’t meet the Sri Lankan state’s needs or the LTTE’s basic aspirations.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived in Sri Lanka in July 1987 to bring about peace, but it only brought about more bloodshed. One thousand fifty-five IPKF soldiers were killed and many more were wounded during the IPKF’s nearly three-year tour of duty in Sri Lanka’s northeast. In 1990, the new president of Sri Lanka, R. Premadasa, made a second attempt at peace talks with the LTTE to try to settle the conflict, facilitate the withdrawal of the IPKF, and bring peace to Sri Lanka. This is the point at which this story begins.5

Batticaloa

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
— George Washington6

With the departure of the Indian peacekeeping forces at the end of March 1990, the LTTE gradually pushed out the rival Tamil National Army and took control of Sri Lanka’s northeast, which had been vacated by the IPKF under the terms of the peace accord. The Tigers positioned their cadres in vital areas that enabled them to exert pressure on both the provincial police and the army, whose troops were very thinly deployed in the northeast to counter the insurgents. In the Eastern Province, just one infantry battalion (typically 500–600 men) was deployed in each of the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa (BCO), and Trincomalee.7

Five army detachments were established in the towns of Wellawadi, Kiran, Kaluwanchikudy, Kalumunai, and Kallady in the BCO district. Out of these detachments, the ones at Kalumunai (in the Ampara district) and Kalawanchikudy belonged to the Sixth Battalion Sri Lanka Light Infantry (Sixth SLLI), which had only just been raised in late May 1990. The older infantry battalions were somewhat handicapped because they had been required to transfer one rifle company and composite platoons to these newly raised infantry battalions. The troops had to reorient themselves from a limited-engagement environment in the south to an all-out counterinsurgency environment in the north and east. The men of the First Battalion, Gemunu Watch (First GW), under my command, however, had already prepared themselves both professionally and psychologically during their 10-month tenure at Ampara. They saw the LTTE annihilate the rival Tamil National Army following the withdrawal of the Indian peacekeepers and had given refuge to 20 or 30 Tamil National Army soldiers who fled from the LTTE attacks into Ampara.

First GW was redeployed to the BCO district on 18 May 1990. By then, the situation in the district was very tense. The LTTE had 30 or 40 outposts with bunkers in the town and vicinity, each of which was manned by 150 to 300 LTTE cadres. These insurgents obstructed the movement of the security forces,
provoked the army, and interfered with the police who were trying to maintain law and order.

A large LTTE bunker had been built near the town’s clock tower, across a lagoon from the BCO police station, where it covered the approach into town. Permission was required from the LTTE to visit most areas in town, while LTTE fighters reserved the use of many local services, such as certain garages and service stations, exclusively for themselves.

This situation was brought to the notice of the military higher command and the civilian bureaucracy, who were negotiating peace with the LTTE at that time. But the security forces were explicitly told to cooperate with the LTTE to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict, because the country couldn’t afford another battle with the LTTE. The president and the civilian bureaucracy did not fully understand the situation on the ground, in large part because the military higher command did not make the difficulties faced by security forces in the Eastern Province clear to the government. The commanders did not want to jeopardize their careers by seeming to question official policy.

The Siege of Batticaloa Begins, 11 June 1990

On the night of Sunday, 10 June 1990, a Sinhala woman was caught by her husband while she was with a young Muslim LTTE supporter. The two men fought, and both were brought to the BCO town police station. The LTTE, who were looking for an opportunity to commence their campaign of violence, surrounded the police station and demanded the release of the Muslim youth. When the police informed them that the youth had been admitted to the BCO hospital, the LTTE insisted that he was not in the hospital and pressed their demand for his release. They disarmed the policemen on guard, took over the police station, and seized its armory, communications equipment, and all the gold and money that was being kept there for safe custody. (The LTTE later abducted the young man from the hospital.)

At this time, I was the commanding officer of First GW, which was then located approximately two kilometers away from the BCO police station at the Kallady Camp. (I had been in Ampara immediately before taking up my duties in BCO.) Although I was also the coordinating officer of the BCO district, the police did not inform me at all about the developing situation. At 0620 on 11 June, a Monday, the owner of the local L.H. Bakery, who happened to be one of my school friends, informed me by telephone that all the Sinhala in the town of Batticaloa were ordered by the LTTE to vacate the town within five minutes. Because I was unaware of the prevailing situation prior to this message, I had dispatched two of my platoons (two officers and 60 soldiers) to Ampara for their annual weapons training classification test just two hours previously.

At around 0730, I was told that a vehicle carrying 10 soldiers from Kalawanchikudy Army Camp (the base of the Sixth SLI) had been ambushed at Kalmunai and all of the soldiers had been killed. Kalawanchikudy Camp had only 48 troops, along with three officers. There was no way anyone could even move out to Kalmunai to recover the bodies, because the main road was now blocked by the LTTE, which had taken up a position surrounding the Kalawanchikudy Camp and the police station. (The police station was located next to the army
camp on the Ampara–Batticaloa road.) The LTTE fighters demanded that the policemen surrender, announcing that they would not be harmed but would be handed over to the Sri Lankan government at the BCO airfield. Ten Sinhalese policemen escaped the deadly fate of the other policemen by jumping over the fence into the adjoining army camp, carrying their weapons and ammunition. Captain Sarath Embowa of the Sixth SLLI was the commanding officer of the Kalawanchikudy Camp. He decided to fight the terrorists.

The LTTE fighters, who were in touch with the Sri Lankan Air Force base in Batticaloa (SLAF BCO), made the same promise to the officials there: if the police surrendered without resistance, they would be handed over to government forces. The police, who were not prepared mentally or physically to fight a ruthless guerrilla organization without military air and artillery support, agreed to surrender to the LTTE. By this time, the LTTE had surrounded most of the 13 police stations in both the BCO and Ampara districts and captured the policemen, who surrendered themselves and their weapons without a fight. All 677 of these prisoners, both Sinhala and Tamil, were taken to selected locations close by, forced to dig their own graves, and then brutally murdered in cold blood.

At 1530 on that same day, 11 June, the army commander, the inspector general of police, a senior officer from the air force, and the director of army operations arrived at SLAF BCO by air. The senior superintendent of police BCO (who happened to be a Tamil), an assistant superintendent of police who was stationed in Kallady Camp, and I were transported by helicopter from Kallady Camp to join the senior officials for an urgent conference. By the time I reached SLAF BCO, the policemen, their families, and the town’s Sinhala civilians, 150 to 200 in all, had gathered at the airport and were awaiting evacuation to Colombo. Getting through this crowd of emotionally devastated, angry, highly charged people was a trying task because their rage was directed at the Tamil senior police superintendent who followed immediately behind me. Fortunately, no incident took place. In the meeting, the group discussed the possibilities for reinforcing the police stations, but at the moment there was no way to do this because the army was already spread very thin—the army camps were under-manned and located too far apart to offer mutual support, and were themselves in great danger of attack. There was no artillery in the BCO district, and it would take one to two hours to fit the only available Bell 212 helicopter with machine guns. We found ourselves in an extremely dangerous situation. The army leadership’s lack of preparation and the government’s abject appeasement of the LTTE could have led to the total loss of the Eastern Province.

The LTTE had launched attacks on the Kiran and Wellawadi Army Camps at 1630, while the meeting was taking place. At around 1800 that evening, after I had returned to Kallady Camp from SLAF BCO, the LTTE contacted me by telephone and told me to direct Kiran Camp to surrender in five minutes. If this order was disregarded, the insurgents were going to launch an all-out attack to take the camp. To buy more time and avoid being blamed for starting a war, I replied that I would inform the camp commanders of the rebels’ instructions after contacting Sri Lanka’s president.8

I immediately contacted my brigade commander in Ampara, but he responded evasively, reminding me of the presidential order to avoid fighting unless under attack. I then contacted the 2nd Division commander, Major General J.R.S. De Silva, at Anuradhapura. He insisted that the army should fight to the last man and the last round, and that the entire country was depending on our performance in BCO. I requested immediate assistance from him to evacuate the camps at Wellawadi and Kalunjai, both of which had only depleted platoons to defend them.

By this time, three army camps in the BCO District—Kiran, Wellawadi, and Kalawanchikudy—and Kalunjai Camp in the Ampara District were under continuous and severe attack. Wellawadi Camp had been established to protect a Sinhala fishing community of about 200 men, women, and children which had been in that area for generations. One group of 22 men led by 2/LT RMCC Ranaweera GW and supported by two 81mm mortars from the Kiran detachment fought for over 36 hours against more than 300 LTTE cadres with only 90 rounds of ammunition per soldier at hand. They received more ammunition by helicopter from Kallady on the morning of Tuesday, 12 June, and ultimately were able to protect the fisher families and evacuate them by sea that day with the assistance of a navy gunboat commanded by CDR Thissara Samarasinghe. The gunboat took the families and soldiers to safety at Trincomalee. The only civilian casualties of the
entire evacuation at Wellawadi were a mother and child who drowned while attempting to board the naval craft. One soldier suffered a minor injury from LTTE fire during the entire 36-hour crisis.

The situation at Kalmunai was similar: the platoon under 2/LT KASH Karunatileke came under intense fire from the LTTE starting on 11 June. On 13 June, a Sri Lankan Navy gunboat under the command of CDR Daya Dharmapriya, along with support vessels, evacuated the platoon after an agonizing battle, during which the soldiers and sailors were supported by artillery fire from the Malwatte Army Camp. The soldiers suffered several casualties from LTTE fire during the evacuation.

The Siege of Kiran Camp, 11–18 June

The siege of Kiran Camp, which also began on 11 June, lasted eight days. The LTTE unleashed salvos of mortar, small arms fire, and 84 mm rockets against the Kiran Camp, and on one occasion even used chlorine gas on the troops in the camp. The camp's commanding officer, Captain Sumith Perera GW, and his second in command, Lieutenant Chinthaka Munasinghe GW, valiantly held the camp with less than 90 men against severe odds. Only one officer in that action, 2/LT Suminda Jayasundera GW, survived to the end of the war in 2009. He had less than one year's service with the battalion at the time of the siege. Private Dharmasiri K.A., the radio operator of A Company First GW, maintained communications with the battalion headquarters at Kallady and the rear HQ at Diyatalawa both day and night throughout the entire battle. When the antenna was damaged by intense mortar fire, Dharmasiri fixed it during the night by climbing the palmyra tree to which it was attached.

On the night of 11 June, an Air Force helicopter fitted with machine guns arrived from the Batticaloa airbase to provide close air support to Kiran Camp. Flying Officer Thilana Kaluarachchi relentlessly and gallantly flew that entire night and continued to fly against the LTTE positions every night until the detachment was relieved. He kept the LTTE at bay and was a tremendous morale booster for the besieged troops. Ground-to-air communications were closely coordinated through CPL Gamini of First GW, who was stationed at the SLAF BCO base during the battle.

