From the Editor

When you think about it, many of us have jobs for a very simple reason: because the world changes. If governments were certain of the future, they would not need as many of us to “hold down the fort” during chaotic times. If the world weren’t in a constant state of change, we might not need to learn or teach nearly as much as we do; we wouldn’t have to think critically and independently, nor need to be taught how. A static, unchanging Earth would be a boring place.

A bittersweet change for CTX – this is the last time I will be writing the Letter from the Editor: I’m moving on to the United States Department of State as a Foreign Service Junior Officer, after a grueling 13-month application process. By the time you read this, I should be starting my training, in a world as uncertain to me now as the global one is to all of us.

And that, in many respects, is the theme of this issue: uncertainty. As we hail 2012, think of how much remains uncertain. Some of the articles in this issue raise questions about morality in a modern bureaucratic world; the unknowable consequences of letting an infamous jihadist die in an American prison; and how we measure success against terrorists.

Once again, we invite your comments on any and all of the pieces in this issue and hope that they provoke thought – and discussion – keeping our minds flexible for dealing with the uncertain times ahead of us.

It has been a monumental pleasure and learning experience working with CTFP, helping to stand up CTX, and getting to know those fellows I’ve been able to meet. I hope that collectively we continue to make the best, and not the worst, of uncertainty.

A note from the Executive Editors: we wish nothing but the best to Julia and look forward to visiting her abroad, particularly when she’s Ambassador McClennon, which we hope she is one day. It is in large part thanks to her considerable efforts, along with those of Amelia Simunek, that CTX was stood up in such short order. Julia is going to be impossible to duplicate and very hard to replace.

The Editors at CTX

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This issue opens with former SEAL and Editorial Board member Paul Shemella’s “Measuring a Government’s Capacity to Fight Terrorism.” Shemella offers us a framework that can, and arguably should, be modified according to the local context since, as he points out, “fighting terrorism is all about context.”

Take Brazil. That’s the topic of retired Brazilian Army Major General and former Special Forces Commander Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro’s article about how Brazil organizes security for major events. While “The Fifth CISM Military World Games” does, as the title suggest, concentrate on last July’s Military World Games, this is hardly the only large event Brazil has hosted or will host in the near future. Olympics, anyone?

Or, consider Egypt – which is what Irakli Mchedlishvili does in her contribution, “Radicalization in Light of the Developments in Egypt.” Mcedlishvili argues for greater international cooperation with civil society groups, and knows whereof she speaks as a member of just such a Georgia-based civil society group herself.

Or, consider Uganda – and the kind of terrorism that now confronts it. That’s the subject of Ugandan People’s Defence Forces Marine major, David Munyua’s article.

Or, how about the question SUNY professor Brian Nussbaum poses in “The Forgotten Jihadist.” What is likely to happen when religious leader Abdel-Rahman dies in a U.S. prison facility which, given his poor health, is bound to occur at some point in the near future?

As for our regular features, we introduce “The Written Word” – book reviews. In this issue, Dr. Dona J. Stewart takes a look at Robin Wright’s Rock the Casbah and Dr. James J. F. Forest reviews Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker’s Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against al-Qaeda.

NPS student and Norwegian Army Major Lars Lilleby was actually able to sit down with Eric Schmitt recently in Monterey. Ideally, the resulting interview will plant the bug in readers’ minds. If you have an interesting visitor, PLEASE consider doing an interview for CTX.

In “The Moving Image” Dr. Kalev I. Sepp offers up a “Top Ten” list – just begging for responses.

In “Ethics and Insights” George Lober stirs the pot regarding moral courage with the express aim of inviting comments and responses.

And in the “Resources” section, you’ll find news about publications by CTFP fellows and faculty.

Everything in this issue, as in the preceding two, is designed to prime the pump and get your juices flowing: we always want your feedback on what is written. But we also are always looking for contributions from you: more film reviews, book reviews, interviews, articles – and FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS, always!

How to Subscribe
Anyone can subscribe to CTX free of charge by emailing CTXSubscribe@gmail.com with the word "Subscribe" in the subject line.
Measuring a Government’s Capacity to Fight Terrorism  
by Paul Shemella

Along the path to any strategic end, leaders are obliged to ask whether that path is leading them to the outcome they seek. The answer to this question may not always be clear. Measuring the effectiveness of any strategy is difficult. As reflected in the growing body of literature on measurement, the challenge is not measuring effort but results. Without capacity, good strategy cannot be formulated or executed; without good strategy, capacity is largely wasted. And what if a government has succeeded in preventing terrorist attacks altogether? Could its leaders claim they have done everything right, or have they just been lucky? There must be a way to measure readiness for a terrorist event that has not yet happened, especially when the worst-case scenario is so severe. Governments must find a methodology that relies on judgment, not merely on numbers. Such a methodology would give leaders confidence that their policies are minimizing the probability their citizens will be attacked - whether or not terrorist attacks have actually taken place.

But what if we wanted to measure a government’s overall capacity to fight terrorism? We would have to look one level higher than strategy; we would have to examine a government’s structures and processes for developing strategy in the first place. Without capacity, good strategy cannot be formulated or executed; without good strategy, capacity is largely wasted. And what if a government has succeeded in preventing terrorist attacks altogether? Could its leaders claim they have done everything right, or have they just been lucky? There must be a way to measure readiness for a terrorist event that has not yet happened, especially when the worst-case scenario is so severe. Governments must find a methodology that relies on judgment, not merely on numbers. Such a methodology would give leaders confidence that their policies are minimizing the probability their citizens will be attacked - whether or not terrorist attacks have actually taken place.

Capacity to minimize the odds of terrorist attacks taking place at all cannot be separated from capacity to minimize the damage from terrorist attacks that have already occurred. In other words, governments need a system to evaluate their performance in a variety of functions related to terrorism. This article proposes evaluating a government’s capacity to execute a spectrum of four basic functions: Strategy, Institutional Preparation, Intelligence, and Emergency Management. The premise here is that if a government can do all these things well, its citizens can feel relatively safe – and its leaders can claim they have done the best they can against a very difficult threat. But how do they turn their best judgment into numbers that can be analyzed?

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Indirect Measurement

Even when the result of an intangible like prevention cannot be measured directly, the processes and systems that lead to the desired outcome can be. The place to begin is by identifying ‘desired outcomes,’ perhaps stated as “what are the significant achievements we would like to be able to report to our citizens?” We can then list a set of preconditions that must be in place in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Take the example of a hypothetical country with the usual set of root causes for terrorism. Ameliorating root causes will certainly reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. One desired outcome might be stated as follows:

“We have eliminated the root causes of terrorism in the country.”

This statement cannot be substantiated with raw numbers, but there is a process for converting the government’s broad approaches into numbers that can be evaluated. This is indirect measurement, or what could be called ‘institutionalizing measures of effort.’ A vital interim step in such a process is the identification of ‘preconditions’ that we think will enable us to reach the desired outcome. In this case, the list of preconditions could include the following hopeful statements:

1. “There is a process for inter-ethnic dialogue throughout the country.”
2. “We have strengthened the justice system.”
3. “We have eliminated corruption from law enforcement institutions.”
4. “We guarantee universal access to basic health care.”
5. “We have ensured that every citizen can receive a basic level of education.”
6. “There is a system for reviewing complaints against the government.”
7. “There is a lively, open, and responsible press establishment.”
8. “The armed forces provide support to civilian law enforcement authorities but do not themselves enforce the law.”

For the purposes of this example, we can assume that these statements have been formulated over time by a panel of experts in our hypothetical government. The preconditions for getting to our desired outcome can now be evaluated on a scale of 0-5 by another (independent) panel of experts. The experts will assign a “0” to statements for which nothing has been done, a “5” to statements where everything has been done, or interim values to reflect partial accomplishment. At the end of this process, the numbers can be aggregated to determine the ratio of the actual score to the maximum possible (“best”) score. For eight preconditions, the maximum score is 40. If the actual total comes to 20,

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it can be said that the government has made progress but probably not enough. This ratio is not very useful by itself, but when compared to other desired outcomes, it may show where the government needs to invest resources, as well as where its previous investments have paid off.

What is more, if the experts score each statement individually rather than by consensus, it will be possible to find an aggregate score for each individual precondition. This can give a more detailed picture of where the most improvement is needed, and how it can be achieved. For instance, weighing the judgment of ten experts means that 50 is the best possible score for each precondition. “We have strengthened the justice system” might get an aggregate score of 20, while “We have eliminated corruption from law enforcement institutions” might score 43. It may then be argued that some methods for bringing police corruption under control might be adapted to strengthening the justice system. In a logical and methodical way, we can transform judgment into numbers, and then compare those numbers to one another for a more thorough analysis.

**Democracies have a wider variety of tools than authoritarian forms of government, one reason they tend to be more successful in the long run.**

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**Reaching into the Toolkit**

Every government has an array of tools it can use to develop and execute strategies for all aspects of fighting terrorism. Democracies have a wider variety of tools than authoritarian forms of government, one reason they tend to be more successful in the long run. The list of tools, or ‘instruments of national power’ as they are sometimes called, might include the following:

- Diplomacy
- Intelligence
- Information
- Law Enforcement
- Military
- Emergency Response
- Economic
- Civil Society
- Financial
- Moral Factors

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4 But democracies are more vulnerable to political violence in the short run, prompting government officials to balance liberty with security.

5 The proficiency to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks that cannot be prevented is now just as much an instrument of national power as any of the traditional “DIMEFIL” tools. Known resilience of critical infrastructure, for instance, can deter terrorist attack.

6 Citizens, acting together, can be the most potent tool a society has to address the problem of terrorism.

7 In the fight against terrorism, governments that learn how to harness moral power stand well ahead of those that do not.
Governments express these instruments of power through institutions, and it is institutional capacity on which our focus will fall. Individuals cannot produce policies, strategies, and operational plans on their own. They must act together in various teams, each with a clearly defined role, promulgated by political authorities. The fulfillment of these roles should drive funding levels, equipment procurement, and most of all personnel requirements. Smart and motivated individuals are assigned to institutions, improve them as much as they can while there, and then move on to other institutions or the private sector - but it is institutions that produce national security over time.

...no one institution can, or should, do everything.

Sound national security decision-making relies on the specialization and diversity of views that a balanced set of institutions provides.

Institutional roles, however, must be complementary; no one institution can, or should, do everything. Sound national security decision-making relies on the specialization and diversity of views that a balanced set of institutions provides. If one institution goes beyond its mandated role, seeking roles and resources that should go to other institutions, that balance is altered in surprisingly complex ways. Greedy institutions, like greedy individuals, are bad for collective effort. Ministers, directors, and secretaries everywhere must remember that the only institution that really matters is the government that each of them serves.

