From the Editor

This issue brings you many different perspectives on terrorist activity, beginning with a highly critical discussion by Dr. Steve Miska and Roslyn Warren of the United States’ general failure to protect its “soft” human networks of host-nation contractors, interpreters, and others who regularly put their lives at risk in service of U.S. forces and interests. Dr. Brian Nussbaum returns to the journal (see vol. 2, no. 1) with a hard look at the increasing danger to information networks from anti-technology violence. The paradox, as he points out, is that both the scientists who are developing new forms of technology and those who are willing to resort to violence to stop them believe they are working in the service of humankind.

LTC Rehan Mushtaq delves directly into the question of why Muslim youth in Great Britain become susceptible to the Islamist message, with implications for diaspora youth elsewhere. He describes several of the messaging techniques that Islamist recruiters exploit to attract vulnerable youth, and offers some novel, even counter-intuitive, but simple and accessible methods to counteract their insidious influence.

The next two articles consider the results of violence—the casualties of war and conflict. War, we all know, has been the catalyst for many of the extraordinary medical breakthroughs of the past century. In this issue, LTC Ramey Wilson, MD, expands on ideas he discussed in the CTAP interview that appeared in the August issue (vol. 3, no. 3) of CTX: swift, reliable medical care for injured military personnel is vital not only to the operational well-being of the armed forces, but also for effectiveness, retention, and security. This idea is reinforced by MAJ Cesar Rolon Villamizar and MAJ Andrés Fernández Osorio, who describe a program they helped set up for Colombia’s army to ensure that injured personnel, civilians, and even enemy fighters will be given appropriate medical care within the “golden hour” of maximum survivability.

COL Imre Porkoláb (vol. 3, no. 3) explores the ways in which both NATO and the U.S. Special Operations Command are developing online education tools to enhance readiness and interoperability at all levels of SOF. COL Porkoláb warns that while such methods can be useful to disseminate specialized education across scattered forces, too much reliance on distance learning comes at the expense of the collaborative experience officers gain in a traditional classroom.

The Haqqani Network, a family-based jihadist enterprise that operates on both sides of the porous Afghan-Pakistani border, has come to resemble a mafia crime network more than an insurgency, according to MAJ Lars Lilleby (vol. 2, no. 1). He makes the case that going after their finances is the best
way to end the Haqqanis’ depredations. In the final feature article, MAJ Mike Loconsolo offers us an alternative way
to evaluate the choices Mexican business owners must make when faced with the constant threats of extortion and
violence posed by another terrorist network, the drug cartels.

For this issue’s CTAP interview, Dr. Doug Borer of the Naval Postgraduate School spoke with COL Billy Shaw, an
American Special Forces officer whose job was to train Afghan Special Forces commandos in Afghanistan. With the
support of a forward-looking Afghan general and a dedicated staff, and with fortuitous help from a British journalist,
COL Shaw developed a values-based training program drawn from the ethics of the Qur’an.

We welcome Dr. Pauline Kaurin of Pacific Lutheran University to this issue’s Ethics and Insights column. Dr. Kaurin
explores the timely question of “kill or capture” in an essay that weighs issues of courage and community, and calls
into question our deep assumption that preservation of life is always preferable to death.

The first review in this issue, by MAJ Donald Reed, offers a new look at an old book, The Deceptive American (1977),
by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick. Set in a fictional Southeast Asian country in the 1950s, this sequel to The Ugly
American was suppressed for 22 years, apparently by the U.S. government. It is shocking, writes Reed, “how the main
themes of the novel still resonate.” CPT Edval Zoto (vol. 3, no. 3) then reviews a work of historical non-fiction, The
Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle (2008), by Roderick Bailey. Bailey’s topic is another of those fascinating
but little-known operations that took place during WW II: the efforts of 100 British Special Operations Executive
troops to prevent the Axis takeover of Albania.

Our publications announcements include a new book by Dr. Douglas Porch of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, 2013), plus a number of new essays from our
friends at JSOU.

The upcoming issue of CTX (vol. 4, no. 1 February 2014) will be another special issue, guest edited this time by
Dr. David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tucker’s theme is the evolution of intelligence gathering
post-9/11, and the uses and sharing of information to counter terrorism around the world. Until then, keep on
reading, thinking, and learning.

ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor
Letter from the Editor  ELIZABETH SKINNER

Protecting Soft Networks: Time to Counter the Enemy’s Logical Strategy
STEVE MISKA, MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE AND
ROSLYN WARREN, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

The Ideologies of Anti-Technology Violence
BRIAN NUSSBAUM, SUNY ALBANY

De-radicalizing Muslim Youth in Western Societies
LTC REHAN MUSHTAQ, PAKISTAN ARMY

The Role of Medical Development in Support of Security
LTC RAMEY L. WILSON, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL CORPS

The Challenge of Combat Search and Rescue for Colombian National Army Aviation
MAJ CESAR ROLON VILLAMIZAR, COLOMBIAN ARMY
MAJ ANDRÉS FERNÁNDEZ OSORIO, COLOMBIAN ARMY

The Future of SOF Education: A Vision for Global Special Forces Education
COL IMRE PORKOLÁB, HUNGARIAN ARMY

The Haqqani Network: Pursuing Feuds under the Guise of Jihad?
MAJ LARS LILLEBY, NORWEGIAN ARMY

To Pay or Not to Pay: Criminal Extortion from a Game Theory Perspective
MAJ MICHAEL E. LOCANSOLO, U.S. ARMY

CTAP INTERVIEW
COL Billy Shaw, U.S. Army Special Forces, with Doug Borer, Naval Postgraduate School

ETHICS AND INSIGHTS
Kill v. Capture—With a Twist
PAULINE M. KAURIN, PACIFIC LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY

THE WRITTEN WORD
The Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle
CPT EDVAL ZOTO, ALBANIAN ARMY
The Deceptive American  MAJ DONALD K. REED, U.S. ARMY

PUBLICATION ANNOUNCEMENT AND JSOU PUBLICATIONS
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Major Cesar Rolon Villamizar is currently the commanding officer of the Combat Search and Rescue Unit of the National Army of Colombia and an UH-1H II maintenance test pilot. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence; the Joint Special Operations University; and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. MAJ Rolon has served in a number of ground combat and Army Aviation positions, and is the creator of the CERO system. He also was key to implementation of Colombia’s CSRÚ and TACEVAC.

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Protecting Soft Networks: Time to Counter the Enemy’s Logical Strategy

In local gathering places, away from the ears of the occupiers, insurgents meet and discuss ways to punish occupation supporters. Although the techniques vary—insurgents confront traitors in the street, leave messages at their homes, and threaten their family members—all of their tactics are designed to make supporting the illegitimate occupation unattractive, dangerous, and even deadly. Once identified by the insurgents, collaborators often cease supporting the occupiers, go into hiding, or move their families away from the area. Those who fail to heed the warnings may pay dearly as they and their families live under constant threat. Does this sound like Iraq or Afghanistan to you? It might be. But it is also colonial Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and every other hotbed of the American Revolution. Rather than harm their livelihoods for a highly risky cause like revolution, a large proportion of the colonials fervently supported the English Crown while many others simply hoped to maintain the status quo. The colonial patriots—the conflict’s insurgents—used a variety of tactics to pressure Loyalists to forgo British allegiance, including public recantation, intimidation, financial penalties, and forfeiture of all property, among others. These tactics proved invaluable to the revolution’s success.

Although this age-old stratagem to intimidate collaborators is pulled straight from the American Revolution playbook, the United States today consistently fails to protect the human networks critical to its effectiveness in the field. U.S. agencies are still surprised when enemies use these same pressure tactics to stymie overseas enterprises—tactics America’s founding fathers adeptly used while fighting from a position of weakness against the British. As operational success in any foreign endeavor becomes increasingly interlocked with the strength and durability of soft networks—those nonmilitary and indigenous partners who support U.S. COIN and CT operations—America must build a diverse portfolio of means to meet the safety needs of those partners who are integral to its engagements abroad.1

An examination of the treatment of British Loyalists during the American Revolution turns the United States’ present-day perspective on its head. Great Britain lost its North American colonies, in part, because it could not adequately protect its in-theater soft networks. Today, where U.S.-friendly host-nation governments lack stability, locals who support the United States (U.S. “loyalists,” branded as “collaborators”) suffer intimidation by America’s enemies, a situation that jeopardizes U.S. operations.2 Terrorist groups and insurgents, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, al Shabaab in Somalia, or the Taliban in Afghanistan, quell indigenous support for Western initiatives through coercion and violence. As U.S.
COIN doctrine notes, warfare is increasingly network-centric, with operational effectiveness dependent on the strength of relationships with local allies on the ground.\(^3\) To remain effective militarily, strategists and practitioners must ask themselves the following questions: How can the United States protect its closest indigenous allies in dangerous areas? Does the United States have the right mix of policy tools necessary for its national security actors to operate effectively when cultivating indigenous networks? What policies and means might be brought to bear? Do any other organizations already use best practices? How can the United States proactively protect its soft networks in fragile environments where national interests are at stake? The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly illustrate the problem at hand: the U.S. military, and the State Department to a lesser degree, desperately needs to set up dynamic protection systems to safeguard its indigenous partners who facilitate logistics, linguistics, and other critical functions for overseas operations. Moving forward, the United States must enter hazardous environments fully aware of the risks that indigenous partners take when facilitating U.S. operations. In strategy and practice, the United States must anticipate that the enemy will target its soft networks, and prepare accordingly.

**Experiences with Soft Networks in Iraq and Afghanistan**

With respect to protecting close partners in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military found itself first unprepared, and then ill-equipped. The Department of Defense was blindsided by the enemy’s intimidation (and, at times, elimination) campaigns aimed at collaborators. Military units responded to such attacks through trial-and-error measures, leaving many interpreters and other contractors to initiate their own survival policies. Some interpreters used nicknames and wore face masks when on patrol with military units. They slept on U.S. bases, at the military unit’s discretion, to minimize the risk of discovery during transit between their workplaces and their homes. With a premium placed on U.S. force protection, some units realized too late the peril in which they placed their soft networks; the U.S. mission and the corresponding legitimacy of the host-nation government suffered accordingly.

On the ground, those units that did realize the value of their soft networks found few policy tools available to protect local partners. Indigenous contractors, interpreters, and others took extreme risks to work alongside the U.S. forces; their lives and the lives of their families were jeopardized not only during the U.S. presence but also long after U.S. troops left Iraq. Ultimately, many suffered intimidation—and even death—for their U.S. affiliation. In these environments, daily survival was paramount. Tactically, U.S. units have responded to these challenges by improvising, or by acquiescing to techniques that the interpreters developed on their own, of the kind mentioned earlier. Some units issued weapons and uniforms to their interpreters. Often near the end of a deployment, units explored possible U.S. immigration for their interpreters, to bring them permanently out of harm’s way.\(^4\)

**The Special Immigrant Visa**

As a surface-level policy, immigration to the United States for critical U.S. employees and partners seems appropriate and comprehensive. It is not. For an array of reasons, the vast majority of host-country nationals who assist the United States cannot or will not pick up and move halfway across the world.
Some cannot steer through the labyrinth that is the U.S. immigration system, while others lack either the financial means or the mental fortitude to move their entire family and start their lives over in a culture utterly different from everything they know and understand. The few who can make this extreme relocation to the United States—if they successfully navigate the arduous bureaucratic process—start down a long road riddled with serious assimilation challenges. Meanwhile, the large proportion of indigenous partners who are either not able or not willing to emigrate to the United States find themselves essentially abandoned by the U.S. government and forced to fend for themselves in an increasingly dangerous and hostile environment, simply because they supported the United States. This is true particularly during the nascent stages of a state-building campaign when the host-nation government is still establishing legitimacy. An exploration of the particulars of the United States' special immigrant visa (SIV) policy more clearly highlights the shortfalls of this one-size-fits-all protection policy.

In 2006, the United States instituted the SIV to assist interpreters in immigrating to the United States. This visa remains the only formal policy tool available to protect a limited number of local individuals, predominantly interpreters, who worked closely with U.S. forces and civilian agencies during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. If the interpreter met certain requirements, such as working with a U.S. unit for at least 12 months, he or she could apply for the SIV. The application process, however, is at best cumbersome and at worst pointless. Between fiscal year (FY) 2008 and FY2012, the United States filled a mere 22% of Iraq SIV quotas and only 12% for Afghanistan for the comparable time period. Without active assistance from an embassy or other U.S. source, most foreign nationals cannot navigate, or even understand, the program and its requirements. Moreover, as the only policy available to help America’s indigenous partners, the SIV does nothing for those for whom immigrating to the United States is not a viable alternative. Adding to this, the United States needed (and still needs) large-scale indigenous support for its state-building operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempting to evacuate the most useful and proven U.S. friends and partners from these countries could create a “brain drain” that would undoubtedly directly affect the United States’ future relations with the countries into which it has now poured staggering amounts of time and money. According to the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency manual,

Commanders must protect their interpreters. They should emplace security measures to keep interpreters and their families safe. Insurgents know the value of good interpreters and will often try to intimidate or kill interpreters and their family members. Insurgents may also coerce interpreters to gather information on U.S. operations. Soldiers and Marines must actively protect against subversion and espionage, to include using a polygraph.

Despite the fact that COIN doctrine affirms that mission success hinges on the strength of U.S. relationships with indigenous experts, and on the military’s ability to insulate those experts from threats, the military possesses few policy options to protect its local partners. To explore potential alternative policies, national security departments and agencies should take lessons from U.S. domestic witness protection systems. These systems offer a variety of more
moderate methods, such as identity protection and temporary relocation, that may achieve better results for both protecting partners and safeguarding present and future U.S. missions.

**Domestic Best Practices**

In areas of the United States with prevalent gang activity or that are enmeshed in organized crime (locales where arguably the United States is not the sole legitimate governing authority nor the only provider of stability and security), U.S. federal and state governments take advantage of specific legal protections to encourage informants and witnesses to assist with the prosecution of accused perpetrators. In this capacity, these witnesses and informants fulfill “soft” roles similar to those of indigenous partners in areas of conflict, serving as the eyes and ears necessary for the operation to meet its end goal. Since 1971, the United States has protected key witnesses and their families in cases against organized criminals, gangs, and other malevolent actors under a federal witness security program. Under the purview of the U.S. Marshals Service, the program to date has safeguarded over 8,500 witnesses and 9,900 of their family members.

Many states, such as Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Illinois, and Connecticut (to name a few), also run their own state-level programs. California and some other states offer comprehensive identity-change and family-relocation services (similar to the federal program), while 33 states administer address-confidentiality programs, and nearly every state in the United States allocates at least some resources to help witnesses navigate the criminal justice system. Given the robust and diverse tools used at both the national and state levels within the United States to promote public safety, similar programs deployed abroad could enhance the United States’ operational flexibility and help deliver security to soft networks, yielding significant benefits during overseas operations.

The United States needs to fund measures short of international relocation to fill the deleterious gap in protective services available to local partners in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in future operations. Like many witnesses enrolled in federal and state witness protection programs, interpreters and other local
contractors can offer inside knowledge of opposition actors and groups, in part because some of these contractors worked personally in such groups in the past, and/or maintain ongoing relationships with members inside these adversarial networks.15

Similar to the way prosecutors depend on the testimony of federal- and state-level witnesses to combat organized crime in the United States, the U.S. military relies on interpreters and contractors to achieve operational effectiveness. While the knowledge that some individuals in these soft networks possess makes them invaluable to U.S. operations in combating terrorist networks in places like Afghanistan, it often simultaneously disqualifies them from legally immigrating to the United States. For example, the Material Support Bar enacted by Congress to stop potential terrorists from seeking asylum in the United States also blocks those with a legitimate and “well-founded fear of persecution” from entering the country.16 Of course, not all members of a soft network will possess intimate knowledge of insurgents and militia organizations, but many do, simply from the need to survive and protect their families. Adding to the reasons cited earlier, and because the U.S. legal system bars many of its closest supporters from entering the country, the United States needs provisions short of immigration to protect its indigenous partners. Certainly, if U.S. federal and state law enforcement agencies need dynamic protective policy options to meet the needs of the U.S. criminal justice system, an environment far more mature in its legal and rule-of-law structures than Iraq or Afghanistan, then the United States can also provide an array of policy options for its foreign affairs apparatus if it means to successfully meet its stated goals abroad. Using the domestic programs as a guide, the cost of such a program overseas would be minimal.

At the federal level, under H.R. 1741, the Witness Security and Protection Grant Program Act of 2010, the U.S. Congress authorized $30 million for each fiscal year from 2010 to 2014, totaling $150 million, to support a federal witness protection and assistance program. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the outlays based on historic rates of spending to total $100 million during that five-year period.17 At the state level, even California’s program, perhaps the most robust in the nation, costs under $5 million a year,18 which would amount to a drop in the bucket of overall U.S. defense spending. These protection funds go a long way. Since 2010, California has protected 1,482 witnesses, 2,272 family members, and 2,433 defendants.19 Given the low costs of domestic programs, an international provision could easily be rolled into the National Defense Authorization Act to provide greater operational flexibility to protect soft networks in dangerous areas.

**International Best Practices**

If the U.S. military or other national security organizations received funding for the members of their soft networks, how could they better protect these local partners abroad? The media and some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide useful examples from overseas operations, where many of these groups apply the principles of identity protection and temporary relocation. The media use local “stringers,” or indigenous freelance employees, who understand the culture and can report from areas where Western journalists have difficulty gaining access. NGOs operate with similar local support staff, especially in dangerous environments where foreigners would be targeted. In
The most successful attacks on criminal networks are likely to be those carried out by innovative law enforcement structures that transcend the normal bureaucratic ways of doing business.

In general, these organizations provide anonymity with respect to an individual’s Western affiliation whenever possible. They use nondescript vehicles to mask identity, and avoid displaying identifiable logos. They allow their local employees to conduct their work without traveling into areas where Western offices are known to be located, and instead communicate via phone and internet for updates.

For their partners who face more severe threats, these entities provide modest and temporary relocation alternatives that do not demand significant assimilation or hugely bureaucratic processes. One NGO in Somalia, for example, temporarily moved a local contractor from the Somali capital of Mogadishu to Nairobi, Kenya, to insulate him and his family from militia threats generated by his relationship with the organization. If the danger were minimal or if leaving the country were problematic, this same organization could move an operative within Somalia, from Mogadishu to Puntland, for example, where there is less violence. Depending on the situation at hand, a temporary internal or regional relocation could be sufficient to ensure security and allow the threat to subside. Just like U.S. domestic witness security programs, these media organizations and NGOs protect the identities of and provide limited relocation options for members of their critical soft networks. While difficulties with implementing some of these strategies in the military arena will undoubtedly arise, there is much that military leaders can do to better protect the identities of those within their soft networks and improve discretion during in-theater interactions. They simply need to recognize the threat and be given the operational flexibility to insulate indigenous partners—just as the COIN manual tells them to do.

Conclusion

COIN and CT operations depend on robust and trustworthy relationships with local partners. If the United States wishes to continue achieving success in current and future operations overseas, it should protect those who help enable that success. U.S. partners in other potential conflict zones are watching how the United States treats its networks in Iraq and Afghanistan; the policies used in those theaters will influence confidence and loyalties elsewhere when supporters are needed. Future mission effectiveness may depend on the United States’ willingness and ability to safeguard those individuals, and their families, who risk their lives in support of U.S. objectives. A one-size policy does not fit all. For this reason, the SIV should be only one of the policy tools in the U.S. national security toolkit to meet these ends. As Phil Williams suggested, because “it takes a network to defeat a network, the most successful attacks on criminal networks are likely to be those carried out by innovative law enforcement structures that transcend the normal bureaucratic ways of doing business.” In today’s highly dangerous overseas operations, U.S. conventional forces should creatively protect their soft networks, first, by anticipating the threats, and second, by proactively using a variety of policy alternatives.

The United States must remove its blinders to adequately meet the threats that exist in current and future operations. Promoting an understanding of the value of soft networks and developing a diverse portfolio of policy options, including those short of extreme relocation, will arm national security professionals with the necessary tools to protect the United States’ closest partners and achieve U.S. national security interests abroad. Not only is this a moral
approach but it is an operationally prudent one, and it will do much to sustain the vital human networks that facilitate U.S. national security objectives across the globe.

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NOTES

1. The phrase *soft networks* refers to nonmilitary, indigenous partners in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and law enforcement operations. Soft networks often include interpreters, local business contractors, politicians, and others, as well as their families. The families of indigenous military partners can also be included in this category.

2. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines *collaborator* in this sense as a person who cooperates traitorously with an enemy—a defector: *He was a collaborator during the occupation*. The negative connotation has been traced to the French Resistance’s use of the word to refer to the Vichy government during the Nazi occupation of France in World War II. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), s.v. "collaborator."


6. Under section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163, up to 50 Iraqi and Afghan translators working for the U.S. military have been eligible for special immigrant visas (SIVs) each fiscal year (FY). Public Law 110-36, which President George W. Bush signed into law on 15 June 2007, amended section 1059 by expanding the total number of beneficiaries to 500 a year for FY2007 and FY2008 only. In FY2009, the number of visas available annually for this category reverted back to 50.

7. Representative Earl Blumenauer et al., to President Barack Obama, letter, 5 March 2013: www.blumenauer.house.gov


10. Ibid.

11. 18 U.S.C. section 3521 established the legal basis for witness security and authorized the United States attorney general to operate a federal witness protection program.


15. A review of Massachusetts’s caseload found that “87% of witnesses stated that they knew the perpetrator,” and that “approximately half (50%) of all critical witnesses had a past conviction, 40% had an open case, and 19% of critical witnesses were on probation at the time the petition was filed.” Deval L. Patrick, Timothy P. Murray, and Kevin M. Burke. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Witness Protection Program: An Overview of Cases in Fiscal Year 2007 (Boston: Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, October 2007), 14–18: http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/publications/07-witness-protection-analysis.pdf


20. Interview conducted by Lt. Col. Steve Miska, Washington, D.C., 3 February 2011. The identities of the individual and the NGO involved are protected by a nondisclosure agreement.

21. Ibid.

The Ideologies of Anti-Technology Violence

Dr. Brian Nussbaum, SUNY Albany

A small but determined number of people have taken it upon themselves to oppose technological advances by lashing out at technology and technologists.

The recently released film *The East*, a thriller about a corporate spy infiltrating an anarchist collective, has sparked interesting discussions about surveillance, eco-terrorism, corporate espionage, and the violent anarchist fringe. It touches upon, though doesn’t fully explore, another theme related to terrorism and political violence—those individuals who engage in anti-technology violence. That is, political violence that targets researchers, firms, and producers because of their involvement in technological innovation and distribution. It is a phenomenon with a longer history than you might imagine.

From British folk hero Ned Ludd (who supposedly smashed newfangled weaving machines in eighteenth-century England, and whose name was the source of the term *Luddite*) to “Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, history is full of examples of ideologically based anti-technology violence. Whether they are smashing knitting looms with a hammer for economic reasons or attacking scientific researchers with letter bombs for ideological ones, a small but determined number of people have taken it upon themselves to oppose technological advances by lashing out at technology and technologists. Such violent episodes seem to be rooted in ideologies that identify with Aldous Huxley’s assertion that “technological progress has merely provided us with more efficient means for going backwards.” These instances of violence have been occasional and usually small in scale; recent events, however, suggest that they may become more common, and perhaps even more deadly. This kind of expansion—in scale, scope, or both—of ideologically driven anti-technology violence is not highly likely, but it is also far from a trivial concern.

Anti-technology violence has never been monolithic, but rather has brought together numerous disparate ideological concerns and causes: environmental conservation, ethical questions about the impact of technology on society, economic self interest, anger at industry or capitalism, and broad philosophical questions about what technology does to the human experience. While these ideological underpinnings are quite different from each other, the resulting prescription of some of the activists has been similar: attack new technologies and those engaged in their pursuit.

Recent Anti-Nanotechnology Violence

In the last several years, there have been several cases of attacks and plots targeting the nanotechnology industry, notably in Mexico and Switzerland.

The attacks against researchers in Mexico have been claimed by an organization whose name translates as “Individuals Tending Toward Savagery” (ITS). ITS posted a manifesto online that enumerates many complaints ranging from ethical questions about nanotechnology to concerns about “gray goo” (a notional cloud of out-of-control, autonomous, self-replicating nano-robots). The case in Switzerland involved Swiss and Italian environmental extremists, who targeted a nanotechnology research center with a bomb. The activists in that case are currently in prison.
Both of these cases of terrorism targeting the nanotechnology sector contain a microcosm of the broader phenomena of anti-technology terrorism. Researchers and research facilities are being targeted with violence for doing what the scientists and their colleagues see as a noble pursuit: exploring new science and technology to improve human life. Thus it appears that both technologists and violent anti-technologists are pursuing what they see as the broader good for humanity, the planet, themselves, and their many other constituencies.

Might New Technologies Inspire Further Violence?