Rescue operations from several directions were finally launched on Friday, 15 June, from northern BCO under the command of GOC 1 Division Major General D.L. Kobbekaduwa. On that same day, before the rescue began, Maj Gen Kobbekaduwa spoke with me over the radio. His voice was a great morale booster to me because at that point we were all desperate for our survival, and this was the first good news we had heard. Until then, the response to our requests for help from the military higher command had been negative at best, and we were given very little encouragement to continue fighting. As he described the pending rescue operations, the general’s voice had an air of confidence that inspired hope in us after four days of mental agony and battle stress.

The Third Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier A.M.U. Seneviratne, provided artillery fire support to break the siege. The Fourth Battalion Gemunu Watch and the Fifth Battalion Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment had
to fight their way into BCO, which they reached by 19 June. Similarly, the First Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier A.K. Jayawardhana, with the First Sinha Regiment and First Special Forces Regiment, fought their way from Ampara across country through Wellaveli to relieve the Kalwan-chikudy detachment in southern BCO. Both brigade groups reached their objectives on 18 June despite heavy resistance from the LTTE.

On Saturday, 16 June, five days after the fighting began and as the relief operations began to put pressure on them, the LTTE requested a ceasefire through the bishop of Batticaloa so that both sides could attend to their respective casualties. The LTTE leaders, however, refused to disarm and remain in the SLAF BCO base, but wanted to accompany the bishop and me or my representative to Kiran. I rejected these terms, because it was clear to me that the LTTE intended to take us hostage and force the detachment to surrender by holding us at gunpoint. The LTTE repeatedly stooped to such deceit and proved their perfidy and treachery throughout the conflict.

They continuously bombarded the troops on the base with pronouncements through a loud hailer, exhorting the soldiers to give up and surrender instead of fighting a losing battle. The troops responded by returning fire and fighting steadfastly and resolutely, denying the LTTE any opportunity to break into the camp.

The men in all the camps under siege survived on liquids, raw pawpaws, palmyra fruits, and the odd animal that strayed into camp during the siege. Such things were collected during the night or whenever there was a lull in the fighting. The well that supplied fresh water to the Kiran Camp was exposed to LTTE fire, so the men tunneled into it at night to get drinking water for their survival. The troops in Kiran survived for seven nights in trenches, with nothing but the uniforms on their backs, throughout relentless attacks by the LTTE. The alertness of the sentry enabled him to wipe out an entire group of nine LTTE guerrillas who were crawling into the camp one night after cutting the perimeter wire fence. Only one soldier was killed in action throughout the eight days of fighting, but one of three officers and 60 of 79 soldiers in the camp suffered injuries and had to be evacuated when reinforcements finally arrived on 18 June. One BBC correspondent refused to believe our low casualty count when he saw the area surrounding the camp, which was littered with more than 100 dead and decomposing bodies of LTTE fighters.

The success of the First GW troops in the defense of their camps in the BCO district was due to their courage, regimental espirit de corps, comradeship, belief in their leadership, and their steely determination to survive amid the death and wounding of their colleagues and the confusion and chaos of battle. The men’s efforts to send the remains of the dead soldier, Sergeant Karunadasa E.A.D., which they had cremated at night with the help of palmyra branches amid LTTE small arms fire, to his next of kin were greatly appreciated by his parents and were a morale booster for the rest of the troops.

Conclusion

The Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally defeated the LTTE terrorists on 19 May 2009 and restored Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
after more than 27 years of bloody fighting. It is pertinent to remember all those who sacrificed their today for our tomorrow and the many Sri Lankans who suffered immeasurable difficulty for almost 30 years. The single most important factor in developing the strength required to meet aggression is the attitude and will of our citizens. In the words of the Gemunu Watch motto: Tarry not forward!

Emboldened by their early successes and with outside support, the LTTE acquired a land force, a seaborne capability, and a nascent air force. The United States government designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. The insurgents’ innovative strategy of using suicide attacks against government forces and installations led the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2008 to label them as the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world. Suicide attacks became a trademark tactic of the LTTE campaign. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense cites an LTTE declaration that the insurgency was responsible for approximately 378 suicide attacks on land and sea from July 1987 to May 2009. This was one of the highest rates of such attacks in the world. Despite the fact that 32 countries have banned the LTTE from operating within their borders, the Tamil diaspora continues to support claims for a separate state and is pressuring the UN to prosecute Sri Lanka for alleged war crimes.

A strategic analysis of the Sri Lankan military victory must acknowledge the political will and leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government (2005–2015). All security operations were coordinated in the National Security Council through Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the defense secretary and brother of the president. He ensured that all military commanders and the civilian bureaucracy cooperated with each other and worked as a team to achieve final victory over the terrorists. The political leadership did not interfere with the operational commanders but gave them the freedom to conduct operations as the commanders thought necessary. Foreign and local media access to the operational areas was restricted, while the establishment of a Ministry of Defense website and a media center within the Ministry of National Security made it possible to counter the numerous LTTE propaganda and news websites and give Sri Lankan citizens and the world a more balanced view of the conflict.

At the tactical level, the numerical strength of the security forces was doubled through new recruitment and enhanced by the procurement of vital armaments through China, Pakistan, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Israel. With this increase in strength, the SLAF took the offensive to the LTTE across many fronts, forcing them to react and lose the element of surprise in the battlefield. This relentless offensive, which lasted for nearly three years, never gave the terrorists an opportunity to recover and mount a counterstrike against the government forces. The increase in overall strength also allowed for better intelligence gathering, which helped prevent numerous suicide bombing attempts by the LTTE in the south of Sri Lanka and the rear areas of the battlefield. The majority of the Sri Lankan people saw the tide turning in their favor after two decades of death and destruction, and supported the government with vital information and moral support, despite some international efforts to halt the offensive and resume negotiations during the final months of the conflict.

It has been seven years since the defeat of the LTTE, and much has been achieved in the resettlement, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of the north and east. Rebuilding the lives of the victims of the conflict and finding reconciliation, however, will take decades, at the least. Some of the few Tamil politicians who remain continue to make political demands based on the aspirations of LTTE ideology. Much of the moderate Tamil political leadership and the democratic parties and their
structures were destroyed by the LTTE. Grassroots Tamil political organizations were controlled by the LTTE, as were the judicial and policing functions in the regions they held. Although the Sri Lankan government maintained adequate stocks and facilities, and remunerated the Tamil civilian administration for the distribution of essential food, medical supplies, and educational materials during the conflict, these local administrations were controlled by the LTTE for over one and a half decades. They have now been rehabilitated with donor assistance, but much more has to be done in the coming years to meet the aspirations of the people in the north and east for a peaceful, productive future.

The resettlement of internally displaced persons was hampered because large tracts of land were mined or strewn with unexploded ordnance and unmarked IEDs. Many other problems also interfered with post-conflict rehabilitation: disputes over land ownership; caste issues; dilapidated roads and poor access to remote areas; access to basic health and education facilities; the total destruction of the Northern railway line from Vavuniya up to Kankasanthurai on the northern coast; the destruction of public utilities including water, electricity, and transport; and the widespread damage and destruction of houses and other buildings due to the fighting. Almost all such facilities have been rehabilitated or rebuilt now with donor assistance, while the Sri Lankan Army has cleared about 75 to 80 percent of the mines and IEDs in the north with donor assistance from the United States and Japan. In addition, India and seven NGOs have conducted de-mining operations in certain areas in the northeast independent of the Sri Lankan Army’s work.

The next important tasks for redevelopment will be to create employment and develop livelihoods for the Tamil populations in the north and east. These areas were dominated by agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries, and now, with many tourists coming back to Sri Lanka, there is great potential for the region’s development. Unfortunately, hardly any members of the Tamil diaspora have made substantial investments in the north, although some entrepreneurs in the south have started garment and other factories that offer employment to Tamil youth from the north and east. This is a very encouraging sign and will help the process of reconciliation. There is more interaction among the people of all communities in Sri Lanka, and the mistrust created by years of conflict is slowly but surely receding. Therefore, it is imperative that the people of Sri Lanka are supported in their efforts to reconcile by the international community, so we all can live in peace and tranquility in an independent, democratic, and united Sri Lanka.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Retired Brigadier General Hiran N. Halangode served in the Sri Lankan Army for 27 years.

IT IS THE SOLDIER

It is the Soldier, not the minister who has given us freedom of religion.
It is the Soldier, not the reporter who has given us freedom of the press.
It is the Soldier, not the poet who has given us freedom of speech.
It is the Soldier, not the campus organizer Who has given us freedom to protest.
It is the Soldier, not the lawyer who has given us the right to a fair trial.
It is the Soldier, not the politician Who has given us the right to vote.
It is the Soldier who salutes the flag, Who serves beneath the flag, Whose coffin is draped by the flag, Who allows the protestor to burn the flag.

Charles M. Province
NOTES


2 Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959 by a man impersonating a Buddhist monk, and his widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, became the world’s first female prime minister in 1960.


4 The proposed Tamil homeland, known as “Eelam,” comprised 28 percent of the land mass and 68 percent of the coastline of Sri Lanka, and encompassed 12 percent of the island’s Tamils. This population is now reduced to 6–8 percent because of overseas emigration and the dispersal of the majority across the rest of Sri Lanka.

5 I dedicate this article to all those valiant officers and men of the First Battalion, the Gemunu Watch, who served under my command from 1 December 1988 to 31 January 1991. They served with me loyally against all odds, and with dedication and commitment, in the Hambantota, Moneragala, Ampara, and Batticaloa districts. All without exception strove hard, and some made the supreme sacrifice, to protect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.


7 During this period, there was much turbulence in the infantry battalions as new units were being raised, existing battalions were reorganized, and new officers and men were distributed among them. Unit cohesion and the morale of the troops in combat initially suffered as a result.

8 The base commanders had been explicitly told by the president’s emissary, who was also the main spokesman for the government’s negotiating team, not to start another war, because the government didn’t have the funds to fight the LTTE and the president was confident of achieving peace through negotiations. This order meant that we couldn’t start firing, even if provoked, unless the insurgents fired first. This is, in fact, what happened, and we fought strongly to defend our base.

9 Both of these officers were killed in action in subsequent operations conducted against the LTTE—in Jaffna in 1995 and Mannar in 1991, respectively.