Institutions act as crucibles for the development of capability and capacity. Without strong and clean institutions, no strategy can be executed and no success against terrorism ever achieved. But capability is not the same as capacity. Capability can be demonstrated once or twice (especially to superiors) but will not by itself produce measurable results. Capacity, however, requires enough resources to execute essential capabilities day after day, year after year. 8 When we talk about the role of institutions in fighting terrorism, we are really talking about institutional capacity. How can we measure how well a government does that?

Measuring Capacity

The indirect measurement technique already described can be used to measure a government’s institutional capacity to fight terrorism. This methodology is essentially a framework for self-assessment. The framework assesses capacity in

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8 Competence is another term often equated with capability. Normally obtained through training, competence describes the ability to produce a measureable result. It is useful to think of building capacity as an orchestrated sequence of creating competence, capability, and capacity.
four functional areas: Strategy, Institutional Preparation, Intelligence, and Emergency Management.\(^9\) In order to explain the methodology, let us take a sample from the “strategy” functional area:

**Strategy.** We can list six “desired outcomes” for the strategy function.

1. Appropriate government institutions have clear roles in combating terrorism.
2. There is a process for coordinating strategy development among government institutions.
3. There is a process for developing an accurate and comprehensive strategic analysis.
4. There is a legal framework for developing responses to terrorism.
5. There is a method for measuring the effectiveness of strategies to combat terrorism.
6. There is a political-level strategy for combating terrorism.\(^10\)

For each desired outcome above, we can list a set of preconditions that will lead a government to that outcome. To use just one example, the preconditions for desired outcome #1 should read something like this:

A. The Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and intelligence agencies have written guidance on their responsibilities for combating terrorism.
B. Other ministries have written guidance consistent with the government’s legal definition of terrorism.
C. Institutional roles are not in conflict with each other.
D. There are no gaps between institutions in terms of responsibility for combating terrorism.

Applying the Likert Scale, we can assign a number to each precondition, based on the judgment of five experts, selected for the strategy assessment. Those experts can be officials from the government being assessed, terrorism specialists from the private sector, or they can even be from another government with more experience in fighting terrorism. A hypothetical set of values assigned by them might look something like this:

A. 2 out of 5
B. 4 out of 5
C. 2 out of 5
D. 2 out of 5.

The total number 10 (out of a possible 20) does not tell us much by itself. The aggregation of totals for each of the six desired outcomes (and their associated preconditions) would give us a total for the strategy function (as well as a

\(^9\) The framework for assessing CT capacity was developed by a team from ‘The Center for Civil-Military Relations’ (CCMR) consisting of Paul Shemella, Lawrence E. Cline, Edward E. Hoffer, James Petroni, and Matthew King. CCMR is an arm of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

\(^10\) Operational-level strategies, which would include the security services, are listed as a desired outcome in the ‘Institutional Preparation’ module at Figure 2.
The final number for “strategy” can then be compared to total values from the other three functional areas to indicate relative institutional capacity – and where the most resources should be invested in the future. All Desired Outcomes for the Strategy functional area are listed, with suggested preconditions, can be found in Figure 1 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701.

Institutional Preparation. The second functional area to be examined is “institutional preparation.” The desired outcomes and preconditions for this category are broken into four pieces: operational-level strategies, operational plans, manpower development programs, and infrastructure support. The desired outcomes can be stated as follows.

1. Each government institution with a CT role has a current and coordinated operational-level strategy that incorporates measures of effectiveness.
2. Each CT institution has a current and coordinated set of operational-level plans.
3. Each CT institution has a comprehensive manpower development program.
4. Each CT institution has adequate infrastructure to support its expected missions, or it has identified shortfalls.

What do we mean by a “CT Institution?” Any government organization with specific responsibility for preventing or dealing with terrorism should be included under this rubric. That means almost all institutions in nearly all governments. Fighting terrorism can only succeed when a spectrum of institutions, each with clear roles, work together in a systematic way (see the “strategy” module above). Desired outcomes and preconditions for the “institutional preparation” module can be found in Figure 2 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701.

Intelligence. The third functional area is “intelligence.” There is nothing more important in the crafting of strategy, or in the execution of operations, than having timely and accurate intelligence. The process for ensuring that intelligence is accurate requires extensive coordination among government institutions, and perhaps multiple intelligence agencies. If undertaken seriously, this process can serve as an example of how the rest of the government reaches workable interagency decisions. Desired outcomes and preconditions for the “intelligence” module can be found in Figure 3 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701.

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**Fighting terrorism can succeed only when a spectrum of institutions, each with clear roles, work together in a systematic way.**

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11 The Strategy functional area in this methodology refers to the political level. Without a political-level strategy, individual institutions will not be able to develop operational-level strategies that can be executed in a coordinated manner.
What has been introduced here is a method, not a recipe

**Emergency Management.** The capacity for a government to recover from the effects of a terrorist attack can act as a deterrent to further attacks. A government cannot be evaluated as completely prepared for the threat of terrorism unless it has a deep capacity for emergency management (sometimes called ‘consequence management’). Fortunately for under-resourced governments, the same institutions and processes used for responding to natural disasters can be drawn upon in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. All-hazards approaches to risk assessment can lead directly to responsible dual usage. Desired outcomes and preconditions for the “Emergency Management” module can be found in Figure 4 at [http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701](http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701).

Totals for desired outcomes and preconditions in all four functional areas can be aggregated as shown in Figure 5 (that can be found at [http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701](http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701)) and analyzed in comparison to one another. Numbers, drawn from judgment, can tell us quite a lot about where a government has been doing well and where it has not.

**Back to Root Causes**
The long-term effort to eliminate the root causes of terrorism has been listed as a precondition for achieving a comprehensive political-level strategy. It may well be that a government wishes to separate this function from the four we have listed, building a fifth functional area on which to apply the indirect measurement technique (indeed, this article has identified preconditions that could be used as a starting point). For countries with a surfeit of root causes, this might make perfect sense, yielding greater resolution of the problem. Certainly, the government of New Zealand would approach this challenge differently than the governments of India or Israel. Root causes operate across the full spectrum of a society. Identifying and mitigating them will reduce the probability that extremist elements in that society will gain the support they need for a sustained terrorism campaign. The long-term effort to eliminate the root causes of terrorism is most often a strategy for better governance. That is the principal goal of any government and the fervent wish of all citizens.

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12 There are really three basic strategies for any government to employ against terrorism. The first of these should be targeted at root causes; the others focus on offensive and defense measures.
13 Terrorism is a transnational event that can threaten even the best-governed societies, but good governance – and the trust between the government and its citizens thus created - is the best way to minimize that threat.
All Governance Is Local

What has been introduced here is a method, not a recipe. It could be called ‘Wikipedia’ for self-assessment. Every government needs a way to measure its capacity to fight terrorism successfully; and each one could modify the framework according to what makes sense within its own local context. Fighting terrorism is all about context. Certain concepts and principles are universal, but their application can be quite different from society to society. The framework described here should fall within the universal sphere, but individual governments must modify the framework to suit their own historical, economic, cultural, and political conditions. Properly used, it allows government officials to identify their own ‘capacity gaps’ and develop a plan to fill them.

Capacity gaps are the raw material for further analysis and concrete actions. But how are they made to benefit the policeman on the street, the medic in the ambulance, or the soldier in the field? Government officials must take the capacity gaps they find at the national level and send scarce resources where they are needed most - to those in the field who actually fight terrorism and its effects on society. They must also require leaders all the way down to develop and coordinate operational plans, as well as the supporting tasks needed to confront terrorists where they work. A government that does this can be said to be governing well. In the final analysis, a path toward good governance is the key to fighting terrorism successfully. Measuring capacity is the essential first step on that path.

Paul Shemella is a retired Navy Captain who served as a SEAL officer until 1997. He joined The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in 1998. Through a network of theoreticians and practitioners, he manages 'Combating Terrorism' education programs for international officials in all regions.
The Fifth CISM Military World Games: A Security Challenge for a Huge International Event

by Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The success of the fifth Conseil Internationale du Sport Militaire (CISM) Military World Games, conducted in July 2011 in several cities of Rio de Janeiro State, demonstrated Brazil’s ability to provide security for a massive sporting event. The 2011 Games involved 6,000 athletes from 114 countries who are members of the military; these events are held every four years as part of CISM’s efforts to fulfill its motto: “Friendship Through Sport.”

Brazil prepared for more than two years to provide security for the Military World Games, which have grown to be the third-largest sporting event of the world, following only the Olympic Games and the Soccer World Cup. The outcome was a solid demonstration of Brazil’s sporting and security competence, particularly within its armed forces. (The Brazilian athletic delegation to the Games also turned in an outstanding performance, earning first place, with 114 medals: 45 gold, 33 silver and 36 bronze).

The Brazilian Army Eastern Military Command (CML/EB) was put in charge of the Games’ security through a presidential directive transmitted by the Minister of Defense. The Commandant of the 1st Army Division was designated as the Security Executive Coordinator (CES), and he established an Operations Coordination Center involving personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and social communication cells. Furthermore, a justice advisory team was established. The division commander’s maneuver elements were two infantry brigades—the Parachute Infantry Brigade and the 9th Motorized Infantry Brigade—both based in the city of Rio de Janeiro.
For preventing and combating terrorism, the CES was given operational control of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) established by the Commander of the Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade. The JSOTF included the following elements from the Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade: the Counterterrorism Detachment from the 1st Special Forces Battalion, the 1st Commandos Actions Company from the 1st Commandos Actions Battalion, elements from the Special Operations Support Battalion, and the 1st Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Platoon. In addition, maneuver, attack, and reconnaissance helicopters from all the institutions involved were present and ready, with crews trained for special air operations. The Brazilian Navy supplied elements of the Rescue and Recovery Special Group from the Combat Divers Group; also included in the security effort were elements of the Rescue and Recovery Special Group from the Marines Special Operations Battalion.

From the Department of Federal Police came elements of the Tactical Operations Command, and resources from the Special Police Operations Battalion of the State of Rio de Janeiro Military Police also joined in providing security. The Civilian Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro provided SWAT teams from its Special Resources Coordination.

...these teams were stealthily dispersed at strategic points in Rio de Janeiro State, ready around the clock to be deployed to specific objectives in both proactive and reactive situations.
In general, there is no empathy with law enforcement agencies (LEA), but the Army is accepted. It is critical to identify and meet community leaders.

Under the leadership of the Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade, the JSOTF developed tactical exercises on the ground for both assault tactical teams and sniper teams. During the Games, these teams were stealthily dispersed at strategic points in Rio de Janeiro State, ready around the clock to be deployed to specific objectives in both proactive and reactive situations.

The Military World Games were a great test of the Brazilian security structure’s operational capability. Like other recent events, including the South American/Arab Countries Conference Summit (2005), the Special Operations Brigade’s field tactical exercise Black October 2010, and the visits of Pope Benedict XVI in 2010 and of U.S. President Barack Obama in 2011, the World Games provided many useful lessons.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the security operation surrounding the Military Games, and from several other operations on the streets and *favelas* (slums) of large Brazilian cities, can be useful for any country considering military operations against irregular forces in urban terrain. Some of those lessons are detailed here.