There is reason to believe that these recent examples of anti-technology violence may be indicative of a broader trend. Today's scientific and technological advances are increasingly impinging on philosophical and ethical territory that is likely to elicit visceral responses. The increasing fusion of technology and life in the biotech industry, the ability to understand and manipulate the genetic code, increasingly small and effective nano-engineering, and other such developments each creates new ethical and ideological challenges that may well elicit reactions of fear and anger—perhaps some violent ones.

The recent debate around whether Dutch researchers should be allowed to publish the findings of their scientific work on manipulating the characteristics of strains of influenza is another example of the increasingly high societal stakes that scientific research can have. Such scientific research could, conceivably, highlight information that would enable the creation of hyper-virulent biological agents, a possibility that could be as alarming to today's technoskeptics as knitting machines were to eighteenth-century British weavers like Ned Ludd. These high stakes are likely to fuel both uninformed speculation and worthwhile ethical debates about the possibility of technological disasters, such as a man-made pandemic. Many technologies and kinds of scientific research have already created controversies resulting in threatening rhetoric or actual violence; these technologies and research range from stem cell research and nuclear energy to cloning and genetic manipulation.

Science author Arthur C. Clarke wrote that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. Few things raise the ire of people more than “magic,” particularly when that magic seems uncontrollable, plays into their fears, or seems incompatible with their worldview or belief system.

The Monkey Wrench Gang: An Example of Environmentalist Writing

*The Turner Diaries*, a novel depicting the aftermath of a race war in the United States, has long been seen as a key document for understanding the white supremacist and antigovernment militia movements in the United States. The Order, a white supremacist terrorist organization active in the 1980s, took its name from the fictional racist group in the book. Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City had many parallels to a fictional attack outlined in *The Turner Diaries*, a book McVeigh sometimes sold at gun shows. Similarly, Edward Abbey’s *The Monkey Wrench Gang* has helped
While ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have largely eschewed attacking people, their violence is clearly designed to intimidate, harass, and coerce.

The Monkey Wrench Gang gave rise to a new term for anti-technology violence—monkeywrenching, meaning activist sabotage.

The Monkey Wrench Gang is a comedic novel that revolves around a campaign of sabotage targeting environmentally damaging facilities and industries in the American Southwest. While this violence only targets property, not people, today the Federal Bureau of Investigation certainly considers that kind of activity to be terrorism. The book is an interesting contrast to some conceptions of modern-day environmentalists. It features characters eating meat; driving large, inefficient cars; littering; and carrying weapons, yet the characters engage in real violence, unapologetically attacking consumerism, particularly a large dam project they see as despoiling nature. The Monkey Wrench Gang gave rise to a new term for anti-technology violence—monkeywrenching, meaning activist sabotage—and inspired numerous environmental activists, including “direct action” activists and violent terrorist activists like the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). “Violence” in this case is a relative concept; ELF targets property rather than people, and its members historically have gone out of their way to avoid injuring or killing anyone. Some ideological compatriots at organizations like Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), however, have shown a willingness to target researchers—and even their homes—directly.

The types of violence and targets chosen by environmental extremists have historically been greatly limited by the activists’ ideological constraints (such as respect for life—human and otherwise), as well as by their relatively narrow aims. While ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have largely eschewed attacking people, however, their violence is clearly designed to intimidate, harass, and coerce various audiences into changing their behavior.

The Monkey Wrench Gang is not the only piece of writing that should be read in order to understand these kinds of violent activists. Ted Kaczynski’s rambling manifesto and the many public pronouncements of radical organizations such as ALF, SHAC, and ELF offer insight into the justifications for violence that these groups might use.

It is not possible to understand the global wave of leftist violence in the 1970s and early 1980s from the statements of the Weathermen, the Red Army Faction, or the Japanese Red Army alone, without also understanding the broader ideologies that underpinned these radical and violent interpretations. Merely reading the violent activists’ writings is not sufficient. Rather, there needs to be a broader engagement with the ideologies that underpin these impulses, from the Deep Ecology movement, to the anarcho-primitivism of John Zerzan and others, to the Christian anarchism of Jacques Ellul. These movements, like most leftist movements in the 1970s, are not violent movements, nor do they typically advocate violence or even sabotage; however, the ideologies they present have the potential to be used by some fringe elements to support violent action, just as leftist ideologies did decades ago.
Concluding Thoughts

At the moment, violent anti-technology activism is a relatively minor concern for public safety officials, at least when compared with the various other terrorist threats facing many modern societies (religious fundamentalists like al Qaeda, state-supported organizations like Hezbollah, or lone-wolf extremists like Anders Breivik and Eric Rudolph). That said, some of the recent anti-nanotechnology attacks by such activists have shed a light onto the constellation of ideological underpinnings used to justify attacking technology and technologists. The need for discussions about the ethics and implications of technology will only grow as we move further into the realm of Arthur Clarke’s “magic,” but the willingness of a small minority to eschew discussion for violence has the potential to grow ever more serious as the stakes seem to get ever higher.

It is to be hoped that those concerned about the future of new technologies will be willing to stay within the confines of a democratic debate about technology, science, and ethics. We should not forget, though, that not long ago, a math professor in a cabin in Montana waged a one-man war against what he saw as the corrupting influence of technology on humanity. He killed three people and wounded more than 20: researchers, graduate students, scientists, secretaries, small-business owners, professors, a police officer, business executives, and engineers.

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NOTES

1 The East, directed by Zal Batmanglij (London: Scott Free Productions, 2013).
7 Andrew MacDonald [William Pierce], The Turner Diaries (Fort Lee, New Jersey: Barricade Books, 2005).
9 MacFarlane, “Rereading: Robert MacFarlane.”
11 Ibid.
Weak and in some cases almost non-existent family bonds have left young Muslims in Britain caught between the beliefs and networks of their parents and those of the host society. This confusion, along with feelings of disenfranchisement and discrimination, creates an identity crisis. Reinvigorating the extended family would help youth overcome the trauma of their identity crisis by granting them a firm sense of belonging to a network of peers, in the form of cousins and other relatives who would help put family first. Muslim youth, in this way, would be connected with the wider British society through having a sense of place and belonging to something.

The general study of religious radicalization tends either to oversimplify the process by stressing single-factor explanations, or it overemphasizes the complexity of the phenomenon and arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that it is impossible to identify “a typical terrorist,” let alone typical ways of becoming a terrorist. But both of these views are too extreme. Radicalization is a process; individuals do not typically awaken with a sudden epiphany that drives them to join a radical Islamic group. They instead experience an often extensive socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debate and deliberation, and even experimentation with alternative groups. In pursuit of their “true identity,” young people tend to look for a “purer” version of Islam and hop from one group to another: from groups that espouse milder views toward those that take a harsher, more fundamentalist standpoint. Only when an individual is convinced that he or she has found the group that represents the “true” version of Islam is he or she likely to join.

Some clear patterns can help explain why and how people become attracted to radicalization. For instance, Marc Sageman writes in Leaderless Jihad that there are three ways to study the process of radicalization: 1) focus on the individual and his background; 2) search for “root causes” in the social conditions; or 3) concentrate on how people in groups influence each other to become terrorists. Though Sageman prefers the third approach, saying it offers the most fruitful way to understand the process of radicalization, I differ from him and take into consideration all three aspects.

Radicalization, in my view, consists of four stages. Muslims in the UK become receptive as a direct result of an identity crisis. The state’s policies trigger a cognitive opening, making individuals vulnerable to outside influences. Cloaked in their new “Islamic identity,” Muslims suffer a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against all Muslims, both globally and locally. This becomes a central theme of their self-image, as outside influences resonate with personal experiences of discrimination. From here begins the process of recruitment through gradual indoctrination, which marks the second stage. Social bonds play a critical role at this stage and sometimes precede ideological commitments. The third stage involves a process of activism, when the fully
indoctrinated individual undergoes a replication process by spreading his convictions to others to whom he has links. Progression along this path carries the individual to the final stage—fanaticism, the acme of radicalization. A graphic representation of this journey is depicted in Figure 1.

**Predicaments of Muslim Communities in the UK**

The UK is home to 1.6 million Muslims out of a British population of nearly 60 million, according to the UK's 2001 census. The majority of Muslims in the UK have their roots in Britain's former colonial territories of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Others hail from the Middle East and African countries, as well as Turkey. Some of these immigrant families have been in the UK for generations. Muslims are the largest religious minority in the UK: 46 percent of all Muslims living in the UK are British-born.

**Muslim Ghettos**

British Muslims have established themselves in certain areas of the UK over the past several decades. For instance, during my interviews in Bradford, I came across a Pakistani who had lived there for the last 35 years; he said, “When I moved in here, there was only one other family of Asians on the street. But now, over the course of 35 years, it’s mainly Asians. This community is more traditional, like back home, Pakistan.”* One hears much the same story in East London, which has a Bangladeshi majority, or in Finsbury, which is predominantly Arab. Elsewhere in the UK, Birmingham and Manchester are well known for their Asian Muslim enclaves.

One can only understand how tightly knit and closed these communities are if one gets a chance to visit them. They have their own food shops, mosques,

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*Cloaked in their new “Islamic identity,” Muslims suffer a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against all Muslims, both globally and locally.*
schools, and recreational spots. Among these, the two social institutions that cast a dominant influence over the community are mosques and schools. Both are interlinked. As an imam of East London Mosque told me in an interview, “almost 90 percent of the Muslim community that lives in and around East London sends their kids to schools affiliated with East London Mosque.”

Another peculiar feature of the British Muslim community is that one finds people still anchored to their culture and traditions back home. It is a common sight to see people wearing their regional dress, especially women and older people. Muslim families also subscribe to those channels on cable or satellite TV that broadcast in their mother tongue. The main reason they give for this is that “they do not want their kids watching European channels because most of the programs are objectionable.”

**Multiculturalism**

There are many factors that are responsible for the apparent alienation of young British Muslims from mainstream influences in society, multiculturalism being one of them. The unwillingness—or inability—of the British government to promote a single, identifiable British identity and culture is the single most important reason “for the self-imposed segregation of Muslim communities, a proliferation of mosques staffed by radical clerics and the establishment of Muslim faith schools that emphasize Koranic studies and teach South Asian languages.” The policy of multiculturalism may focus too much on ethnic diversity instead of integration. Consequently, after more than sixty years of British citizenship, some ethnic minorities remain segregated by culture. The fact that many adhere to a different religious faith and remain attached to their country of origin and its culture and traditions is deemed problematic because such attachments help discourage them from identifying with Britain and “Britishness.”

**Perception of Not Being Accepted**

There is a widespread perception among Muslims that they are not accepted by British society, despite government programs to support multiculturalism. In their view, experiences with “Islamophobia” belie official claims of tolerance. During my visit to the UK, I asked one Pakistani whether he thinks he has been accepted as British in the UK. He replied, “Well, these goras [whites] tell us you can be a British but not an English, who associate themselves with privileges of the House of Lords, foxhunting, and exclusiveness of class.”

Many Muslims also believe that the law treats them more harshly because of their religion. The Muslim community cites as an example the prison sentences given to the predominantly Muslim Asian participants in the Bradford riots (July 2001). The average length of sentence meted out to 46 rioters was 4.5 years longer than terms handed down to rioters in Belfast.

Although these disparities may not be a direct result of racism, racial discrimination compounds the sense of exclusion and inequity. Forty percent of all Britons believe Britain is a racist society. Sixty percent of blacks and Asians say they have experienced verbal racism, 20 percent complain of physical racial abuse, and 33 percent of Asians feel that racial prejudice is worse now than it was five years ago. These experiences are exacerbated by the activities of
racist, right-wing groups like the British National Party, a group known for its public anti-Muslim campaigns. After the worldwide row over the Danish cartoons that lampooned the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), BNP was accused of deliberately ramping up racial and religious tensions by launching a leafleting campaign with anti-Muslim messages, including its own controversial cartoons of the Prophet.¹⁷

The experience of both racial and religious discrimination often prompts some young Muslims to question their identity and how they fit into British society.¹⁸ According to a survey in 2002, 69 percent of Muslims felt that the broader society did not consider them integral to life in Britain. Since 9/11, the situation has grown worse.

Today, more than ever, British Muslims are asked to prove themselves to be not only loyal and peaceful, but also as integrated citizens.¹⁹ Questions about loyalty and citizenship are regularly asked within a frame that juxtaposes Islam with Europe and, in so doing, frequently serves to exacerbate the tensions of having a Muslim presence in the West.²⁰ Social exclusion, unemployment, and the lack of opportunities further strengthen the perception that citizenship is constructed in exclusive terms.²¹

Clash of Values

British Muslims are experiencing inter-generational strains. The liberal secularism of British law often clashes with Muslim religious doctrine. In his book Made in Bradford, M.Y. Alam attributes this tension to competition between Western secularism and traditional religious beliefs, which leaves young Muslims in Britain caught between the traditions and networks of their parents and those of a host society that limits their acceptance on the basis of race, ethnicity, and faith.²² The dominant reaction to this predicament is a non-violent, non-political, neo-fundamentalist reinvigoration of faith and a return to activism that emphasizes personal action and social activism in search of “a new Ummah [community].”²³ As one reporter puts it, “Reconciling these contradictions with compromising their faith and way of life is a central challenge for British Muslims and the society in which they live.”²⁴

Disenfranchisement and discrimination have led many to wonder, What does it mean to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim country? Here it must be remembered that British Muslims enjoy only limited theological guidance about how to practice Islam in a Western country, dominated as it is by secular social, political, economic, and cultural traditions.

This question of what it means to be Muslim in a non-Muslim country is complicated by the fact that Muslim minorities in Western countries are heterogeneous: they are frequently subdivided by ethnicity, language, culture, and religious traditions. As Olivier Roy observes, “While old minorities had time to build their own cultures or to share the dominant culture (Tartars, Indians, China’s Hui), Muslims in recently settled minorities have to reinvent what makes them Muslim, in the sense that the common defining factor of this population as Muslim is the mere reference to Islam, with no common cultural or linguistic heritage.”²⁵
Identity Crisis and Cognitive Opening

Because many of the young British Muslims drawn to extremism feel a sense of cultural alienation, disenfranchisement, and discrimination in a society that does not fully accept them, they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of collective identity to counteract their feelings of exclusion. Exclusion is constructed by outsiders, i.e., other Britons, whose discrimination reinforces individual Muslims’ cognitive boundaries. Consequently, despite being heterogeneous, Muslims recast and rationalize a collective identity expressed through new cultural material—names, narrative, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on.

Besides creating a collective identity, such alienation and disenfranchisement also lead to what Quintan Wiktorowicz calls a cognitive opening. In Wiktorowicz’s view, individuals are initially inspired by a cognitive opening that shakes their certitude in previously accepted beliefs. Once individuals are willing to expose themselves to new ways of thinking and worldviews, the cognitive opening helps facilitate their receptivity to joining a movement and engaging in activism.

In many cases, individuals can address and resolve a crisis or psychological distress through their current belief system. But, where this seems inadequate, individuals may be open to other views. The specific crisis that prompts a cognitive opening varies across individuals. Any number of things can prompt a cognitive opening (for instance, experiences with discrimination, a socioeconomic crisis, or political repression), which means that there is no single catalyst for triggering initial interest. Worth noting is that when an individual’s identity is tied to religion or derives its meaning from religion, a cognitive opening may lead to “religious seeking”—a process by which an individual searches for some satisfactory system of religious meaning through which to interpret and resolve his discontent.

The Radicalization Path—An Influence Campaign

The Muslim community in the UK, comprising migrants from different countries, resembles a society that is fragmented into clusters of individuals who share similar characteristics. In The Islamist, his autobiographical account of becoming radicalized, Ed Husain describes how his friendship with one particular individual allowed him to connect to more people, and introduced him to new social clusters. Throughout his journey inside different radical networks, Husain was always influenced by just a few people. His account makes clear how a very small number of people can be linked to everyone else in just a few steps. Although the Islamists Husain describes operated in different, distinct hubs—like the Young Muslims Organization, Hizbut-Tahrir, or al-Muhajiroun—their frequent interaction with each other enabled them to recruit new people from society’s vast pool. The singular journey Ed Husain describes can help us better grasp the path of radicalization.

One of the most widely accepted notions related to behavior in networked societies is that word-of-mouth communication plays an important role in shaping people’s attitudes and behaviors. For example, “Word-of-mouth is the most important source of influence in the purchase of household goods and food products. It was seven times as effective as newspapers and
magazines, four times as effective as personal selling, and twice as effective as radio advertising in influencing consumers to switch brands.”

One finds illustrations of this in Ed Husain's journey through radicalism. Husain was mostly influenced by messages that came to him by word of mouth. Although he and other activists would start their own canvassing of new recruits among those with whom they had “stronger ties,” we find them quickly approaching anyone and everyone.

People pass on all kinds of information to each other all the time through word of mouth. “But it’s only in a rare instance that such exchanges ignite the word-of-mouth epidemic.” In *The Tipping Point*, Malcolm Gladwell attributes the start of a word-of-mouth epidemic to the “involvement of people with a particular rare set of social gifts.”

**Societal Links—Some People Are More Influential**

In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment to investigate how humans are connected. This led to his famous concept that every person on earth is connected to every other person through “six degrees of separation.” Gladwell explains that Milgram’s concept does not mean that everyone is linked to everyone else in just six steps. Instead, it means that a very small number of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps, and the rest of us are linked to the world through those special few—people with a gift for bringing the world together. Gladwell characterizes these individuals as Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen.

What makes someone a Connector? The first and most obvious criterion is that Connectors know lots of people. They are individuals with a knack for making friends and acquaintances, and master what sociologists call the “weak tie,” a friendly yet casual social connection. However, Connectors are important for more than simply the number of people they know. They are also important for the kinds of people they know; they manage to occupy many different worlds, subcultures, and niches, which is a function of something intrinsic to their personality, some combination of curiosity, self-confidence, sociability, and energy. While Connectors typically establish both stronger and weaker ties, a critical review of Islamists' network topology suggests that weaker ties are more important because these serve as bridges, linking closely-knit network segments, and it is through these weaker ties that the word-of-mouth epidemic spreads.

Just as there are people who connect people via an Islamist ideology, there are also people who could be termed religious information specialists. Gladwell calls these specialists Mavens. What is critical about Mavens is that they are not passive collectors of information but are individuals who, after acquiring particular knowledge, want to tell everyone else about it, too. Mavens are more influential than Connectors, due to their ability to make a particular case so emphatically that listeners take their advice. “A Maven is not the kind of person who wants to twist your arm. To be a Maven is to be a teacher.” Prominent clerics can be termed Mavens. They have the knowledge and the social skills to start a word-of-mouth epidemic, though what really sets them apart is not so much what they know, but their desire to help others, which turns out to be a very effective way to gain others’ attention. Mavens and Connectors have different personalities and act for different reasons. But they
both have the power to spark a word-of-mouth epidemic. Mavens are data banks: they provide the message. Connectors are the social glue: they spread it.

A Maven or a Connector, however, is not is a persuader. Persuaders are the types Gladwell describes as Salesmen, who have the skills to persuade us when we are otherwise unconvinced about what we are hearing. They are able to quickly build trust and rapport among their audience, and thereby exert an enormous amount of influence over others. In UK Muslim communities, this category of people does not exist as a separate type. Rather, some of the individuals from the other two groups (Connectors and Mavens) undertake Salesmen-like tasks. Once recruits are indoctrinated, and as they adopt their new role as Islamists, they start canvassing as Salesmen. The radical organization they join trains them in persuasion techniques. Those who do this job efficiently later become Connectors, and some of these end up as Mavens as well.

The “Stickiness” Factor

According to Gladwell, exceptional people who are capable of starting word-of-mouth epidemics can always be found. You just have to identify them. The same is true for stickiness. There is a simple way to package information that, under the right circumstances, can make it irresistible. By carefully structuring and formatting their material to enhance its attractiveness, people who want to spread a message engage in “stickiness engineering.” Islamists always try to come up with innovative ways to convey messages. When they cannot tamper with the message itself, they devise new propagation techniques. In Made to Stick, Chip Heath and Dan Heath identify six different tools that can be used to make a message stickier. I will use these to elaborate how Islamists make their message sticky.

The first is simplicity. Developing a succinct message requires stripping an idea down to its most critical essence. Many of Islamists’ sticky ideas are actually “generative” metaphors in disguise. Generative metaphors, like proverbs, derive their power from a clever substitution: they replace a complicated idea with something that is easy to understand. For example, “Islam is the Solution” and “Allah’s Law in Allah’s Land” offer the listener tangible, easily processed slogans that can be used for guidance in complex, emotionally fraught situations. Such simple ideas are especially helpful in guiding individual decisions in an environment where people share common beliefs, by offering rules of thumb for expected behavior.

Unexpectedness is the next tool for making a message stick. How do we get our audience to pay attention to our ideas, and how do we maintain their interest when it takes time to get the ideas across? According to the Heath brothers, the most basic way to grab someone’s attention is to break a pattern. Our brain is designed to be keenly aware of changes. The Heaths say that smart designers are well aware of this tendency and make sure that, when products require users to pay attention, something changes.

It is possible to use surprise—an emotion whose function is to increase alertness and focus—to grab people’s attention. But surprise does not last. In order to ensure their idea will endure, Islamists generate interest and curiosity by making use of the Gap theory and arousing their audience’s curiosity.
According to the Gap theory, we need to open gaps in people’s knowledge before we close them. Islamists believe it is a mistake to give people facts right away. First, they make people realize they lack information by posing a question or puzzle that confronts the listener with a gap in his or her knowledge. In 1994, the Hizb in the UK drew people’s attention by suggesting that something momentous was about to happen in the Middle East. They propagated the notion that the Khilafat (Caliphate) would soon be announced in some Arab country. For publicity purposes, they put stickers everywhere stating: “Khilafat—Coming Soon to a Country Near You?” The message attracted a lot of attention, and many people who otherwise would not have taken an interest wanted to know what this was all about.

Abstraction is the luxury of the expert. Concreteness, by contrast, is another technique to make a message stick among a broad audience. Concrete language helps people, especially novices, understand new concepts. If you have to teach an idea to a roomful of people, and you are not certain what they know, concreteness is the only safe language to use because it helps you construct building blocks out of people’s existing knowledge and perceptions.

What makes a message “concrete”? Islamists always build their argument around some religious perception or set of fundamental Muslim beliefs. For example:

- Allah is our Lord
- Mohammad is our Leader
- The Qur’an is our Constitution
- Jihad is our Way
- Martyrdom is our Desire

If we analyze these messages, we will appreciate that most Muslims cannot object to any of them. Together they cover the entire spectrum of a Muslim’s life. They are easy to remember, because they are short and succinct, yet so meaningful that people can spend hours discussing each line.

What is it about concreteness that makes ideas stick? The answer lies in the nature of our memories. There are some terms that resonate with us and are saved in our minds, and any reference to these by others adds strength to those people’s arguments. For instance, the words jahilia, Kuffar, Mushriqeen, and Khilafat resonate deeply for most Muslims. Making such references creates a concrete shared “foundation” on which people can come together and collaborate. “Everybody feels comfortable that they are tackling the same challenge.”

Credibility is the fourth tool that increases a message’s stickiness. How do we make people believe our ideas? If we are trying to persuade a skeptical audience to “buy” a new message, we are usually fighting an uphill battle against a lifetime’s worth of personal experiences and biases. In such situations, we seldom have an external authority who can vouch for our message; most of the time our message has to vouch for itself. It must have “internal credibility.” What is unusual about the Islamist case in the UK is that Islamists simply manipulate their message and package it in a wider belief system that people are already familiar with. In other words, Islamists’ message has automatic credibility due to its link to the audience’s existing beliefs.
An emotional idea makes people care, and the right story makes people act.
radicalization follows the same rules that fashions or fads do. Fashion trends involve relatively straightforward and simple things—a product and a message. Islamists’ radicalism, on the other hand, is not a single discrete thing, but a phenomenon used to describe an almost impossibly varied and complicated set of behaviors. What is more, radical activists can face serious consequences for their actions, and what activists do often puts them at great personal peril.

It does not seem that the psychological predisposition to break the law would be transmitted casually, from one person to another. Yet, somehow in the UK, this is exactly what has occurred. In the first half of the 1990s, the UK saw the spread of a wave of radicalism that reached its peak at the end of the 1990s and continued into the early 2000s. There were as many religiously inclined people living in the UK at the peak of this radicalism as there had been before, but for some reason a small number of these individuals suddenly dominated the environment.

The incidents that took place between 1990 and 2000 had a huge impact on Muslim society, and were a major factor in helping Islamists to propagate radicalism. The broader context for the British Muslim community’s discontent at the time included: hostility toward the Saudis for allowing the U.S. military and other “non-Muslim” forces to be stationed in the Kingdom—an act many considered to be a betrayal of Islam; hostility to the politics of Western governments and specifically the British government on domestic issues; and antagonism toward the British government for its refusal to ban novelist Salman Rushdie’s controversial book, *The Satanic Verses*. Additional sources of tension were Britain’s involvement in the first Gulf War, its rejection of military action to aid Bosnian Muslims, and its commitment to the United States’ Global War On Terror.