10 This officer was killed in 1997 when a missile hit the Mi-24 he was flying in over Kokilai Lagoon.


14 Charles M. Province is a US Army veteran and founder of the George S. Patton, Jr., Historical Society: http://www.iwvpa.net/ provincem/
The Lumads of the Philippines: Struggling from Conflict toward Peace

Lumad is a Filipino-Bisaya term meaning "native" or "indigenous," and is the self-ascription and collective identity of the non-Islamized peoples who are said to be the original habitants of the island of Mindanao. The term is short for Katawhang Lumad (literally, “indigenous peoples”), the autonym officially adopted on 26 June 1986 by delegates to the Lumad Mindanaw People's Federation (LMPF) founding assembly. The Lumad groups are a minority in the southern Philippines, distinct from the majority Moro Islam people of Mindanao. Not coincidentally, the places where the Lumads live are also the country's last frontier in the hunt for natural resources. Because they have so far remained protected from mining and logging, the ancestral Lumad lands are said to have the highest mining potential of all the islands and include the last remaining uncut forests on Mindanao. Of the 23 priority mining projects under a government mining revitalization program in Mindanao, most lie within the ancestral lands of the Lumads. Aside from state-run mining and logging, and despite laws like the Indigenous People’s Rights Act, big plantations and big corporations still manage to encroach on this ancestral domain.

In September 2015, a tribal war erupted between the paramilitary group called Magahat-Bagani and the local Manobo tribe of the Lumads after the militia killed three tribal leaders. The Magahat-Bagani were formed as part of an anti-communist/anti-insurgency drive being carried out by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the continuation of a long struggle against insurgency beginning in the time of the anti-Japanese Hukbalahap Resistance in the occupied Philippines (1942–1954). In recent times, any Manobo who have complained about the behavior of the military and paramilitary troops are labeled as communist-terrorist sympathizers and targeted by these paramilitaries. There are plenty of allegations and misunderstandings from every side, including from the mining companies and local politicians. The Lumads, however, are the victims of these clashes: some 1,000 Lumads were displaced by the September 2015 incident after they fled from the Magahat-Bagan. The question is, who is to blame for the clashes: the military leadership, the communist-terrorist New People’s Army (NPA), local leaders, the mining companies, or the people who reacted with force without any clear understanding of the situation? Which side should the people of the Philippines support if we are to achieve any peace for the Lumads—peace that, so far, has been elusive? And what is the best way for the military to confront such a complicated problem?

Communist Exploitation

In the Philippines, indigenous people have seen the passage of laws protecting their rights, customs, and beliefs, including the economic, political, and cultural practices handed down by their ancestors from before the colonization of the Philippines by Spain in the sixteenth century. These laws are similar to the protections the United Nations and other international bodies have granted to indigenous people throughout the world. In the Philippines, there are government
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have been supporting these rights and ensuring protection for people such as the Lumads. At the same time, however, some of these organizations have been manipulating indigenous groups, exploiting their vulnerabilities, and exerting social control. One such organization is the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front, or CPP-NPA-NDF. This movement is composed of three branches: an ideological front (the CPP), an armed group (the NPA), and a legal-political wing (the NDF).

The CPP and NDF have legal standing. Based on their ideology, practices, and political agenda, the Philippine government gave the party a seat in Congress, and their party lists for congressional seats have been accepted since the 1990s. But these three branches of the violent communist movement in the Philippines have shaped the ideas of scholars, students, poor people, and indigenous people like the Lumads. As a result, such people will often accept the communist ideology and support their tactics, and frequently will join the communists’ armed struggle against government forces.

By manipulating the political weakness and political innocence of these indigenous people of Mindanao through communist propaganda and the exploitation of legitimate grievances, the insurgents have led hundreds of Lumads to their deaths in clashes with security forces. Lumad villagers also serve as crowds during local communist rallies and have become a money-making tool for the communists, who encourage international organizations and other countries to support indigenous people’s rights, culture, and environmental preservation, but then uses various subterfuges to divert the donations to support its armed struggle.

Communism as an ideology is not evil. Primitive, pre-Marxist-Leninist communism was something more like communalism—a social system whose structure, membership, and objectives are based on egalitarian relations within a group, common ownership, and a common goal. Such structures still exist in some indigenous hunter-gatherer communities, and the concept was revived in the West in the early to mid-twentieth century as communes of like-minded individuals. The Philippine CPP-NPA-NDF, however, are accused by some of manipulating the beliefs and ideology of the Lumads and some members of the NGOs that are working to preserve indigenous culture and tradition. Communists are suspected of infiltrating certain NGOs to influence the organizations’ work with the Lumads and make it easier to recruit indigenous supporters and incite them against the government. The insurgents exploit the Philippine government’s weaknesses, such as failing to provide basic services to the people in those areas or to protect the land from illegal resource extraction by private mining and logging companies. The Lumads seem to be caught between the two opposing forces: if they cooperate with the insurgents against mining or logging operators, government forces might respond by intensifying military operations that could damage Lumad lives and homes. Those Lumads who support the government risk harassment or attack by NPA supporters, and their leaders risk assassination. In this atmosphere of fear and violence, NPA groups also extort Lumad communities and local companies, including mining, farm, and logging businesses, and even small-scale stores in rural areas, to pay a so-called revolutionary tax, which is a main source of funding for the violent communist cause.
The Government Effort

The Philippine Army has created irregular security forces among the Lumad groups to help secure the indigenous communities. These irregulars, called Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs), are usually trained and armed by the Army as an auxiliary force and paid a subsistence allowance. A regular cadre typically is assigned to each CAFGU unit. Some members of the Magahat-Bagani paramilitary groups, mentioned earlier, are also CAFGUs. This project has had both positive and negative outcomes. On the positive side, the Lumad CAFGUs were given training and arms to enable them to secure their community and their communal lands. When big companies started to invest near Lumad lands or bought out sacred grounds, the indigenous people were given jobs in mining, logging, farming, and other fields and opportunities for economic progress. Some CAFGU Lumads and army personnel stationed in the Lumad region receive a salary or “allowance” from these private and international companies to provide security (although it is unlawful for military personnel to do so). The money becomes a much-needed potential source of economic progress for some Lumads and their communities, some of which have become assimilated into this new type of partnership. Some Lumad CAFGU members have become local police and community leaders, working to secure their communities from threats and even act as judges in simple disputes. Others help the military hunt rebels.

On the negative side, although these activities have helped build mutual trust between some members of the military and some Lumad communities, this kind of selective cooperation has also created rifts between indigenous communities and groups, a problem further exacerbated by the uneven distribution of funds from the military and the private companies. These are circumstances that the communists have exploited to win local support. A Lumad community that has a good relationship with the mining companies and the government and is making some economic progress will arm itself against other Lumad communities that have been alienated by neglect and therefore support the communists’ armed struggle. This becomes a cycle of violence between the security forces, the NPA, and the Lumads, which the government needs to address not only by military intervention, but through government services like education, jobs, roads, housing, and social and health services.

Local politicians and the Philippine government are known to give permits to big international and local companies that are taking the Lumads’ natural resources without permission from the indigenous communities. This has been the case for as long as the government and the military have been involved with the Lumads. As a result, the Lumad groups’ loyalties are divided between the government and the communists, and the legitimacy of the government in many indigenous areas has diminished. Some Lumad leaders have started to speak up for their communities, however, noting that historically, Lumads have been perfectly able to handle their own communities and ancestral lands according to their own culture, beliefs, and ancestral practices and laws.

Since 2013, the military’s strategy in Mindanao has been more effective in helping empower the local communities, by starting a broad, community-based peace struggle rather than simply confronting the armed component of the rebels in battle. This strategy involves enabling all local government agencies to provide basic services, especially to the communities of the Lumads. Unfortunately, due to financial constraints and the community divisions described here,
annual aid targets have not always been met, a circumstance the communist rebels have taken advantage of with increased propaganda, recruitment, and fighting. The result has been even greater confusion among the Lumad communities.

In October 2015, Lumad leaders stood up to both the NPA and the Philippine government by making it clear that they did not want to be exploited by anybody. Lumad activists posted films on YouTube that showed how Lumad youth and the education system have been influenced by communist rebel propaganda, and how young Lumads are being influenced to participate in the communists’ armed struggle. At the same time, the CPP took loyal Lumad supporters to Manila to expose extrajudicial killings and protest the military and the government’s counterterrorism efforts. Such events highlight the Lumads’ intention to stop both the NPA and the government from exploiting indigenous people and dragging them into conflict, and to force both sides to respect their human rights and ancestral domain. These events continued for several weeks, during which local Philippine news sources exposed the stories of the indigenous people’s struggles and their manipulation by both the communists and the government. After several days of this public exposure, Dario Otaza, a Lumad official who had been fighting against communist exploitation, was assassinated by the NPA. The investigation is ongoing, and warrants have been issued to capture the NPA members believed to be responsible for the assassination.

Conclusion

The Lumads have a great number of followers, including independent organizations, scholars, religious groups, and government agencies, which respect indigenous people’s rights and have shown support for the principle, “Leave them alone.” Some key Lumad leaders are renewing the call to respect their rights as indigenous people of Mindanao. They describe how tired they are of conflicts in which the strategy of “divide and rule” is used against them, not only by the military and the NPA but also by miners and local politicians. These leaders say the Lumads are being treated as give-aways by these powerful forces and have always been used as propaganda for others’ self-advancement. Although the military has played a large role in empowering the Lumads to oppose the communist rebels in recent times, the stigma of the time when both the military and government officials exploited the ancestral communities, lands, and natural resources of the Lumads still lingers. But the Lumads in Mindanao generally recognize that the Philippine military has changed to a professional institution in recent years. The government’s strategy for peace and development has empowered the local people to reject the NPA insurgency and oppose its influence.

The Philippine government has the duty to uphold the rule of law equally for all citizens, especially if it hopes to have their support against the violent communist insurgency. The government’s legitimacy should be reinforced in all parts of the Philippines, including within the Lumads’ ancestral lands, not only by the security forces but also by all local government agencies concerned with providing government services. The Lumad communities must be empowered not only with military training and arms but also with sufficient social services, including education, jobs, roads, and basic infrastructure to support their communities and tribes. For their part, the security forces—both military and police—and local politicians must avoid the culture of bribes and personal advantages that lead to unequal treatment for the indigenous people, including the exploitation of their lands and natural resources.