A. In the “*favelas,*” the streets are extremely narrow and lack signage. Buildings are very close to each other, severely restricting observation and firing fields. Designating targets is a hard task. In general, the topography is extremely irregular, and combatants in higher places gain an overwhelming advantage.

B. Commanders at all levels must understand the human dimension of the population in the area. Most residents are good citizens who do not have links to drug trafficking and work outside the operational area, using various transportation means such as motorcycles and vans. Because they fear retaliatory actions from the gang members after the Army leaves the area, residents usually hesitate to provide information. In general, there is no empathy with the law enforcement agencies (LEA), but the Army is accepted. It is critical to identify and meet community leaders.

C. The Army should not identify drug trafficking gangs as the enemy; it should want to avoid the appearance, in the eyes of the public, that its operations are being conducted in a context of

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**Less ELINT and SIGINT and more HUMINT is the rule.**

*Counterintelligence is also extremely relevant. Each soldier must be a sensor.*

Conventional warfare. Therefore, gangs are better identified as opposition forces or “forças adversas.”

D. The opposition forces have great power to intimidate the local population with their firepower, which includes automatic rifles, submachine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. They often employ children to deliver drugs and to get information about troop movements; use caches to hide weapons and ammunition; and communicate with cell phones, small radios, fireworks, and visual signs. When gang members find themselves at a disadvantage, they try to blend in with the local population, and in critical situations they may use the population as a shield. More and more, these forces are employing urban guerrilla tactics, techniques and procedures.

E. Actions against criminal gangs in large cities are basically urban operations, and success depends primarily on small unit effectiveness and efficiency. Often, there is decentralization of actions down to the squad or team level. This type of action requires well-trained, disciplined soldiers and exceptional leaders at all levels who are capable of maintaining high moral standards. Rifle marksmanship during the day and night (when angles and distances differ), small-unit tactics (particularly in close combat), and effective communications are critical issues. Urban operations require special weapons and ammunition (including nonlethal) and tools for breaching and entering buildings. Close combat to clear buildings and houses is the norm. Sniper activity is intense, so passive and active measures must be established to counter snipers. Machine gun drills and fire control are absolutely critical. Light mechanized forces are effective because of their ability to move quickly to isolate opposition forces, control highways and main avenues, and attack decisive points. If needed, they are also useful for fire support in close combat, and can have great psychological effect.

F. Commanders must establish rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the escalation of force to avoid collateral damage and casualties among civilians. Distinguishing opposition force combatants from
civilian noncombatants is a very difficult but vital task. Even while displaying an aggressive attitude against opposition forces, the security troops must show respectful behavior toward the local population.

G. Specific demands are made on intelligence preparation. Terrain is described in terms of lines of communications, the urban pattern, and building structure. Civilian concentrations and critical infrastructure must be studied. Intelligence data collection about the opposition forces is an essential task. Less ELINT and SIGINT and more HUMINT is the rule. Counterintelligence is also extremely relevant. Each soldier must be a sensor. The best source of information is the “bad guy” arrested alive, so soldiers must be trained to get timely information from captured gang members in order to achieve tactical advantages. However, commanders must establish limits on detention and interrogation. In order to keep high moral standards, torture is completely unacceptable. To ensure these results, high standards of leadership at all levels are essential.

H. The decision-making process must establish actions to be performed in three phases: isolation, movement to contact, and conquest of key points. Principles of mass and unity of command must be observed. Law enforcement personnel under operational control must support the decision-making process and participate in the operations on receiving complementary tasks. Command posts must be established close to the operational area. In most of the *favelas* of Rio, the isolation phase demands the occupation of the railroad station used by that community, as well as the establishment of blocking and checkpoints in the access. Whenever possible, in order to gain a significant tactical advantage, stealthy occupation of dominant points must be executed in advance.

I. Employment of Army Aviation helicopters with crews trained in special air operations tactics is very important to help facilitate command and control, move small units quickly and precisely, and provide a good psychological effect. Often, gangs erect barricades in order to block access to key points; therefore, engineer support is mandatory to clear the way.

J. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed in all phases of the operation—for training the general purposes forces before the deployment, operating during the deployment, and continuing to work after most of the deployment has been completed. Psychological Operations tactical teams are essential to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Using loudspeakers and passing out leaflets have proven to be effective tactics for informing the local population about procedures during operations.
Brazil, the best law enforcement special operations units are trained by the Army. Experience shows that civilian police SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams and military police special operations teams may be deployed to accomplish specific tasks under the operational control of the Army’s SOF.

K. Social communication is extremely important to the success of a mission. Selected reporters should be afforded the opportunity to cover the operation under specific restrictions since keeping the media updated on the operations is indispensable. Legal aspects are fundamental, and justice backup is essential. All searches and arrests must be conducted in accordance with the law and performed legally.

L. The Brazilian Army experience in Haiti has proved extremely important for better understanding urban operations. MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) was activated in 2004 under the military command of a Brazilian two-star general, and lessons learned from that operation are being effectively and efficiently disseminated elsewhere. The Brazilian Army’s Special Operations Training Center (recently transferred to the City of Niteroi, State of Rio de Janeiro), the Brazilian Joint Peace Operations Training Center (City of Rio de Janeiro, State of Rio de Janeiro), and the Guarantee of Law and Order Training Center (City of Campinas, State of São Paulo) have the responsibility of training combat units to be prepared for these special kinds of operations.

**Conclusion**

Operations developed to provide the security of international events like the Military World Games are routinely conducted by the Brazilian Armed Forces. Such operations usually are performed under directives from the President of the Republic transmitted by the Minister of Defense, and are normally conducted under the responsibility of the respective Area Military Command of the Brazilian Army. This Army Command also usually receives operational control of the law enforcement agencies.
These security tasks routinely involve the development of the “Guarantee of Law and Order” operations, an Armed Forces mission stated in Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution. Mainly because of their political implications, the conduct of operations under the Guarantee of Law and Order is always viewed with suspicion by the services’ high commands. However, the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Army, are fully aware that besides their traditional tasks, they must be sufficiently flexible and versatile enough to deploy capably against both guerrillas and urban drug gangs as well as against nontraditional or new security threats. These needs include operations to prevent and combat terrorism.¹⁵

The lessons learned from all of these experiences are being applied to security planning under way for large, international events that will be held in Brazil in the future, including the Ecological Conference RIO+20 in 2012; the Youth Festival of Pope Benedict XVI and the Soccer Federations Cup in 2013; the Soccer World Cup in 2014; and the Olympic Games in 2016.

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¹⁵ Since November 2010, the Brazilian Army’s Eastern Military Command has been in charge of a “Pacification Force” (an infantry brigade with two battalion task forces) deployed in the largest of Rio’s favelas, the Complexo do Alemão/Penha, with a population of more than 500,000 people. This arrangement is scheduled to extend through June 2012.
Radicalization in Light of the Developments in Egypt: Challenges to Effective International Cooperation
by Irakli Mchedlishvili

Background
In the decade after 9/11, many countries perceived terrorism and especially Islamic terrorism as one of the main threats to national and international security and stability. The Greater Middle East was perceived as a region where Al Qaeda and similar organizations had the strongest foothold.

Numerous factors, including Iran’s 1979 revolution and conversion into a theocratic state and the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan in 1996, created the impression that other countries in the region without a strong ruler or regime could easily fall into the hands of radical Islamic forces. Consequently, the international community chose to look at many authoritarian regimes of the region as partners or allies in the fight against radicalization and terrorism.

One example of this attitude can be seen in this quote from Christopher Bennett: “A day after hijackers flew commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the Allies responded by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the Alliance’s history. And by agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should trigger NATO’s collective self-defence obligation, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.” “Interpreting Prague: Combating Terrorism,” NATO Review, Spring 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html/, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).

Evidence of this view can be found in many places, such as the Wikipedia entry on Al Qaeda, which includes this passage: “Others, however, see Al-Qaeda as an integrated network that is strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas and has a powerful strategic purpose. ... Al-Qaeda has the following direct franchises: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which comprises Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia; Islamic Jihad of Yemen; Al-Qaeda in Iraq; Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb; Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen in Somalia; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.” “Al-Qaeda” in Wikipedia, (last modified Dec. 3, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). And from another article, “Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who led the CIA’s hunt for Osama Bin Laden, states that terrorist attacks—specifically Al Qaeda attacks on America—are not motivated by a religiously-inspired hatred of American culture or religion, but by the belief that U.S. foreign policy has oppressed, killed, or otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East.” “Islamic Terrorism,” in Wikipedia, (last modified Nov. 30, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).

According to Alvise Armellini, “As it was mentioned by the Enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fule said the EU should reach out to ‘the crowds in the streets of Tunis, Cairo and elsewhere’ rather than interact ‘with dictators who are, as we speak, spilling the blood of their own people with utter disregard for human life. We must show humility about the past ... Too many of us fell prey to the
Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt was an active member of the international community in the fight against terrorism, and Egypt is a major non-NATO ally to the United States.\textsuperscript{19} Egypt was a natural ally in the war against terrorism as the country had long been targeted by terrorist groups. Various radical organizations acting in the country include what experts say is Al Qaeda’s direct franchise, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Egypt has been the target of terrorist attacks at least seven times since 2001.\textsuperscript{20} Due partly to these reasons, Western financial and military support of Egypt and particularly Mubarak’s regime was substantial. Egypt for many years received more than one billion dollars annually from the U.S., making it second only to Israel in the amount of foreign aid provided.\textsuperscript{21}

**Expectations and the Reality**

Naturally, when unrest began in Egypt in 2011, many observers expected it to lead to a confrontation between secular forces in Egypt’s ruling group and Mubarak’s regime, who would attempt to maintain the stability of the country, and pro-Islamic, radical groups, who would push Egypt toward radicalization and instability.\textsuperscript{22} However, the reality appeared different.

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\textsuperscript{19} “Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) is a designation given by the United States government to close allies who have strategic working relationships with US armed forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ... Initial MNNA...” “Major Non-NATO Ally,” in *Wikipedia*, (last modified Nov. 29, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_non-NATO_ally, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).


\textsuperscript{22} Ilan Berman writes, “According to a Pew opinion survey of Egyptians from June 2010, 59 percent said they back Islamists. Only 27% said they back modernizers. Half of Egyptians support Hamas. Thirty percent support Hezbollah and 20% support al Qaida. Moreover, 95% of them would welcome Islamic influence over their politics... Eighty two percent of Egyptians support executing adulterers by stoning, 77% support whipping and cutting the hands off thieves. 84% support executing any Muslim who changes his religion. ... Egyptian values, in other words, are far from liberal—even if some of the protesters currently out in the streets might be. This, of course, runs counter to the idea that has taken hold in many quarters: that the end of the Mubarak era will inexorably lead to democracy in the heart of the Arab world. But numbers don’t lie; Egyptian society as a whole is both religious and deeply conservative.” Ilan Berman, “What Egyptians Want: Not Western-Style Democracy,” *Forbes*, Feb. 2, 2011, http://blogs.forbes.com/ilanberman/2011/02/02/what-egyptians-want-not-western-style-democracy/, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).
Protesters in the streets were ordinary people who demanded democracy, freedom, and the abolishment of the dictatorship of Mubarak’s regime. Radical Muslim forces had almost no role in the protests. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was considered the biggest and best-organized group opposing Mubarak’s regime, initially did not even support the protesters. When they finally joined, their position could hardly be seen as seeking specific Islamic objectives.