**Broken Window Theory**

According to social scientists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, if a window is broken and left unrepaired, people walking by will conclude that no one cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and the appearance of anarchy will spread from the building to the street, sending a signal that “anything goes.”

This *Broken Window* theory can help us understand the UK Muslim community’s radicalization. When people started displaying an unusual inclination toward religion in the 1990s by setting up exclusive foundations in mosques, canvassing on behalf of extremist positions, and openly espousing radicalism, the British government did nothing. As Ed Husain writes, “Britain offered the Hizb the freedom to express its ideas freely and recruit uninhibitedly. The Hizb was legal in Britain, but illegal in the Arab World.” As a result, people in particular Muslim communities thought their activism was the right way to publicly express themselves. When this public expression spread from the closed quarters of mosques to the streets without eliciting a response from the authorities, it sent the signal that “anything goes.” That signal in turn rendered radicalism as contagious as urban decay, which can start with a broken window and spread through an entire community.

Malcolm Gladwell applies the Broken Window theory to what he terms the *power of context*. Both are based on the premise that “an epidemic can
The UK government’s silence about jihadis from Britain encouraged the younger generation to follow the jihadis’ example.

We can thwart Islamists’ organizations and overshadow their message with our own message.

be tipped, by tinkering with the smallest details of the immediate environment.” Both suggest that a radical activist is someone acutely sensitive to his environment, who is alert to all kinds of cues, and who is prompted to commit to Islamist theory (in our context) based on his perception of the world around him. For example, Ed Husain’s bias toward religion was grounded in his early home life. He moved along the path of radicalization slowly. Small incidents against Muslims kept reinforcing his belief that the West was in fact at war with Muslims. Consequently, Husain and many like him started idealizing those who had fought in the Afghan jihad. The UK government’s silence about jihadis from Britain encouraged the younger generation to follow the jihadis’ example. No one foresaw in the mid- and late-’90s that these trends one day would lead to violent radicalism.

Context of Narrative

When we are trying to make an idea, attitude, or product tip from obscurity to popularity, we are trying to change our audience in some small yet critical respect: we are trying to infect them, sweep them up in our epidemic, convert them from hostility to acceptance. That can be done through the influence of special kinds of people, people with extraordinary personal connections, such as Mavens. It can also be done by changing the content of communications, by making a message so memorable that it sticks in people’s mind and compels them to action—this explains the importance of the Stickiness Factor.

But we also need to remember that small changes in context can be equally important in tipping outbreaks into epidemics. Environmental tipping points are things that we can change. We can, for instance, thwart Islamists’ organizations and overshadow their message with our own message, and by shifting ground.

Reversing the Tide of Radicalism

As long as Muslims in the UK see other Muslims in different parts of the world being victimized in ways that may resonate with their own feelings of exclusion by the broader British society, they are apt to experience collective dissonance and a cognitive opening. Islamists have proved able to exploit this cognitive opening and push fellow Muslims toward radicalism. In that sense, radicalism itself acts much like an innovation, whose “newness” often amounts to simply seeing the same world (or set of problems) from a new perspective.

Gladwell’s concepts, substantiated through anecdotal evidence, provide a workable framework for understanding how the proliferation of radicalism has taken place among UK Muslim communities. By following the simple rules of marketing, a small number of Islamists made their message credible, persuasive, and stickier. Word of mouth and interpersonal connections were critical, as was context and the environment.

For almost a decade, a small percentage of British Muslims has been following the radicals’ path. Today, however, the Islamists’ innovation of the 1990s has come full circle, and has reached a point where its adopters have started to become isolated from the mainstream society. The violent ends of this innovation have created a distaste for it among its target audience. A number of British Muslims are now engaged in what Everett Rogers calls
a “discontinuance” phenomenon—a decision to reject an innovation after having previously adopted it.

This could be the result of the dissatisfaction that comes about when an innovation is inappropriate for most individuals and does not result in any perceived advantages over other alternatives. This state of dissonance that Muslims in the UK suffer from seems to be due to their frustration with not finding the right means through which to redress their grievances. Here, then is our cognitive opening. Here is a situation that we can potentially rescue by diffusing a new innovation.

Contours of a De-Radicalization Campaign

Two alternatives suggest themselves for helping to counter radicalization among Muslims in the UK. The first is to theologically propagate a softer image of religion—something along the lines of “Islamic Enlightened Moderation.” The second is to help strengthen the Muslim community by reinvigorating family values. Both alternatives could be pursued independently or diffused side by side as described in this section.

A Theological Innovation—The Need for an Alternate Community

As we have seen, Islamists have an elaborate system by which they spread their message. The Mavens, Connectors, and Salesmen who assist with this are individuals who are not necessarily Islamists themselves, but almost all have a bias toward religion and being religious. They, like any good religious followers, adhere to certain beliefs that would be very difficult to alter.

Here I need to be clear. I am not suggesting that beliefs can never change. Instead, it appears to me that people’s religious beliefs evolve through a long natural process; the radicalization of a small segment of society simply hooks onto this. Hence, if we want to bring about some change in religious thinking among the UK’s Muslims, this too can only be done over a prolonged period and through inculcation of an altogether different mindset. To accomplish this will require an alternate community to support the proliferation of new theological ideas, and the creation or identification of such an alternate community would present major challenges.

For instance, enlightened moderation is the quality or state of becoming rational or having reasoning power, or being able to think clearly and make decisions based on reason rather than emotions. The concept of enlightened moderation was proposed by the former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf. His premise is that enlightened moderation should apply to all spheres of life, but most importantly to the practice of Islam. The aim is that a moderate version of Islam should be practiced, as opposed to a fundamentalist version.

Presently, however, there are very few Mavens in the UK who could act as beacons of Islamic enlightened moderation, and even if there were such experts somewhere and we parachuted them into the UK from abroad, imported Mavens would require time to establish themselves. As for Connectors, we are somewhat better off. But still, social networks among UK Muslims are dominated by those willing to promote the Islamist message. It would be futile to try to transmit an opposing theological message through these same
Any new interpretation of religious thought, especially one supported by the UK government, cannot be expected to draw much of an audience.

Connectors. Lastly, the most vocal and active Salesmen are already committed to the Islamists’ message. If they wanted to “sell” moderation, presumably they already would already be doing that. Besides, there is skepticism among Muslims regarding any new interpretation of Islamic teachings; it would be very difficult for the persuaders to introduce new theological reasoning.

Potential Pitfalls

Although poll results indicate that most Muslims in the UK espouse moderate religious views, any new religious interpretation would be looked at as an innovation in the field of theology and could prove counterproductive by appearing to promote *fitna* or *bid’ah* (heresy or innovation). Any new interpretation of religious thought, especially one supported by the UK government, cannot be expected to draw much of an audience.

For an idea to spread we need a conducive environment; the Power of Context is important. In an environment where most UK Muslims still feel the West is hostile toward Islam, it would be a mistake to go forward with any plan that counts on a theological innovation—especially one that Islamists can construe as Westerners trying to change Islam. Just as no fashion store should expect to sell great coats with much success in the middle of summer, one must not try to sell a new idea about a theological reinterpretation in the wrong climate. In fact, doing so might give renewed energy and impetus to the Islamists’ fading narrative, especially in the absence of a robust alternate community to support or promote the new religious thinking. Hence, to counter radicalization our idea should not be one that the radicals can counter on theological grounds. Instead, it should be one that they cannot theologically dispute at all.

As part of the overall context, it is also important to understand how the British general public would view the promotion of enlightened moderation. Some segments of British society might not be comfortable with or supportive of the idea of sponsoring or spreading religious ideas. Britons might find these threatening. Islam, after all, remains a religion practiced by a thin minority of the population. Lending undue importance to Islam might create problems within British society, which strives to appear ecumenical and multi-cultural. Similarly, giving too much prominence to Islam might not be politically feasible for authorities, since there is already an argument made by many non-Muslims that any concession in terms of religion might embolden Islamists and threaten the security of the UK government and the English people.

In other words, there is reason to believe that this counter-radicalization alternative might not only be hard to implement, but could well backfire. It is likely to be less successful than assisting with the reinvigoration of extended families.

Strengthening the Family

Family values are important to Muslims, especially to those from South Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, the push to strengthen the family as a basic building block of a non-violent community would not be considered incompatible with Muslim traditions. Families normally believe that when parents directly monitor and/or supervise their children’s interaction with peers, they facilitate and regulate the development of children’s social skills. Parents consciously and subconsciously influence whom their youngsters spent time with in an effort to shape their values and attitudes. Family elders
The sense of belonging and warmth activists enjoy within their group is stronger than what they feel for their own families. For them, a call to rebuild Muslim society around families would be a welcome step. Also, since they themselves have experience living within tightly bonded families, it would be easy for them to adapt and organize their lives accordingly.

Tellingly, Islamists offer a sort of substitute family; they too use community to control and monitor their activists’ activities. As Ed Husain’s autobiography and other literature makes clear, the sense of belonging and warmth activists enjoy within their group is stronger than what they feel for their own families. This is primarily because parents are either too busy to spare sufficient time for young people, or parents are considered by their grown-up children to be too traditionalist. When parents are seen to be old-fashioned, they cannot provide the necessary guidance regarding day-to-day problems. Feeling neglected when it came to handling the challenges of adolescence, Ed Husain, for instance, sought guidance from Islamists—and later offered the same to other Muslims.

If the family system were reinvigorated and supported by the mosques, parents could win back control of their children from Islamists. A reinvigorated family system would assist parents to monitor standards of acceptable conduct, maintain limits, and encourage participation in some activities and discourage participation in others. The aim here would be to bring Muslim children back into the fold of their parents’ tolerant and non-violent religion.

Reinvigorating and strengthening the extended family system would also provide social warmth. Belonging to an extended family would make children feel secure, not stifled. By encouraging more family-oriented events, the community would ensure that, with lots of cousins, aunts, and uncles nearby, youth never feel alone. In large extended families, everyone would be able to find a trusted confidante to turn to for advice and to share personal concerns. If every member found himself or herself occupying a place of value in a large welcoming family mosaic, much-needed harmony, which most young Muslims now miss, would be available. Also, and just as important, the more warmth and significance families retain, the less the lack of British society’s warmth should matter and, as a result, the less alienated Muslim youth should be feeling.

Not only would strengthening this family connectivity reduce Islamists’ ability to dominate the British Muslim community, but it would make the family the cocoon in which adaptation to living in the West is best handled—families make traditions together.

A vigorous family-based social life would also provide parents and other family elders an excellent means by which to engage youth and fully exploit familiarity and word-of-mouth persuasion techniques for raising respectful young people. Father, mother, elder brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins, and multiple sets of grandparents would all be there to provide the necessary support and guidance to the family’s adolescents. Indeed, the stretch (or breadth and depth) of extended families would ensure that the influence of adults could remain strong since parents would have other adults to rely on. They would be able to gather strength from numbers, which in turn would enable them to relax their individual vigilance. This should help ease tensions with their children. At the same time, more parental warmth and clearly defined limits would let adolescents know their parents care for and about them.
Muslim parents want their children to grow up able to participate comfortably in the broader UK society, while still retaining a proud but non-defiant sense of identity.

Non-Muslim Britons have an equal stake in containing this contagion of radicalization among young Muslims. Many Britons consider the decline of family values to be a national problem. One can assume that most Britons would support British government assistance to help revive strong families in Muslim communities. In fact, an argument could be made that the only long-term approach to defusing racism—and even exclusion—would be for Britons to see that Muslim parents want their children to grow up well educated and well-mannered, able to participate comfortably in the broader UK society, while still retaining a proud but non-defiant sense of identity.

Potential Objections

Strengthening the family system might seem to run counter to fully merging Muslims into British society, because their attachment to tradition could exacerbate the sense of exclusion. There is also the chance that, by strengthening traditional family bonds, Muslims in the UK might end up importing foreign influences from South Asia and the Middle East, where the mood is generally anti-Western and the environment is unstable. In Londonistan, Melanie Phillips describes how fears of these kinds of connections inflamed sentiments in the UK.

For their part, those Muslims who belong to the second and third generations living in the UK might find family bonds too restrictive. The generation gap between these youth and their parents might also hinder any move toward making the family a building block of Muslim society. Most second and third generation Muslim children regard their forefathers’ home country traditions as being too orthodox and constraining. Consequently, a call to strengthen family traditions could aggravate the clash of values that already exists between parents and their British-born children. Another problem is that most Muslim families belong to the lower or lower-middle class. In such cases both parents work, often at odd hours. Parents in such families are so preoccupied with trying to make ends meet that it could prove too costly a luxury for them to spare sometime for themselves and family.

Constructing Suitable Narratives

What might help convince people that concentrating on rebuilding family could be a worthwhile investment? To propagate an innovation requires a suitable narrative. The most complex aspect of any de-radicalization campaign is to write or contextualize the narrative to support the innovation. This involves constructing meta-narratives, which act as overarching big themes that set the parameters for “stories” to be told at the individual, local, and community levels.

An example of a meta-narrative for strengthening family would touch on topics like forced marriages, drugs and criminality, employment issues, racism, political representation, faith, freedom, and the notion of home and belonging, all of which are among the problem areas that pop up frequently whenever one discusses the predicament of young British-born Muslims. To overcome these problems Muslims need to not only maintain their distinct identity, but to project themselves as useful members of the broader society. However, in order to ensure that members of the younger generation follow a more progressive path, become better human beings in terms of this world and the world to come, and do not get absorbed or seduced by the wrong
kinds of Western values, they must be plugged back into old, neglected traditional family values.

Part of the pitch would be that British Muslims need a system that insulates their children from the wrong influences of society and provides them with the warmth they long for in an environment in which they often feel alienated. Family offers this strength. Just as the strength of a building depends on its foundation—if the foundation is weak the building is going to crumble—likewise, the Muslim community’s foundation rests on the family system, a vibrant home life, how parents bring up their children, and how connected parents and children stay throughout their lives.

The application of a meta-narrative demands the construction of many small narratives, which is a long-term process. At this point it might not be possible to correctly project how the “reinvigoration of family” innovation might be received. Some major sub-narratives can be identified, however, and these could be emphasized as areas to work on. These might include, for instance, the quality of family support structures; cohesion—the commitment of family members to one another; expressiveness—the degree to which family members act openly and express feelings; conflict mitigation—addressing disparities among and between members of the family; the transmission of ethical standards from parents to children; daughters’ close positive relationship with their mothers; other relatives’ influence during adolescence; and so on.

**Spreading the Idea of Strengthening the Family System**

As for the social infrastructure that could be used to propagate the revival of families, one question that looms is: Would we need to identify new “influentials” in the community or are they already present? Thanks to the non-theological character of this innovation—in contrast to enlightened moderation—it would not be necessary to build an alternative community through which to spread the idea. In a system with traditional norms, the opinion leaders who favor old traditions are always present. This increases the probability of finding enough “influentials” who would carry the new “family” message. These persons could effectively spread our message through their social networks.

Mavens are the information specialists who are readily available to assist people with information sharing, and whereas the numbers of qualified people are limited when it comes to religion, those knowledgeable about social themes like “family” should know no such limits. The Mavens we would need can be identified in two different age groups: older people who enjoy respect and credibility for their insight and wisdom, and younger British-born Muslims who are viewed as successful. The message can also be propagated through religious channels since Islam itself places great importance on family values. Other Mavens from many other walks of life could include journalists, social workers, school teachers, or anyone with communications skills.

As people with a special gift for bringing the world together, Connectors are not particular or choosy about information, and enjoy passing on to others anything they find interesting. They are people who naturally occupy the hubs in multiple societal networks. In the case of “family” as an innovation, we would not require any separate set of Connectors.
We live during a period of time when events in the wider world are bound to continue to provoke a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against Muslims.

Salesmen’s role will be the most critical to this process. Salesmen help reduce uncertainty about an innovation. These individuals must be clear in their own minds about what goals lie behind adoption of the innovation. Unlike Connectors who mostly help with propagating information, Salesmen are practitioners of innovation. Much of their credibility rests in their actions. Thus, to persuade people to adopt family values, Salesmen must show people the practicability and usefulness of adopting this innovation. They must walk the walk and not just talk the talk.

Old values will be acceptable to the elders, but to attract the attention of younger people old ideas may require some creative re-tailoring.

Clearly, to transmit ideas to help this innovation take off, or tip, Mavens, Connectors, and Salesmen will have to use language that resonates with the experiences of Muslims in the UK. Because the message has to be engineered to appeal to both elders and members of the younger generation simultaneously, Salesmen will have a tough task. Old values will be acceptable to the elders, but to attract the attention of younger people old ideas may require some creative re-tailoring.

Another aspect that deserves consideration when creating stickiness in messages is sustainability. In order to reach a point that the new idea becomes institutionalized, an innovation should be open to modification to fit a wide range of conditions. Therefore, the tone of the message will have to be adjusted as behavior gradually changes. People are usually attracted to an innovation when they feel the need for a new alternative. This means creating awareness among people that it is in their interest to seek a stronger family system, given the dissatisfying environment in which they find themselves.

The psychological scars of racialism and disenfranchisement may take a long time to fade away in the Muslim community. But interestingly, this should help the acceptance of our innovation by providing the proper context. Under threatened and strained conditions, it is going to be easier to propagate counter-radicalization messages by stressing the need to pull together and look within, which is what a return to family offers. Nevertheless, overnight changes should not be expected. Ideally, family control over younger generations can, in the short term, slow down the process of radicalization. By reshaping the environment in this way, the plan would be to continue to steer Muslim society away from the Islamists’ path.

Conclusion

Perhaps there is something beyond family that would draw its strength from ideas that are non-theological in character, yet could undercut Islamists’ activism. But I cannot think of what that might be. On the one hand, the family environment significantly determines children’s social development. On the other hand, we live during a period of time when events in the wider world are bound to continue to provoke a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against Muslims, and when there is unprecedented media influence on adolescent identity. Accepting these two givens, the significance of family as an indirect tool for reversing the process of radicalization among Muslim diasporas in the UK seems unmatched.

Certainly, the terrorist threat to the UK is not new; between 1969 and 1998 over 3,500 people died in the UK alone as a result of Irish-related terrorism. Recent Islamist terrorism, however, is quite different. It is linked
to international terrorism and different militant groups that are spread throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, there is a domestic and homegrown aspect to this terrorism as well.

In 2009, the UK government revised and issued a detailed counterterrorism strategy called “CONTEST,” organized around four themes: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare. My approach is fundamentally different. Instead of preventing terrorism from happening, I have proposed reversing the radicalization process itself.

What Islamists have achieved is an innovation. That is why the best course of action for de-radicalizing British Muslims is to go well beyond using prevention strategies; these are important, but far from sufficient. To trigger de-radicalization, we must encourage Muslims to seek a better alternative. Any effort to counter-innovate via religious thought, however, is likely to seem as abid’ah and will fail. Rather than contesting the Islamists on theological grounds, it makes more sense to reinvigorate “family” as a counter-radicalization tool. By pursuing this strategy, the UK government would avoid direct confrontation with Islamists on religious grounds. At the same time, it would be introducing a small change (a nudge, basically) that no theologian could argue against. In one package, making something of extended families could mitigate social strains, hamper Islamists’ mobilization mechanisms, and trump their methods of message propagation techniques based on both familiarity and word-of-mouth persuasion. In other words, reinvigorating family would steal the stickiest of Islamists’ methods right out from under them and might even help strengthen the idea that family values are critical overall to a healthier British society.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES

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5 Sageman lists three levels of analysis: the micro-level, which focuses on terrorists; the macro-level, which focuses on the environment; and the middle-range analysis, which bridges the gap between micro and macro approaches and examines how terrorists act on the ground. Sageman, 13–23.
6 Some experts believe that the UK’s Muslim population may be as high as 2 million, if undocumented asylum-seekers or illegal immigrants are added to the government’s official figures. Paul Gallis et al., “Muslims in Europe: Integration Politics in Selected Countries,” Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL 33166, 18 November 2005, Committee Print, 10.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview with Mr. Umar Qureshi, Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK, 4 January 2009.
10 Interview with Mr. Samad Nevasandu, an Iraqi asylum seeker, London, 6 January 2009.
13 "Islamophobia” was first identified in 1997 by Runnymede Trust’s report. The report noted that hostility and hatred towards British Muslims was becoming more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous. Ziauddin Sardar, Balti Britain: A Journey through the British Asian Experience (London: Granta UK, 2008), 337.


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17 Mathew Taylor, “BNP Accused of Exploiting Cartoons Row with Muslim Leaflet,” The Guardian, 5 October 2006: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/oct/05/uk.advertising

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The Role of Medical Development in Support of Security

The motto of the United States Army Medical Department, “To Conserve the Fighting Strength,” often conjures visions of field medics providing care to the injured on the battlefield or surgeons with blood-soaked gowns using skill and ingenuity to save patients from the grip of death. For some, the motto summons images of soldiers lined up for vaccinations or digging field latrines, thus preventing the diseases that are endemic to areas of conflict. There is little doubt that a robust medical support system directly affects security force readiness, by preventing disease and injuries from sapping a force’s strength, and by restoring the injured to health. History is full of examples where illness and non-battle injuries caused by poor hygiene or environmental hazards decimated a military’s available combat power.

But the motto also alludes to another aspect of safeguarding the fighting force: the psychological benefit for soldiers of knowing that competent care stands ready to serve them if they are injured. When security forces are risking injury or death in the performance of their duties, a competent medical system prepared to care for the injured strengthens their resolve, supports unit morale, and increases the effectiveness of operations by mitigating the risk of injury. As states or international partners work to improve security institutions, they therefore must develop and resource the medical systems that support security forces as part of any security strengthening effort.

Direct Benefits of a Strong Military Medical System

Legitimate governments must maintain a monopoly on the coercive use of force within their borders and abroad. How that force is used and who it serves speaks directly to the state’s viability and its acceptance by the population and the international community. Without security, both internal and external, progress, growth, and development fail. The proper use of force, usually within the context of a legal system that prevents abuses of power, thus supports the legitimacy of a nation-state. At the most basic level, the members of the security forces must be willing to put their lives at risk to serve the state’s interests.

A security officer’s willingness to provide effective security, however, varies according to the perceived risks, and the disconcerting risk of injury weighs heavily on the minds of those placed in harm’s way. While many factors influence the effectiveness of security forces (e.g., professionalism, leadership, legitimacy of cause, unit cohesion, doctrine, training, organization, and camaraderie), security force members also weigh the risk of injury as they work to improve or maintain security. If they deem the risk of injury to be too high, members of the security forces could, while appearing to be conscientious, reduce their risks by conducting operations in a way that ultimately has no substantial impact on security. One can easily predict the results: ineffective operations lead to a lack of real security, and a lack of security stalls stability and development.
My research into this quandary explored the influence of medical support on security operations, and the role of developing medical systems and institutions that support security forces as part of a state’s security-strengthening efforts. A comparison of the productivity of security forces in over 150 countries, based on the availability of ambulance services in varying levels of violence, showed that security forces with access to pre-hospital medical care were more effective at doing their jobs. The application of game theory and utility theory to the data revealed that the availability of casualty and evacuation services had a direct influence on the willingness of security personnel to conduct effective operations. Together, these findings clearly suggest the influence of medical support on the behavior and effectiveness of security forces. Without a medical support system to provide care to personnel injured in the performance of security operations, those operations were less effective.3

The benefits of a strong medical system to support security operations may not initially be obvious. In stable areas with good security, the importance of a robust medical support system may not reveal itself until the risk of injury to security forces increases significantly, such as during an uprising or riot. While the risk of injury remains small, security forces place a low value on the presence or absence of medical support, and its lack has no appreciable impact on effectiveness. Once the risk of injury increases, however, the presence of effective medical support directly influences both the behavior of security forces and security.

At its root, security force medical support is a form of insurance. If the state doesn’t perceive a need for it, the state is unlikely to invest the necessary resources to provide it. A robust medical support system, which is both technically demanding and potentially expensive, takes time and resources to develop. In the absence of a demand signal urging the development of medical support for security forces, it is understandable why many developing states fail to invest in this aspect of security development. As levels of violence increase and the need for medical support becomes clear, an unprepared medical system will not be able to adapt or develop fast enough to prevent the unnecessary loss of life or a decline in security effectiveness. The risk to the state, therefore, arises from its failure to both appreciate the importance of the medical system and invest the required resources to develop a medical capability before it is needed.

As states proactively evaluate the current and future requirements of their security force medical systems, they must pragmatically consider the capabilities that will be needed during periods of increased violence, and balance potential future needs with current resources. Even in areas of instability and violence, the demand signal for medical support may be artificially low because security forces, in an effort to mitigate their risk in the absence of reliable medical support, have already adjusted their behavior or operations. The true need for medical support may not be known until the security forces aggressively conduct operations; they will, however, be less willing to do this without good medical support. States, therefore, must provide medical support based on the likely requirements if security operations were conducted effectively. This may involve temporarily increasing that support in specific areas until real security is established.
Afghanistan provides an illuminating example of how the presence or absence of adequate medical support directly impacts security development. As U.S. military forces have provided the bulk of medical support to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for the past 10 years, U.S. forces have strengthened and girded the resolve of the Afghan forces. By providing medical support to the ANSF, the coalition secured the risk-mitigating benefits that medical support has on security operations. Providing this service external to the existing Afghan military health system, however, removed the demand signal for the aggressive development of indigenous medical support that could be sustained by the Afghan security forces once coalition forces depart. Instead, coalition forces spent more time assisting the public health departments to meet the medical needs of civilians as part of counterinsurgency strategies, and the ANSF medical system experienced only intermittent and uncoordinated development. With external medical support now decreasing as coalition forces draw down, the nascent ANSF medical support system cannot meet the casualty evacuation requirements generated by independent security operations. The lack of an adequate indigenous security force medical system threatens the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and their ability to operate independently.  