This has been a long fight for the Lumads, but the fate of their long struggle for peace remains in doubt. The Philippine government, the law enforcement agencies, the military, and the local government—especially indigenous leaders—must unite in their efforts to shape and deliver peace for the Lumads. The Lumads of Mindanao are a great treasure of the Philippines and deserve every effort to preserve their culture and communities. Sometimes all of us become greedy—we forget the past and the people to whom we owe our origins. We should reflect on the words of anthropologists and environmentalists, who caution that indigenous people like the Lumads should be left untouched and unexploited by the greed of the outside world.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CDR Gilbert G. “Billy” Villareal, Jr., serves in the Philippine Navy.
NOTES

1. There are 18 Lumad ethnolinguistic groups: Atta, Bagobo, Banwaon, B’laan, Bukidnon, Dibabawon, Higaonon, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Manguwangan, Mansaka, Subanon, Tagakaolo, Tasaday, Tboli, Teduray, and Ubo. See "Lumad", Intercontinental Cry, n.d: https://intercontinentalcry.org/indigenous-peoples/lumad/


3. The CPP-NPA-NDF uprising, which the Philippine government has been fighting since 1969, is one of the longest-running communist insurgencies in the world. The organization’s leaders have variously drawn their basic ideologies from Marx, Stalin, and Mao. The movement was funded and supported by China, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam during the height of communism’s spread in the mid-twentieth century.

4. This information came from a Facebook post by Miyako Izabel on 1 November 2015. The author is a popular political and social blogger in the Philippines.

5. The martial law imposed by President Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s was a “dark age” for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, during which they were branded as abusers and human rights violators. But the military has evolved since then to become a professional force, especially with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine constitution, which defines the Armed Forces as the protector of both the people and the state.


Assessing Canada’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams: Can the Concept of INSETs Be Exported?

After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, several countries adjusted their counterterrorism and national security policies to better protect themselves against terrorist threats. The Canadian government took a proactive approach to counterterrorism by studying the United States’ 9/11 Commission report, which found that barriers to communication and cooperation between various security and intelligence agencies had made it easier for al Qaeda to conduct an attack on US soil. The assessment led to Canada’s first official national security policy, which set expectations for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to work together more closely to share information, conduct investigations, and prevent terrorism, both within Canada’s borders and abroad.

In addition to encouraging security agencies to collaborate more closely than they had done prior to 9/11, the Government of Canada also set out specific provisions for countering terrorism. In particular, in 2002, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was given the primary responsibility for counterterrorism in Canada’s post-9/11 security environment and was instructed to set up Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) in various strategic sites across Canada. These new teams included Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) agents, Canadian Border Services Agency members, local law enforcement personnel, and other security-related officials. The INSETs allowed the RCMP to engage in intelligence-led policing by making it possible for all participants to provide information about threats to Canada to RCMP counterterrorism officers on an ongoing basis.

The approach was not unlike those taken by the United States and the United Kingdom after 2001. The US government set up counterterrorism “Fusion Centers” following 9/11 to integrate law enforcement and intelligence services, while the United Kingdom created “Integrated Security Units” to operate in a similar fashion. In Canada, however, the situation was somewhat unique because the RCMP and the CSIS, arguably the two biggest INSET partners, had shared a tumultuous history since the creation of CSIS in 1984. The CSIS was created from the RCMP’s Security Service, which was responsible for intelligence and national security investigations in Canada prior to 1984. RCMP officers were moved to the new intelligence service amid disagreements about whether national security investigations should be conducted by law enforcement or a civilian agency, prompting resentment among former colleagues. An agency turf war resulted, and the inability of the two services to work together left Canada more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These negative consequences came to light with the bombing of Air India flight 182 on 23 June 1985, by the Sikh terrorist group Babbar Khalsa. A subsequent inquiry into the bombing led to assertions that a better working relationship between the RCMP and the CSIS could have prevented the attack. Therefore, with the creation of the INSETs, the two Canadian services most responsible for combating terrorism had to overcome their past conflicts and find a way to work together very closely, as well as alongside new partners such as local law enforcement agencies.
The purpose of this article is to assess the integrated security model in Canada, and to determine whether this approach can be applied in other jurisdictions and how to implement it. There are several issues that have facilitated or prevented close collaboration between Canadian security agencies, and can provide useful insights for successful security integration in Canada and across the globe.

Canada’s Counterterrorism Efforts since 9/11

Canada made significant changes to the structure and operations of its security and intelligence community soon after 9/11 with passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the development of a formal national security policy, both of which were later augmented by an official counterterrorism strategy. Under the Liberal government of the day, an initial $7.8 billion was earmarked over five years for national security (all dollar amounts in this article are in Canadian dollars). In the eight years following 9/11, the government allocated $1.6 billion for intelligence and policing and gave nearly $600 million to the RCMP for counterterrorism efforts. With these budget increases, the RCMP set up INSETS in four major cities across Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa. These units were responsible for national security investigations in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and the national capital region, respectively. Members of Canada’s various security institutions were required to work together on issues of counterterrorism within these INSET offices and to share information more widely than they had prior to 9/11. These agencies were also housed under a new federal department, Public Safety Canada, which had assumed the role of its predecessor, the Office of the Solicitor General. Unlike the post-9/11 changes to the United States’ national security policies, however, these organizational and policy changes to the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement did not lead to a massive increase in the size of Canada’s security bureaucracies. As security analyst Kostas Rimsa notes, the Government of Canada “reorganized existing resources, only hiring a very few new staff at the lowest levels.”

Still, Canada’s security institutions had been revitalized following the budget balancing and spending cuts of the 1990s. While the responsibilities of agencies such as the CSIS remained relatively the same, the RCMP was given new powers to combat terrorism, including preventive arrest and an increased role in intelligence gathering. As a result, the gap between intelligence and policing, which was seen as a major obstacle to preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, was greatly diminished. Police officers gained access to security intelligence information that had typically been used only for discovering security threats.

INSETS are based on the premise of intelligence-led policing, in which police use intelligence to make arrests before an incident occurs. The RCMP is the lead agency in Canada’s integrated security units, while several other agencies
provide information to the Mounties as necessary. Conversely, the RCMP can provide INSET partners with operational support as needed. The close collaboration between various organizations with distinct responsibilities creates a delicate balance between intelligence and policing in Canada. In deference to the tumultuous past relations between these services, the federal government instituted a joint management team at the outset to increase cooperation and decrease interagency conflict. In 2004, two years after the implementation of INSETS, 285 members of the RCMP were engaged in the four INSET units located across the country. Since that time, the Government of Canada has set up one more security unit in the province of Alberta, with 32 officers. It is unclear exactly how many officers from the RCMP or agents from other services are currently engaged in INSETS, but the new partnership between the various national security agencies represents a fairly distinct shift in counterterrorism efforts in Canada when compared to pre-9/11 arrangements.

More recently, Bill C-51 was enacted in June 2015 to further support the integration of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Canada. The legislation gives police increased powers of preventive arrest and intelligence agencies the ability to play a more proactive role in the disruption of terrorist activities. For instance, police officers can now make an arrest if they believe someone may conduct a terrorist act. Prior to C-51, officers could make arrests only if an individual clearly intended to commit a terrorist act. While the Criminal Code’s wording was only slightly changed, police officers have greater responsibility to decide whether a suspect is involved in terrorism, while the threshold for making an arrest has decreased. Furthermore, there are a greater number of departments and agencies now involved in information-sharing, which had previously been limited to specific services such as the RCMP or the CSIS.

These new measures have certainly not been without controversy. Citizens have raised concerns about privacy rights, individual freedoms, and oversight for the intelligence services, all of which may be impinged upon by new “disruptive” capabilities. It is worth noting that Canadian courts have historically set the burden of proof quite high for such cases, and law enforcement officials have been hesitant to use the power of preventive arrest in the past. Since C-51 was enacted, police officers have also turned increasingly towards the use of “peace bonds,” which restrict an individual’s movements and activities without placing them under arrest. To obtain a peace bond, police must present evidence before a judge that a suspect is liable to commit a terrorism offense. Therefore, meeting a legal burden of proof is still the norm, even if the threshold for preventive arrest has been lowered. Finally, the recently-elected Liberal government has promised more oversight for the security services with their enhanced capabilities. In this manner, the government has paid recent attention to ensuring that the new “disruptive” measures are not unduly impacting civil rights. Nonetheless, Canada’s federal government also announced, in April 2015, that it was going to
increase security spending by about $293 million over five years. According to the announcement, the budget increases are meant to aid INSET partners as they work to protect national security.

Case Studies

Two specific cases involving INSETs, discussed below, demonstrate whether and how the institutions have been successful in countering terrorism since 2001.

The Arar Affair

Soon after the implementation of INSETs, Canadian security agencies began working closely together, sharing information that would help them successfully combat terrorism both at home and abroad. However, they quickly discovered the inherent risks of an integrated security approach. In 2002, an engineer with dual Syrian-Canadian citizenship named Maher Arar was stopped by US officials at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. Using information passed along by the RCMP, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers detained Arar for questioning about his alleged connections to al Qaeda and his involvement in terrorism-related activities. It is worth noting that the RCMP officials responsible for passing the intelligence on Arar to the FBI had originally been given the information by CSIS agents, who are a main partner in the INSET arrangement. Despite there being no evidence that Arar was knowingly associated with al Qaeda in any way, RCMP officials treated information that he was involved in terrorism-related activities as fact because of his acquaintance with individuals such as Abdullah Almalki, who was associated with the Ahmed Khadr family, some of whose members were linked to Osama bin Laden.

In this case, concerns about the intelligence-sharing process centered on the fact that security intelligence had been passed along to the RCMP, which, in essence, used the information as evidence to designate Arar as a terrorist without empirical corroboration. Arar was subsequently deported to Syria, where he was imprisoned and tortured for over a year until the Syrian government gave up its efforts to find a link between him and any terrorist organization. He was finally released to Canadian consular authorities in October 2003. Instead of presenting the intelligence information from the CSIS as evidence of guilt, it would have been feasible for Canadian authorities to designate Arar as a person of interest due to his apparent relationships with jihadists and keep him under
surveillance. Instead, his case made clear that the integrated security approach had flaws that needed to be remedied.

In the ensuing official inquiry into Arar’s case, Justice Dennis O’Connor found that there was no reason to suggest that Maher Arar was involved in terrorist activities and also that the RCMP had supplied US authorities with inaccurate information that was probably the deciding factor in the deportation of Arar. In his final report and recommendations on the case, O’Connor’s main concerns had to do with role definitions, accountability, and external review, along with training and communications within and among the security services. Intelligence should be used to “see patterns and understand the general picture about a specific group or activity.” This is why the job of the CSIS is to collect and analyze information and report to the government: intelligence collection is not the same as acquiring evidence to make arrests or lay charges. Justice O’Connor’s report stressed that INSET partners should stay within their mandates, communicate effectively, and respect each other’s areas of responsibility when working together.

The Arar case and O’Connor’s report shifted the INSET arrangement into a new era, with new rules in place to prevent misuse or abuses from recurring. The RCMP and the CSIS signed a renewed memorandum of understanding in 2006 that delineated each agency’s role when conducting counterterrorism investigations and during other joint initiatives. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police also adopted a Common Framework for National Security, which outlined the distinct roles of police forces like the RCMP and security agencies like the CSIS in national security operations. Finally, the RCMP began to configure its National Security Criminal Investigation Program’s Tactical Priorities using the CSIS’s National Strategic Priorities to better respect the intelligence service’s role in Canadian security. This new level of coordination and cooperation was reflected in the Toronto 18 terrorist case, described below.