At the same time, the local government, which initially was considered as a guarantor of peace and stability, began aggravating the situation: radical groups of civilian “Mubarak’s supporters,” or more precisely, radical groups of plainclothes security forces, began attacking peaceful protestors—throwing the whole country into a violent confrontation, while law enforcement personnel did nothing to avoid mass violence. As a result of these clashes, many peaceful Egyptian citizens were killed and wounded. Due to the government’s “neutrality” and because many of the radicals attacking peaceful demonstrators turned out to have police and security agency ID cards, most observers believe the radical groups attacking peaceful demonstrators were orchestrated by Mubarak’s police and the security structures.

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25 “By 1 February, the protests had left at least 125 people dead, although Human Rights Watch said that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay claimed that as many as 300 people may have died in the unrest. This unconfirmed tally included 80 Human Rights Watch-verified deaths at two Cairo hospitals, 36 in Alexandria, and 13 in the port city of Suez, amongst others; over 3,000 people were also reported as injured.” Retrieved from the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. “2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in Wikipedia, (last modified Dec. 1, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_2011, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).

26 The Toronto Star showed photos with this explanation: “I.D. cards of members of the Ministry of the Interior police force that anti-government protesters say they confiscated from pro-Mubarak militias they captured—along with weapons—during violent clashes Wednesday night” along with a story by Sandro Contenta, “We Have Proof Mubarak Orchestrated Clashes, Protesters Say,” The
This was NOT Mubarak’s regime attempting to guarantee the peace and stability...

*In fact, it would be more accurate to say the battle came to be between ordinary people who were calling for freedom... against the Mubarak regime, which manipulated radical forces and pushed the country toward radicalization.*

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27 “Violence escalated as waves of Mubarak supporters met anti-government protesters, and some Mubarak supporters rode on camels and horses into Tahrir Square. The clashes were believed to have been orchestrated by Habib El Adly, and there were hundreds of casualties. ... Incidents of violence toward journalists and reporters escalated amid speculation that the violence was being actively aggravated by Mubarak as a way to end the protests.” “2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in *Wikipedia*, (last modified Dec. 1, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_2011, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).

As the revolution in Egypt unfolded, it became evident that this was not the battle that had been expected. This was NOT Mubarak’s regime attempting to guarantee the peace and stability of the country and the region, while battling radical Islamic groups and a radicalized population trying to push the country toward confrontation and instability. In fact, it would be more accurate to say the battle came to be between ordinary people who were calling for freedom, democracy, and stability, against the Mubarak regime, which manipulated radical forces and pushed the country toward radicalization.

*Figure 1.* Expectations before the unrests in Egypt were that Mubarak’s ruling group would be a guarantee of peace and stability, while the population of Egypt was perceived as primed for radicalization. In reality, during the unrest, Egypt’s population appeared to be inclined to peace, stability, and democracy, while Mubarak’s regime became a factor of radicalization and instability.
Necessity for Strategy Change

The difference between the expectations and the reality in Egypt (and in the Middle East in general) should prompt the international community to devise a new strategy and a new approach to combat radicalization and strengthen the stability of the region. Old strategies based mainly on supporting the usually corrupt ruling group should be modified or abandoned. Instead, the international community should think about new strategies which could be oriented more to support the whole society (e.g., via civil society organizations), rather than only the local ruling groups.

According the new strategy, the international community should direct its main efforts toward increasing the local population’s capability to withstand radicalization—or to withstand the radicals. Such support could be a part of wider efforts to strengthen the local society’s ability to achieve democratic transformation and development. This approach would oppose the methods used by the authoritarian system that encourages ordinary citizens to feel responsible only to those in the ruling group (clergy, royal family, dictator, ruling party, etc.) and not to care about the future of their country or society.

Making the societies of the Middle East part of a wider international community through Facebook, Twitter, and other networks could decisively influence the region’s fight for democracy and safety from radicalization.

Recent events have demonstrated that creation of media and communication platforms that are independent and free from the control of authoritarian regimes and radical groups’ control can make an impact in the fight for democracy. Making the societies of the Middle East part of a wider international community through Facebook, Twitter, and other networks could decisively influence the region’s fight for democracy and safety from radicalization.


30 “In the case of Egypt it really played a critical factor in getting out the word on how to organize. ... There was one group in Egypt that was one of the key groups in getting people out on the street. ... Last week in a matter of days they went from 20,000 fans to 80,000 fans. ... We can see that these sites were used in order to get the word out about how to bypass checkpoints, how to get across bridges, how to get to places where people wanted to demonstrate. So it was a critical tool in getting people out into the streets.” “Uprising in Egypt; Mubarak Shuts Down Al Jazeera,” CNN Transcripts, Jan. 30, 2011, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1101/30/rs.01.html, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).
Latest Developments and Final Remarks

Continued clashes with government forces in Egypt, as well as the advancement of Islamic parties in recent parliamentary elections show that Egypt’s civil society so far has not been able to create the ideological platforms necessary to move from protests toward active political work. Although Egypt’s civil society quite clearly expressed that it would no longer accept the dictatorship in Egypt and was able to force Mubarak’s withdrawal from power, Egypt remains in a period of transition that may be long and difficult before it will realize the aspirations of the January 2011 revolution and prove able to form institutions which will preserve the country from the threat of radicalization. From this point of view, strengthening international cooperation with civil society groups in Egypt (which is the recommendation given in this article) looms even more important.

The pattern just described does not seem only to reflect the situation in Egypt, but also in most of the states of the Middle East where the local regimes and radical groups tend to treat their own people as a threat to their power rather than as a source of power. This attitude creates the background for radicalization. Even when well-known leaders like Mubarak are removed, the situation in these states will not improve at once, as it will require time to completely replace old ruling structures with new democratic institutes. This too is why more specific plans and approaches relevant to the new reality of supporting the democratic aspirations of local societies is of the highest importance, and will be for a long time to come.

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Combating Terrorism: A Ugandan Perspective
by Major David Munyua

Background: Terrorism in Uganda
“Uganda is truly the pearl of Africa,” said Sir Winston Churchill. Many people would agree with that description, saying this small country in Eastern Africa that lies on the equator has been blessed with the best nature can offer humanity.

However, that endowment has not prevented Uganda from suffering terrorist threats and acts. Local terrorists orchestrated the attacks, while most of the threats came from international terrorist groups. Because of these actions and threats, the Ugandan Parliament enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002, shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The Act defined terrorism as “Any act of violence or threat of violence carried out for purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public and for a political, religious, social and economic aim, indiscriminately without due regard for the safety of others or property.”

It should be noted that most local terrorists in Uganda originated as insurgents who failed to win the support of the population. Over time, these groups began resorting to coercing and forcing local people to join them through acts of abduction, intimidation, and violence.

...the LRA has admitted to cooking body parts of the dead and then feeding those parts to close relatives of the victim.
When the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRM) came into power in Uganda in 1986, many insurgent groups emerged to fight it, including the Holy Spirit Movement, Uganda People’s Democratic Army, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Force Obote Back, West Nile Bank Front (I and II), Allied Democratic Front (ADF), and People’s Redemption Army, among many others. Out of all those, the LRA and ADF crossed the line into terrorism. Most of the other groups were either defeated or entered into a settlement with the NRM government. Many of the still-active leaders of those insurgent groups currently serve either within the ranks of the NRM or as members of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), the nation’s armed forces.

Acts by the LRA and ADF introduced Ugandans to terrorism. The LRA says it is fighting because it wants to rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments in the Bible, and the group has been trained and facilitated by external forces, including some sovereign countries. LRA members have committed despicable atrocities against the people of northern Uganda, including abducting young boys to force them to join their ranks; taking young girls for sex; cutting off the limbs, ears, and lips of local people; and killing innocent civilians indiscriminately. If those actions were not excruciating enough, the LRA has admitted to cooking body parts of the dead and then feeding those parts to close relatives of the victim. As a result, many Ugandans were forced to abandon their villages and live in internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps where the UPDF could effectively protect them. These acts of terrorism by the LRA were not committed only against Ugandans but also against innocent people in Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. The LRA thus was transformed from a local terrorist organization into a regional/international one.

Figure 2. Map of Uganda. (Microsoft Encarta map)

Figure 3. A view of Kampala City, Uganda. (Source: Majesticsafaris.com)
The ADF, just like the LRA, received training and facilitation from some external forces. One of their main objectives was to rule Uganda using Sharia law. They operated from the eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), committing atrocities against the people of western Uganda and eastern DRC—raiding and burning down schools and villages, and killing innocent people indiscriminately. ADF not only terrorized the rural population, but they also used clandestine operatives to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in commuter taxis, buses, bars, and busy streets in Kampala City. They also abducted and ruthlessly killed some civilians who refused to cooperate with them.
The American embassy in Uganda was on Al Qaeda’s list of possible targets when the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were simultaneously bombed on August 7, 1998. Al Qaeda continues to threaten Uganda, which has more recently begun to receive threats from Al Shabaab also. Al Shabaab is an Islamist terrorist organization directly linked to Al Qaeda that operates in war-torn Somalia and wants Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers out of Somalia. They made several suicide and direct attacks on UPDF bases in Mogadishu, a port city in Somalia, as well as performing roadside ambushes and also trying on several occasions to infiltrate into Uganda and attack from within. Indeed, on July 11, 2010, Al Shabaab used suicide bombers in two separate attacks in Kampala City to kill 76 football fans watching World Cup finals. Since then, they have continued to issue threats of attacks within Uganda and Burundi.
Uganda introduced what it calls “community policing,” literally meaning that local people will supplement the effort of the police by identifying and reporting suspicious elements within the community.
that is unusual in their neighborhood, and informing the police for immediate action. This effort also involved empowering and educating the population about terrorism through regular village meetings with the police.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 also solved a legal problem the police and the directorate of public prosecution had been facing, by saying that terrorists will no longer be treated like other criminals who are charged under the penal code. Instead, terrorists are to be charged under a separate criminal law.

As urban terrorism was being addressed through these measures, the Ugandan military also intensified efforts to eliminate terrorist activities in rural areas. To succeed, the military needed to attack these terrorists in their hideouts and points of origin and to ensure that their supply lines were blocked. As fighting occurred on the battleground, diplomatic efforts were also made to ensure that the UPDF could cross the borders into both the DRC and Southern Sudan to deal with the terrorist groups. These efforts proved mostly successful.