Indirect Benefits of a Strong Military Medical System

The benefits of a strong medical system to support security operations extend beyond the strengthening effects of tactical field care and evacuation. Such a system also provides indirect benefits to the security institutions, the public health sector, the state, and the region.

A strong, dedicated medical system incentivizes service in the security forces and supports recruitment and retention. In countries with a substandard or developing civilian medical capability but a good military system, volunteering for service provides individuals with access to competent and capable medical care for themselves and possibly for members of their family, and maximizes the value of training already invested in current personnel by keeping them healthy.  

By caring for the individuals in the organization, which is a fundamental component of leadership and professionalism, a competent medical system strengthens the professional milieu of the security organization, improves morale, and communicates to the individual and his or her family members that they are valued by the organization. For institutions that strive to inculcate their members with a service mentality, providing medical care models the values that the institution expects its members to embrace. If care is extended to family members, the medical system allows security personnel to focus on their duties rather than be distracted by family medical concerns.  

For the public health sector, the benefits of a competent security force medical system extend beyond the security sector. Security forces routinely operate in areas with stunted development and inadequate public services (e.g., poor or scarce public and private hospitals for the civilian populace). A strong security force medical system not only supports security operations under these conditions, but also can be used to assist in providing care to the civilian populace, and to build local capacity to support the public health sector.
Regional medical interoperability has the potential to leverage the medical strengths of multiple states.

As states evaluate their security forces and work to improve their effectiveness, they should include a pragmatic assessment of their medical support system in the analysis.

resources and the ability to operate in austere conditions, a robust security force medical system can provide medical care in areas where other government entities cannot, thereby ensuring essential care until the civilian sector develops. The security forces, in turn, benefit by demonstrating their service to the population. If done correctly and professionally, medical “civic action” missions connect the security forces to the population and demonstrate that the security forces are there to serve the people, and not the other way around. Security force capabilities in the areas of advanced communications, coordination, logistics, and transportation can also augment the delivery of civilian health care through partnerships with the public health sector. The current civilian aeromedical evacuation capability in the United States, for example, began as a joint partnership between U.S. government agencies and the military to improve traffic safety. The solution to a public health problem was facilitated by a robust and capable military medical system.

For the state, a robust security force medical system can provide medical care to the civilian population when it is not available through the public sector, respond to disasters or emergencies when the civilian medical system is overwhelmed, and partner with other government agencies to develop solutions to complex problems. Investment in the security force medical system also signals the degree to which the state values its citizens, especially those who serve on behalf of their state, and makes the state’s commitment clear to the population at large and to the international community. A capable medical system communicates the intent of the state to meet its ethical obligation to its security personnel and reveals the value that it places on service to the state.

Just as a strong and capable national security force strengthens a state, a robust state has the potential to stabilize a region. When states partner with and strengthen their immediate neighbors, the region benefits from increased security through collaboration, dialogue, and reinforced support. Security cooperation facilitates regional security and enhances the ability of partners to respond in coordination. Regional medical interoperability has the potential to leverage the medical strengths of multiple states to create systems that enable them to solve challenging health problems and to contribute to regional security. During a regional disaster, medical crisis, or disease outbreak, state responses inevitably include security forces. When states have established and maintained prior working relationships with regional partners, they will form an accurate assessment of their partners’ capabilities and ability to handle crises. Established medical partnerships will expedite appropriate support integration during the response to a crisis.

Conclusion

Robust and capable medical support for security forces strengthens security operations by mitigating the inherent risk of injury to security personnel. While directly benefiting security operations, an effective and reliable military medical system has the potential to benefit the state beyond direct security support. As states evaluate their security forces and work to improve their effectiveness, they should include a pragmatic assessment of their medical support system in the analysis. If medical capacity is found to be lacking, the state must make the resources available to strengthen and develop the medical support system in coordination with other aspects of security force
development (i.e., leadership, professionalism, logistics, the rule of law, tactical training, and proper utilization). Because of the technical nature of medical support and the time needed to build medical capability, efforts to strengthen medical support organizations must be initiated early in the effort to improve military effectiveness. Waiting to develop medical support capabilities until the security force is ready to conduct security operations will likely result in inadequate medical support and will directly impact security force effectiveness.

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NOTES

6 Martin C. M. Bricknell and Donald Thompson, “Roles for International Military Medical Services in Stability Operations (Security Sector Reform),” Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 153, no. 2 (June 2007): 95–98.
8 The meaning of civic action in this article reverts to the definition and goal of civic action coined by Edward Lansdale (COL, Ret.) during his time advising in the Philippines. The original goal of the program “set out to make the soldiers behave as the brothers and protectors of the people in their everyday military operations.” See Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 70.
The Challenge of Combat Search and Rescue for Colombian National Army Aviation

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The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.
—Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), General, U.S. Army

Since the mid-1960s, the Republic of Colombia has suffered from an internal armed conflict against Marxist-Leninist narco-guerrillas, violent drug cartels, illegal armed groups, and criminal bands, most of whom support themselves through the production and trafficking of narcotics. This situation profoundly affected the stability of the country; more specifically, foreign investment dropped, international confidence in the country reached unfavorable levels, and several social and economic problems reached the boiling point. Nevertheless, despite the colossal tasks of the war against terrorism, drug trafficking, and a static economy, during the past decade the Colombian government has made steady progress through an ambitious and innovative approach that Time Magazine called “The Colombian Comeback: From nearly failed state to emerging global player—in less than a decade.”

An important part of this strategy relies on the Armed Forces of Colombia. Despite the risks they faced, Colombia’s armed forces have established a more stable security environment so that citizens can live in peace and the government’s programs can achieve their desired goals. Regrettably, the conflicts have exacted a terrible toll on armed forces personnel and civilians, many of whom have been wounded or killed by the terrorists. The Colombian National Army Aviation, eager to save the lives of all victims, including those of wounded terrorists, and to enhance national disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, created the Combat Search and Rescue Unit (CSRU) in 1997 as a decisive response to the needs of the country within the field of human life and human rights protection.

This article describes the Colombian National Army Aviation’s system—called the Casualty Evacuation and Rescue Organization (CERO)—which was designed to save the lives of Colombian military personnel, civilians, and adversaries wounded in conflict zones. It explains the importance of the
Unfortunately, enhanced military operations have also impelled the weakened terrorist groups to use prohibited weapons, such as land mines and IEDs. The enhanced capabilities of the services, specifically within the areas of aviation, intelligence, and SOF, boosted the number of successful military operations and subsequently citizens’ levels of security and confidence. This increased security served to bolster new economic and social programs and foreign financial investment.

Better planned and professionally executed military operations have positively affected the morale of troops as the number of armed forces personnel killed in action has decreased significantly (see figure 2). Unfortunately, enhanced military operations have also impelled the weakened terrorist groups to use prohibited weapons, such as land mines and IEDs, in a desperate effort to hinder the operational effectiveness of the military. As a result, the numbers of those wounded in action during the same period notably increased (see figure 3). Recent studies have shown that Colombia, with an unfortunate average of 811 land-mine and IED victims per year (almost 39 percent of whom are civilians), has one of the highest per capita casualty rates in the world.

Background

During the past decade, the Colombian government and Ministry of National Defense designed three strategic policies designed to bring an end to Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict, as well as guarantee economic and social development programs throughout the country. The Democratic Security Policy (2002–2005), the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (2006–2009), and the Comprehensive Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity (2010–2014), backed by the United States–Colombia joint initiative “Plan Colombia,” maximized the Colombian armed forces’ capabilities and reduced terrorism, kidnaping, and drug-trafficking levels.

Along with the enhancement of interoperability among the armed services and the acquisition of new equipment, these policies progressively increased the numbers of Colombian armed forces personnel; enhanced professionalism among the officers, NCOs, and soldiers; and improved the forces’ ability to fight terrorism and drug cartels across the country (see figure 1). These changes were accomplished in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. The enhanced capabilities of the services, specifically within the areas of aviation, intelligence, and SOF, boosted the number of successful military operations and subsequently citizens’ levels of security and confidence. This increased security served to bolster new economic and social programs and foreign financial investment.

Figure 1: Increase in Colombian Armed Forces Personnel per Year

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Besides the casualties inflicted by IEDs and gunshots, a wide variety of tropical diseases such as leishmaniasis, malaria, dengue, and several other common pathologies demands a permanent tactical health care system with a high level of readiness to ensure the survivability of the more than 400,000 armed forces personnel permanently deployed across the country’s 1.1 million square kilometers. All of these challenges, combined with the extremely difficult geographical and meteorological conditions of the country, from dense tropical jungle to mountain ranges reaching 6,000 meters high, create a complex environment for the armed forces’ operations tempo. This situation forced the services to permanently revise their own policies, systems, and procedures in order to ensure that they could execute an appropriate medical evacuation of casualties within the “golden hour” of maximum survival.

The 2008 Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s Directive No. 001, Definition of Public Forces’ Tasks, and the 2009 Colombian Military Forces General Headquarters’ Directive No. 003, Military Forces’ Roles and Tasks, assigned responsibility to the Army, Navy (and Marines), and Police for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions at the tactical level; similarly, the Air Force was made responsible for such missions at the operational and strategic levels. Each service functions within a joint operations structure, but independently undertakes and supports its own operations guided by its own doctrine, regulations, and policies. This structure has permitted the creation and implementation of tailored tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) suited to the requirements of the respective service.

The Army is the tip of the spear of the Colombian military forces’ ground-based strategy, as well as the service with the largest number of troops and rates of wounded and killed in action. The Army therefore required a precise system that would guarantee its troops’ lives, as well as those of the civilian population and injured adversaries. No “off-the-shelf” approach was suitable;
The Army’s ethos implies a moral commitment to armed forces personnel and their families that ensures maximum effort to protect lives.

The National Army of Colombia’s Personnel Evacuation System

The National Army of Colombia is the largest service of the Colombian Armed Forces and is responsible, along with the Marines, for ground military operations against domestic or foreign threats. It is organized around eight territorial divisions and one special division: the Air Assault Aviation Division (DAVAA). DAVAA is a one-of-a-kind military unit of combined arms that encompasses the Army’s Special Forces Brigade, the Special Counternarcotics Brigade, and the National Army Aviation, which operates the largest fleet of helicopters in the Colombian Armed Forces.

DAVAA is responsible not only for planning, executing, and coordinating special operations and counternarcotics raids but also for providing aviation support to the eight divisions, through Mobility and Maneuver Army Aviation Battalions attached to each division, and tactical evacuation (TACEVAC) for its own troops, wounded adversaries, and civilians. TACEVAC is a comprehensive task designed by the National Army Aviation, and defined as a tactical mission performed by DAVAA’s CSRU, usually within a threat environment, using non-dedicated, armed, and unmarked (no emblems of the International Red Cross are displayed) aerial, land, or maritime platforms to locate, evacuate, and provide pre-hospital care to wounded or injured individuals from the point of injury to the nearest medical facility.

TACEVAC is one of the most sensitive aviation missions performed by DAVAA; the Army’s ethos implies a moral commitment to armed forces personnel and their families that ensures maximum effort to protect lives. Still, the wide range of high-risk tasks assigned to the National Army of Colombia—such as the fights against terrorism and drug cartels, the liberation of kidnapped personnel, the protection of national infrastructure, and the humanitarian land mine and IED clearance programs—assures a high rate of wounded and killed in action to be supported by DAVAA’s CSRU.

The Combat Search and Rescue Unit

The CSRU is the Special Operations Aviation unit responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of TACEVAC aviation missions. Created in 1997, it has performed more than 12,000 missions and has saved more than 9,000 lives, setting an unprecedented level of response to the needs of the troops.
of the Colombian armed forces within the field of human rights protection. For the National Army of Colombia, combat search and rescue (CSAR) is an indispensable element of military operations implied within the Army’s responsibilities. CSAR is a military occupational specialty within the Colombian National Army Aviation’s operations specialty, and CSAR operators are Special Operations Forces who form part of an Army aircrew. CSRU has five operational companies: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo. Each operational company consists of search and rescue operational teams (SROT) that specialize in different search and rescue missions: SROT-A specializes in jungle operations; SROT-B in mountainous terrain; SROT-C in water rescue; SROT-D in urban terrain; and SROT-E specializes in extrication equipment.

All CSRU troops are fully combat-experienced personnel drafted from the Army’s SOF units; once chosen, they are required to pass CSRU’s selection process and complete a three-month Military Rescuer course. This selection and training process guarantees that CSRU will accomplish its missions, for four reasons. First, CSRU personnel are completely capable of executing missions under fire and behind adversary lines due to their previous training and combat experience in SOF units—it has been shown repeatedly that combat training is not a replacement for combat experience. Casualties usually occur within a combat situation in high-risk surroundings; SROTWs are fully competent to rescue wounded personnel under fire, fighting their way in or out as necessary to evacuate the injured. When performing civil or military search and rescue, contingencies such as bad weather, mechanical failure, or tactical considerations may impede the evacuation of the wounded from the field; in this case, SROTWs can easily be attached to ground units, taking care of the casualties without being an obstacle or a risk for the combat personnel in the field.

Second, CSRU personnel entirely understand the relevant doctrine, the missions, the tactical situation, and the requirements of the troops because they previously were in the field as members of the units they now support. There is often an additional moral commitment involved, because the SROT’s members are generally rescuing and supporting friends and former comrades.

CSRU’s primary responsibility is to provide CSAR and TACEVAC coverage for Army operations; its secondary responsibility is to provide humanitarian relief and assistance along with the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, military and civil search and rescue in coordination with the Colombian Special Administrative Unit of Civil Aeronautics, and Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery.
Third, CSRU personnel, as part of the National Army Aviation, are completely familiar with the available aerial platforms and relevant regulations, thus creating a supportive environment for every mission. All SROTs’ equipment and TTPs fully comply with National Army Aviation flight regulations. In addition to receiving medical training in basic life support and other necessary medical evacuation protocols, SROT members will act as hoist operators and load masters where needed. Fourth, CSRU personnel take responsibility for the entire chain of evacuation procedures: they rescue the casualties from the field, receive and process the diagnostics and treatment plans given to them by the ground unit’s medics, provide tactical combat casualty care during transport to the medical facility, provide full information on each case to the receiving medical personnel, track the patient’s recovery, and integrally assess the whole process for lessons to be learned. In sum, CSRU ensures the survivability of the troops through a trusted chain of tactical health responders.

The CERO System

The CERO system is a comprehensive strategy designed by CSRU personnel, which aims to reduce to zero the mortality rate of wounded or injured individuals, including troops, civilians, and adversary personnel. It strives to fully report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate individuals through the maximization of DAVAA’s capabilities, and thus provide the National Army of Colombia with the most effective solution for TACEVAC missions. The CERO system is the result of a DOTMLPF assessment that included quantitative methods, comparative analysis, and common sense about the actual and projected scenario of a conflict; the doctrine, resources, and personnel available to fight; the lessons learned; and the approaches used by other countries’ armed forces.

A complete statistical analysis, using a primary dataset collected over the years by the CSRU along with official reports produced by the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, provided useful insights that supported the theoretical framework suggested by the CSRU’s CERO system. The four primary findings are as follows.

First, seriously wounded or injured patients are most likely to die during the pre-hospital period of care, at the point where they were injured, or during transport to medical facilities. Despite the reduction in numbers of Armed Forces personnel killed in action during the past decade, the number of urgent and priority TACEVACs requiring medical assistance by SROTs has increased (see figure 4). The statistical significance of this factor ($R^2 = 0.6658$) underscores the importance of providing medical assistance before and during TACEVAC missions, especially when handling urgent and priority patients. CSRU’s statistical analysis demonstrated that patient mortality usually decreases when TACEVACs are performed with SROTs that can provide specialized medical assistance, versus general transport performed without health care.

![Figure 4: TACEVACs Performed per Year by the CSAR Unit (2002–2012)](image-url)
A 2011 survey by the U.S. Defense Health Board drew similar conclusions when analyzing tactical evacuation care improvements within the U.S. Department of Defense: “A retrospective cohort study … demonstrated that mortality was significantly lower when evacuation was performed by a U.S. Army National Guard Air Ambulance unit with formally trained CCFPs (critical care flight paramedics) compared to standard military air ambulance units, staffed with EMT-Bs (emergency medical technician-basics).”

Second, the urgent and priority patients’ survivability could be maximized by providing them with proper basic life support (BLS) and pre-hospital trauma life support (PHTLS) in situ, to stabilize and prepare them for transportation to a medical facility, rather than relying solely on access to scarce dedicated medical transportation platforms. Indeed, in Colombia, due to the scarcity of dedicated MEDEVAC platforms, the evacuation time has often been prolonged far beyond the golden hour. Frequently, the chain of command underestimates the importance of BLS and PHTLS, which provide patients with essential medical care prior to evacuation; this evacuation-dependent approach has been proven wrong by many successful strategies—such as the Ranger Casualty Response System—that have strengthened the medical skills of SOF troops and thus reduced their levels of mortality. Furthermore, a 2001 survey published by the U.S. Army Medical Department established that “transport from an injury scene to an intermediate level hospital for the purpose of ‘stabilization’ prior to transport to a trauma center produced a delay in definitive surgical intervention that was, on average, 6 times (196 minutes) longer than the time it would have taken to have directly transported the patient to the trauma center (34 minutes).” Through SROTs, the CSRU ensures wounded personnel and their chain of command a high level of patient survivability despite the platform or means of evacuation used.
Third, assigning dedicated aerial TACEVAC platforms is not a recommended solution for the National Army of Colombia because it reduces the availability of multipurpose aircraft that are used for a wide range of missions; furthermore, it is not a fiscally responsible solution because the funding required to procure the necessary dedicated aircraft is needed in other crucial areas.

In order to ascertain the quantity of dedicated aircraft needed to meet the TACEVAC requirements of the National Army of Colombia, it is feasible to use the U.S. Army Table of Organization and Equipment and associated policies. The rules that allocate U.S. Army air ambulances established that each Army division should contain one aviation brigade with 12 aircraft. In the case of the National Army of Colombia, this would mean a total of 108 aircraft ($9 \times 12$), a number far beyond the reach of the service. Alternatively, CSRU’s CERO system uses all of the aerial, land, or maritime multipurpose non-dedicated armed platforms available to the National Army of Colombia and deployed across the country, adapting them for TACEVAC missions with modular medical packages and SROTs, thus guaranteeing a rapid response to save lives. This approach has been successfully proven by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force, which in 2003 incorporated the concept of multipurpose aircraft fitted with “modular medical packages that would allow for the rapid transition of an armored, armed rotary wing aircraft, not dedicated to TACEVAC missions, into a temporary designated CASEVAC transport vehicle.”

Fourth, an appropriate evacuation decision-making chain of command is needed to guarantee the effectiveness of the whole tactical care system. The worst possible case is to have multiple commands—sometimes from different services—each with different criteria, located in different areas, remotely handling a TACEVAC mission; unfortunately such missions have sometimes
occurred. The CERO system maintains that the only way to ensure adequate medical coverage is through the centralization of the TACEVAC mission requirements by the corresponding Mobility and Maneuver Army Aviation Battalion assigned to the jurisdiction, which, in conjunction with SROTs, plans and executes the mission based on a METT-TC matrix and risk assessment. The CERO system’s goal is to coordinate the resources available to ensure a 60-minute time frame for TACEVACs, in correspondence with the standard mandated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Rescue Missions: Different Approaches, Common Conclusions

Even though diverse doctrine and terminology are used by the different services of the armed forces, several common conclusions should be drawn to ensure true interoperability among them, especially in the area of TACEVAC missions, to avoid possible interference with each other’s mission and the loss of human lives. First, despite the many names given by the services to rescue missions, all the names refer to the same objective: to save lives. Combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and non-conventional assisted recovery, for example, are all terms used by each service to describe how the same mission is executed based on the service’s own doctrine. The mission must be understood as the rescue of victims (one’s own troops, the civilian population, or adversary personnel), and this fact should not be confused by the names used within the services.

Since the mid-2000s, the term personnel recovery (PR) has been commonly used by armed forces globally to describe the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel; however, personnel recovery, however, includes a wide range of methods that require an extremely high degree of combat experience, means, and capabilities. It is a common mistake to assume that military units responsible for CASEVAC, MEDEVAC, and TACEVAC missions are capable of performing PR missions. Consequently, senior military commanders and decision-making officers should carefully consider the inconvenience of giving military units without full PR capabilities such designations and related responsibilities. In the specific case of the National Army of Colombia, DAVAA is fully capable of performing all PR methods because it integrates the SOF units and a CSAR unit for the full range of rescue missions.

Second, a key factor that guarantees coherent interoperability among the services is a unified activity that allows each service to plan and execute its own operations and missions with total independence within its responsibilities. Interoperability is not only the joint execution of operations in a common scenario but also the understanding of other services’ missions and requirements, as well as tailoring effective and appropriate options collectively to accomplish a final objective. Third, forces specifically trained for rescues are responsible for accomplishing the mission; therefore, the selection process, training, and TTPs should be adjusted to meet the requirements of the services, with the emphasis on the survivability of the troops and nothing else.

The CSRU’s CERO system described in this article is a reliable, combat-proven system for TACEVAC missions. CERO has continually confirmed its efficiency.
and value in Colombia’s ongoing internal conflicts. The CSRU, as part of the Air Assault Aviation Division, will always strive for the modernization of policies, procedures, technology, and coordination with other services or government agencies, to provide our troops with the best possible guarantee for their lives.

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NOTES

1 This article is a tribute to the sacrifice of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Colombia, who fight with an enormous faith in the cause, and to the courage, sacrifice, and honor of the soldiers of the Colombian National Army Aviation’s CSRU, who will leave no one behind.


3 The Armed Forces of Colombia comprise the Army, Navy (including Marines), Air Force, and Police.


5 All figures were created by the authors using Colombian Ministry of Defense data.


7 Ibid.


10 The golden hour, or golden time, is a widely accepted description of the 60-minute period within which a patient with a traumatic injury has to receive proper medical treatment; after this period, life chances are seriously threatened by further complications and involve lesser probabilities of recovery.


12 Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) is a comprehensive evaluation system that encompasses doctrine, organization, training, maintenance, leadership, personnel, and facilities.


18 The standard policy for tactical evacuation (TACEVAC) missions of the Colombian National Army Aviation is the use of armed, unmarked (no emblems of the International Red Cross are used), multipurpose helicopters, fitted with modular medical packages manned by SROTs.

19 U.S. Defense Health Board, Tactical Evacuation Care Improvements within the Department of Defense, 6.

20 METT-TC stands for mission, enemy, time, terrain, troops, and civilians.

It gave a tremendous level of self-confidence, that through exploration and learning one could understand seemingly very complex things in one’s environment.

—Steve Jobs

In early March 2013, Dr. Sugata Mitra, one of the pioneers in online learning (also known as e-learning), was awarded the TED Prize, which comes with a $1 million check and the commitment of millions of TED community followers to help fulfill a wish of the winner. Dr. Mitra’s vision forms the first step toward what is being called in the education community “Online Learning 2.0.” Dr. Mitra’s ideas are clearly pushing toward the day when access to education will become far easier and considerably less expensive than it is now, ideas that are very much in line with NATO’s current force education efforts as well. Programs like Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) offer NATO member states innovative solutions in many areas of the defense industry, particularly in the areas of training and education.

An Education Revolution

Whether we realize it or not, education systems as we know them are changing at lightning speed. Critics declare that the time-honored liberal arts model of a broad classical education may be an expensive anachronism, while others observe that the lives of entrepreneurial heroes such as Steve Jobs suggest that accomplished and creative high school students may be better off avoiding formal post-secondary studies altogether. In a thought-provoking piece for The Awl, however, Maria Bustillos argues that the rise of so-called massive open online courses (MOOCs) may not bode well for the quality of higher education. She and others question the wisdom of moving scarce public funding away from public education, where it is desperately needed, to for-profit MOOCs. Rather than leveling the educational playing field for those who can’t afford to attend a four-year college, these critics warn that it will create a two-tier education system in which the well-off continue to get the full benefit of a traditional Socratic education while everyone else makes do with videotapes of varying quality, and occasional email chats.