The Toronto 18

In 2006, 18 men from Ontario planned to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange, the CSIS’s Toronto offices, and a military base along Highway 401, a major roadway in Ontario. Before the attacks could occur, however, two members of the group that came to be known as the “Toronto 18” notified CSIS agents about the plot. Mubin Shaikh and Shaher Elsohemy had infiltrated the cell on behalf of the Canadian spy agency and trained at the group’s camp near Orillia, Ontario. After concluding that the cell was in fact involved in criminal terrorist activity, the CSIS passed the two informants along to the RCMP, which ran a separate investigation.
A man by the name of Zakaria Amara was one of the leaders of the Toronto 18 terrorist cell. After the CSIS passed its information to the RCMP, officers entered his apartment on a legal warrant, where they found evidence including detonators, instructions about how to mix deadly chemicals, and videos on bomb activation. CSIS agents had previously entered Amara's apartment in a covert operation and were able to lead the police in their search. The Mounties were also able to use wiretaps and electronic surveillance to record Toronto 18 members discussing potential attacks on Canadian soil and their motives for executing such attacks. In the end, the attacks were prevented, members of the group were charged under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and several conspirators received prison sentences through the criminal justice system.

More than 200 RCMP officers conducted surveillance on the targets in conjunction with their INSET partners. While the CSIS’s findings would be inadmissible in court because they dealt with sensitive national security issues, the RCMP collected evidence that would ensure that members of the Canadian terrorist cell would be brought to justice. Project Osage, the code name given to the joint surveillance operation, can be considered one of the most successful outcomes of the integrated security model to date.

**Taking the INSET Model into the Future**

The Canadian integrated security approach has resulted in both positive and negative outcomes since its inception in 2001. As the CSIS has noted, the Toronto 18 case proved that police and intelligence agencies can work together to “achieve a common goal while not diluting or overstepping their respective legislative mandates.” The “separate but parallel” investigation system developed within the INSET model and successfully implemented during the Toronto 18 case is a key factor in sustaining the integrated security approach. Agencies responsible for national security in Canada have been able to maintain separate investigations while occasionally sharing information, which has allowed them to work together more seamlessly to fulfill their mutual goals and preserve their independent mandates. After the Toronto 18 investigation, the CSIS planned to continue improving its relationship with the RCMP. In one of its latest public reports, the CSIS stated that it has continued to work toward this objective by developing a series of protocols for information sharing with the RCMP. The two services have also sought guidance from the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service to interpret a growing body of jurisprudence on joint operations, which will help them further ensure that they can safeguard national security while respecting legal boundaries. More recent investigations conducted by INSETs, such as the Via Rail plot to attack a passenger train in 2013, seem to indicate that the agencies have remained committed to the goal of observing their respective mandates while conducting joint investigations to achieve successful outcomes.

In response to the O’Connor inquiry, Canadian INSET partners implemented new policies and procedures to decrease the chances of another negative outcome, while strengthening their ability to protect Canadian security. To investigate the Toronto 18 case, agencies such as the RCMP, the CSIS, and local law enforcement worked together to prevent potential attacks on Canadian soil.
enforcement were able to draw on well-trained personnel who shared information and pooled resources in a precise, effective, and responsible manner. The agencies markedly improved their communications with each other, fully respected their partners’ roles, and worked together to achieve common objectives during the investigation. These measures allowed INSET partners to collaborate more successfully than they had during the Arar affair. The agencies also demonstrated that they were able to overcome the long-standing differences that had troubled them prior to 9/11.

Conversely, it is evident from the Arar affair that any government attempting to closely integrate its security agencies must ensure that all of the partners involved have clearly demarcated roles, understand and respect each other’s responsibilities, and have appropriate accountability structures in place to deter the improper sharing of information. Furthermore, it is imperative that personnel assigned to integrated security units receive proper training and understand how to effectively communicate with officials from other agencies. This will help them to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that any information shared includes stipulations regarding the user’s intentions and the information’s degree of accuracy. Such measures will help any country that is considering the integrated security model to avoid problems such as those that occurred in the Arar case.

Outside of specific cases however, obstacles remain with regard to security integration in Canada. Of particular concern are the very different natures of intelligence and law enforcement. In essence, the imperative of the CSIS is long-term intelligence gathering, so that policy makers may understand and address future threats to national security. Yet the RCMP is driven by the need to prevent crimes in the short term. While these responsibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the divergence in organizational cultures creates a barrier for the close collaboration of intelligence agencies and police services. It is worth noting that the CSIS and the RCMP have experienced some tensions in recent years, especially with regard to resource allocation, how information is shared between partners, and how new mandates under C-51 might affect each agency’s existing relationships with other security agencies. Due to their tumultuous history, there are avenues available for these particular agencies to overcome their cultural differences. States that are looking at implementing an integrated security model, however, must be aware of similar issues as they rethink their own national security policies.

Further consideration must also be given to the issue of oversight for integrated security services. Traditionally, security services have their own accountability mechanisms, but the integrated security model likely requires an integrated oversight mechanism as well. When they do implement this kind of accountability structure, agencies are actually more prone to sharing information because they feel less concern about how the information will be used by the partner agency. An enhanced accountability mechanism also helps to alleviate public concerns about the possible infringement of civil rights. Notably, the Government of Canada has recently announced that it will review national security oversight in an attempt to address the lack of an integrated accountability mechanism for INSET partners. In the same way, other countries that plan to shift from traditional security approaches to the INSET model should review their oversight mechanisms to ensure effective collaboration and successful operations between security partners.

The auditor general of Canada has found further problems with the INSET partners’ ability to work together due to technology constraints and personnel decisions. Specifically, INSET partners have had to work together without adequate computer systems in place to share database information, despite the fact that one of the central goals of the INSETs is better data-sharing. Another concern is whether the agencies have sufficient resources and subject matter experts in place to fully address threats to national security, conduct investigations, and collaborate with partner agencies. While it would seem that government and top security officials have attempted to address some of these issues in recent years, especially with regards to computer systems and personnel distribution, it is important that sufficient resources are allocated to give INSETs the best opportunity to achieve their central objectives.

Conclusion

While Canada’s INSETs undoubtedly have room for improvement, experience so far suggests that the model can be applied across various jurisdictions if the appropriate measures are established for security services to work together effectively to combat terrorism. In the Canadian
context, it will be important to study how Bill C-51 affects the integrated security approach moving forward and to determine how enhanced security services collaborate under an altered accountability structure to safeguard national security. Based on the assessment presented here, countries considering the integrated security model may better understand whether INSETs can be successfully established within their own security communities.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael Tierney is an anti–money laundering and anti–terrorist financing investigator in Canada.

Copyright 2016, Michael Tierney. The US federal government is granted for itself and others acting on its behalf in perpetuity a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable worldwide license in this work to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the US federal government. All other rights are reserved by the copyright owner(s). Foreign copyrights may apply.

NOTES

7. Ivison, “RCMP, CSIS Bumbling.”
11. Eric Lerhe, “Connecting the Dots” and the Canadian Counter-Terrorism Effort—Steady Progress or Technical, Bureaucratic, Legal, and Political Failure? (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2009).
18. “Mounty” is a colloquial term for a member of the RCMP.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.


33 Ibid.


38 Thompson, “Other Cops,” 63.

39 Ibid.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


47 Teotonio, “Toronto 18.”

48 Boer, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 222.

49 Teotonio, “Toronto 18.”


52 Teotonio, “Toronto 18.”


54 Teotonio, “Toronto 18.”


57 Ibid.


61 Lerhe, “Connecting the Dots.”


64 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 1—National Security.”

This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP). On 20 August 2015, Dr. Doug Borer sat down with Brian Fishman to discuss the history and strategies of al Qaeda and ISIS, and what makes them different. Mr. Fishman previously served as the research director at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and was a founding editor of the CTC Sentinel. He is presently a fellow in the International Studies program at New America and at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

DOUGLAS BORER: A lot of people don’t understand how ISIS seemed to pop out of the sand, if you will, and take over parts of the Middle East so rapidly. Can you help us understand the group’s background?

BRIAN FISHMAN: This group’s roots go back to organizations in Jordan in the mid-1990s, which were led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Zarqawi, who was the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was released from prison in 1999. He moved to Afghanistan, where he was able to interact with al Qaeda, and ended up establishing a camp in the western Afghanistan city of Herat. This camp included mostly people from the Levant: Jordanians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians. This is a population that al Qaeda traditionally had a difficult time recruiting among—there weren’t a lot of senior al Qaeda leaders from that part of the world. So Zarqawi set up this camp, which he called Jund al-Sham, or the “Soldiers of the Levant.” Obviously, after 9/11 and the US attack on Afghanistan, Zarqawi ended up in Iraq.

He eventually united with al Qaeda, but he already had this network of people that stretched from Iraq into Lebanon, among the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and across Syria. This organization established al Qaeda in Iraq, which was, of course, one of the main insurgent groups fighting the US and coalition presence there. But what’s really critical to the story of ISIS is that throughout that early, pre-9/11 period, Zarqawi talked a lot about building an Islamic state in Iraq and in Syria. That’s one of the interesting things: even in those early days, he and his followers saw a demographic opportunity in Syria, which had a primarily Sunni population led by a government dominated by Alawites, a form of Shi’ism.

Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 in a US airstrike, and in October his successors declared something called the Islamic State of Iraq. The US government, for the most part, believed this declaration was merely a sort of window dressing—a rebranding of al Qaeda in Iraq. In the United States, the organization was still called al Qaeda in Iraq for another five years, until the Syrian civil war broke out, despite the fact that it had formally changed its name, and despite the fact that in 2007 al Qaeda’s leadership said there was no more al Qaeda in Iraq—there was only the Islamic State of Iraq. So there are a lot of reasons to think that even al Qaeda’s leadership was buying into this rebranding.
But what’s important about that is that the people who are part of ISIS today believe their history is almost 10 years long—that they have been at this project of building a state for 10 years. They believe that they have sustained their organization and continued to fight despite the surge of US troops into Iraq from 2007 to 2009, despite the “awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders against the Islamic State of Iraq. So today ISIS’s leaders say, “Look at what we have beaten. We have beaten the best the Americans can throw at us, and we have sustained ourselves, and we have remained through that time.” They draw a lot of strength from this notion of their history.