Given the fact that some of the combatants had been abducted and indoctrinated by the terrorist groups, Parliament introduced the idea of amnesty for such fighters. Therefore, the amnesty law of 2000 allowed the government to peacefully welcome home those who denounced their evil acts against innocent civilians. In addition, resettlement packages were given to those who were captured, surrendered, or came out of the bush through peace talks and officially applied for amnesty.

Threats from Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab still cause discomfort for the leadership of the country. Although the LRA is more than 600 kilometers from the border of Uganda, the group should not be forgotten or ignored as long as the forces that kept them operational for many years still exist. Terrorists change their tactics with advances in technology; therefore, security agencies must stay on their toes to recognize and defend against any new high-tech tools terrorists may be planning to use.

Figure 11. Weapons and ammunition captured from LRA. (Source: Defence Press Unit photo)
At the regional level, the East African Community inter-forces cooperation and partnership made tracking of terrorists groups a little easier. The forces share information and intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist activities in the region. This effort is also supported by the governments of each country. For instance, the suspects in the July 2010 Kampala terrorist attacks were extradited from Kenya and Tanzania to Uganda. The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, which are not members of EAC, also cooperated with Uganda to allow UPDF to cross their borders and jointly fight the LRA in their countries. The Republic of South Sudan has been in partnership with Uganda since 1987, long before that country officially gained independence on July 9, 2011. This partnership contributed greatly toward winning the fight against the LRA in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. The passage of the LRA Disarmament Bill by the U.S. Congress in May 2010 also provided another strong CT partner for fighting—and hopefully eliminating—the LRA problem in the region.

Whereas regional CT efforts are already in place, challenges still exist that require even stronger cooperation and partnership. Not all the countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa have laws to address terrorism. That lack directly affects regional efforts to battle terrorism, especially when a terrorist act is committed in a country that lacks the relevant laws. These efforts are also hampered by continued support given to terrorists by some countries within and outside of Africa, differing levels of CT training and awareness within the Great Lakes countries, and the varied threats to the individual countries, which in part determines their strategic priorities.

I wish we could all appreciate that “a pain on any part of the body affects the whole body.” If all countries in the region would respond with one voice and take action against terrorism, the efforts would enjoy greater success.

The threat of terrorism is real and it affects every country. Partnering to counter terrorists is the most effective way to apply our resources.

Major David Munyua is a Battalion Commanding Officer in the UPDF Marines.
The Forgotten Jihadist
by Dr. Brian Nussbam

Much ink has been spilled recently about the potential impact of the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. Analysts, pundits, experts, and others have widely questioned whether their deaths increase the likelihood of terror attacks in the short term, whether they will cause the jihadist movement to fracture and fray, whether they will, in the longer term, lead to the demise of the movement for which the men were great symbols.

These are all worthwhile and important questions that need to be answered. However, in the frenzy to find meaning in the death of these terrorists, and frankly in the years prior to those deaths, a major figure in the same movement has been forgotten. This man will also die soon, and his death will also be blamed—at least by some—on the United States: Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman.

Abdel-Rahman, currently imprisoned in North Carolina, is one of the most important figures in radical Islamist thought of the past century. Not only is he intellectually important to the movement, but outside the United States he is widely seen as one of its key symbolic figures. Born in 1938, Abdel-Rahman has been in poor health for at least the last decade and is unlikely to live much longer. When Abdel-Rahman dies in a U. S. prison facility—as he inevitably will in the near future—there is the potential for a major backlash from radical Islamists around the world, a backlash that we should be preparing for now.

Abdel-Rahman is, arguably at least, as important to the global jihadist movement as Bin Laden was. While he never had the notoriety, nor the riches-to-revolutionary-rags life story of the Al Qaeda leader, Abdel-Rahman has substantially deeper religious credibility in the Muslim world and a gravitas that Bin Laden could never match. He was the religious guide and theological sanctioner of violence for several revolutionary Islamist organizations in Egypt, including Gamaa Islamiyah and Tanzim al Jihad, from the 1970s through the 1990s.

Known in the United States mostly as “The Blind Sheikh,” Abdel-Rahman in the 1990s lived in New York and New Jersey while serving as one of the key U.S. representatives of the Maktab al Khidamat (the “services bureau”), the organization Bin Laden co-founded with Palestinian Abdullah Azzam to support the jihad in Afghanistan which was a precursor to Al Qaeda. Abdel-Rahman gained notoriety when he was linked to the men responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. In 1995 he was convicted on charges of “seditious conspiracy” related to a plot to bomb landmarks in the
New York City area. That plot was purported to include such targets as the United Nations, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and a federal building. Sentenced to life in prison, Abdel-Rahman is currently housed in the Butner Federal Medical Center in North Carolina.

Abdel-Rahman’s importance to the global jihadist movement goes far beyond what most Americans know about him. Abdel-Rahman was, according to journalist Peter Bergen, the first figure in the movement to give “religious sanction to attacks on American aviation, shipping, and economic targets.” A fatwa attributed to Abdel-Rahman, and purportedly issued in the mid-1990s from his prison cell in the United States, called for all Muslims to cut off relations with Americans, Christians, and Jews, and to:

tear them to pieces,
destroy their economies, burn their corporations, destroy their peace,
sink their ships, shoot down their planes,
and kill them on sea, land and air.

Unlike similar fatwas by Osama Bin Laden and current Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdel-Rahman is deemed by many to actually have the religious credentials to call for such attacks. Bin Laden (trained as an engineer) and Zawahiri (trained as a surgeon) lack the proper religious bona fides to issue such fatwas, or religious rulings. Abdel-Rahman, on the other hand, has impeccable religious credentials, including a doctorate from Al Azhar University—an Egyptian institution that is considered the most illustrious religious university in the Islamic world.

In fact, so central is Abdel-Rahman to the movement that some of Al Qaeda’s discussions and planning regarding potential operations were purportedly designed to help secure his release. Some of the threat information that came into federal intelligence agencies in the summer of 2001—a period during which the 9/11 Commission reported “the system was blinking red”—had to do with potential Al Qaeda operations tied directly to Abdel-Rahman. According to an excerpt of a declassified intelligence report, available from CNN, there were unconfirmed reports that Al Qaeda operatives in the United States were involved in plots to secure Abdel-Rahman’s release that included hijacking an aircraft. For example:

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [redacted] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Sheikh” Umar Abd al-Rahman and other US held extremists.

Abdel-Rahman was, according to journalist Peter Bergen, the first figure in the movement to give “religious sanction to attacks on American aviation, shipping, and economic targets.”


The system was “blinking red” before the attacks of September 2001, and at least some of that intelligence was tied to Abdel-Rahman. And Abdel-Rahman’s galvanizing effect continues.

In early December 2011, Al Qaeda’s media office As-Sahab (The Clouds) released a new video featuring Zawahiri, in which he threatens the life of an American hostage and makes numerous demands of the United States. These—and, notably, one of the eight demands Zawahiri made included:

Releasing Shaykh Omar Abdulrahman, and dropping all the charges against him and stopping any legal pursuit of him, and returning him to his nation, dignified and endeared.  

...demands include ending air and drone strikes in numerous countries, shutting down the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and releasing detained jihadists like Ramzi Yousef. This list of demands reads like a primer on jihadist gripes...

It is fairly clear that Abdel-Rahman was, and remains today, a major figure in the global jihadist movement. Less clear is what his inevitable death in a U.S. prison will mean for the movement—or what it will mean for U.S. security. There is reason for concern. In a “will” released at the same time as his influential fatwa, Abdel-Rahman said “If they [the Americans] kill me … do not let my blood be shed in vain. Rather, extract the most violent revenge....

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Ten years after 9/11, Robin Wright provides a fresh look at the Islamic world and how it has changed in the past decade. Her well-documented and in-depth account is informed by Wright’s decades of experience covering the Middle East for a wide range of news outlets. This book is of great value to the counterterrorism community as well as others who seek a nuanced understanding of the region’s population during this tumultuous revolutionary period.

Wright argues that two dramatic, related events currently define the region: the shattering of the old order in the Arab Spring and the societal rejection of extremism. She terms this “rejection of the specific violent movements as well as the principle of violence to achieve political goals” the counter jihad (p. 3).

While acknowledging that violent extremism still poses a threat, Wright focuses on the actions, events, and attitudes that compose the counter jihad. She reveals the lesser-known struggles of the population to shape their own destiny, often countering violent extremism in ways ranging from the mundane to the remarkable. In doing so, she grants insight into significant indigenous economic, political, and social factors that even the Middle East Studies academic community failed to accurately forecast in advance of the Arab Spring.37

For instance, in Egypt, the youth-led movement that overthrew Mubarak managed to achieve in 18 days a goal that had eluded Al Qaeda for decades. Indeed, the speed and success of the Arab revolts took Al Qaeda by surprise, leaving its leaders scrambling to adjust their narrative and embrace the revolts. Wright notes that in an era defined by Twitter, Al Qaeda’s statement—released on video—seemed out of touch. She declares, “Al Qaeda is not dead, even with Bin Laden’s death ten years after 9/11, but it is increasingly passé” (p. 5).

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Hip-hop lyrics of Moroccan singer Soultana:

You bring hell to our world, you bring misunderstandin’...
Now you represent no Muslim, because al Qaeda is hell... Shame on you...

A major force driving the counter jihad is the general disgust with the tactics of militant groups such as Al Qaeda. Muslims declared their rejection of Al Qaeda in venues from large-scale demonstrations in Mumbai where thousands took to the streets to condemn the 2008 terrorist attacks, declaring “killers of innocents are enemies of Islam,” to the hip-hop lyrics of Moroccan singer Soultana:

You bring hell to our world, you bring misunderstandin’...
Now you represent no Muslim, because al Qaeda is hell... Shame on you, shame on your people.

In addition to ire over the group’s tactics, opposition rose in response to bin Laden’s leadership style, leading even some of his closest supporters to turn their backs on his movement. Noman Benotman, a founding member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and close associate of bin Laden, broke with Al Qaeda in 2003. He viewed bin Laden’s strategy of targeting the United States as a miscalculation that would bring the full weight of American military power to bear on the group. Pettier reasons have driven others away; Sudanese informant Jamal al Fadl left because his pay scale was lower than that of the Egyptians.

Wright claims that the publication of Sheikh Salman al Oudah’s open letter to bin Laden marked 2007 as the symbolic turning point for the counter jihad. In his letter, as quoted by Wright, al Oudah offered some of the harshest public criticism of bin Laden:

I say to my brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed, maimed, or banished in the name of al Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands if not millions, of innocent people on your back? (p. 65)

Al Oudah went on to say that bin Laden has brought ruin to the entire Muslim world. This criticism from such a strong supporter of jihad carried much weight. Al Oudah, a Saudi sheikh, had issued a fatwa against the Saudi government in 1990 for allowing foreign, infidel troops to be stationed in the kingdom, a fatwa bin Laden used to justify his own activities. Al Oudah had also endorsed jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and resistance against U.S. troops in Iraq, as both were

The Western model, epitomized by leaders such as Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali, fails to meet the needs of the region’s growing, and extremely youthful, population.
“defensive jihads.” Indeed, bin Laden’s first fatwa condemned imprisonment of the sheikh by Saudi authorities from 1994 to 1999.