Proponents of online education have long branded it as a way to bring free knowledge to the masses. In a world trying to recover from an economic crisis, where every organization is looking for smart solutions, it is not surprising that one of the main drivers behind the debate on education is cost related. Early adopters of the new educational model imagine that in the near future, all students will enroll online and create a personalized plan of study from courses that cover a vast array of subjects, delivered by the world’s best lecturers. Mitra’s vision sees even beyond this; among several of his bold assertions about online education, three in particular deserve further exploration.
Schools are obsolete and outdated. Mitra understands that great teachers can inspire students and help them find their passion, and foster a culture of high expectations that pushes students to excel. His declaration that schools are obsolete assumes that the more students who can be exposed to these outstanding teachers through online lectures, the better. What he fails to take into account are the value of the interpersonal relationships that teachers and their students develop in the classroom, and the mentoring and collaboration that often last well beyond graduation.

Give students a problem and then let them go figure it out for themselves. This idea reflects the age-old dilemma of giving someone a fish versus teaching that person how to fish. It also attempts to put to rest the concern that online learning is no more than a videotaped lecture. Many people believe that online courses are an essentially authoritarian structure, a one-way process in which the student is a passive recipient of bestowed learning, but digital communications offer many means for online interaction between teachers and students. It is important to make a distinction in this regard between certain skill sets that need to be taught and practiced over and over again to inculcate them, for which online education is well-suited, and the kind of knowledge that requires association and extrapolation.

Knowledge is obsolete. This might be one of the boldest of Mitra’s statements. His point is that students can look anything up on the internet, so the value of memorizing facts is low. This, combined with the fact that students have different abilities and learning styles, makes it easy to understand why Mitra champions the kind of personalized study plan that online learning makes possible.

Two MOOC providers, Udacity and Coursera, have gained most of the attention recently. In January 2013, the very large, financially troubled California State University system swung open the digital gates by piloting a few online courses for credit, at the remarkably low cost of $150 per course. Many might be tempted by this news to predict that Udacity has the potential to expand radically and replace most of the physical college classroom experience. Just three weeks after the California State University’s announcement, the American Council on Education, a consortium of roughly 1,800 accredited universities, announced it was also piloting inexpensive online science courses at three more universities, including Duke and the University of Pennsylvania. Perhaps most disruptive of all, the University of Wisconsin is offering a fully accredited bachelor’s degree without any in-class time required. As long as students can pass the class exams (and pay the associated fees), they can learn from anywhere in the world.

Stanford professors Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng launched Coursera last year to give anyone and everyone access to courses from top-tier universities for free, online. At launch, the start-up offered courses from a mere three institutions, but Coursera’s platform now hosts over 200 courses from 33 top international and domestic schools, and reaches over 2 million students around the globe. But Coursera and Udacity are not the only two choices for distance learners. In fact, the number of options has grown considerably. Last May, for example, Harvard and MIT teamed up to launch edX—their own, high-profile response to the online wave transforming higher education—and MIT’s OpenCourseWare project quickly expanded to 1,700 courses over three years.
Educators knew the online revolution would eventually envelop the physical classroom, but this torrent of near-revolutionary developments in 2013 is proving that change is coming quicker than anyone imagined. In the course of one month, the largest school system in the U.S. began offering credit for online courses, a major university began awarding degrees without any class time required, and scores of public universities began moving their courses online.11 Clay Christensen, who is considered to be an expert on disruption, talks about where the disruption to traditional education fueled by the web is going to strike next.12 When it comes to education, Christensen suggested that the availability of fairly high-quality online learning would be the disruptive force because “it will take root in [the education system’s] simplest applications, then just get better and better.”13

**NATO SOF Education Initiatives**

NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) leads continuous NATO military transformation experiments to enhance effectiveness in current and future operations through the innovative development and delivery of training, education, capabilities, doctrine, and concepts. NATO forces are facing many challenges in the field of training and education, as the Alliance completes its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 2014 and prepares to shift over the coming years from a campaign to a contingency posture requiring ready, flexible, robust, and interoperable NATO forces. One of the key elements of this transformational effort is the CFI. The CFI was developed to maintain the allied forces’ cohesion, and ensure that the needed military capability will be available to support political decisions. Its main priority is to support the readiness and interoperability of NATO forces, in close collaboration with Allied Command Operations, by leveraging ACT’s reinforced and consolidated responsibilities in education and training, including exercises.

Because the operational tempo for NATO members will most likely slow down post-Afghanistan, working together will mean “educate, train, and exercise together” to retain interoperability and readiness. ACT’s new training concept also promotes a more integrated, coherent, and global approach across the Alliance. As part of this effort, ACT Joint Force Trainer has been promoting the Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) network as the main tool for NATO forces’ future education. NATO, like other institutions, appears to be on the brink of an educational evolution, and changes are inevitable if the Alliance is going to be able to fulfil the requirements of the post-Afghanistan era.

Just like NATO forces in general, over the last decade the SOF of NATO member nations have been engaged almost continuously in out-of-area, expeditionary operations in geographic areas of economic and political interest to their parent nations, including the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. These SOF units have successfully performed a wide variety of missions, unilaterally or in combination with the SOF of other participating nations, under circumstances not envisioned when most of these SOF units were organized, trained, and equipped as national strategic assets during the Cold War.

Addressing this situation in 2006, the North Atlantic Council approved the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) to increase the ability of NATO
SOF to train and operate together. NSTI could be viewed as an initial experiment for the CFI.

The Alliance also highlighted the importance of a collaborative network with a recent communiqué on “The Connected Forces Initiative—Recommendations to Enhance SOF.” With this initiative, the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is planning to establish a SOF-specific mid-level professional military education course titled “Catalyst for Change—SOF Adaptability to 21st-century Operations.” It is also working to improve SOF-specific medical interoperability, capability, and survivability across the Alliance with the NATO SOF Medicine Development Initiative, which consists of SOF medical courses and workshops, along with the creation of a NATO SOF medical education center. The NATO SOF air warfare initiative will help facilitate and hasten the development of interoperable SOF-specific aviation through the NSHQ’s future Air Warfare Centre. Also in the works is a better defined potential role for SOF in support of broader NATO operational capabilities in environments degraded by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

The center of gravity of the NSHQ is the human network, comprising SOF commanders, staffs, and special operators from member nations, as well as the conventional force expertise that provides invaluable knowledge and experience at the NSHQ, in Afghanistan, and across the force. The relationships among members of the NATO Allied and Partner SOF Collaborative Network in turn are the center of gravity for the international SOF community, and modern education is vital for these personnel to successfully execute joint future operations.

**U.S. SOF Education Initiatives**

General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in a 2012 white paper titled *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* that U.S. forces need to evolve regarding the field of education. As he pointed out: “We must review our joint education objectives and institutions to ensure that we are developing agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and critical thinking skills necessary to keep pace with the changing strategic environment.” The white paper also stresses the military’s need for agility and flexibility as the United States faces unclear and unknown threats in the future. At the heart of *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* is an idea called globally integrated operations, which will be used to build and organize Joint Force 2020. This vision is similar to NATO’s CFI concept.

Based upon this guidance, USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven has also emphasized SOF education as a major part of the future USSOCOM strategy. According to McRaven, USSOCOM must become more intellectually agile and better prepared to operate in a complex environment. His strategic guidance focuses on building an educated force for all ranks of the U.S. SOF community; to carry out this guidance, he established the Force Management and Development program within USSOCOM. McRaven’s vision includes accreditation for the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and its new Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, as well as SOF education teams for Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) education.
These steps would enable U.S. SOF to become the best educated force within the U.S. Department of Defense. JSOU is currently planning a new facility to enable it to fulfill this expanded role as the hub of future U.S. SOF education, and is also planning to develop a SOF-focused think tank that will provide instruction, research, and publication opportunities in national security, military strategy, and regional studies.

To implement Admiral McRaven’s concept, it also will be necessary to unite the current U.S. SOF-related educational institutions toward this common goal. Apart from the more prominent service educational institutions, there are a number of training establishments out there with an abundance of knowledge on Special Forces. This U.S. SOF education concept provides opportunities for USSOCOM personnel attending intermediate- and senior-level military colleges to advance their knowledge, skills, and value well beyond what is currently available. It also offers academic certification programs that enhance regional, cultural, and geopolitical understanding, and places a special emphasis on foreign language education.

## Connecting the Dots

The first question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF education is, why is it necessary to revolutionize SOF education? It is easy to see that both the NATO and U.S. visions for SOF are emphasizing the ability to better understand the security environment and to deal with surprise and uncertainty. Developing the ability to recognize change as it unfolds and lead logical, measured transitions and transformation is a main goal of these concepts. Adaptation to prepare for future challenges is a major driver of study and research in high-profile organizations, and education is an integral part of this adaptation process.

Nevertheless, the U.S. and NATO SOF visions for education are somewhat limited because they do not recognize the full potential for global SOF education, and they underestimate the advances of the online educational revolution. More and more SOF deployments are international gatherings of allied SOF personnel from around the world (the recent deployment in Afghanistan is an excellent example), and a widely supported and internationally agreed program for SOF education would support the NATO requirement of interoperability. Interoperability for SOF is not only a buzzword, but a bottom-line requirement.

Most of the time, SOF training includes known scenarios, and some of the more sensitive aspects of this training will always be a national, rather than group, responsibility. Through this training, SOF personnel learn the science of war. But in the context of new complex challenges, we also need to educate our SOF personnel at all levels in the art of war. This kind of thinking interoperability is not just about absorbing more tactics, techniques, and procedures, but rather is a common way to think and learn from each other, and education is the best tool to achieve this. International allies have a much better opportunity to define common ground within the field of SOF education than through training alone. International education also has the possibility to create a myriad of other opportunities, such as offering a common platform for concept development to support a worldwide, networked SOF community. For all of these reasons, I advocate the development of global SOF education.
The second question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF education is how to develop this vision of global SOF education. The international approach toward such a plan must support international participation through SOF schools and the TSOCs. The NSHQ and JSOU have the potential to serve as the hubs for this online education activity, and to coordinate online education throughout the global SOF enterprise. This approach also makes it possible to access the accredited online portion of the education portfolio anywhere on the globe. With a well-planned access and crediting system, SOF personnel could join any of the international educational institutions and collect credit points toward their required educational goals.

It must be said, though, that technological educational revolution is in some ways a double-edged sword. It is true that for most SOF personnel, there is no time to sit through an 18-month course at the Naval Postgraduate School, because current operational tempo requires them to be deployed most of the time. The temptation of online education is that its flexibility makes it possible for everyone to gain the required knowledge at their own pace and time, adjusted to current operational tempo. The implementation plan needs to clarify the ways in which the SOF network connects (e.g., VTC, JKO Portal, or Blackboard, or for NATO, ADL, and the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System [BICES]), and the reasons and benefits for maximizing technology as an educational tool. These educational tools must be not only interconnected, but also based on a common platform, which can be an obstacle in itself.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that online solutions are not the holy grail of SOF education. Online education has its limits and cannot be seen as the only solution to the needs of SOF education. SOF personnel are quality people, and the quality of education entirely through online tools is still questionable. A personal relationship with professors at a physical educational institution has real value, and we need to make sure that we have the correct balance between online instruction and face-to-face education. Existing educational institutions can play a major role here, and this brings up our third question.

The third question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF education is, who has the ability to contribute toward this vision of global SOF education? There is already an abundance of knowledge out there that needs to be compiled and distributed, and it would be very beneficial for all allied nations to ensure that their service personnel interact with other nations’ representatives. For SOF this is not only a possibility but a must. The technology to achieve this kind of knowledge fusion is already out there, and it is logical that SOF educators should continue their tradition as innovators to become leading experts in the field of military education.

The U.S. SOF educational vision is very U.S.-centric; it should be extended to better leverage international educational institutions within the Alliance (and in some partner countries as well). The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; and the NATO Defense College in Rome are excellent educational hubs with strong knowledge bases that should be made widely available. Moreover, the NATO Centres of Excellence (such as the Centre of Excellence—Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, the Counter IED
Centre of Excellence in Madrid, and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn) are among many others that could also contribute toward a global vision of SOF education. The NSHQ facilities, for example, are custom-built to welcome and educate SOF personnel from all around the world.

**What Does the Future Hold?**

Ken Robinson, a specialist in education and creativity, gave a TED speech called “How to Escape Education’s Death Valley,” in which he made some interesting points that are applicable toward SOF education as well. One of his main points was that many of those who attend school are disengaged from it and do not get any real benefit from being there. The reasons, says Robinson, are threefold.

First of all, human beings are naturally diverse and learn in different ways. This is true with the SOF community as well. If we are thinking of developing a vision for global SOF education, we need to take account of the fact that SOF personnel are a special breed of characters, as anyone who has interacted with us can tell. Add to this mix a wide array of cultural differences and we have a level of diversity that needs to be directly addressed in any planning for global SOF education.

The second principle that allows human life to flourish is curiosity, a fundamental quality that standard education too often ignores. The best educators focus on facilitating learning as a tool for discovery and less on testing students’ memories. Education for a global audience must address this principle. SOF selection (in most places) makes sure that those who make the cut are not only physically and mentally tough, but are devoted to lifelong personal development and learning as well. Educators in the SOF education system must understand and leverage these qualities. It is not enough to pass on knowledge; educators also need to mentor, stimulate, provoke, and engage those who participate. This is one of the reasons why online education alone is not enough. The mentoring role of educators at all levels of SOF education is a vital component of the whole system.

The third principle is that humans are inherently creative. SOF operations in most cases are the most innovative and creative military operations. This creativity enables the SOF community as a whole to always stay one or two steps ahead of the conventional forces. By constantly venturing out of our zone of comfort, we can develop our personalities, and through a restless process of thinking out of the box, imagine new alternatives and possibilities. The role of education should be to foster this kind of attitude, and SOF education can go one step further by teaching SOF personnel the kind of unconventional leadership skills that can be used in asymmetric conflicts with great effect. This kind of unconventional education will enable SOF to become a learning organization.

There are a lot of considerations related to designing a global SOF education system that can address all of the previously mentioned issues. First of all, individualizing education is difficult, but if we use the principle of slicing rather than simply layering knowledge onto students when designing the building blocks, we can achieve this goal. The system must engage its participants to make sure that their individuality, curiosity, and creativity are fully activated. Therefore, the next hurdle is that these goals demand the very
best teachers. Investing in “rock star educators” is vital for SOF, and selecting the teacher cadre is probably the most important decision that has to be made. The third consideration is incentives. Those who go through this specialized education system must be incentivized not only with career advancement, but also with the knowledge that much of what they learn through SOF education is applicable to their everyday professional work and other areas of life as well. Finally, SOF education needs to concentrate on developing leaders—not just the leaders we need today (command and control) but also the leaders we will need in the future (climate control). Unconventional leadership can enable SOF personnel to create a climate of possibility, and if we can provide that leadership, SOF forces will step up to the complex problems we have to face every day and fulfill missions that were unanticipated and appeared to be unachievable.

The demands put on organizations now require learning to be delivered faster, cheaper, and more effectively. Some organizations conduct business with an “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it” attitude, until one day they find that they have to make major changes in their organizations to continue to compete. A learning organization is one that continually expands its ability to shape its future. For a modern SOF to thrive, learning and education must be linked to the strategic goals of the organization, so that continual learning at all levels becomes a way of organizational life.

According to Peter Senge, a leading expert in the field of organizational management, systems thinking is the single most important learning discipline for any organization if it wants to adapt, change, and thrive. In a learning organization, members understand that changes intended to improve performance in one part of the organization can affect other parts of the organization in surprising ways. It is also important for the organization as a whole to have a learning perspective. In the past, education ended when an individual received credentials. Now, education is becoming continuous, deliberate, and organization-wide. Developing organizational learning is an emergent process in the sense that its outcome is not predictable and it is more than the separate contributions of individuals. If individuals and teams are encouraged to be innovative and think creatively, some of those proposed alternative approaches will entail inherent risks, and not all of them will succeed. To achieve constant self-transformation, this is a painful and necessary aspect of the process that the members of the global SOF community must accept if they want to stay ahead of the game and transform SOF into a learning organizational system.

Final Thoughts: The Balanced Approach

The alarming aspect of recent technological advances and the online educational revolution is that we seem to be acting more quickly than we’re thinking. It can take years, if not decades, to fully assess a single course, let alone an entire restructuring of the education system. Therefore, the accreditation process for JSOU and the fusing of the already existing SOF institutions will be a lengthy and frustrating process—an adaptive challenge in itself. The best way forward is to establish a baseline and build upon the existing capabilities.

For example, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School already has an established and accredited, internationally recognized graduate-level program for SOF personnel. Optimal utilization of this program, on the one hand, can be an
important piece of the education puzzle. We should never underestimate the benefits of face-to-face discussion and collaboration that come with classroom attendance! In institutions such as this, the “traditional” means of instruction must be encouraged, including professor-student interactions, mentorship, and long hours spent in the campus library.

On the other hand, parts of the educational domain must be more “virtual”: providing online courses (MOOCs) for SOF personnel all around the world, creating a SOF professional reading list with downloadable audio books that are available for SOF personnel anywhere, and offering a common virtual place for the international SOF community to discuss new ideas, in the think tank model described earlier.

Between the physical classroom and the virtual one, a cadre of mobile education teams (METs) can be utilized as a means to export quality education to wherever students need it the most. This kind of activity must be linked to the TSOC concept. We also need to combine two bodies of theory to understand how this process might unfold and support a balanced approach. The current education market overall clearly seems to fit Clayton Christensen’s disruption theory, but we need to complement this view with another body of theory that suggests that education is basically knowledge sharing. In a much-cited article on education written a decade ago, the authors argued that different kinds of knowledge require different kinds of sharing approaches. If their analysis is right, then maybe just 10 percent of the executive education market is safe from the online onslaught, but my personal opinion is that a considerably bigger percentage of classroom time must be preserved and protected when we are planning global SOF education.

If the proposed goal of the new form of virtual education for SOF is actually to create a viable online education model (not just a poor man’s alternative) and transform SOF into a learning organization, traditional SOF educational institutions (the brick-and-mortar hubs) need to produce some sort of a return on investment. Because traditional education is the most costly, it makes sense to have them focus on the most beneficial disciplines—those that foster creative thinking—and be the main source for degree credits. In turn, while MOOCs are great for distance learning and for those who are pursuing pure mental development, most such platforms should not be credit-bearing but should serve only informational purposes. In other words, online courses don’t lead to diplomas, but help develop SOF personnel into better leaders.

To summarize, we have almost no idea how the educational revolution will affect the SOF educational ecosystem. What we do know is that the unknown is coming at us very, very quickly, and SOF has to be ahead of other services to build on these changes.

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NOTES

1 Each year, the world’s leading thinkers and doers gather for the invitation-only TED conference, an event many describe as the highlight of their year. Attendees have called it “the ultimate brain spa” and “a 4-day journey into the future, in the company of those creating it.” See Adi Robinson, “Online Education Wins Big as TED Awards $1 Million to Pioneer Sugata Mitra,” *The Verge*, 27 February 2013: http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/27/4035596/ted-awards-1-million-prize-to-online-education-pioneer-sugata-mitra. In what he called his “Hole in the Wall” experiment, Dr. Mitra provided very poor children in the slums of India with a computer and left them alone. Within a few hours they had figured out how to get online, browse, and learn. He replicated the experiment in several forms, and it forms the basis of his hypothesis that students learn just fine in a self-organized learning environment, with no adults around. Dr. Mitra’s TED talk, “Build a School in the Cloud,” filmed in February 2013, can be found at http://on.ted.com/TEDPrize2013

2 Smart Defence is a complex multinational defense cooperation project in which NATO member and partner nations cooperate to find solutions to common defense problems in capability development. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) was developed to maintain allied forces’ cohesion, and provide the military capability required to support political decisions.


14 NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration,” news release, 29 November 2006: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm

15 See the NATO website for more information on the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI): http://www.nato.int/ctso/np/natolive/topics_98527.htm

16 The inaugural course was conducted from 27 May to 5 July 2013 at the NATO Special Operations School at Chîvères Airbase in Belgium.


21 Details on McRaven’s vision on SOF education were shared by Dr. Amie W. Lonas, Dean of Academics, Joint Special Operations University, at the conference Special Operations Summit West, presented by the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement in San Diego, California, on 18–20 March 2013. A theater special operations command (TSOC), a sub-unified command, advises combatant commanders on the capabilities of SOF, provides SOF personnel for employment, and integrates SOF fully into theater plans by planning, coordinating, conducting, and supporting the geographical unified commander. See Gay M. McGillis, *Organizing NORTHCOM for Success: A Theater Special Operations Command*, monograph (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003): http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416189

22 These include the Defense Analysis department of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Center for Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman (SWCC) in California; the School of Advanced Military Studies and the Air War College in the Midwest and South; and the Joint Forces Staff College, the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Naval War College, and the Marine Corps University on the East Coast.

23 Some of these are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command located at Fort Bragg, the Naval Special Warfare Command at Coronado, the Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Field, the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command at Camp Lejeune, the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, and the Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities headquartered at Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia.

24 The U.S. Defense Language Institute, for example, specializes in highly intensive language-immersion courses taught by native or native-level speakers.


27 “Slicing” in this context means that an individual’s current skill level is continuously monitored so that education can be tailored in a way that fits each person’s needs and abilities. In this way, SOF personnel don’t get a “cookie cutter” education, but rather a program that takes into account their other needs—operational, family, and so on.


29 Adaptive challenges require new perspectives, expertise, and solutions. These types of challenges are the real innovator’s dilemma, where we first need to diagnose the challenge and then create the right new tool to solve it. An adaptive challenge creates a lot of friction within organizations.

The Haqqani Network: Pursuing Feuds under the Guise of Jihad?

In addition to its unique terrain, RC-East had the Haqqanis.
—General Stanley McChrystal, USA

The intersection of tribes, corruption, insurgency, poppy, tyranny, family feuds, and loyalties makes conducting counterinsurgency in eastern Afghanistan highly complicated. Few terrorist organizations in this region have had the kind of sustained success over a period of years and the ability to adapt and increase their threat as the Haqqani Network (HQN). From its beginnings as a subgroup in the Afghan insurgency with ties to al Qaeda, the network has risen to become one of the most effective, feared, and hard-core elements of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. When counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategists categorize the HQN as a transnational jihadi group, however, their well-intended countermeasures often fuel the network instead of defeating it. The overall goal for the HQN is to tie the region together in a financial web, using every aspect of the black, white, and grey markets to benefit the HQN organization in ways not necessarily related to jihad. Therefore, it's important to make a distinction between the HQN financial structure and its ideological ambitions. This article makes the case that HQN disguises its financial motivations with nationalist jihadist rhetoric primarily when doing so fits the leadership’s purpose.

Background

As one area expert has noted, “Many of the most prominent jihadi groups in the world today are nationalist in their orientation, framing their irredentist struggle as being one of regaining lost lands from a foreign (usually infidel) occupier. Because they are essentially nationalist groups, these jihadi organizations tend to have significantly higher levels of popular support.” The fighters who eventually joined the HQN first fought as mujahedeen following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1981, operating in eastern Afghanistan along the Khost-Miranshah corridor into Pakistan. These men were regarded as some of the fiercest and most dedicated fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top mujahedeen leader who had ties to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), met in the early 1980s with U.S. CIA agents on the Afghan-Pakistani border, in a bid to win their support against the Soviet invaders. Looking for ways to connect with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the CIA had turned to the ISI for help and were offered Jalaluddin, by then a respected and trusted leader within the ISI who could be relied on to “deliver” when asked. Jalaluddin became a prominent leader among the mujahedeen in eastern Afghanistan for several reasons. Initially, he was a nationalist and a royalist who sought to reinstate Mohammad Shah, the deposed king, as the rightful leader of Afghanistan. In addition, as a nationalist and Pashtun, he was outraged by the brutal repression imposed by the Soviet occupiers, and their violations of Muslim traditions and norms. This nationalist stance sparked wide support among the Zadran tribe, which is the dominant tribe in the Afghan-Pakistani border area and the tribe of the Haqqani family.
Soviet efforts to impose a communist system on the tribal culture in Afghanistan sparked wide resistance, not only in Afghanistan but also internationally. Muslim culture, values, and traditions were important and brought different families and tribes together in every part of Afghanistan in a unified fight against the Soviet invaders. It was natural for the Zadran tribe to organize themselves under Haqqani leadership due to their demographics, tribal structure, and strong family ties. Jalaluddin was the family elder and tribal leader among the different Zadran families. He also had support and funding from different foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and the ISI, which gave him significant power and influence compared to other potential mujahedeen leaders.

After successfully defeating the Soviet occupation in 1989, the mujahedeen maintained strong relationships among their different groups. HQN members had established a reputation as fighters and loyal jihadis, which gave them access to money and support far beyond the border area where they lived. Jalaluddin and his close associates in the HQN had increased their personal credibility and status as well, both within the Zadran tribe and among their different international supporters. Now that the war was over, however, the HQN needed to create new and different business opportunities to keep money flowing and build resiliency into the organization. Jalaluddin used his influence and leadership to transform his mujahedeen and military organization into a political and economic franchise. By 1994, the HQN was recognized as a tanzim, or distinct Muslim organization, by foreign jihadis. Today the HQN consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, and is viewed as a sophisticated and highly respected organization by the ISI and supporters on the Arabian Peninsula.