I think they really did intend to build a state in 2006. But even if you disagree with that point, and I think smart people can reasonably disagree with it, it’s important to grasp how ISIS understands its own history. When we think about them from an information operations perspective, or think about what it means to defeat them, we have to understand their sense of identity, which is wrapped up in this history going back at least to 2006.

The original set of leaders who founded the Islamic State of Iraq was killed in 2010. That’s a period, I think, when many in the United States believed that the group was basically defeated. That was wrong. This was an organization that had, by US government estimates, maybe 800 to 1,000 people straddling the border between Syria and Iraq, even on the eve of the Syrian civil war. That was a major decline from its earlier peak of about 12,000. The Islamic State of Iraq may not have looked like a state at that moment, in 2010 to 2011, but 800 to 1,000 people is still a really big terrorist group by any measure. Al Qaeda on 9/11 had maybe 200 people in it. So when those of us who had watched the Islamic State of Iraq for a long time started to see the unrest in Syria, both political unrest and then early hints of violence, it was pretty clear that the Islamic State of Iraq was well-positioned to take advantage of that. The leaders certainly thought they had a demographic advantage in Syria that they didn’t have in Iraq, because Iraq is a primarily Shi’a country and Syria is a primarily Sunni country.

Therefore, I think this notion of history is really important. I think ISIS’s leaders will keep going back to that history for inspiration, especially when they get pressured. We can do a lot of damage to this organization with military force. We could do more aggressive things than we are doing, and I think we could hurt them badly. But their sense of identity is tied to the idea that they can withstand those blows. They say to themselves, “We know we can, because we have done it before.” When we think about how we are going to defeat this organization and its fighters, their belief in themselves raises
the level of difficulty because we not only have to defeat them militarily, but we have to find ways to crush their spirit as well. They built an ideology—not just an ideology, but a legend, the mythology of their history—that I think will help sustain them in those hard times.

I suspect those hard times are coming for ISIS in the next couple of years. I don’t think it can remain as powerful as it is today, but neither do I think it will be defeated easily, because its leaders have this mythology that makes them resilient and regenerative.

BORER: I would like to go back to this al Qaeda connection. Is separating the two groups a distinction without a difference? Are al Qaeda and the Islamic State essentially the same thing, or are there ways to distinguish between them?

FISHMAN: I think they come from two different sources. The way this often is described is that al Qaeda is a group of intellectuals, while ISIS grew from the bottom up. Zarqawi, the mafia-style “godfather” of ISIS, is often characterized as a kind of street thug, whereas Osama bin Laden was an educated man. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current emir of al Qaeda, is a doctor, so also very educated.

I tend to think this distinction isn’t that important, however. The way I see the difference between these organizations in broad terms is that al Qaeda had a pretty big ideological tent for a jihadi group. It said, “You don’t have to agree with us on everything. But we want to help you work with other militant organizations. We want to help you overthrow governments that are unjust.” In other words, “We want to help you attack the United States. We want to help you overthrow the Saudi monarchy.” Al Qaeda built relationships with lots of different organizations to achieve those things, without getting hung up on the specifics of doctrine. Its goal was to collaborate with others.

But it was also fundamentally an elite organization. It wasn’t an accident that al Qaeda only had around 200 members on 9/11. The organization was designed to be small. It was supposed to be elite. Its members thought of themselves as sort of special operators in the jihadi world, who would train, advise, and assist other jihadi organizations. That was the mission. And then they had their own special operations, including 9/11. So that was al Qaeda’s operating model: big ideology, willing to work with anybody, but a small elite organization.

ISIS turned that around, saying, “Our ideology is more restrictive. We are not going to work with people who don’t agree with us on everything.” In practice, they do build political alliances. But ISIS’s ideology is much more restrictive in terms of the people it will tolerate. And that means it is much more willing to declare other Muslims takfir—non-Muslims—than al Qaeda is. Al Qaeda was willing to do that, too, but had different ways of going about it, and the differences are really important.
There are two debates within the jihadi world over when to declare \textit{takfir}. When you declare another Muslim a non-Muslim, you essentially kill them. The first questions are, what has that person done? Is he a soldier in the enemy army? Is he a bureaucrat in the enemy government? Is he a shopkeeper who sells to enemy soldiers? Or is he just a person on the street who doesn’t join our movement? There are lots of different arguments among jihadis over who is actually eligible to be killed. That’s one set of arguments.

The more important argument, which distinguishes \textit{ISIS} from al Qaeda, is that al Qaeda says only somebody who really knows what they are talking about can make the decision that another Muslim is a non-Muslim. You need to get the decision from a scholar, a religious leader, somebody who has thought about this question really carefully. And whenever possible, you need to make that decision about individuals rather than broad categories of people, unless maybe they are enemy soldiers.

The reason why al Qaeda is doing this is to set de facto limits on the types of people within the Islamic community, within the \textit{ummah}, whom they are going to kill. Al Qaeda says American civilians can be attacked because the United States is a democracy and the people support their government. Therefore, all Americans are legitimate potential victims. Within the Islamic world, al Qaeda is much more restrictive about whom it thinks you ought to be able to kill. ISIS is really interesting, because its ideology prioritizes violence and the participation in jihad above all else. In other words, its leaders say, “Look, you might be some brilliant Islamic jihadi legal scholar, but if you don’t actually go out and fight, then you don’t really understand Islam. You are just sitting around reading your books all day. But our understanding of Islam is that you have got to go and fight for it. If you aren’t doing that, then how good a Muslim can you be?” That leads to the position, “Well, as long as you are out fighting, you must be the best Muslim; therefore, you can decide who is not a good Muslim. You are the one who really understands the religion.” This boils down to ISIS saying, “We can kill anybody. We can declare who is a non-Muslim and go kill them.” Killing isn’t centrally controlled.

So this is a real challenge in ISIS’s ideology because, on the one hand, ISIS is trying to build a state structure. On the other hand, it has always espoused this ideology that delegates authority down to individuals to make this incredibly far-reaching theological, ideological, and political decision of declaring another Muslim to be non-Muslim. The way ISIS tries to square that circle is by saying, “Well, that was true until we had a Caliph—until we declared that there was a Caliphate. Now we all listen to him.” But it had already created this ethos, this long lineage of ideology that devolves this kind of authority to lots of different people. Now ISIS’s leaders are trying to get it back in the box—and that’s going to be hard for them to manage. ISIS, in the long run, is going to be fractious.

The other reason ISIS is likely to be fractious in the long run is that while al Qaeda has this big tent ideology but a small organization, ISIS has a more narrow ideology but a big organization. If you want to join ISIS, the number one thing you have to do is show that you are willing to go to them. If you do that, you can get in. You are part of the club. You see this difference reflected in the different ways that foreign fighters interact with some groups in Syria. For example, to join Jabhat al-Nusra, which is an al Qaeda affiliate, somebody has to vouch for...
you; you have to be a known entity. It is a smaller, more exclusive, more elite (in some ways) organization. Whereas with ISIS, if you show up and you are willing to do brutal things, that is more or less your stamp of approval. It’s almost automatic.

This is a major difference in the ways al Qaeda and ISIS were structured. But I think it’s also one of the things that empowers ISIS and gives it the ability to recruit people remotely. It is saying not just, “You are a good Muslim,” but also, “You can be part of our group. And all you have to do is believe you are.” In contrast, al Qaeda might say, “You go do your thing over there, but you are not really al Qaeda. You are part of our movement, but you are not part of our organization.”

I think this has something to do with the ability of ISIS to inspire people in the West to come and join them. And I certainly think it has something to do with their ability to grow so quickly. That said, that ethos, that ideology, that willingness to accept all these people, means that ISIS is going to be inherently fractious. That is its Achilles heel in the long run. I don’t think it will be able to hold together, but I do think that it will be resilient and hard to destroy.

BORER: You more or less answered my next question. I was going to ask you about the potential impact of ISIS outside of Syria and Iraq. It sounds like they are trying to consolidate power inside the Caliphate, but are they still going to have an echo effect in other parts of the globe, meaning effects that they may not be able to control?

FISHMAN: That’s the biggest change, in my opinion. There was this powerful continuity from 2006 until now: the Islamic State of Iraq was intended to be a real state in the way that we think of ISIS as a proto-state or a pseudo-state today. At least, it has a lot of those elements to it. But when ISIS declared itself the “Islamic State,” the Caliphate, and said everyone should swear allegiance to it, that was a difference. It was saying, “Not only are we going to govern here in Iraq and Syria, but we are a point of inspiration and leadership in all of these other places around the world.” That’s new.

ISIS’s predecessors always had regional connections. So the group that became ISIS had lots of connections in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Europe. But ISIS’s leaders purposefully avoided saying all of their supporters out there were part of the organization, because they wanted them to be able to operate without the affiliation. Not being formally affiliated with al Qaeda in Iraq or the Islamic State of Iraq gave those sympathizers some operational security. That has clearly changed. Al Qaeda had a sort of built-in advise-and-assist mission for decades, and it’s not totally clear to me how ISIS is managing that today. How often are they sending people from Iraq and Syria to Gaza? To Libya? To the Sinai? To Afghanistan? To bolster these affiliate provinces of ISIS? It’s a hard thing to learn about from open sources.

There is a lot of circumstantial evidence that suggests this is happening in ways that are different from before—certainly a lot of evidence that it is happening digitally. ISIS is taking lessons learned and packaging them up to be used in other places. And that’s smart; that’s what people do. The United States does that: we package up learning materials to reflect on and to expand our digital reach. Well,
An Iraqi security officer carries a dead citizen after a suicide car bombing, claimed by ISIS, in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq, on 3 July 2016.

Aftermath of suicide bomb attack in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq, on 3 July 2016.
ISIS is doing the same thing, but fortunately, they don’t have military schools where everybody can get together. To the extent that they do, those are in Iraq and Syria.

This is actually one of the fascinating differences between ISIS today and the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 and 2007. One of the great challenges for the organization in 2006 and 2007 was that most of the foreign fighters who came in had no training whatsoever. They really didn’t know what they were doing, and they were actually a security problem for the Islamic State of Iraq. They would show up, they would speak Arabic with a conspicuous accent, they wouldn’t have any knowledge about Iraq, they wouldn’t be able to shoot straight—in short, they wouldn’t have even basic skills.

BORER: They were foreign tourists?

FISHMAN: Yes, they were tourists. You can turn a tourist. You can use a tourist as a suicide bomber. But some of these foreigners didn’t want to be suicide bombers, so the Islamic State of Iraq needed to find a way to train those people and needed to find the space to train them in. That was also a problem. There was a lot of talk for a time about what a “safe haven” meant for the group. A safe haven means you can take tourists and turn them into soldiers. Al Qaeda in Iraq had such a place for a while in 2005–2006, and then it lost it for a long time. Now ISIS has one again, and it is still getting a bunch of tourists. This time, though, it also has the ability to train tourists and make them into soldiers. That’s terrifying.