The 2007 renunciation of extremism in by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, proved a further blow to the Al Qaeda movement. The former leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and founding member of Al Qaeda, was considered Al Qaeda’s chief ideologue. In a 1,000 page-long book, he provided justification for killing anyone, of any religion, who disagreed with Al Qaeda. But in 2007, al-Sharif reversed course, writing from an Egyptian prison that Muslims are prohibited from committing aggression against anyone of any religion and condemning the 9/11 attacks.

Wright emphasizes that any societal rejection of Al Qaeda should not be misinterpreted as an embrace of the United States or the West. The Western model, epitomized by leaders such as Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali, fails to meet the needs of the region’s growing, and extremely youthful, population. The incident in Tunisia that sparked widespread revolution was rooted in the rampant corruption and daily hopelessness that marked peoples’ lives under these largely secular and pro-Western regimes. When an inspector confiscated Muhammad Bouazizi’s wares from his fruit cart because he did not have a permit, Bouazizi sought redress at the town hall and governor’s office; he was turned away at both. The sole breadwinner for an extended family of eight, he lit himself on fire, declaring, “How do you expect me to earn a living?”

At age 25, Bouazizi was a member of “Generation U,” Muslim youth under the age of 30 who, Wright says, are “unfulfilled, unincluded, underemployed or underutilized, and underestimated” (p. 91). Though they may reject Al Qaeda, they have strong reservations about the West and are likely to want their countries to take a more independent course in their external relations. Many of them have studied the West and share values that align with American ideals. At the same time, they may embrace Islamist parties, drawn by the latter’s effective organization and strong social justice message, a marked contrast to the corruption-laden old guard. But this generation is also not seeking a new set of authoritarians operating under the guise of religion.

Wright’s anecdotes and interviews, especially with the youth, and recounted in chapters titled “Hip-Hop Islam,” “The Living Poets Society” and “Satellite Sheikhs and You Tube Imams,” illustrate the energy and idealism that has rocked regimes long thought stable. For example, there is 29-year-old Dalia Ziada, an activist who translated into Arabic a comic book about Reverend Martin Luther King’s 1955 civil disobedience campaign. Ziada also defied Egyptian authorities by hosting the Cairo Human Rights Film Festival, secretly screening the banned movies on a dinner cruise boat. At the same time, Dalia is also a survivor of female genital mutilation, and her first protests were against her own
family’s embrace of this cultural—not Islamic—tradition, a reminder that nearly every facet of economic, social, and political life in the region is currently contested.

Another individual Wright discusses is Hamada Ben Amor, a 21-year-old Tunisian rapper. His songs, posted on Facebook and YouTube shortly before the Jasmine Revolution, took Tunisian President Ben Ali to task, stating what many felt, but few dared to say:

_They steal in plain sight,_
_No need to name them,_
_You know very well who they are._
_A lot of money should have gone to development,_
_To schools, to hospitals, to housing._
_But the sons of dogs,_
_Are instead filling their stomachs._
_Mr. President, your people are dead._

Another refrain called on Ben Ali to:

_Go down to the street and look around you,_
_People are treated like animals._
_Look at the cops,_
_Their batons beat everyone with impunity,_
_Because there is no one to say no,_
_Not even the law or the constitution._


Although the outcome of the Arab Spring remains unclear, members of Generation U are bound to form a large part of the region’s future leadership. As such, they will influence the direction of their countries’ foreign policies and positions on a wide array of issues, to include partnerships in the fight against terrorism and extremism. A greater understanding of the grievances, hopes, and goals of this generation is essential to forming effective and lasting partnerships.

The title of Wright’s book, _Rock the Casbah_, alludes to a song by the English punk band, The Clash. A fictitious Middle Eastern king bans rock music. The people revolt, so the king calls out his jet fighters to bomb them, but the pilots refuse and instead play rock music in their cockpits.

Nearly 30 years after this song was released, the Tunisian military refused to fire on civilians and pledged to support that revolution.\(^{38}\)

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It is only natural that practitioners and policymakers have grown weary from the myriad criticisms published about U.S. counterterrorism strategy within the last decade. Whether laying blame for why the United States failed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora in 2001, vilifying the intelligence community for perceived failures of imagination, or serving up saucy details of supposedly private conversations in the White House, authors and their publishers have enjoyed much success and publicity from their criticism-laced best-sellers. By contrast, a well-written, non-ideologically motivated analysis of U.S. counterterrorism efforts that inspires hope and optimism has been all too rare.

But now, *New York Times* national security correspondents Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker offer an important counterweight with their new book, *Counterstrike*. While focused on people and strategies that most Americans have never heard of, it is also written with the sensibilities of journalists who know how to make complex topics readable. Their interwoven stories and interesting characters are made all the more compelling upon realizing that the events they describe really happened.

Drawing on their impressive access at all levels of the government, the authors describe how the U.S. government has quietly developed and implemented a counterterrorism strategy that integrates kinetic and nonkinetic instruments of national power. The SOF and counterterrorism community will especially appreciate the book’s robust description and analysis of modern, networked, asymmetric threats. Schmitt and Shanker also aptly illustrate the absolute necessity of working closely with other countries (both officially and unofficially) to identify and utilize new ways of diminishing Al Qaeda’s capabilities to organize or inspire terrorists attacks. There can be no doubt that Al Qaeda is an enemy of the world, not just the United States, thus the crucial importance of partnering in a global effort to constrain the financing, safe havens, and ideological support that gives oxygen to the terrorist movement.
Surely there are ideas and lessons that can be drawn and incorporated into the fight against terrorism elsewhere in the world, particularly in places like Colombia, Lebanon, India, Algeria, Pakistan, Kashmir, Indonesia, and the Philippines...
support, and—most importantly—in achieving anything worthwhile through the use of violence. Governments must use every tool at their disposal, including the theories of deterrence as described in *Counterstrike*, to make these challenges increasingly difficult for the terrorists, to the point where they implode and then decay into oblivion, like countless other terrorist groups throughout history.

In sum, this book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on what can be called influence warfare, a way of conceptualizing the multi-faceted struggle to shape perceptions and behavior in an age of globalized information technologies. The authors have an important story to share, and they do so in a way that readers in many countries will find engaging and accessible. In additions, the book highlights the kind of sophisticated thinking about terrorism that true CT practitioners will surely appreciate.

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Q & A with Eric Schmitt  
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*Interview by Lars Lilleby*

On the 6th of December 2011, Eric Schmitt, the co-author (with Thom Shanker) of Counterstrike, visited the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey to talk about his new book. Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who covers terrorism and national security issues for The New York Times and has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. During his visit at the NPS, an international student from the Norwegian Army, Major Lars Lilleby, conducted the following interview:

**Lilleby:** In your new book you are talking about the new US strategy against terrorists – deterrence – a strategy well known from the Cold War. How does Al Qaeda react to this strategy and will this strategy work against other and smaller terrorist groups around the world?

**Schmitt:** I think this type of approach can work against any kind of network terrorist organization, in that you are both looking at nodes of the terrorist network to identify the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities that it has and then apply a strategy and approach that tries to go after that. In our book, the type of deterrence we talk about is Al Qaeda specific but it could be adapted to other organizations, too, in terms of identifying organizations that do not have physical things that they value. Classic deterrence is how you can hold physical things at risk. And, in Al Qaeda’s case, we talk about the virtual values, things like honor and prestige and the individual’s standing within the “Umma” or the Islamic public, and how you undermine those types of things and develop strategies to go up against that. As for Al Qaeda’s response, it’s hard to say, it’s not like people have gone and asked Al Qaeda leaders, “What do you think of the new deterrence structure?” I don’t think it’s quite that clear and I think they’re still very much involved, and even more involved in the kinetic fight on the ground. The ideological fight in terms of combating the narrative that we see; this is kind of a subtler approach that Al Qaeda perhaps hasn’t adjusted to yet.

**Lilleby:** What implication will this “new” strategy of deterrence have for the future of combating terror and would you recommend other countries follow this approach? Also, what role will U.S. allies and partners have in this new strategy against terrorism?

**Schmitt:** Well I think American allies are already playing a part in this strategy. I think they are adapting certain elements of this new deterrence strategy in their own fight against terrorism. This is something that can be applied against Al Qaeda wherever Al Qaeda is showing up, whether it’s in the affiliates in North Africa, East Africa, Somalia, Iraq; these are all approaches that can be used there. I think the long term focus is that it has to be
a resilient strategy, but flexible and supple and able to adapt as the enemy itself adapts. And if there are new elements that are considered new values that they hold, the United States, or its allies, have to be nimble enough and flexible enough to identify those new values and to target those as well, as part of any new and expanding deterrence strategy.

**Lilleby:** *In your chapter “Exploitation of Intelligence” you talk about a new approach in the use and sharing of intelligence. How well has this worked and does this help explain why the US eventually got hold of bin Laden in Abbottabad?*

**Schmitt:** I think, ultimately, the raid in Abbottabad in Pakistan culminated almost a decade’s worth of improved intelligence sharing, improved coordination between the intelligence committee, the Special Operations community, the military, and many other agencies of the United States government and other governments as well. I think what that raid showed was that the goal after 9/11 was breaking down some of the walls and sharing more intelligence, at first within the United States government, then expanding that, and being able to share outside the U.S. government. Now, there are still, to this day, restrictions on what the United States shares outside of the so-called “5 I” community of its closest allies. Even with other NATO allies it doesn’t share everything that it has. So, there are still certain restrictions that could hamper counterterrorist activities, but I think the record, since 9/11, is much improved and the Abbottabad raid underscores this new kind of success.

**Lilleby:** *In your book you talk about two operations, the Taji and Sinjar operations, both in Iraq. These operations were major intelligence breakthroughs in the war on terror. Why were those operations so significant and is this information still valuable today? What would you say are the key takeaways from these operations?*

**Schmitt:** The Taji raid was important because it yielded what was basically the blueprint for Al Qaeda in Iraq’s counterattack against the American surge in 2007. It laid out where they were going to deploy their forces and essentially how they were going to attack the American and Iraqi forces. But it also gave some really interesting insights into what they were going to target to try and undermine the credibility of the new Iraqi government. They were going to target bakers, for instance, because baking fresh bread is part of everyday Iraqi life. They were going to try to target the garbage collectors in the hopes that garbage would pile up in the streets and people would become more and more angry and frustrated with their government’s lack of ability to carry out essential public services. Taji revealed everything from tactical positions on the battlefield to these more interesting ideas. Sinjar was important because it provided new insights into the pipeline for suicide bombers into Iraq.