Ideology and Finance

Although some experts argue that the HQN is a transnational jihadi group along the lines of al Qaeda, the official HQN ideology is to ensure a secure Afghan state under shari’a rule and establish a reformed, nationalist Afghan government. The unofficial HQN economic agenda is to keep the network flourishing by promoting growth and resiliency in the black, grey, and white markets. At the same time, the HQN will look to develop new ventures in any segment where economic opportunities arise, not only in South Asia but also in Africa, South and Central America, and Europe. The top tier of the HQN organizational structure reflects this focus. Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin, is currently the undisputed leader. Under him, Nasiruddin (also a son of Jalaluddin), Khalil (brother of Jalaluddin), and Ibrahim (brother of Jalaluddin) are all primarily involved in financial matters. Only Badruddin Haqqani (another son of Jalaluddin, now deceased) was mostly involved with military operations. For example, Badruddin was actively involved in directing and advising the terrorists who attacked the Intercontinental hotel in Kabul in 2009, an operation that was probably funded at least in part by outside Arab support. Most of the HQN’s terrorist operations come at a low cost for the network due to their use of highly motivated local fighters. The three family members involved in financial matters seem less interested in directly supporting jihad than in building a financial empire similar to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra.

HQN founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, now a senior mentor to the organization, and his son Siraj have sworn faithful support to the Taliban and Mullah Omar. That does not mean, however, that they necessarily share the same
goals or ideology. The groups have agreed to not fight each other, divided up areas of operations, decided who will be involved in the different business ventures, and pledged to support each other when it is operationally and financially beneficial to them. The pact between the Kandahari Taliban and the HQN on drug smuggling in eastern and southern Afghanistan might be such an agreement. 

The HQN modus operandi seems to indicate that the HQN plays a specific role in the Taliban-led insurgency.

When a terrorist group functions alongside a well-established guerilla group, it can play an even more important role. In such instances, terrorists function for guerilla movements almost as special operations forces do for regular armies. Terrorists can destroy a rival’s command and control structure. They can provide logistic and financial support for guerillas. Perhaps most important, they can also threaten individuals who collaborate with a regime, making it hard for a government to elicit regular and reliable intelligence about a guerilla movement.

The HQN’s Foreign Fighters (FF) units, ISI support, safe houses, facilitators, and infiltration routes from Miranshah to Kabul all serve as valuable force multipliers for the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, these assets indirectly support the group’s long-term financial goal, which is to develop a resilient regional economic base in both the legal and illegal sectors, so that the HQN can live on. By keeping significant pressure on Kabul with high-profile terrorist attacks, the HQN helps to emphasize the Afghan government’s lack of control over the country and diminishes the ability of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) to uphold the law and fight crime. The strategy of the HQN is a mix between attrition and intimidation. Both the Taliban and the HQN embrace attrition as their overall strategy in their fight against the central government and its international backers for two reasons. First, attrition makes it costly for both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the ANSF to stay in the region. Second, the attrition strategy seeks to change the government in Afghanistan into a reformed and nationalistic government under shari’a law.

The most important task for any terrorist group is to persuade the enemy that the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy yields to the terrorists’ demands. The attrition strategy is designed to accomplish this task. In an attrition campaign, the greater the costs a terrorist organization is able to inflict, the more credible its threat to inflict future costs, and the more likely the target is to grant concessions.

In Afghanistan where the government is struggling with legitimacy, corruption, and its inability to provide substantial security for the population, an attrition strategy works well.

The other strategy that the HQN uses is intimidation.

Intimidation is akin to the strategy of deterrence, preventing some undesired behavior by means of threats and costly signals. It is most frequently used when terrorist organizations wish to overthrow a government in power or gain social control over a given population. It works by demonstrating that
the terrorists have the power to punish whoever disobeys them, and that the government is powerless to stop them.\textsuperscript{15}

This fits the picture of how the HQN conducts operations in Kabul. The city of Kabul has no particular historical value, but as the capital, it is the center of gravity for the ANSF and the national government led by Hamid Karzai. If the ANSF is unable to secure even Kabul and its population, it will lose credibility among its own population and the international community, who might begin to believe that they would be better off with another government—presumably one that is pro-HQN and Taliban. Even as ruthless as the Taliban was when in power, it was able to provide some security for the population through shari’a courts, and most Afghans will put their trust in whoever can provide security for tomorrow.

The HQN’s Pakistani and Arab Connections

The cities of Khost in Afghanistan and Miranshah in Pakistan, which lie about 40 km apart on either side of the mountainous border, are important to the HQN, and are under strong influence from the network. One reason for this is the deep ties to the Zadran tribe in these areas, along with the nationalist jihad ideology that has been passed from father to son since the Afghan-Soviet war. In the Pakistani tribal areas, the central government’s law and authority have little importance. Tribal ties are strong, and loyalty to one’s tribe is more important than loyalty to the state. The HQN’s operational security against spies and journalists is dependent on this tribal relationship. The support that the HQN is enjoying in the province of Khost is unique even given the strong pressure being put on this area by the ISAF and ANSF. Jalaluddin Haqqani and his men became heroes and liberators for the people in and around Khost, and are still considered heroes there today. The locals in Khost see both the ISAF and the ANSF as just more intruders that the HQN eventually will defeat. The HQN is known to have mobilized as many as 500 local fighters to launch large-scale attacks on government buildings in and around Khost, such as the one that took place in May 2009, when HQN fighters staged a complex, multi-staged attack on the Khost City provincial governor’s compound, the police headquarters building, and a nearby administrative building.\textsuperscript{16}

The Foreign Fighters’ Units

The differences in goals between the HQN and the Taliban have occasionally led the HQN to accuse the Taliban of being too extreme in their ideology. Disagreements have arisen over the games children are allowed to play, the Taliban’s ban on music, and whether girls should be allowed to go to school. Operational disputes have been reported as well. HQN leaders have condemned the Taliban’s and FF’s excessive use of violence in operations that have killed several innocent civilians, including children. Local fighters in the tribal areas often object to the FF units coming into their area because the members of the FF bring tactics and attitudes that conflict with local tribal customs. Although Pakistanis mainly comprise the FF, North Africans, Arabs, Europeans, Uzbeks, and Chechens have been identified as FF members fighting in Afghanistan as well.

A considerable number of FF members who come to Afghanistan from the Arabian Peninsula rely on HQN support. Their need for safe houses, guides
for crossing the border, and facilitators who provide equipment for operations makes HQN support for the FF essential. Jalaluddin traveled frequently during the Soviet-Afghan war and made strong connections with supporters of the Afghan jihad on the Arabian Peninsula. It is reasonable to assume that Arab sponsors offered the HQN both money and eager, dedicated jihadi fighters who wanted to gain combat experience while fighting for the cause in Afghanistan. Once this pipeline was established, the HQN’s canny marketing of its operations has kept the flow of money and fighters coming. In addition, Jalaluddin’s second wife is from the United Arab Emirates, and her marriage with the Haqqani leader helped establish credibility and trust between the HQN and potential Arab beneficiaries. It is reasonable to assume that she had an important role in connecting the HQN with the Arabian network.

The FF brings valuable experience and weapons such as modified IEDs that have proven effective in other conflicts. “Intelligence analysts believe this is evidence of an AQ [al Qaeda] affiliated information network linking Jihadist movements in multiple theaters of operation with loose operational coordination on a global scale and of a capability to move at least small numbers of personnel from one operational theater to another.”17 This does not mean, however, that the HQN is part of a larger transnational network of jihadis, but rather that it uses the existing information and personnel networks for its own benefits.

**Operations and Activities**

While the Taliban is fighting the ISAF and ANSF primarily in the valleys and the rural areas, the HQN focuses its attacks on Kabul. Between 2002 and 2004, the HQN reconstituted its operations in its historical stronghold of Loya Pakhtia, which encompasses the provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika in southeastern Afghanistan. During this period, loyal supporters and sponsors reemerged to support the nationalist jihad and the HQN. Between 2005 and 2009, the HQN was able to expand its influence beyond Loya Pakhtia towards Kabul, which gave the network the ability to execute attacks in Kabul itself. “From 2008 to 2009, the network launched an offensive aimed at strengthening their positions in Loya Pakhtia, while projecting suicide bombers into Kabul to launch some of the most lethal attacks of any insurgent group in Afghanistan.”18 It may be that this division of activities was worked out between the HQN and the Taliban to maximize the effect of the larger insurgency. Similar agreements among insurgent factions regarding operational areas are well known, such as that between the Kandahari Taliban and the HQN regarding the smuggling of opium and the chemicals used to process narcotics.

The HQN leaders, and Jalaluddin in particular, are well known for exploiting the media to their advantage. The HQN produces a significant amount of propaganda from its operational successes; this material is translated into Pashto, Dari, and Arabic to market the HQN and gain support and recruits. Attacks in Kabul give the group a significant advantage when it comes to getting the news media’s attention, due to the number of media companies located in the capital.

Extortion and assassinations are also among the HQN’s tactics. In September 2006, HQN operatives assassinated Paktia’s governor, Hakim Taniwal. At Taniwal’s funeral a couple of days later, another bomber sent by the HQN detonated his device, killing 39 and injuring four of President Karzai’s...
In Kabul the HQN is using Fedayeen tactics, based around mobile attack teams. The Fedayeen (“those who sacrifice themselves”) originally were Palestinians operating from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon who, after 1948, formed small, autonomous teams to attack Israeli targets. Their tactics, which can but don’t necessarily include suicide bombs, have since been modified and adapted by several terrorist and insurgent groups around the world. The Fedayeen model is based on a small team of several terrorists, each with a specific task, who launch a coordinated attack on an identified target. The HQN used something akin to Fedayeen tactics when they attacked the Kabul Serena Hotel in 2008, the Afghanistan International Bank in 2009, the Hotel Inter-Continental Kabul in 2011, and the Spozhmai Hotel in 2012 (all located in Kabul). The FF units bring valuable experience to these command operations and often work as force multipliers together with the local fighters.

The HQN and the ISI

The strong ties between the HQN and Pakistan’s ISI remain intact today. Pakistan needs a means to influence the political situation in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis fear that a strong and nationalistic Afghanistan will put Pakistan in a squeeze between Afghanistan and India. As long as it is receiving money, weapons, and intelligence from the ISI, the HQN will keep launching high-profile attacks in Kabul intended to destabilize the government. This is in accordance with nationalist jihadi ideology: to fight the near enemy. At the same time, the situation enhances the HQN’s financial ambitions, because an unstable Afghanistan attracts international support that helps the HQN business empire to expand. Millions of dollars are flowing into Afghanistan for counterinsurgency projects such as reconstruction, road building, digging wells, providing schools, and so on. HQN front companies often win these contracts, or HQN fighters protect the workers from attack (or both). Either way, the HQN profits directly from these projects, not unlike the Italian Mafia’s control of trucking, construction, and garbage disposal in southern Italy. Everybody knows who is running these businesses, but it is very hard to stop them without causing even greater problems.

A weak and corrupt central Afghan government also makes it easier for the HQN to deal profitably in the grey and black economic markets. ISI support to the HQN is not limited to support inside Afghanistan, however; the ISI also protects financial interests for the HQN in Pakistan. By helping to facilitate the export and import of resources and products for the HQN, the ISI plays an important part in the larger HQN business empire. Two examples of this are the import of chemicals to process narcotics and fertilizers for bomb making. Normally the export and import of these kinds of dual-use precursor chemicals are controlled under international trade regulations. When a known terrorist group like the HQN is able to engage in this trade, it seems reasonable to assume that the ISI is helping the HQN avoid normal import controls and customs checkpoints.

The HQN also relies on ISI support when its members travel to other countries for fundraising: the ISI sees to it that HQN leaders slip through security checkpoints at Pakistani airports, and lets them travel on fake passports around the world. Arguably, ISI support is one of the reasons why the HQN is more sophisticated and violent than any other group in Afghanistan. At the same
time, HQN leaders have successfully exploited the weakness of the Pakistani government and been able to establish safe havens on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

**A Financial Empire**

The HQN’s financial interests are far more impressive than the group’s terrorist acts, but draw less attention. The business side, comprising both legal and illegal ventures, involves more people and operations than the jihadi side, and stretches into the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and Europe. HQN businesses range from illegally exporting high-value minerals like chromite to China to legally investing in real estate all over Asia and the Middle East. Besides the chromite, the HQN gets much of its revenue from the smuggling of precious jewels and other metals, and from timber smuggling.23 Extortion of local and regional businesses is another important source of income for the HQN. Those who fail to pay are punished, in classic gangland style.

Fundraising in the Gulf Region, and the support of wealthy donors, going back 30 years to Jalaluddin’s early fundraising trips to the Arabian Peninsula, remain very important to the HQN. These sponsors help raise money for the HQN and at the same time reward the leadership for conducting high-profile attacks in Kabul. Madrassas and mosques in Loya Paktia also do fundraising for the HQN. The imams and clerics preach jihadi ideology supporting HQN activities, and help with community support and recruitment to the jihad.24

The group also takes part in drug trafficking, but not in the same way as the Taliban. The HQN is cleverly organized to deal only with the precursor chemicals used for processing raw opium into heroin.25 These same chemicals can be used in legal pharmaceutical manufacturing and in hospitals as well, which gives the HQN both great cover for buying these products and a secondary market for their resale even when heroin production is low. In this way the HQN avoids being harmed by fluctuating opium prices. Kidnapping for ransom is another HQN business venture. By kidnapping people like David Rohde (a New York Times journalist), Bowe Bergdahl (a sergeant in the U.S. Army), and Abdul Khaliq Farahi (an Afghan diplomat to Pakistan), the HQN has gained credibility within the Afghan insurgency because of the media attention these cases receive. Smuggling and taxation of people in the border area are common ways of gaining income for the lower ranks of the HQN.

As mentioned earlier, the HQN financial structure is not made up solely of illegal activities. Like other mafia-style ventures, the HQN needs legal enterprises to launder money and ensure resiliency in its business structure.26 Examples of this legal side include supporting and running hospitals and madrassas in the border areas, and real estate development projects in Dubai. Classic mafia-friendly enterprises like the trucking and transportation companies that operate daily across Afghanistan and Pakistan are also part of the HQN legal/illegal economic structure. HQN-affiliated construction companies, which are primarily contracted by the ISAF, are another such scheme; in this case, by hiring these contractors, the ISAF is directly fueling the HQN structure. Many of these HQN companies have shadow structures, so it is hard to directly trace them back to the HQN. According to Gretchen Peters, who lived in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan for five years, the
HQN controls between 10 percent and 25 percent of all the business conducted in their area, legal and illegal. Of the total amount of money spent on the Gardez-Khost Road, for example, about US$12 million to $30 million ended up in HQN-affiliated bank accounts. At the same time, the ISAF relies on these companies because they are an important part of the legal economy that people in the region are dependent on. The instability in Afghanistan benefits every part of the HQN business empire, and as long as instability is in its favor, the HQN will continue the fight.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The HQN is a subgroup in the broader Afghan Taliban insurgency, but it is far more financially sophisticated and economically motivated than the other jihadist groups, and resembles a mafia organization in this regard. Going after the HQN financial structure would therefore likely be a more effective counterterrorist strategy than using a classic counterinsurgency strategy. An information operations campaign should target the HQN’s financial network and highlight its less ideological reasons for fighting in Afghanistan. This might help drive a wedge between the different jihadi groups fighting the ISAF and the Afghan government. The HQN has specialized in spectacular attacks in Kabul while leaving the countryside to the Taliban, a “division of labor” that must be taken into consideration when countermeasures are planned.

What Can Be Done

ISAF-ANSF information operations should reflect the fact that the HQN’s high-profile attacks in Kabul are conducted for economic reasons rather than for defensive jihad, and that sponsors and supporters pay for these operations. HQN leaders know that they can play on the nationalist jihadi ideology to gain support in Afghanistan and other like-minded countries. In the Gulf Region, wealthy private sponsors, who want to see the apostate Karzai government in Kabul crippled and rendered ineffective, support jihad around the world by sending money to groups like the HQN. A way in which the allies who are fighting to stabilize Afghanistan can counteract these forces is to drive a wedge between the local fighters and the HQN leadership. This can be done by highlighting the fact that it is financial motivations rather than ideology that drive the HQN’s top-level decision making. A cleverly planned information operation designed to expose the true identity and motivations of the HQN leadership would be one way to create this wedge. Another way to weaken the network is to reduce the support coming from wealthy Arab benefactors, not only by informing them of the Haqqanis’ avarice, but by focusing at the same time on ways to trace and target the money coming from these sponsors.

The continued failure to recognize the fact that the HQN is not a transnational jihadi organization but rather a nationalist, mafia-style group can serve to enhance the network instead of harming it. Traditional development and reconstruction projects often indirectly and directly benefit the HQN. Targeting the financial structure and revenues of the HQN would cripple the group more than traditional counterinsurgency operations. As it is, doing no development work in Khost would be better than the current ISAF strategy of project building, because a lot of the funding coming from the ISAF is directly fueling the HQN. To counter extortion, the ISAF should develop a corps of engineers within the ANSF. The ISAF would then be channeling money in the
right direction, and the ANSF would have an opportunity to win the trust of the population while at the same time reducing the influence of the HQN.

The main problem for the HQN is that it is running out of time. The population that is loyal to the Haqqanis is getting tired of war. Presenting the HQN leadership as primarily motivated by money could cause its ideology-based relationships with both fighters and wealthy donors to suffer.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJ Lars W. Lilleby is currently serving in the Norwegian Army as a company commander.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 319.
4 Gretchen Peters, a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC), describes how, after over three decades of war, the Haqqani Network (HQN) has evolved into an efficient, transnational jihadi industry. See Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, July 2012): http://www.ccc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report_Final.pdf
6 Dressler, The Haqqani Network. Also see Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 41–77, 65. Different sources state that the HQN controls between 4,000 and 20,000 fighters. HQN leaders have claimed that they control more than 10,000 fighters, but never as many as 20,000. My estimate therefore falls somewhere in between.
7 In their recent book, Fountainhead of Jihad, Don Rassler and Vahid Brown assume that the HQN’s support to al Qaeda is driven more by ideological motives than economic ones because the HQN did not benefit economically from helping al Qaeda. This argument neglects the importance of alliances, trust building, and long-term investments. A character like Jalaluddin plays on a lot of different strings. Investing in friendship and alliances that can benefit him in the future is a highly likely strategy, even if the alliance does not immediately pay off. See Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (New York: Columbia/Hurst, 2013); also see Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qaeda (West Point, N.Y.: Combating Terrorism Center, 2011).
8 Gretchen Peters describes how the sons and close relatives have taken on certain roles in the network related to operations and financing. See the section “Key Financial Personalities and Organization,” in Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 24–31.
9 Ibid., 12.
10 Jeffrey Dressler, interview by BBC News, video, 16 September 2011: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5s7uty0zuNI
13 These Foreign Fighters (FF) units are made up of jihadists who come into Afghanistan from Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere specifically to join the fight against Western forces. FF members from the Arabian Peninsula come in to fight alongside the HQN, while members of the Pakistani Taliban often fight alongside the Afghan Taliban. Most FF members join for ideological reasons (jihad), but the host they are fighting for may have different objectives. For example, the HQN is mostly financially motivated, while the Taliban is said to be primarily motivated by nationalism and religion.
15 Ibid., 66.
18 Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 3.
19 Ibid., 21.
20 All of the following information regarding Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) support to the HQN comes from Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 2–5.
21 Dressler, The Haqqani Network, 9, 32.
22 Ibid., 45–46.
23 Ibid., 56–57.
24 Ibid., 51–53.
25 Ibid., 45–46.
26 The information in this paragraph was gathered from Peters, Haqqani Network Financing, 9–11.
THE DILEMMA: OVER THE PAST DECADE, THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT has spent prodigious resources attempting to halt the increasing power and influence of drug cartels throughout the country. An offshoot of the growing power of cartels is their ability to threaten businesses through the illegal enterprise of extortion. Mexican authorities have seen an exponential increase in reported threats and extortion rackets throughout the country.¹ As a result, local business owners face a deadly dilemma: if cartels seek to extort their business, should owners cooperate by overlooking illegal activity and paying extortion fees? Or should business owners stand up to the cartels by refusing to pay extortion fees and notifying the authorities of the cartels’ illegal activity? Through the use of game theory under current security conditions, this article shows that business owners achieve their best outcome by organizing a fierce, unified resistance against the cartel’s efforts to extort. This united resistance ultimately allows local business owners and the cartel that is threatening them to reach an agreement whereby the cartel promises not to pursue extortion while the business owners promise to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking and other illegal activities. In the absence of effective law enforcement, the resulting decrease in local violence and economic damage from such a “truce” can be seen as the community’s best outcome as well.

The Game

Figure 1 depicts the extortion dilemma using ordinal rankings (where “4” is best and “1” is worst) with two players, a business owner and the cartel:

A BUSINESS OWNER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mexican Drug Cartel</th>
<th>Extort local businesses</th>
<th>Do not extort local businesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turn blind eye; Pay fees if extorted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resist payment; notify authorities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEXICAN DRUG CARTEL

| Turn blind eye; Pay fees if extorted | 4 |
| Resist payment; notify authorities | 1 |

Figure 1: The Extortion Dilemma

AC

A business owner is willing to pay “protection” fees and turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities.
**Cartel:** This is the best scenario for the cartel, because it receives revenue without any resistance from the business owner and without fear of police interference.

**Business owner:** This is the third best (i.e., next to worst) scenario for the business owner. Although he is willing to pay fees and turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities in exchange for relief from violence, he surrenders his profits and ultimately resides in a threat- and crime-filled environment.

**BC**

The cartel attempts to extort a local business owner but meets staunch resistance: the business owner refuses to pay extortion money and notifies the authorities.

**Cartel:** This is the second best scenario for the cartel. Although the cartel has to use threats and violence against the business owner, in the absence of effective police action it still gets its money.

**Business owner:** This is the worst scenario for the business owner, because in much of Mexico, the local authorities typically cannot match the power and influence of the cartels. As a result, the cartel is still able to extort the business owner, but does so through violence and punishment.

**AD**

The business owner is willing to pay fees and turn a blind eye to cartel activities, but the local cartel does not have any interest in extortion.

**Cartel:** This is the third best scenario for the cartel. On the one hand, it willingly chooses to forgo a significant source of income from extortion; on the other hand, it still has the freedom to conduct other illegal activities without the risk of locals notifying the authorities.

**Business owner:** This is the second best scenario for the business owner, because he is able to maximize his profit without the need to pay the cartel for “protection.” By turning a blind eye to other crime, however, he has to operate his businesses in a crime-ridden environment that affects overall sales.

**BD**

The business owner vows to resist the cartel’s presence in his town and works with the authorities to stop the cartel’s illegal activities, even though the cartel does not try to extort money from any of the local business owners.

**Cartel:** This is the worst scenario for the cartel. It chooses not to extort money but the business owner is not content with the cartel’s other illegal activities in the town and assists authorities in identifying and arresting cartel members.

**Business owner:** This is the best scenario for the business owner and the town because everyone can run their respective businesses without the threat of criminal extortion. They also assist authorities...
Since the cartel has a dominant strategy of extorting money, the best outcome that the business owner can secure is the third best scenario: pay extortion fees and turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities.

**Nash Equilibrium**

Figure 2 identifies a Nash equilibrium at the point (AC)—the cartel extorts the business owner, who decides to pay fees and turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activity. In addition, the illustration shows that the cartel has a dominant strategy to extort the local business owner regardless of the business owner’s decision to cooperate or resist. Although no reasonable business owner would like to pay extortion fees, the threat of violent consequences from resisting is less desirable than simply appeasing the cartel by paying the fees and turning a blind eye to illegal activity.

![Nash Equilibrium Diagram]

**Strategic Moves**

This section examines strategic moves by the cartel as well as the business owner. It considers potential consequences associated with each decision.

**First Move**

**Business owner**: If the business owner decides to make the first move, he determines that since the cartel has a dominant strategy of extorting money, the best outcome that the business owner can secure is the third best scenario at (AC): pay extortion fees and turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities.

**Cartel**: If the cartel decides to make the first move, it determines that by choosing to extort money, the local business owner will prefer to pay and turn a blind eye rather than resist the cartel and risk violence. By making the first move, the cartel can secure its best scenario at (AC): charge extortion fees from a cooperative business owner.

Regardless of who makes the first move, it is reasonable to assume that under these conditions, the cartel will seek to extort money while the local business owner complies and turns a blind eye to the cartel’s illegal activities.
Threat

**Business owner:** The business owner can threaten to resist the cartel and notify authorities if the cartel pursues extortion. His intent is to persuade the cartel to cease extortion efforts against his business. Under the conditions of this game, the cartel still prefers to extort money from the business owner, even if he resists. As we pointed out earlier, this is the worst scenario for the business owner, because his counter-threat does not work and the cartel takes his money through violence.