BORER: I am going to wrap up the interview with the “king for a day” question. If you were the king of the world, what one significant change would you make that you think would reorient this situation?

FISHMAN: I would try to get back to a consensus among countries—a consensus that I, maybe naively, felt was there at one time. Maybe this consensus never really existed, but in 2005 and 2006, especially after al Qaeda’s attacks on Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2005, I thought that there was a real sense of consensus in the international community that you can’t use jihadis as tools of state foreign policy. Lo and behold, when the Syrian civil war started, lots of countries essentially tried to instrumentalize the jihadis to go after the Assad regime. Frankly, the Assad regime had been trying for a long time to instrumentalize jihadis as well. So it was sort of a pox on everybody’s house.

I thought that the lesson had been learned, but it hadn’t. This current situation illustrates the danger. We can see this today in some very dangerous Gulf state support for some of the jihadi groups operating in Syria. We see it in Turkey’s toleration of foreign fighters crossing the border with Syria for years. We saw it in Assad’s behavior for decades, first in Lebanon and then in Iraq, as well as within Syria. The global community of responsible people has to agree that there are certain kinds of behaviors and certain kinds of ideas that are just unacceptable, and that are corrosive to stability. The kinds of ideas that ISIS and its predecessors have been pumping out for 15 years now should have been alarming enough, and everybody should have known that these were people to be avoided at all costs. The fact that the Syrians didn’t know this, that the Iranians tolerated some of the jihadis’ behavior as well, and that American allies in the Gulf and Turkey did the same—all for their own purposes, all for understandable strategic objectives—was unacceptable, in my opinion. So we have to try to get back to a point of consensus around this problem. I don’t know how you do that, because now the choices are getting worse, with ISIS pushing the limits of what a jihadi group is. Some people even see groups like Jabhat al-Nusra as a reasonable alternative these days. And I think that’s crazy. We have got to turn that around. ◊

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER

Dr. Douglas Borer teaches in the Defense Analysis department of the US Naval Postgraduate School.

This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

NOTES

1 The Combating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP) aims to collect and archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by military and other security personnel from around the world in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in the future.

2 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the official positions of the US Naval Postgraduate School, the US Department of Defense, the US government, or any other official entity.
The phrase “war comic” feels oxymoronic, doesn’t it? While war poetry, war novels, and war movies are long-accepted narrative forms (the first ballads passed down in most oral traditions are war epics)—and despite the rampant humor some of those forms exhibit—somehow the words “war” and “comic” just don’t seem to go together.

There’s the more highbrow term graphic novel. It’s kind of a weasel term, borrowing as it does the solemn acceptance of the novel as “art,” while furthering the assumption that no mere comic can claim that august mantle. But let’s use the term anyway, at least until the canon comes up with a better one.

Terminal Lance: The White Donkey is a graphic novel based in part on one former Marine’s experience in Iraq. Some of you may be familiar with author Maximilian Uriarte’s “Terminal Lance” strip, which is published in the Marine Corps Times newspaper and on his own website. The first time Uriarte went to Iraq, in 2007–2008, he deployed to the Zaidon region as the turret gunner of an MRAP. Based on his own experiences during that deployment, The White Donkey follows a Marine named Abe and one of his buddies from early in their enlistment to Abe’s dark, PTSD-induced encounter with suicide.

Moving Parts

Graphic novels generally have two aspects: the pictures and the words. Both carry the story’s plot and themes equally. For this article, we’ll look at the pictorial art and how it conveys the story’s plot, themes, and emotions. I lean heavily on Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art, a fine work that gives an insider’s perspective on how comics and graphic novels function.

Just as each sentence in a novel is (one hopes) carefully crafted by the author for a specific effect, to illuminate a character or scene or to convey thematic meaning, so is each aspect of the art in a graphic novel chosen to depict the author/illustrator’s intent. The illustrator of a graphic novel makes deliberate choices not only about what should be described in words and what should be shown in pictures, but also about the level of visual abstraction, the appearance of lines, how to distribute panels to show time or convey feeling, and how to use color (or its absence) to best effect.
Abstraction

Let’s begin with the knottiest, but in many ways most interesting, aspect of graphic novel illustration: abstraction. Put simply, any object can be drawn as a photorealistic imitation or as a quick sketch of just a few marks, or as any interpretation along the spectrum between those points. Take a look at your coffee cup: it can be drawn with all the stains and scratches, or as a couple of lines and arcs. The viewer will recognize it in either case.

This is even more the case with human faces—a face can be reduced to two dots and a line, and you’ll still recognize it as a face, as in figure 1.

The interesting thing about levels of abstraction is that the more detailed a drawing of a face is, the less likely one is to identify with that character. In figure 1, that handsome fellow on the left is clearly a white guy somewhere around age 40; as you move toward the right he begins to lose those distinctive features until, at the far right, he may not even be a he. That far-right face could be any person, at any age. The specific face has become the idea of a face. This degree of abstraction allows a reader to see him- or herself as the character, to enter into the world of the story as that character.

In The White Donkey, our protagonist Abe is introduced in a very detailed image (figure 2).

Underneath the helmet, he has identifiable features and a clearly sanguine expression, and we gather information about him: he’s young; has nice-enough, regular features; he’s got on military gear; he’s maybe a little bored. Can a reader identify with him? Perhaps in parts—being a young man, being in the military. But can a reader (psychologically) become him? Not likely. He’s still only himself, and the reader can’t have his specific features.

But in moments of high stress, something interesting happens (figure 3).

Gone are many of the distinguishing features—the shape of his eyes, the few lines around his mouth, the contours of his lips. He’s pure, abstracted expression now: he’s all terror. Granted he’s not two dots and a line, but still, it’s not much of a stretch to say that you can’t be positive he’s even a he, and so this face could be anybody. In your mind as a reader, this could be you. Abstraction opens the door; it allows you to feel terror.
Line

You might think that lines wouldn’t have much to say, but they’re actually very expressive (figure 4).

And there are yet more variations on a line than shown here: drawing software can create thousands of different types of lines. A person drawing by hand has an infinitude of choices. Everything about a line carries meaning: its weight (thickness), angle, hue (darkness or lightness), uniformity, and so on. In the panels shown in figure 5, the gradual lightening of the donkey’s lines gives the scene a ghost-like spectral feeling.

By this point in the graphic novel, the donkey has made a few interesting and unlikely appearances. It clearly carries some heavy symbolic significance for Abe and his companions, and for Uriarte. In figure 5, as the donkey disappears, we must ask what the donkey represents—is it a hallucination? A dream? A vision? Or a sign?
Panels as Time

In traditional comics, a panel was literally a box—one box that surrounded each drawing. In newspapers, an editorial comic might be one drawing in one box, while a daily strip might have four or five same-sized boxes. Comics these days use panels far more flexibly and interestingly, so that now a panel can convey time.

In real life, time is not experienced as a sequence of fixed, equal parts marching in lockstep. Combat time has been called “long periods of boredom punctuated with sheer terror.” Panels chop time into discrete moments or events, and the shape of the panel illustrates not the duration of time but the feeling of it (figure 6).

In the top image, the disinterest of the mustachioed fellow, staccato in three panels, is clear and unchanging. It could have been represented in just one panel, but the duplication makes it extra clear that some time has passed before he answers his interlocutor’s question.

In the bottom image, some uninteresting detail has been added (the lamp, the back of the chair), but the experience is of a long stretch of time between question and answer. It actually feels longer than the three staccato panels.

Uriarte uses panels to very good effect in *The White Donkey*. After Abe undergoes an assault of a haircut across 13 panels that are compressed into two pages, Uriarte gives us this image, which occupies the next full page (figure 7).

Abe’s resigned disgust is evident in the expanse of that panel, and the fact that it occupies a full page gives us plenty of time to absorb his feeling.

In general, Uriarte uses multiple panels to express compressed time, and larger ones to express its expansion. In figure 8, Abe’s on his first mission in Iraq, an escort patrol. His job is to keep an eye out for any suspicious item in the road that might be an IED. Here he’s spotted a truck ahead that’s carrying some large and unidentified canisters, but his more experienced driver has told him to chill. Figure 8 shows the art as they pass the truck.

The alarm in his face is evident (again, note how his face is drawn more abstractly) and the tight space between the three panels gives a feeling of time being squeezed. These three panels are also chained by Abe’s drumbeat of curses—reading them, one counts each curse as a second or so of time. Taken together, words and picture create a sense of time being terribly distorted, as it must feel to someone who fears they’re passing a monstrous bomb.
Shortly after this event, Uriarte introduces the reader to the white donkey of the title. The convoy has passed the not-a-bomb truck but has not yet reached its destination when it is stopped by a white donkey in the road (figure 9).

This image is the first in the graphic novel to span two pages, and Uriarte has made some really intriguing choices for this art.

Many things about it contribute to the feeling of a full stop: the white space around the image (it doesn’t continue clear off the page); the border around the panel; the balance of the lead truck’s big, heavy, black wheels across the centerline of the image. Although the donkey is clearly walking, the two trucks appear motionless, and the blurriness of the palm trees in the background gives no clues about movement. It’s an odd, arrested image. It tells you without doubt that the donkey is important, very important, and you should stop and pay attention.
This panel also covers two pages. It is composed of a number of small scenes—handing out water, negotiating at a checkpoint—entirely without borders. Across the top of the panel, trucks come “in” toward the reader; at the bottom, they exit the scene in rhythm like a small metronome. The images are all fairly matter-of-fact and some are quite heartening. But they are unbounded by time, by the black boxes of panels, and the feeling the collage conveys is of random events or memories in snapshot. This is the everyday routine.9

One last panel relating to time is fun to examine. This one occurs after Abe has been in-country for some time and the newness of the experience has waned. Scary things have happened, but none were scarring, and the images feel settled and unconnected (figure 10).
Color

Color is emotion. Don’t believe me? Look at figure 11. Give it an honest test, now: look at it for at least five seconds and check your inner emotional register.

Don’t you feel a little cheerier, kind of upbeat, like maybe tonight would be a good night to go out dancing? I don’t have the expertise in color theory to tell you why, but for most Westerners, these are energetic, happy colors.

Ok, now have a look at this (figure 12).

If you’re like most Westerners, you’ll be feeling rather less chipper now, maybe a bit relaxed, even serene. Color has a very direct effect on how we feel.

Uriarte uses a lot of what are called duotones in his work. The images are made of black and one other color (see figures 7–10 for examples). Sometimes the color is pale, sometimes deep, but it is still only one color plus black, which can also become some hue of gray. That’s a duotone.