**Lilleby:** *General McChrystal, the commander of these successful raids, has said we need to share all of this information. Is that still going on? Or is it something he brought forward, and when he left we lost that?*
Schmitt: No, I think it’s still going on. Stanley McChrystal, who was then the head of the Joint Special Operations Command, did some revolutionary type thinking in terms of this. He really broke down many of the walls, certainly within his own organization so that people were sharing information in a real time way. Take the Sinjar raid. It is the best example of a raid by JSOC forces. It was on this little dusty camp, on the Syrian/Iraqi border, and what they ended up capturing is what we call the Al Qaeda rolodex. It is a very detailed account of the suicide bombers who were coming through from Syria into Iraq and countries all over North Africa and the Middle East. In the book, we talk about how Al Qaeda was as anal in its record keeping as the Nazis were. So you had the name, the hometown, and all sorts of details about each individual suicide bomber who was coming through this pipeline. McChrystal recognized the value of what his forces captured and recognized that it wouldn’t be enough just for him to hold onto this and parse it out, but that if he put it into the hands of the State Department it could be much more effective. He declassified most of that information, gave it to the State Department whose diplomats could then go country by country and present the information from the Sinjar files to these nations and say, “Look, this isn’t American propaganda, these are your own records. These are the photocopies and records from these individuals. And while you might not agree with American foreign policy, some of these people, if they’re not killed on the battlefield in Iraq, they could come back and be a threat to your country. So you need to take this seriously.” The upshot of it was that the suicide pipeline really was choked off by over 75%, as General David Petraeus told us.

Lilleby: Many critics of deterrence say that it only works against rational sovereign state actors. In your opinion, what are the challenges of using this strategy against non-state actors like Al Qaeda?

Schmitt: Clearly, there will always be elements of a terrorist network like Al Qaeda that are not deterrable. We’re not saying the strategy applies to everybody. Osama bin Laden, for instance, was probably undeterrable. There are certain suicide bombers that are probably undeterrable. But there are many others that we identify in our book that are enablers, the financiers or the gunrunners who are in it for economic reasons. There are others who maybe aren’t as committed jihadists as they thought. If you can undermine and question some of the values they have, that will cause them to either not go through with the attack or delay a bombing or force them to use a different route, a different method, a different type of explosive that maybe is less effective. So, I think it does have that kind of impact.

Lilleby: Are there any signs that Al Qaeda is responding to this new strategy?

Schmitt: In one sense, one way they’re responding is their deep concern for civilian casualties. For instance we’ve seen a lot of Al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, issue edicts, basically proclamations, that tell people to be very careful to not carry out many attacks.
that kill civilians, saying that these are very bad for public relations; it’s bad for our business because it’s not as if you’re killing security forces or Americans, you’re killing our own people, and that ultimately will make us very unpopular with them. There’s a recognition that this can be used against them in counter-messaging campaigns and so I think that’s one area where they have responded and tried to counter some of the more violent trends that cost civilian casualties.

**Lilleby:** The operation against bin Laden in Abbottabad was a huge success, both in terms of taking out UBL but also because of the amount of intelligence that was captured there. Has Al Qaeda recovered from that? And how will these events affect the organization and its strategy in the future?

**Schmitt:** In many ways, the core leadership of Al Qaeda in Pakistan was suffering even before the raid and are suffering more now because a few more of their leaders, most notably bin Laden, were killed, so it makes their ability to plan and execute attacks against the United States or Western interests much harder. Also they’ve spent so much of their time worrying about their own survival that they can’t spend much time on the attack.

**Lilleby:** This implies we are dependent on making such significant captures of information and intelligence from time to time?

**Schmitt:** Absolutely. There will be new exploitation operations that go on that cause the enemy to go in different directions and evolve. There will be new targets for the U.S. and its allies to go after and hopefully capturing or intercepting communications and intercepting other types of intelligence caches that will give them the information to allow them to then carry out operations, whether they’re kinetic or psychological operations. As General McChrystal has said, it’s all about the fight for intelligence right now; that’s what this war on combating terrorism is really all about.

**Lilleby:** One chapter in your book is dedicated to Pakistan and the problems the Pakistanis face. Is the key to success in Afghanistan how the Pakistanis approach their domestic problem? What would be the best U.S. response to these problems?

**Schmitt:** The United States has spent many years trying to persuade, cajole, and threaten the Pakistanis to do more to wipe out these safe havens. Pakistan has either been unable or unwilling to do that completely. Pakistan has been a very valuable ally in going after Al Qaeda elements, particularly senior leaders of Al Qaeda right after 9/11 in some of its cities. It’s been much more reluctant, however, to go after some of these groups, such as the Taliban or the Haqqani network that they view as proxies for their interests in Afghanistan after the United States leaves in the next few years. Everything in Pakistan is viewed through the prism of India, and so right now the Pakistanis are very concerned that if the United States leaves it will leave a void in Afghanistan. India is already making inroads, both economic and political, and they will in effect encircle Pakistan; that’s their great fear. Right now, the longer term goals should be to try and get Pakistan to
recognize that India does not pose an existential threat to the nation. That is very hard to get through right now, so the United States and Afghanistan is having to come up with a Plan B, and that is, if the Pakistanis aren’t able or willing to combat these militant elements, then the U.S. along with the Afghans will try and build a stronger, more effective ring of defenses along the border to try and contain the problem inside Pakistan. That hasn’t worked so far, as we’ve seen in some of the recent bombings in Kabul, which shows the Taliban’s ability to infiltrate and carry out attacks right in the heart of the city, right against the U.S. embassy and headquarters. So they’ve got a long way to go.

*Lilleby:*  *What then would be the best U.S. response to these problems?*

*Schmitt:*  In the short term, the United States has basically said, “We have to take measures into our own hands,” so the drones have become a very important tool and tactic in combating Al Qaeda, not only in Pakistan, but places like Yemen and Somalia, now too. But the drones are just a tactic; they’re not a long term strategy. I think the longer term strategy is to persuade and help these countries train their own forces—police, security forces, military forces—to combat these extremist threats so the U.S. and its allies don’t have to do that. Indigenous forces are usually better equipped in general to do this; they know the culture, they know the language. Their intelligence gathering ability is better from human sources and human intelligence, not necessarily technical intelligence. And so, if the U.S. can step back and rather than having to fight all these battles by putting troops in foreign countries, particularly Muslim countries, can instead help these countries fight the battle themselves more effectively, I think that’s the longer term plan. Short term, very tactical, more drone strikes; longer term, help build up the capacity of these indigenous forces.

*Lilleby:*  *Many officers in the U.S. and other countries criticize journalists and the media for being too fast and eager to publish “news” from groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan. From our perspective, too much of this “propaganda” is based on rumors and not facts. Journalists often claim that they evaluate all their sources carefully and adhere to a high standard of integrity regarding what’s true. What are your comments about this?*

*Schmitt:*  As journalists we’ll always have to be careful no matter where the information is coming from; if it’s slanted or pure propaganda. Certainly, we’ve gotten familiar with the type of statements the Taliban makes. If there’s a bombing, for instance, who’s responsible for the bombing, how large the casualties are, all these kind of things and so it may be that the only source of reporting or information, so this has to be very clearly laid out in our reporting: We have to be clear that this is only what the Taliban claims, that the government may have a totally different response. I think as long as journalists offer the appropriate caveats and warnings to readers, viewers, or listeners to say, “Hey, look this is what they’re saying but they don’t have a good track record. You don’t want to necessarily believe them. But you don’t want to necessarily ignore it all together.
because there may be kernels of truth in these things, there may have well been an attack. There may well have been a drone that went down on the Iranian-Afghan border. Now, did the Iranians shoot it down? Did it crash for mechanical reasons or other reasons, we’ll get into that.” But the fact is something did crash. Some surveillance aircraft crashed. That’s important news to get out. But it’s also just as important to get to the facts surrounding what happened. That’s true with anything that happens in dealing with terrorist organizations.

Lilleby:  In the epilogue of your book you say that “it will be impossible to end terrorism” and that terrorism will always be there. You are probably aware of the idea that there have been waves of terrorism. In your opinion, how long do you think this wave of religious terror will last and what will dominate the next wave?

Schmitt: It’s hard to predict how long these waves will last, but there are some positive trends that suggest that at least Al Qaeda may be on the way down. Now, whether some other religious form of terrorism takes its place or not and continues the wave in general is harder to say. But, optimistically speaking, there are American officials who believe that if they can kill or take out about half a dozen of the top leaders in the next few years that they will have been able to diminish the capability of Al Qaeda, and its franchises. What comes next, I think, is the realm of cyberspace. Terrorists, so far, have not used cyberspace in an offensive way; it’s been mostly a safe harbor for them where they can plan their attacks, where they can raise money and recruits. They actually haven’t used it in an offensive way against the United States or others; that has been more the realm of state-sponsored groups, the countries themselves. I would look to cyberspace as perhaps an upcoming area.

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The Moving Image
By Kalev I. Sepp

TOP TEN WAR MOVIES (about Irregular Warfare and Special Operations)

“A “Top Ten” list of motion pictures about Irregular Warfare and Special Operations has an objective similar to reading lists. There are literally thousands of war movies, so it helps to narrow the field, and offer a few titles of particular note to military professionals and students. Also, common viewing creates a basis of discussion, as with common reading of select books.

This Top Ten list has its limitations. All are English-language films, excepting the Italian-made/French-and-Arabic-language La Bataille d’Alger/The Battle of Algiers. This excludes some noteworthy Irregular Warfare movies, like the Peruvian La Boca Del Lobo, the French La 317e Section, and the Russian 9th Company. Also, none are documentaries. They may be historical fiction, or carry the disclaimer, “based on actual events.” In every case, a real understanding of the action and context of the films can only be gained by reading serious books on the subject.

Still, there are benefits to movie-watching. Unlike reading a book, viewing a film can be done collectively; there is the opportunity for a shared experience and common understanding. Cinematography is an art form, and can entertain as well as evoke contemplation of the subjects addressed. The intention of this Top Ten list is to suggest movies that convey a sense of the nature of irregular warfare, and the character of Special Operations. For both the professional and the “non-specialist,” this feeling might improve their understanding of these kinds of warfare. A picture, after all, is worth a thousand words -- which makes each movie, comprised of thousands of images, a visual novel.

Here are this writer’s Top Ten movies, in historical order of the wars in which they are set:

LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1992)
In the mid-18th century, a few European regiments and their native allies battle in the primeval wilderness for control of half the North American continent. Hawkeye (Daniel Day Lewis), a frontiersman and adopted white Mohican, is the consummate irregular warrior. Armed with his tomahawk, knife, and longue carabine (long rifle), he fights a running battle – literally – in
the forests of the Hudson Valley with the Hurons and French to save his friends, his tribe, and the woman he loves. Awarded an Oscar.