**Cartel:** With a dominant strategy of extortion already in place, the cartel does not have a further threat.

Promise

**Business owner:** Similar to a threat, the business owner also has a promise to offer. In this scenario, the business owner can promise to turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activity as long as the cartel agrees to avoid any extortion of his business. Under the current conditions of this game, the cartel achieves a better outcome by extorting the business anyway. As a result, even though the business owner agrees to turn a blind eye, the cartel continues to extort money from him. The promise does not work.

**Cartel:** Under the game's current conditions, the cartel can promise the business owner that it will not extort money if he turns a blind eye to illegal activities. While this is a reasonable promise, it is still worse than the likely first move. As a result, the cartel is better off without offering any promise to the business owner.

Combination

**Business owner:** A combination of threat and promise is a potential point of negotiation for the business owner. In a combination strategic move, the business owner can threaten to resist and notify authorities if the cartel seeks extortion, but promise to turn a blind eye to illegal operations if the cartel avoids extortion activities. Under the pure conditions of the game as I’ve labeled them, the cartel would reject this offer and prefer extortion. The following section explores scenarios in which such an offer might be acceptable to the cartel.

**Cartel:** The cartel does not have a combination strategy.

Security Levels/Prudential Strategy

Security Levels

Figures 3 and 4, respectively, identify each player’s security level. In a two-player game, a player’s security level is his maximum gain after his options have been minimized by the other player's actions. Consider, for example, the business owner’s preferences. Using the preferences listed in figure 3, the business owner can achieve a 2 or a 3 if he decides to turn a blind eye to the cartel’s crimes. Knowing this, the cartel minimizes the business owner’s security through the use of extortion (2 < 3). Conversely, the business owner can achieve either a 1 or a 4 if he decides to resist payments and notify the
Authorities suspect that a significant number of additional extortions occurred that simply were not reported to local police, probably for fear of reprisal.

Knowing this as well, the cartel again minimizes the business owner’s security through extortion ($1 < 4$). The cartel’s commitment to extortion effectively minimizes the business owner’s well-being, and restricts the maximum gain the business owner can achieve. Knowing this, the business owner prefers to turn a blind eye (settling for a 2) rather than resist payment (resulting in a 1). Thus, the business owner’s security level is 2.

Figures 3 and 4 identify each player’s security level by maximizing each player’s own gain while minimizing the gain of the other player.

**Business Owner’s Security Level:** The business owner’s security level is 2 (see figure 3). This means that in the worst case, the business owner can guarantee what he considers to be the third best scenario: the cartel pursues extortion, and the local business owner agrees to pay fees and turn a blind eye to illegal activity.

**Cartel’s Security Level:** The cartel’s security level is 3 (figure 4). This means that in the worst case, the cartel can guarantee what it considers to be its second best scenario: although the business owner resists, the cartel uses threats and violence to pursue extortion.
**Prudential Strategy**

Figure 5 illustrates that using both security levels, the status quo is found at (2,3), a situation much more favorable to the cartel than to the business owner. The status quo describes the existing state of affairs in a disturbingly large number of towns throughout Mexico. *The Washington Post* recently noted that in 2012, reports of extortion doubled in Mexico while most other types of crimes declined. In addition, authorities suspect that a significant number of additional extortions occurred that simply were not reported to local police, probably for fear of reprisal. Nash’s game theory provides an accurate reflection of this unfortunate state of affairs.

Both solutions are found in pure strategies, suggesting that in order to meet its guaranteed minimal payoff, the cartel should always pursue extortion, while the business owner will suffer the least by cooperating with the cartel, paying extortion fees, and turning a blind eye to the cartel’s other illegal activities.

**How to Resolve the Extortion Dilemma**

Presumably, there is no rational business owner who prefers to pay extortion fees. I make the assumption that rational business owners, whether actively or passively, will search for a solution to eliminate extortion payments. This section considers several actions that might alter the preferences of either the business owner or the cartel, and how those changes ultimately affect each side’s strategy. It suggests a strategy where the business owner is better off than Mexico’s current status quo.

**Increased Security Presence**

Most logically, the business owner would benefit from a more robust and effective police force that has the strength to overwhelm and defeat the cartel. In this scenario, the effectiveness of the police force serves as a deterrent to extortion practices. The cartel’s preference shifts as a result: now the cartel’s second best preference is not to extort if the business owner turns a blind eye to illegal activities (AC). Conversely, the cartel’s option to extort money from the business owner who will resist and notify authorities (BC) becomes its third best preference. All other preferences remain the same.

Figure 6 illustrates the new preferences and corresponding Nash equilibrium.
Without communication between the business owner and the cartel, however, nothing changes for the business owner. The cartel still has a dominant strategy in pursuing extortion. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium remains where the cartel extorts while the business owner pays and turns a blind eye to illegal activity. What has changed is the business owner’s leverage in strategic moves. If effective police operations increase a business owner’s leverage, the business owner can offer the combination of a credible threat and promise to improve his outcome.

Solution: Should the cartel pursue extortion, the business owner can threaten to resist and notify the authorities (eliminating AC). This threat does not work alone, however. Game theory suggests that the business owner would also have to promise to turn a blind eye to the cartel’s illegal activity (eliminating BD). By combining the threat and promise, the business owner can secure an agreement: the cartel will not extort in exchange for the business owner’s blind eye to other illegal activity (AD).

Community Organization against Crime

In an ideal world, the Mexican police forces would maintain the trust of the people and wield the strength to defeat the drug cartels that are terrorizing an increasing number of businesses and communities throughout Mexico. Unfortunately, the reality is that widespread corruption within the police forces leads many business owners to question police motives and to hesitate to call on them for help. Furthermore, the drug cartels have grown so strong that in some areas of Mexico, they frequently outgun and outmatch the government forces that are tasked to protect the population. In some instances, Mexican business owners have grown tired of the status quo and have sought ways to mount a collaborative effort among themselves against cartel activity.

In this scenario, the game changes in that the single business owner is replaced by a collective group of business owners with a common preference. It is apparent that a simple shift in the business owners’ preference to resist and notify authorities has little effect on the cartel’s actions. The cartel maintains a dominant strategy to extort businesses through any means necessary, and the resultant Nash equilibrium shifts to BC: extortion against a resistant community. This scenario is likely to result in the most chaotic, violent environment of any of the preferences. Furthermore, the business owners pin themselves in a corner where neither threat nor promise will persuade the cartel to change its activities. So, how can business owners create an incentive where resistance to cartel activity might cause the cartel to change its strategy and eliminate extortion?

One suggestion is that any organized resistance must be conducted with total commitment against the cartel. As mentioned previously, a simple shift in the business owners’ preference to resist is not enough to eliminate extortion. Business owners must form a resistance so unified and fierce that it shifts the preference of the cartel as well. Specifically, the cartel would prefer to simply
conduct its illegal activities without extortion in exchange for a blind eye from the business owners (AD) rather than trying to extort a fiercely resistant community (BC). Figure 8 illustrates the new preferences and corresponding Nash equilibrium.

Solution: While the Nash equilibrium remains at BC, strategic moves now suggest that both sides have a promise that would make the outcome more preferable for both parties. The business owners promise to turn a blind eye if the cartel does not extort their businesses. Similarly, the cartel promises to cease extortion if the business owners agree to turn a blind eye to the cartel’s other illegal activities. In this classic prisoners’ dilemma, game theory suggests that the resultant outcome would be at AD, the second best outcome for both parties. Unless police and military forces can make strong gains against cartel activity, it is arguably in the best interest of Mexican business owners to work together to take resistance efforts into their own hands (figure 9).

Case Study: Ayutla, Guerrero, Mexico

The past few years have seen an increase in the formation of various vigilante groups throughout Mexico that are focused on resisting the violent drug cartels. One news source recently reported that in the southern Mexican state of Guerrero, “a vigilante movement [was] born of frustration at extortion,
In the interest of their families, businesses, and overall livelihood, locals can likely benefit most by taking matters into their own hands. Once the cartel sees greater benefit in coexisting with the locals without disrupting their businesses, a mutual agreement can be reached.

No one, from the store owner to the bus driver, seemed to be exempt from the protection payments demanded by cartel members. Initially, business owners preferred to cooperate with the cartel and resorted to raising the prices of their products and services to make up their losses. “When they extorted money from the rancher, he raised the price of beef, and the store owner raised the price of tortillas,” explained a local vigilante in the town of Ayulta.

The rise in intimidation and extortion by the cartel ultimately pushed the citizens of Ayulta to their limits; in January 2013, the town created the Las Mesas vigilantes. The business owners reached the point where they preferred to resist rather than passively comply with cartel demands. According to the Las Mesas commander, drug activity is frowned upon by locals but is not the target of this upstart resistance movement. “We are not against those who are distributing drugs. That’s a way for them to earn a living. …What we are against is them messing with the local people,” explained the group’s commander. The result has been growing support, both active and passive, from the local population for increased resistance against unpopular cartel intimidation. One local resident explained, “In less than a month, [the vigilantes] have done something that the army and … police haven’t been able to do in years.” One might suggest that in line with the game theory model, the cartel is beginning to shift its preference: it now prefers to stop extortion in return for the community’s blind eye to drug activity, rather than try to continue extortion efforts against an armed, strongly resistant community.

**Conclusions**

Mexico continues to have a significant problem with powerful, violent, and influential drug cartels. Although cartels do not plague the entire country, many areas are severely affected. While security forces continue the fight, internal corruption and lack of resources have made it difficult for them to garner the trust and support they need from affected populations in local communities. As extortion efforts have increased, local business owners have helplessly obliged the cartels’ demands and suffered the economic consequences. Growing discontentment with the status quo has led to an increase of popular resistance against cartels across Mexico. Business owners are increasingly exasperated with the security situation and have decided to collaborate in efforts to eliminate the cartels’ impact on their local communities.

While most business owners would prefer to turn the responsibility for security over to a trustworthy police force with the capability to eliminate extortion and other cartel activity, few perceive this as a serious option for the near future. Instead, business owners need strong resolve to shift their preference and resist extortion rather than accept it as an inevitable way of life. Resistance must be strong enough to shift the cartel’s preference as well. Once the cartel sees greater benefit in coexisting with the locals without disrupting their businesses, a mutual agreement can be reached. As the Ayulta defense commander suggested, business owners can promise to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking in exchange for an end to extortion and intimidation. Despite continuing drug activity, the new status quo would allow businesses to operate without the fear and violence that plagues their society.
For the Mexican government, the cartel problem is a complicated, protracted fight. History suggests that a significant victory against the cartels in Mexico will take years of effective strategy. In the interest of their families, businesses, and overall livelihood, locals can likely benefit most by taking matters into their own hands. While their actions might not solve the problems of drug trafficking, they can defuse cartel violence at the local level and prevent the country from continuing to spiral into extreme chaos.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJ Michael E. Loconsolo is pursuing an MS in Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in the Defense Analysis department, Naval Postgraduate School.

NOTES

2 The Nash equilibrium in game theory is the point at which each of two or more non-cooperative players has made the best choice of strategy he can, knowing the strategies of the other players and knowing that changing his strategy unilaterally will bring no added benefit.
3 “US Chamber Study.”
4 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Colonel William (“Billy”) H. Shaw

T his interview is taken from the collection of the Combating Terrorism Archive Project.¹ Dr. Douglas Borer, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, spoke with U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel William H. (“Billy”) Shaw on 22 July 2013 in Stuttgart, Germany, where COL Shaw was serving with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). They discussed a groundbreaking training program for the Afghan Army Special Forces that COL Shaw developed while serving in Afghanistan in 2010–2011.²

DR. BORER: Billy is going to recap some of his experiences for the historical record. So Billy, take it away.

COL SHAW: Thanks, Doug. My background is mostly in the Special Forces. I spent a year in Djibouti, and 13 months in Afghanistan, as well as a couple of tours to Iraq, the first in Provide Comfort Desert Storm, and then Operation Iraqi Freedom. Now I work at SOCEUR. Specifically, I want to talk about what I did when I was in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. When I originally got there, I was the deputy commander for CFSOC (Combined Forces Special Operations Command) Alpha under General Austin S. Miller. General Haas came in a couple of months later. A position opened up as the commander for the Special Operations Advisor Group, so I became the senior American and de facto camp commander for Camp Morehead, which was collocated with the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Headquarters.

DR. BORER: What year was this?

COL SHAW: This was in 2010. My job was to do a couple of things. First of all, I was a base commander with a very small contingent base that was located inside a larger ANASOC base called Camp Commando. That was the headquarters for one of the kandaks, which is the Afghan equivalent of a battalion, as well as the location of the School of Excellence, which was basically the Afghan Special Warfare Training Center where we trained all of these guys. The second thing I did was to act as primary advisor to Brigadier General Lawang, who was the commander of ANASOC at the time, and then later to Major General Karim when he became the commander. That in itself was probably about an eight- to 10-hour-a-day job because everywhere the commander went, I went as well. The third thing my staff and I did was to oversee and resource the School of Excellence, which trained Afghan commandos, Afghan Special Forces guys, and then also some MISO (Military Information Support Operations), civil affairs, etc. Specifically, one of the things that we did was to try to address and counter the insider-threat problem. Along with that, there were some issues like retention, and we were trying to figure out how to make all that work.
The commandos were the iconic heroes of Afghanistan. They saw probably 80% of the combat action. They had never been defeated on the battlefield. They were advised by either SEAL, SF, or MARSOC (Marine Corps Special Operations Command) teams, but there were still issues below the surface for the commandos. We also had Afghan Special Forces guys there. So the insider-threat piece really got everyone’s attention. We said, Okay, what can we do to counter corruption—the corruption piece was another huge piece—as well as solidify the resolve of our force so that they don’t turn on their American advisors?

My academic background was teaching ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) in a number of leadership venues prior to coming back into SF as a colonel. While in college, I was exposed to a number of academic programs that I found to be very useful for this project that we were taking on. One was a class with Dr. Brian Hall, who wrote *The Omega Factor* and was one of the leading U.S. experts on values. His theories on values identify them as the underpinning reason for all thoughts, ideas, behaviors, etc. If you want to change behavior or the way somebody thinks or feels, you have got to address their values at the root level. So that is what we decided to do. We allowed the Afghan National Army to define their values. We held a seminar so that the senior leadership could expound upon what their values meant, and then we assisted them in product development and campaign design.

The values campaign, specifically, was introduced through the chain of command and through the School of Excellence back into the force to try to shore up the program. In our preliminary research and study, we found that the average Afghan had very limited exposure to new ideas. He heard three primary voices: family and friends, the mullah, and a little bit of media, whether it be radio, TV, text, cell phone, or whatever. Those three voices we found were inadequate when it came to trying to inoculate our soldiers from being turned by the Taliban. General Karim and I were very close friends, and this happened under his watch. He was also a direct descendant of Mohammad—he was a two-star Army general, but people from the surrounding communities revered him as being from the holy tribe or holy family, which greatly assisted us in what we were doing. Because of the taboo of trying to get involved with the soldiers’ religious activities, we were walking a pretty fine line, but between General Karim and me it was good because of our trust level. We were extremely close, almost like brothers. We agreed early on that we would be transparent with one another, and if we agreed to disagree, obviously he would win because he was the two-star general and it was his country!

As we developed this plan, General Karim was very much a player in the development of it. What we found was that the Taliban—especially when guys were going home on leave for 30 days or so—were stepping in and becoming what we termed the “fourth voice.” They became that fourth source of information that could convince someone that the Taliban were doing the right thing. The average Afghan soldier didn’t have enough educational background to refute things that people would tell him. So that fourth voice became very important, and we wanted to become the fourth voice. We did not want the Taliban to do that. The values campaign and then the messaging strategy became the way ahead. The essence of this is that ANASOC values are very similar...
to our values and go back to Qur’anic scripture. That was one of the things that General Karim would continually talk about, because he knew those values were the center of gravity, what the average Afghan Muslim soldier held as the essence of his existence. That essence was what was frequently being targeted by the Taliban. So we began a series of efforts. Religious and Public Affairs defined the Afghan National Army values and then tied them back to Qur’anic verse through a series of pamphlets. Additionally, each kandak had a mullah. General Karim obviously couldn’t tell these mullahs exactly what to say, but he did give them the themes that he wanted taught at mosque. Those themes directly tied our (Afghan) values at ANASOC back to the Qur’an. That was the first piece.

We developed four lines of effort. One line of effort was what is called adaptive leadership, which was developed at Harvard University. The adaptive leadership model lends itself very much to mentorship, where you don’t have the authority or the position to direct people on what to do—in my opinion, that is not actually leadership; it’s management. What you have to do is create conditions that hold a person in an environment long enough for them to deconstruct values that are not consistent with what is required, and then reconstruct those values. But it requires a captive audience, and it actually requires some stress. They don’t have to be super stressed, but just enough. That stress—what we called the crowbar; that was our private little term that we used—came from illuminating and holding the soldiers accountable for the difference between their lived values and their espoused values. The difference between those two is disequilibrium. Unless the person is just a sociopath, when you hold them in that environment and you offer positive reinforcement, then they deconstruct those values that are associated with poor behavior. It could go the other way as well, and that is how they got to where they are. These men had been in a survival situation for an extended period of time under very chaotic and terrible conditions, without being continually reinforced to maintain the positive aspects of their life. It would be really easy for them to slip into the negative and steal and lie and cheat and do all the things that they know are wrong from the Qur’an. But they have grown up that way, first because of the conditions in which they lived, and second, because there was not enough positive pull the other way to offset their survival-type situation.

So adaptive leadership and mentorship were important, but no one there other than myself had any background in how to do these things. The first thing I had to do was teach the mentors and get my cadre onboard with these methods. Applying the methods of adaptive leadership is not easy to do by any stretch of the imagination. But I had to educate my crew because they were the ones who were going to carry the message to their crew: their Afghan counterparts.

DR. BORER: When you say “your crew,” who were those guys?

COL SHAW: I had 64 MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Inc., a private military contracting firm) contractors, and I had some transmedia³ guys, who actually understood what we were trying to do and helped to do it. Then I initially had about 12 active duty or green suiters—these were not necessarily
active duty but people who were assigned to me—and that group grew to around 50 before I left. We were the ones who engaged the Afghans. Here’s a little sidebar on why it was important to get us all synced up: We found that you could personally engage each person, but they are part of a network or a structure that has some pretty constant themes and positions. It’s like a spider web, and they are kind of stuck in that environment. Even if you could move one person away for a time, the environment would deconstruct what you had taught him and he would go back to the status quo.

DR. BORER: Billy, the challenge of reshaping values sounds like the famous recurring line in the *Sopranos* [an American television show about a Mafia family]: “Just when you think you’re out, they suck you back in.” Is that an accurate analogy?

COL. SHAW: Yes, exactly. We did a lot of modeling with two guys from MIT (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) who were out there. They were doing systems analytics for the VSO (village stability operation) program. So they helped out, and one of the transmedia guys, Mike Marks, really got involved with it. He had a background that supported a lot of our theories. We told our crew, If you have random efforts to deconstruct and reconstruct values, or you’re trying to get your counterpart to shift a little bit, it has to be a synchronized, holistic approach so that the whole network shifts. Then you can hold your ground a little bit there. If not, then the environment will pull them back to where they were. This stuff is a slow go. It isn’t something you’re going to fix in an hour or a week or maybe even a year. The deconstruction and reconstruction of values can take years and years and years. So anyway, we started that program, and it worked out pretty well.

Our second line of effort was our engagement strategy with the ANASOC chain of command, and their engagement strategy with their soldiers. We did this fairly effectively once we all got through the training. It took about four months to get my instructors through a mentorship academy, a three-day school, as well as give them the academic background to understand values and adaptive leadership. Prior to getting there, I had guys who were just randomly assigned—you know, Air Force reservists who were not only my supply officers, but also the primary mentors to the Afghan brigade staff. We were all dual-hatted as advisors, plus we were doing our normal duties in whatever position we were in. Prior to that, there was not a common platform for the close-to-100 people who were advising. There was no mentor academy; there was no pre-train-up to come to ANASOC. People would just kind of show up. We had to have that common ground, so we started running a mentor academy and got everybody through, and then after that, we would run it quarterly so that people who were newly assigned would go through and understand what we were doing.

The third line of operation was obviously the religious aspect. That was fully outside of my realm. I was just an advisor to General Karim. I advised Karim on how to frame the message and then how to disseminate it back into the force, which he did through his mullahs. It was bigger than just that, though; it was also training with media. We ended up working with a guy named Ted, who came from Great Britain. He was a freelance journalist, and he wanted
We told him that everybody else who came to see us wanted to see night-vision goggles and M4 assault weapons, but that was not the story. The story is the human element behind that. So Ted made a film trailer, and I think he has produced a movie now, or a series, called “God, Country, Duty: The Commando Story.” If you Google that, you will see it. The trailer was all values-based. It was personal stories of Afghan soldiers who were from different tribes, and how they initially didn’t trust one another, but after going through the training and everything else, they became like close friends and brothers. Ted was planning on following them through combat, etc., for a period of time and producing this story. Whether that actually happened, I don’t know, but you can still see the trailer “God, Country, Duty” on YouTube.

The final piece of this process was institutionalizing the training into the Afghans’ systems. Obviously the leadership was already onboard, but we wanted to have venues in which to do this. The first thing we did was work with the School of Excellence. We went through the POIs (programs of instruction), and instead of just teaching someone how to fire a weapon, we also infused the message of how the Afghan value system would support them as soldiers in combat—that it is about doing the right thing, not hurting women and children, not stealing, whatever. These little vignettes were actually infused into the instruction. In addition, some of our performance-oriented training had values-based or ethics-based scenarios where each trainee had to make the call.

The way that we got to this point was also pretty interesting. ICRC (the International Committee of the Red Cross) had come out, because of some allegations in the open-source media about atrocities committed by village stability platform guys. These were the Afghan Special Forces guys who were out there doing VSO, or commandos. In fact, three months prior, there was an allegation that the commandos had murdered somebody who happened to be one of Karzai’s friends, and so a general was fired along with his entire staff. The allegations were totally false. It was actually the Taliban that did it. But the general was a casualty of rumor at that point. ICRC had some legitimate concerns about what was being taught, who was teaching it, how much time we were spending on it, and all that other stuff. So the initial reaction from our side of the fence would have been to keep them at arm’s length. We would have assumed that these ICRC guys are not necessarily making the accusations, but they are supporting the people that do make them.

The ICRC representative, Art Bristol, had military experience from the Australian Air Force—he had retired in ’06, but he fully understood the military mission. He was not against the military mission, but he was also responsible for the law of land warfare. So after a 10-minute discussion, it came down to “What we are trying to do is have a values-based, ethical, professional force. Well, what is the law of land warfare? It is synonymous.” We were in violent agreement at that point that we needed to do something. So my staff and I laid out the entire values campaign: what we were doing and how we were doing it. We then invited Art and his instructors to come and personally give the law of land warfare blocks of instruction to our Afghan instructors because, first of all, we didn’t understand it as well as they did. The Afghan
instructors were fluent linguists and understood the context, and could convey their subject much better through vignettes or stories or whatever else. My guys weren’t actual teachers—our Afghan instructors were the commandos themselves. They just didn’t have the background that ICRC did. So we wanted ICRC to do that for us, which they agreed to do, and that was the first time that has ever happened. At the same time, ICRC was very excited about the access, about the transparency, about the ability to ensure that the law of land warfare was being adequately addressed. The by-product of this was that initially there was some nervousness at the higher levels, at the GO/FO (general officer/flag officer) level as well as the O6 (colonel) level.

As a result, the next time an allegation was made, ICRC became the defense attorney: “Hey, that is not at all correct, and let me tell you what we are doing. We personally give the blocks of instruction. This is the POI they go through. It is 20 hours’ worth of training plus etc., etc.” So the unintended consequence was that we had a very close ally with very heavy-duty global credentials in this area. Like I said, in the end, we were both in violent agreement that we wanted the same thing, but at first we couldn’t figure out how to work together.

DR. BORER: It was the “odd couple.”

COL SHAW: It was, but if it hadn’t been for Art Bristol and his open-mindedness and his ability to understand the military mission—he understood and saw what could work. We also got those ICRC guys to help us build law of land warfare ethical dilemmas into our training environments. They had very good context because they received all the reports. So they could take the latest and greatest of the bad things that were happening, and we would put those into our training events. When the Afghan soldiers went through that training, they had to address the problem, and that was part of the after-action review process. So the learning model was not just didactics. It wasn’t just a motivational speech from the commander of the day. It was actually experiential learning in a realistic environment, just like how U.S. forces train, which had a pretty good impact. So that was a big positive.