Generally speaking, Uriarte has a color scheme for each location in the novel: a sea-green for the training base in Kaneohe, Hawaii, sepia for Camp Wilson, California, purple for some half-waking states, khaki for Iraq, and so on. These shifts make for a nice visual hint: the reader absorbs the idea that if the color has changed, so has the place—external or internal. The color is not always bounded by line (remember learning to color within the lines?), but is generally a wash of watercolor that shifts subtly in hue and density, giving the work a range of texture. It’s a nice choice that allows for a lot of variation in the art.

Having set up these rules for himself, Uriarte breaks them in some interesting ways. In one panel, otherwise colored in Iraq khaki, the red and green of the Iraqi flag practically jump off the page. For reasons I can’t guess, the goggles the Marines wear are often some color between tan and a dusty rose. In figure 13, Abe is handed a Gatorade after a particularly horrible day, and the drink’s cheerful pink is jarring.

One of the worst events in the book is covered in red. The scarcity of other colors throughout makes that red feel shocking and terrible. Finally, the most awful nightmare in the book is all in stark black, white, and red, and is unforgettable.
Words & Pictures

So there you are at your drafting table, working up the next scene in your graphic novel, and you have yet another choice: do you write it in words, or draw it in pictures, or both? If both, do the words express the same thing as the picture? The opposite of the picture? Something entirely tangential to the picture, like a character’s thoughts in a bubble? Do the words amplify some non-pictorial aspect of the scene?

There are a lot of choices to be made.

Uriarte tends generally to stick to pretty conventional choices: the words and images in *The White Donkey* are closely tied, one generally supporting the other. There are usually a lot more words on the page when Abe’s at home on leave, so we can assume civilian life is a lot chattier. Until the end of the book, that is.

Abe is deep into depression and suffering from PTSD by the last 40 or so pages of the book, most of which are set in Oregon where Abe is home on leave. It’s very evident that language is deserting him. He speaks very little—whole two-page spreads can go by in which he stays silent, and all the talking is done by others in his life. There’s one remarkable series of 20 pages (an eternity in a graphic novel) where he speaks not one word and is not even capable of language. Uriarte is trying to convey, I think, the terrible difficulty of putting the experience of the Iraq war into words. Or perhaps the fact must be faced: there are some experiences that cannot be conveyed in words, however expert the writer.

Why a Graphic Novel?

Uriarte says that he began writing this story as a conventional novel, which didn’t work. He then wrote it as a screenplay, ending up with a 145-page version. (That would make it a two-and-a-half-hour movie.) Because Uriarte earned a degree in animation, storyboarding the screenplay must have seemed a natural fit.

Given the other art forms that are available, however, we have to ask: why make a graphic novel? A text-based novel would surely find a wider audience than a graphic novel. A movie could make more money. Assuming that either of those things could be made without creative interference, what advantage does the graphic novel hold for a storyteller?

A text-only version of Abe’s story would lack the immediacy that the graphic novel inherently offers. However fluent we are, reading text is still an effort of translation: the reader must transform the squiggles of type into mental images, sounds, smells, and so on. A graphic novel does all this mental heavy lifting for us by drawing the pictures, giving sound a shape (the jagged shape of the line container around a BOOM, for example), and depicting smell with stink lines or an expression of disgust on a character’s face. It’s a much less mediated, much more direct experience.

Why not make a movie, then? A movie hands the watcher all the pictures and sound a person could hope for, sometimes to the point of sensory overload. But one thing is lacking in film: identification. To a limited extent, people do
identify with a movie character when the character shares some trait with the watcher or expresses some familiar emotion. Still, I think the experience is much more constrained. We can never become that guy on the screen because he’s seven feet tall, absolutely specific in his gestures and voice, and probably much better looking than we are. In a comic book, the generally iconic style of representation allows a reader to inhabit the character, not merely to observe.

All in all, I found that *Terminal Lance: The White Donkey* allowed me to feel what it is like to be a shiny new Marine in a combat zone—and all the deadly consequences thereof—in a way no other medium could do. Reading it is an experience not to be missed. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Ryan Stuart** is an artist and designer, and the design and layout manager of *CTX* at the US Naval Postgraduate School.

This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

NOTES

1. Let’s agree to ignore the propaganda comics skulking in that dark corner over there.
3. See http://www.terminallance.com
4. Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicle.
5. Some graphic novels don’t have words at all except the onomatopoeic ones, like “BOOM!”
7. Let’s dispense quickly with the fantasy, shall we? No art form—pictorial, musical, kinetic, written, or whatever—is a serendipitous outpouring of Muse magic. All serious artists study and practice their craft for years, as thoroughly as any scientist, soldier, and—it is fervently to be hoped—dentist does. Inspiration isn’t the same as fairy dust.
8. The donkey gets some very interesting visual treatments throughout the work, as do a coyote or two and a fox.
9. Other, later panels have quite the opposite visual effect. I hope readers of this article will be intrigued enough to read *The White Donkey*, so I’m not going to spoil it by examining those more shocking panels. You’ll know ‘em when you see ‘em.
10. If you’re curious, you can read more here: http://www.colormatters.com/ . Culture matters with regard to color. For example, in Western cultures black is associated with death; in Asian cultures, death is white. All my commentary here relates to Western cultures. As a side note, I once saw two Pantone books (those are printers’ books of color swatches, a little like the color strips you see in a paint store) side by side: one made for the United States and one for Japan. The two books were easily distinguishable: the very range of color and hue was different. This leads me to wonder whether people from different parts of the world actually perceive color differently, and react to something more than cultural cues.
11. Comics traditionally have used only black and white or duotones to reduce printing costs. I can’t say whether Uriarte chose duotones for this reason, or possibly as a nod to comic art history, or for another reason altogether. It works for his story, however.
12. Learn more about storyboarding here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storyboard . It’s an amazingly useful technique for much more than creating graphic novels.
Global Responses to Maritime Violence

Edited by Paul Shemella
Stanford University Press, April 2016
344 pages
$27.95

*Global Responses to Maritime Violence* is a full discussion of maritime security short of war. The chapters in this volume examine maritime terrorism, piracy, maritime smuggling, and everything in between. The perpetrators of these activities derive benefit from violence and disorder in the maritime domain; the challenge for governments is to impose order while protecting citizens who live by and depend on the sea. Maritime violence constitutes an “ecosystem” in which connections and common threads offer clues to effective government actions. The book coheres around the premise that good maritime governance, though difficult, is worth the considerable resources required. It concludes by offering “strategic precepts” that can be used to guide governments in their individual and collective efforts.
JSOU PUBLICATIONS

These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Library Management System: https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare
by Major Riley J. Post and Colonel (Ret.) Jeffrey D. Peterson, Ph.D.

In this monograph, Major Riley Post and Dr. Jeffrey Peterson offer a compelling look into economic activities and influence in the context of unconventional warfare (UW). The value of this monograph lies in the creation of a framework that provides a structured approach for UW practitioners to employ as they assess and analyze economic factors that influence and support insurgency movements. This framework offers a way to simplify the varied and complex economic activities required to support equally complex resistance operations. The monograph provides examples of tactical economic opportunities that support operational and strategic objectives. To illustrate the use of their model, the authors evaluate the rise and potential vulnerabilities of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The authors conclude with recommendations to enhance training for Special Operations Forces leaders and operators in the application of economic factors in UW.

2016 Special Operations Essays

Each year, the Joint Special Operations University partners with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association in sponsoring an annual essay contest. This year’s first place winner is US Air Force Major Jared Harris, with “Daydreams of an Operational Planner: Reimagining the Counterterrorism Task Force.” In second place is US Army Major Tim Ball, with “Bringing the Alliance Back to SOF: The Role of NATO Special Operations Headquarters in Countering Russian Hybrid Warfare.” This collection also includes high-quality, original works from four other professional military education (PME) students: US Army Chief Warrant Officer 3 James Allbright, Peruvian Army Colonel Ricardo Benavides, US Army Major Orlando Craig, and US Army Chief Warrant Officer 4 Stephen Dayspring. These essays provide current insights on what our PME students see as priority national and international security issues affecting special operations. They add value to the individuals’ professional development, provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the knowledge of the special operations community.
A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare
by Will Irwin

In this paper, Mr. Irwin explores gray zone unconventional warfare (UW) options in the context of the recent Syria train-and-equip mission. To better posture itself for engagement in gray zone political warfare, the US government, and especially special operations forces, must work to reestablish, revitalize, and master important but seemingly lost components of our UW capability, as well as engage in concept development marked by uncommonly creative and innovative thinking. Mr. Irwin argues that early US UW engagement, effective influence and coercion actions, and a more disciplined approach to non-violent civil resistance in Syria could have resulted in more favorable outcomes in line with US interests.

Función de las SOF en la lucha contra el crimen organizado transnacional
edited by William Mendel and Dr. Peter McCabe

Announced in the previous issue of CTX, now available in Spanish! This is the translated version of “The SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime.”
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

The Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX) is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal. We accept submissions of nearly any type, from anyone; however, submission does not guarantee publication. Our aim is to distribute high-quality analyses, opinions, and studies to military officers, government officials, and security and academic professionals in the counterterrorism community. We give priority to non-typical, insightful work and to topics concerning countries with the most pressing terrorism and CT issues.

Submission Guidelines

For detailed submission guidelines, go to www.GlobalECCO.org/journal/ and click on the “Guidelines for Authors” link.

CTX accepts the following types of submissions. Please observe the following length guidelines:

- reports or insightful stories from the field (up to 5,000 words)
- academic analyses (up to 6,000 words)
- photographic essays
- video clips with explanation or narration
- interviews with relevant figures (no longer than 15 minutes)
- book reviews (up to 2,000 words), review essays (up to 2,000 words), or lists of books of interest (which may include books in other languages)
- reports on any special projects

Submissions should be sent in original, workable format. (In other words, we must be able to edit your work in the format in which you send it to us: no PDFs, please.)

Submissions should be in English. Because we seek submissions from the global CT community, and especially look forward to work which will stir debate, we will not reject submissions outright simply because of poorly written English. However, we may ask you to have your submission re-edited before submitting again.

Ready to Submit?

By making a submission to CTX, you are acknowledging that your submission adheres to all of the submission requirements listed above, and that you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them carefully.

Send your essay or other submission to

CTXSubmit@GlobalECCO.org

If you have questions about submissions, or anything else, contact

CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org

Terms of Copyright

Copyright © 2016. The copyright of all articles published in CTX rests with the author(s) of the article, unless otherwise noted. The Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX) is a peer-reviewed, quarterly journal available free of charge to individuals and institutions. Copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, research, or educational purposes free of charge and without permission, except if otherwise noted. Any commercial use of CTX or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder.

CTX is online at globalecco.org/journal