Art took his program—the program that we were currently doing—back to Geneva and briefed it. They kept him there for another week, and I believe they decided that they were going to change the way they presented their global engagement strategy, basing it on values and adaptive leadership. I mean, you can teach the laws of why this is good and why this is bad, but if you understand the values of the culture you are talking to, you can relate it back to them in a way that will gain and maintain their attention a lot better than putting it in American-speak. ICRC also adopted the learning model of how we infused those vignettes into the training, as opposed to just the classroom. There is a guy who is very high up in ICRC, and right before I left, he had a meeting with General Haas—he basically came in and gave General Haas a hug and said, “This is the greatest thing since sliced bread.” Art Bristol brought this program from Afghanistan back to ICRC and said, “We are rethinking the whole way we are doing business.” So that was a great extra point there that we didn’t even plan on getting.
The person who made sure it was received at the senior levels of the Afghan command was General Karimi, a U.S.-trained four-star who was the chief of the Afghan MoD. He was also U.S. Special Forces-trained back in the late 1970s. I used to meet with him about once a week because ANASOC fell directly under MoD. Because of ANASOC’s assets, it didn’t fall under one of the regional commands. General Karim wanted to brief General Karimi, who was a very busy man. I mean, he was always signing papers, or he was listening with one ear and you would get the “Yes, yes,” even if it wasn’t a yes or no question. We tried to explain to him a little bit about values up front, but he was too busy, so we said, “Okay, sir. You need to watch this video.” So he watched that trailer, “God, Country, Duty.” After that, he called his aide in and said, “Lock the door. I don’t want to be bothered.” MoD was actually attacked by suicide bombers while this was going on. General Karimi just handed his phone to his J2 and said, “You handle it. I am busy right now.” That is how much attention it garnered from him. General Karimi said, “This is exactly what we need for our force,” because they were having problems with people stealing. They were having problems with people going AWOL (absent without official leave). And the insider-threat thing was really weighing heavy on their minds. MoD was getting a lot of pressure to do something that would counter that. So when General Karimi understood the “fourth voice of influence” arguments that we described, he said, “I am adopting this for the Afghans—for the whole armed forces.” Now I don’t know whether that actually happened—this was about five days before I left in May 2011.

There are two other pieces to this—and this was all very fortuitous because it took about three months to conceptually get this right. We had about 20 whiteboards in a conference room that no one was allowed to touch, and me and my guys were trying to turn our ideas into a plan: “How do you operationalize these academic theories into an executable program or plan?” Then we had to train ourselves, so that’s how the whole process started. It would have been nice if all of this was precooked and we rolled into base hot and ready to implement a plan with pre-trained instructors. But it wasn’t that way. Very much towards the end there, a couple of things happened. Ted (the filmmaker) had come in six months earlier—with MoD approval but without ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) approval—as a freelance journalist to do a story. I didn’t have any authority to control his access or censor his message. We had to be transparent because it was the Afghans’ post; it wasn’t a U.S. post. I think we influenced his perspective of what was important and what wasn’t with the values piece, which turned out to be brilliant. I mean, the guy is brilliant. It is a moving three-minute clip. You are just saturated in values through these personal stories of people.

About a month before I left, around April (2011), Ted showed back up, and he had this video on disk. I watched it, and I said, “Fantastic.” So I gave it to my boss, General Linder, who was deputy commanding general for Special Operations Forces NTM–A (NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan). GEN Linder (who is now commander, Special Operations Command–Africa) was fully onboard, and he had been facilitating and contributing to this whole values campaign. He would come out and do whiteboard sessions with us and get down in the weeds of “How are we going to make this right?” He
disseminated our ideas very quickly through ISAF Headquarters. Then Ted put the trailer on YouTube, and it went viral—on a very small scale, but a lot of Afghans were downloading it and looking at it. It had English subtitles, but it was spoken in Pashto. So I got that video from Ted at a very good time.

The week after that, the secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, visited. I happened to be out on a camp leave, but during that exchange, the briefing of values and that video were a very important part of the demonstrations and his visit to the school. Mr. Rasmussen understood about the ICRC piece, and he said, “We have got to take this to the NATO summit in Chicago.” Or so I was told by his aides. Then the week after that, the chairman (of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Martin Dempsey, came. NTM–A had four hours with him, and they gave me all four hours—which I wasn’t very excited about initially because four hours is a long time to spend with the chairman. But after he saw the video, he became very, very interested in our program. We laid it out for him, and then took him on an interactive trip around the base. Our briefings were given at the top of the mountain on a piece of plywood and Plexiglas, but you are standing on top of a 2,000-foot mountain, and you can see where all the battles happen. That is a hell of a lot better than being in a hot, dusty conference room looking at a PowerPoint. I tried to hit the general with a PowerPoint, and when I got into the car he said, “You don’t understand. I don’t take PowerPoint from three-star generals. I am not going to start with a colonel.” I said, “Maybe you want to watch the video.” After he watched the video, he started asking questions. I said, “Sir, I’ve got it right here. I can explain it to you, or I can show you.” He said, “Okay, I will look at the PowerPoint.” So we went back, and I gave him a copy of the disk with all of the stuff on it.

I gave the presentation all the way up the line to General Linder. I think General Bolger had sent parts of it back to his Center for Army Lessons Learned. COL Joe Duncan’s job at the time was the special operations division chief at JRTC. (As of today, he is the new J3 for SOCEUR.) So I said to Joe, “Hey, this is what we did, and this is what we sent back.” The chairman’s words were “Where are we going wrong with this? Why haven’t we done this? We’ve been here how many years now? Ten going on 11, 12 years? Why haven’t we done this?” That was a very good question. My initial reflection was “Sir, our system doesn’t promote long-term stuff. I mean, if I have a combat rotation as a major and I have my company in combat, what is the metric we use here? It is pretty much kill/capture, number one. Number two, even if I had the best values campaign ever, within six months I am not going to have any measurable difference—or a very small measure of difference. That is not a part of my OER (officer evaluation record) that is going to get me or my battalion command promoted.” He said, “Wow. You’re right.” Consequently, as we talked, I noted that the United States gave a lot of money and equipment and taught a lot of skills to the Afghans, but they didn’t have the values necessary to sustain that long term without our continuing engagement, in my personal opinion.

So anyway, that is the Billy Shaw story, of being in Afghanistan for about eight months. It is kind of a different approach—not your average combat story. We were trying to use other tools that were not necessarily associated with military doctrine, and then worked with very unconventional partners.
like ICRC to fix problem sets. That level of trust had to be there, but we worked with the right guy at the right time, who had the right vision. So it ended up working out pretty well for us.

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**ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE**

**COL William (“Billy”) H. Shaw** is currently working on a doctorate in Adult Education from Auburn University, where he has also served as professor of military science for the Army ROTC.

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**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

**Dr. Douglas Borer** is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis department of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, where he teaches war and political legitimacy and national security strategy.

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**NOTES**

1. The Counterterrorism Archive Project aims to collect and archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by military and other security personnel from around the world in the 21st century fight against global terrorism. Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and in the future.

2. This interview was edited for length and clarity, and at the request of COL Shaw, some names were changed to pseudonyms. Every effort was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions of all participants are theirs alone, and do not represent the official positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any other official entity. The original interview is available on video to CTFP members at www.globalecco.org/archives.

3. This is a term for spreading information, i.e., “storytelling,” across multiple platforms and in different formats using digital media.

4. COL Shaw later explained the time line more clearly: “The first month at Camp Commando we worked around the clock to adjust the production model and quality of the soldiers we were training in the School of Excellence. We were not making the numbers the command needed and the quality of our graduates (especially Special Forces) was poor, in my opinion. It was in about the second month of my time at the camp that we started to design the values campaign. It was initially intended to fight corruption, which was terrible in the unit. It was not until after about six months there that we actually put our plan into effect.”

5. COL Shaw later clarified this point: “The metrics we use to define our military success and earn promotion are based on kill or capture, and have nothing to do with values. No one would divert their attention from achieving those metrics in order to experiment with values. The problem is, while we can train anyone to pull the trigger and develop military skills, if they don’t have the values or ethical base to be responsible, then there will always be problems with behavior.”
The recent debate in the United States about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, referred to as “drones” in the popular press) has highlighted the question of whether it is more ethical to kill the enemy or capture and imprison them. (In some cases, especially with U.S. citizens like Anwar al-Awlaki, there may be the issue of legality as well.)

This kill-or-capture debate is a long-standing one in the ethics of war, but recent prison breaks in Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya have added a layer of complexity to the discussion. Prison breaks are a time-honored strategy that insurgents, terrorists, and other asymmetric fighters have used to both disrupt the enemy and release captured fighters—especially leaders; however, the recent rash of these breaks has been disconcerting because of concerns that some of them were planned by possible al Qaeda affiliates and may be a prelude to further attacks. In this article, I explore the argument that the risks posed by prison breaks shift the discussion in favor of killing over capture in ways that merit serious attention and reflection.

Let’s begin by considering the debate in general. What are the ethical reasons to capture rather than kill in the context of war? There are three major ethical issues to consider: (1) proportionality of means, (2) the value of “winning hearts and minds,” and (3) material and logistical costs. In both the Just War tradition and international law, there is a requirement to use means proportional to the desired end, and also to use the least amount of force that is militarily necessary to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering. For example, if one can achieve the military objective by capturing adversaries instead of killing them, then capture would be ethically preferable because it uses less force and has milder, more reversible effects. This requirement stems at least in part from the notion of “winning the hearts and minds” of a population, which is frequently a concern in asymmetric conflicts, but it also relates to considerations about restoring the peace after the conflict is over. We need to consider not only what the effects of killing may be on the local populace, but also the effects of sending troops in to make a capture, especially of a high-value target like Osama bin Laden. Capture may be regarded as more humane and compassionate than killing, but capture may actually be more problematic in terms of adverse impacts on the population, and on the capturing forces’ relationship with the government controlling the territory. In particular, one might be concerned with how the prisoners will be treated in captivity and what will happen once they are released. Finally, the costs (material and logistical) associated with capturing, keeping, and maintaining prisoners—presumably in compliance with humanitarian standards—must be considered. When it comes to ethics, we should certainly examine the tangible costs, but also try to assess at least some of the intangible costs, like reputation, moral authority, impact on morale, and domestic support for the actions.

In thinking about these assessments, it is important to be aware of operating assumptions. The first assumption is that death is always the most ethically
problematic and the least humane option, and that it is to be avoided. Related to this is the assumption that humanely conducted confinement causes less long-term, irreversible damage to the individual, and to the family and community, as long as the released prisoner is returned in good health and mental shape. The presumption is that capturing causes less resentment and adverse feeling among the population one is engaged with, and is less disruptive and harmful to community and family life.

In addition, let’s consider the “warrior” mentality or worldview, and its assumptions. The epic Greek hero Achilles certainly did not regard death as the worst thing that could happen to him; in fact, he embraced his death as the vehicle to immortal glory in ways that might remind us of today’s suicide bombers or other fighters for whom martyrdom is desirable. An honorable death on the battlefield, especially at the hand of the adversary, may be seen as much more of a moral good than the humiliation and shame of imprisonment and a return to the community having failed in the goal of the warrior: to die well. We should consider whether the ethical harm from this humiliation is worse than death, and whether the moral equality of combatants—the idea that combatants are not morally responsible or guilty for the justness of the cause for which they fight, but fight in good faith—means that we owe an adversary the right to a good death. It may be tempting to deny our adversaries a good death, and to view their humiliation as justified by our own suffering, but we should recall that we can expect reciprocity if the tables are turned. Furthermore, certain forms of humiliation that deny the human dignity of the individual are morally and legally problematic in significant ways.

How do the recent prison breaks change these calculations, especially in the case of large-scale prison breaks (of several hundred to a thousand inmates) that are part of a larger strategy by insurgents? What if it is reasonably likely that those who are captured will quickly end up back in the fight? With UAVs, we can target and kill adversaries (especially high-value targets and leaders) with less risk to ground troops than would be the case when sending in a kill team, even an elite force. Having this option available makes the capture argument much less attractive, especially in light of the warrior mentality discussed previously. While some warriors may be more willing to die than others, the point of war is to disable the enemy enough to prevail, not necessarily to destroy their worldview or ideology (an outcome we might desire, but one that is hardly a militarily achievable objective). We must also consider the likely collateral damage (unintended harm, especially to noncombatants) that comes with either the drone-kill option or the capture option, especially of a well-defended high-value target. Finally, how does one calculate the potential damage if captured fighters and leaders escape from prison and return to the fight? Clearly this depends on how many escape, what their leadership profile is, and also what happened while they were in prison. If they were incarcerated with other like-minded individuals, it is possible that prison becomes an opportunity for further radicalization and networking, making them more dangerous should they be freed to fight again.

As a thought experiment, consider two prisoners. Prisoner Alpha is captured, imprisoned, interrogated, and treated humanely near where he was captured, and then released. He returns to his community and family as a productive and integrated member of society, along with several others from his village.
who were also captured. Prisoner Omega is captured, imprisoned, and interroga-
ted to gather intelligence; he makes connections with other prisoners, and sets out to gather his own intelligence on the operations of the adversary in conjunction with other prisoners, from whom he receives instructions and mentoring. Either of these scenarios, as well as a range of other possibilities in between these poles, is entirely plausible, which makes our task of reflection even more difficult, because it is hard to predict which scenarios are likely in any given context.

One way to think through the issues here is to return to a core question: What is the moral point or value of dying in war? Why take the risks (physical, material, financial, and social) that come with war or conflict? Historically, dying in war seems to be an act of sacrifice by the individual for fellow citizens, for a greater good, and/or for the community. The flip side of this is to ask, what is the moral point of killing in war? The answer, presumably, is to protect and defend the community and the common good from some kind of serious injustice, harm, or threat. What is the moral point of capturing (instead of killing) in war? It seems that it is to immobilize the enemy, stop the threat that the enemy poses, and prevent the enemy’s further action for the duration of the conflict. This is not to assume that enemy fighters will never pose any kind of threat in the future, but only that the present threat is neutralized. The understanding in conventional conflicts is that prisoners will be taken care of in certain prescribed ways, including being repatriated at the end of the conflict. Clearly the asymmetric context of today’s military operations—often open-ended, often unfolding in the midst of the civilian population, and typically fought against unconventional combatants who may be indistinguishable from the locals—makes this question more complicated. In some cases, especially in counterterrorism, there may also be considerations of deterrence, intelligence gathering, and possible criminal prosecution where appropriate when deciding whether to kill or capture.

This brings us back to the prison break phenomenon: How do we assess the threat and the danger that prison breaks pose, and how do we decide whether killing is the best way to deal with that threat in terms of the possible and likely effects? To the degree that prison breaks heighten the possible threat posed by prisoners, that consideration will complicate the argument for capture (unless intelligence is needed or prosecution is being considered) and weight the decision toward killing. This argument, however, should include two caveats: first, these kinds of assessments are often highly speculative and prone to be wrong, because in war we tend to either overestimate or downplay the threat that an adversary poses, in part because of limited information, but also due to our presuppositions and working assumptions. Second, the presumption against killing in war is powerful and long-standing for a myriad of important ethical, religious, social, material, and practical reasons. Any move to weaken that presumption requires deeper reflection and conversation.
Even to serious fans of WWII history, devoting an entire book to the operations of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in wartime Albania might seem to be a generous enterprise, but the story told by historian Roderick Bailey in *The Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle* is intriguing. Both strategically and politically, the British SOE engagement in Albania was a complete failure. The 100 men who were sent by the SOE into the country between 1942 and 1944 to prevent an Axis takeover did not make history; they could neither play a substantial role in helping local guerrillas fight the Axis forces, nor could they prevent the subsequent installation of communism in Albania. The reasons for this failure of British military and political efforts in the Balkans during WWII deserve attention, and Bailey provides a thorough description of what the SOE mission did and did not accomplish in Albania.

The book, however, deals less with the issues of Britain’s “grand strategy” for defeating the Axis forces by sending in SOE to support local guerrillas, and more with the challenges and dangers faced by those British liaison officers (BLOS) once they were on the ground. The action takes place at a time when the Axis’ power in the region was declining and local resistance was abruptly increasing under the influence of Communist cadres. The author, a decorated veteran of British Army operations in Afghanistan, is a prominent military historian whose more recent works on irregular warfare and special operations have been cited by the British government.

The most engaging aspect of the book is the deep research done by the author, who had access to the personal diaries of the SOE officers who went into Albania. Bailey brings to life the colorful and dramatic experiences of these men in the wildest province, where they worked with “enough chiefs and tribes and rifle-wielding guerrillas to conjure lively images of Lawrence and the Arabs.” The fact that the men kept such diaries, risky and unwise as it might have been, offers us the rare opportunity to understand their motives for joining the SOE’s Albanian campaign. The British soldiers sent there were intrepid adventurers, which explains in part why many of them persisted in carrying out their dangerous, difficult, and ultimately futile missions until the Germans finally withdrew.

The first SOE men infiltrated Albania in early 1943 by ground, after being parachuted into neighboring Greece. They literally started from scratch. Their mission was to conduct guerrilla warfare with the support of the local resistance in an attempt to make the Italians capitulate, but from the beginning of the campaign they lacked proper intelligence on the ground. They soon had to change their plans anyway, because the political situation changed rapidly after the Italians signed an armistice in September 1943 and the Germans stepped in to occupy the Balkans.

Besides the political changes on the ground, the SOE operation in Albania was also being affected by political problems at home. Greece and Yugoslavia were
pressuring the British government over the issue of which political factions to support in Albania. This meant that local groups often refused to cooperate with the BLOs because Britain, as one of the world’s “great powers,” had not yet expressed its opinion on what would happen in Albania after the war. Meanwhile, Albanian Communist forces supported by Yugoslav and Soviet advisers were gaining strength at the expense of British influence. The SOE officers on the ground found themselves at the mercy of these strategic and political uncertainties while trying to deal with the operational difficulties of working without local support, not to mention the tremendous tactical risks of their mission. Bailey’s detailed descriptions of both major operations and minor events provide the reader with a lively picture of the daily life of these daring Special Forces officers while they were in Albania. The Wildest Province may also serve as a starting point for understanding why British and American secret operations that attempted to overthrow the Albanian Communist regime in the late 1940s and ‘50s met with such failure.

Students and practitioners of irregular warfare and special operations may find this book intriguing for its descriptions of the preparations and conduct of what were the first special and clandestine operations in Europe. The book details mission planning, force selection and training, contact development and infiltration, and then the mission itself. How these men managed operational security and communications with the SOE HQ and developed relationships and coordinated with both local guerrilla forces and the civilian population, as well as how they carried out their sabotage operations, can offer some surprising insights for today’s SOF officers.

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

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The Deceptive American

Any epic novel’s lore can be enhanced by a mysterious urban legend. The meteoric success of The Ugly American, published in 1958, created high expectations among readers for authors William J. Lederer’s and Eugene Burdick’s second collaboration. They published Sarkhan in 1965, and received initial high praise from early reviews. The Literary Guild and the Reader’s Digest Condensed Book Club made it an immediate selection for their readers. Bookstores around the nation stocked tens of thousands of copies on publication day. Yet, the book simply disappeared without explanation, supposedly recalled by the publisher. Lederer and Burdick spent years attempting to discover why their work had been withdrawn, and blamed agencies within the U.S. government for suppressing the book because of its disapproving view of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The novel was finally re-released under the title The Deceptive American in 1977, after an additional 12 years of effort by the authors to republish it.

Readers today will be shocked by how the main themes of the novel still resonate. The action takes place in Sarkhan, the same fictitious Southeast Asian country where The Ugly American was set, bordering China and Vietnam. The
country faces a pivotal transition of leadership in which Crown Prince Lin is set to replace his retiring father, King Diad, in a ceremonial transfer of authority. A covert Communist insurgency, supported by external powers, positions itself to manipulate the government and take advantage of the confusion during the transfer to seize control. The Communists run a highly functional underground network that allows them to influence key negotiations and sway both Sarkhanese and U.S. perceptions, thus setting the conditions for the Communists’ attempt to seize power.

Washington’s foreign policy mistakes are evident throughout the book and unfortunately are recognizable as ones that still occur today. The various U.S. agencies that are working through the U.S. embassy in Sarkhan lack a comprehensive strategy for engagement and development. Aid, intelligence, diplomacy, and military assistance frequently run counter to each other. U.S. embassy officials put too much faith in the wrong Sarkhanese power brokers and are often attracted by the power brokers’ American education and flawless use of English, rather than their actual accomplishments and abilities.

Lederer and Burdick emphasize the importance of understanding a culture in order to relate to it. The two protagonists, a retired U.S. Navy captain turned merchant trader and an American anthropologist who lives in Sarkhan, are fluent in many dialects of Sarkhanese. Their ability to accurately read the rapidly changing situation results from their long-standing relationships within Sarkhan, a deep understanding of the cultural nuances, and familiarity with the key Sarkhanese power brokers. These factors should reverberate with present-day Special Forces soldiers as essential traits for operational success around the world.

In the following scene, the protagonists, Coldstone and McCauley, argue with an embassy official against blindly increasing military aid to the Sarkhanese government. They insist that a more population-centric approach will be more effective to counter the Communists’ efforts.

In Sarkhan, the Communists are educating and brainwashing the best people in the rural areas, which is ninety percent of Sarkhan. Almost daily, they are visiting villages which have almost no communication with the government in Haidho [the capital] except when the tax collector comes or the Army requires recruits. The Communists soon will have a network of communications through Sarkhan. (p. 168)

Most American diplomats and intelligence people go for the “sure” military man. And wind up with unstable dictators in Korea, Vietnam, Formosa, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan—the list seems endless. The only sure victory is a solid political victory, but Americans are not prepared to travel that harder, slower, more tedious route. The Communists are. American men must go overseas as patriots, preferably without families, willing to die, willing to learn the language and the customs, the emotional patterns, the
historical and religious backgrounds. They must be willing as Americans to suffer and be as dedicated as saints. (p. 169)

The enemy and locales maybe different today, but it is easy to see the similarity to problems that the United States faces in its current overseas contingency operations.

This novel is a great read for anyone who will operate at the battalion level with SOF. Even if that individual is not going to work in Asia, the story of The Deceptive American is still useful to help identify the culture biases that many Americans possess, so that such biases can be mitigated in future engagements. ☼

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

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NOTES

1 Did the government censor the novel, or was this just coincidence? While it is unlikely that a diabolical Orwellian conspiracy existed to censor the work, the controversy nevertheless piqued my desire to read the novel. This could have been the authors’ intent all along.
Douglas Porch
Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013
ISBN: 978-1-107-02738-1 Hardcover

Excerpt from the Preface:

My argument continues to be that what has long been called small wars in its various reiterations as imperial policing or COIN (counterinsurgency operations) does not constitute a specialized category of warfare. Rather, it consists of the application of petty war tactics that its advocates since the 1840s have puffed as infallible prescriptions for effortless conquest, nation-building, and national grandeur. Small wars enthusiasts basically reject the Clausewitzian character of war in favor of a Jominian tactical and operational approach, in large part to evade democratic civilian control. Claims in doctrine for success in small wars, at least at a reasonable strategic, financial, and moral cost, have relied on mythologized versions of the past too often supported by shoddy research and flawed, selective analysis of cases. History cooked as COIN folklore can lead to people getting killed because it fails to convey that each insurgency is a contingent event in which doctrine, operations, and tactics must support a viable policy and strategy, not the other way around. (xi–xii)

Hybrid Warfare
by Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson
Issue Date: August 2013

Major Timothy McCulloh and Major Richard Johnson wrote this monograph on hybrid warfare while they were students at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written in two parts, their individual approaches complement each other by providing a synergistic combination of both an overarching theory as well as an operational perspective. While the idea of hybrid warfare is not new, the authors together provide a clear, useful, and relevant contextual understanding of the differences between conventional conflicts and the realm of irregular warfare. Major McCulloh’s contribution in the first section lays the theoretical basis for a definition of hybrid warfare, while addressing the pertinent question of its historical origin. Major Johnson’s section uses historical examples and case studies to approach hybrid threats through a lens of U.S.-oriented operational art. The authors contribute to the understanding of warfare as a spectrum of conflict rather than a dichotomy of black and white alternatives.
Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy
by Francisco Wong-Diaz
Issue Date: August 2013

The publication of Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz’s monograph coincides with a major strategic reassessment of U.S. national security interests and the future military posture taking place at the national level. Today’s strategic environment requires astute statecraft to formulate and execute grand strategy—strategy that effectively blends all forms of power and uses them smartly, that is, effectively and efficiently. Though there is no consensus on what constitutes the smart use of U.S. power, the concept of “smart power” is a dominant theme in policy circles. Smart power, however defined, is directly relevant to the SOF community. With a smaller footprint than conventional forces, SOF are both a cost-effective and less visible instrument of national power. SOF are expected to combine both hard- and soft-power approaches instinctively to achieve strategic-level effects. Using case studies from around the world, Dr. Wong-Diaz expertly draws the links between the strategic-level projection of power by states and their consequences on the ground.

Special Operations Research Topics 2014
Issue Date: August 2013

The Special Operations Research Topics 2014 publication presents a list of SOF-related research topics for research to be undertaken by PME students, JSOU senior fellows, and other SOF researchers who desire to make timely and meaningful contributions to SOF issues and challenges. Each year representatives from USSOCOM, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), SOF chairs from the war colleges, and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) senior fellows meet at the JSOU campus for three days to collaboratively review topic submissions received from the SOF community and debate emerging issues and challenges. That collaboration results in the first draft of this publication, a prioritized list of salient issues confronting SOF. The list is vetted through the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. Ultimately, the research, study, and debate of these topics will inform decision makers and better prepare SOF for our current conflicts and future challenges.

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