**FORT APACHE (1948)**
In post-Civil War Arizona territory, a by-the-book commander of a U.S. cavalry outpost applies conventional tactics and attitude against an unconventional opponent – the Chiricahua Apaches, masters of guerrilla warfare. The story of the arrogant colonel from “back East” (Henry Fonda) who ignores his frontier-savvy officers and sergeants (including John Wayne) is loosely based on Lt. Col. George Custer and the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

**ZULU (1964)**
The year is 1879. A 20,000-man Zulu army armed only with spears massacres 1,300 rifle-bearing British and allied soldiers in a single day at Isandhlwana. 4,000 Zulu warriors then detach to mop up an understrength company of red-coated British infantry at Rourke’s Drift. The result surprises both sides. Eleven of the surviving Tommies receive the Victoria Cross – the most ever for a single unit in a single action. Sometimes, irregular warfare can just be a helluva gunfight. (Hint: Fast-forward through the irrelevant scenes of the drunken minister and his daughter; they’re completely fictional.)

**BREAKER MORANT (1980)**
An Australian counter-guerrilla unit leader applies “Rule 303” against Boer irregulars and spies on the South African veldt in 1902 – as per orders from headquarters. But Lieut. Harry Morant is court-martialed for his tough tactics by his waxed-moustache British superiors, to appease Boer leaders so they’ll begin peace talks. The sharply anti-British tone of this Australian film is quite intentional. (Turn on the English subtitles -- the accents of the Aussies, Scots and Brits in the echo-chamber courtroom scenes make the dialogue almost unintelligible.) Nominated for an Oscar.

**LAWRENCE OF ARABIA (1962)**
An Arabic-speaking Oxford archeologist joins the British Army, and is sent to blow up the Turkish railroads he travelled on when he did field research across the Ottoman Middle East before the Great War of 1914-18. To accomplish this, he leads Arab irregulars in a revolt against their Ottoman masters. The remarkable story of T.E. Lawrence follows this university scholar’s rise from observer to adviser to guerrilla army commander, and is enhanced by the spectacular locations in this exceptionally watchable picture.
Incidentally, Peter O’Toole was only the fifth choice for the lead role. Awarded seven Oscars, including Best Picture.

**THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (1957)**
The mission: Form a four-man team, jump into Japanese-occupied Thailand, link up with the “indig,” march cross-country, and blow up a railroad bridge. The team leader is an SOE officer, and fluent in the native dialect. One team member escaped from the Japanese POW camp at the bridge site. What could go wrong? Well, almost everything. Perhaps a British colonel (Alec Guinness) collaborating with the Japanese might also prove troublesome. Note: When the movie was released, former Allied prisoners-of-war picketed at theaters in England and Australia, protesting that the movie did not adequately portray Japanese cruelty and atrocities during World War II. Awarded seven Oscars, including Best Picture.

**A BELL FOR ADANO (1945)**
Call it “Stability Operations,” “Civil Affairs,” “Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” or “Transitional Military Authority,” the trials of rebuilding communities devastated by war are constant. Major Victor Joppolo is the U.S. military governor of the cratered Sicilian town of Adano in 1943. His newly-liberated townspeople need the coast road to cart in food and water, but the U.S. division commander orders the major to keep the road clear at all times for military convoys. What’s more, the Fascisti took the great town bell, a source of civic pride; the citizens want him to replace it -- immediately. And what is this ‘democracy’ the major keeps talking about? The movie is based on the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel of the same name.

**THE BEST YEARS OF OUR LIVES (1946)**
Here’s a hard look at how Americans back home in the States don’t understand or appreciate the experiences and sacrifices of servicemen returning from distant wars overseas – and their struggles with unemployment, estrangement, substance abuse, nightmares, divorce, and loss of limbs. In 1946. This film is especially for those who imagine the post-World War II years were some sort of “golden age” for returning U.S. combat veterans. Awarded eight Oscars, including Best Picture.

**LA BATAILLE D’ALGER / THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS (1966)**
Commissioned by the then-newly independent revolutionary government of Algeria, this film employs a documentary style to tell the victorious rebels’ version of their urban insurgency against the French paratroopers and pieds noirs. Some of it is true, some is what the rebels wished was true, and some is pure fabrication – and very well done, in any regard. It is a striking view of urban guerrilla warfare, and masterful propaganda as well. Nominated for three Oscars.
BLACK HAWK DOWN (2001)
What happens when the major general commanding Task Force Ranger in the cinderblock maze of Mogadishu in 1993 ignores the venerable “Rogers’ Rangers Standing Orders” of 1757? – notably, “Don’t ever march home the same way; take a different route so you won’t be ambushed.” This film shows the awful price paid by soldiers when their leaders underestimate irregular opponents – a recurrent fault in U.S. military expeditions. Awarded two Oscars.

WORST
Then there are the “Worst War Movies (about Irregular Warfare and Special Operations).” Leading this very large pack, in no particular order:

RAMBO II & III (1985 & 1988)
As embarrassing to U.S. Army Green Berets as Navy SEALs is to Navy SEALs. Rambo III received five Razzie nominations, including Worst Film, Worst Director, Worst Screenplay, Worst Supporting Actor, and Worst Actor (Sylvester Stallone).

NEVER SO FEW (1959)
The only movie made about the OSS in World War II, Never So Few is The A-Team without the gripping realism. The lackadaisical performances by the actors (including Frank Sinatra and Steve McQueen) give the impression the movie was made in a careless rush, and every scene was shot in one “eh, good enough” take. Hollywood was full of OSS alumni after the war; it’s a shame this was the best they could do to tell their story.

THE WILD GEESE (1978)
A shady financier hires over-the-hill white mercenaries (led by Richard Burton) to rescue an African leader ousted in a coup. The mercs – swell guys all – do one P.T. workout, parachute via free-fall into an unnamed country, slaughter hundreds of blacks with bullets, poison arrows, and cyanide gas, then run for the border with their prize – supporting the apartheid view that only whites can save blacks from themselves. Racist and despicable.

HURT LOCKER (2008)
Deplored by all Iraq and Afghanistan EOD veterans for its jarring inaccuracies, particularly the erratic, lone-wolf personality of the team leader – the antithesis of a successful bomb disposal specialist. Awarded six Oscars, including Best Picture and Best Director.

BEHIND ENEMY LINES (2001)
Like Hurt Locker, deplored by all Air Force officers for the escape-and-evade ineptness of the pilot (comedic actor Owen Wilson) shot down over Bosnia during the NATO “peacekeeping” mission in 1995, and the political flip-floppery of the U.S. and allied
commanders (including Gene Hackman) directing the combat-search-and-rescue operation.

**THE GREEN BERETS (1968)**
This film – very possibly the worst war movie ever made – inspired a drove of Special Forces colonels to believe they could imitate Colonel Mike Kirby (John Wayne), and personally lead each of their group’s fifty-plus A-Detachments in combat. Who needs all those company and battalion commanders, anyway?

**FUNNIEST**
There’s a parallel category to the Irregular Warfare/Special Ops “Worst” movies – which is “Funniest.” Most were not intended to be laughable, but they just turned out that way. Several of note include:

**NAVY SEALS (1990)**
It’s not a war movie; it’s a “bro-mance.” And ooh, such coiffures.

**DELTA FORCE (1986)**
Chuck Norris is so serious it’s comical; not to mention Lee Marvin as the Oldest Colonel in the World.

**CHARLIE WILSON’S WAR (2007)**
Even the major critics called it a “comedy-drama” and “political satire.”

**OPERATION DUMBO DROP (1995)**
Is an elephant for the village of Dak Nhe like a bell for the town of Adano? Just add Green Berets and a cargo parachute.

**G.I. JANE (1997)**
Demi Moore, chosen for her femininity (really, they say so in the movie!), guts out a SEAL-ish selection course, then rescues Rangers surrounded in the Libyan desert. Would Jody Foster, the original choice for the lead, have made this believable?

One more reason for lists of this brand of war movies, is to incite readers to challenge the titles presented, and suggest others (“Where is Red Dawn?! “What about that great 1948 Franco-Norwegian film about the Vemork Heavy Water Raid, Kampen om tungtvannet?”). Such recommendations are gladly welcomed.

**Next issue:** Movies of the Irish “Easter Rising.”

END

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is senior lecturer in Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He earned his Combat Infantryman Badge in the Salvadoran Civil War.
Ethics & Insights

by George Lober

Let me offer the outline of a very general but common case study. A subordinate witnesses a peer, or a superior, doing something that is patently wrong. The wrong being committed is a prosecutable act. Maybe it’s the embezzlement of funds, or maybe it’s an ongoing pattern of fraud from which the perpetrator has profited. Maybe it’s the theft of expensive organizational resources and property, or maybe it’s the molestation of another, weaker employee within the organization. The point is, the wrong discovered is no minor infraction or bending of a rule. It’s not just borrowing a pen from work and forgetting to return it. This is a serious offense.

Now imagine that same subordinate, following policy and the chain of command, reports the wrongful act either to his or her immediate superiors, or—in the case of an immediate superior being the actual perpetrator—to those appropriately next in the line of authority. The ranking individuals who receive the information thank the subordinate for coming forward and then promise to handle the situation.

Now imagine that weeks or maybe months go by, and nothing happens. Nothing. Or imagine that instead of nothing happening, the perpetrator suddenly retires with an appropriate organizational celebration and full retirement benefits. Or maybe the perpetrator is promoted to another position in another area, and the promotion includes an increase in salary. In any event, the perpetrator is not dismissed, not charged, not prosecuted, not called to account for the wrong committed.

At this point, imagine that you are the subordinate described above. What is your role, if any? Do you have an ethical obligation to take what you have discovered further? What if you have strong reason to believe that those high up in the organization are aware of your report but have chosen to deal with the situation as indicated above? Do you consider going outside the organization? What if revealing that information could potentially damage the reputation of the organization itself? What if going outside the organization also involves serious risks to your position, your ability to support yourself and your family, even your career if your lack of discretion and loyalty are discovered? What if such a discovery could imperil your safety? Are you still obligated to reveal what you know?
You’re suddenly characterized as lacking moral courage. Is that fair? Is it accurate?

Yet, what if you don’t act and don’t take the information you’ve discovered further? Are you, in essence, entering into a degree of complicity with the wrong committed? You know it happened. You know it was wrong. To the very best of your knowledge, no punitive action was taken. If you remain silent, are you to some degree sanctioning an apparent cover-up?

Flash ahead six months—or maybe a couple of years—to a point in time when the wrong committed is eventually discovered by someone else, and suddenly you are called to task for not pursuing the matter further and not doing more, even if it meant going outside the organizational chain of command. You’re suddenly characterized as lacking moral courage. Is that fair? Is it accurate?

Thoughts or comments regarding moral courage? Other ethical dilemmas? Address them to George at CTXeditor@gmail.com.
Call For Submissions

The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) accepts submissions of nearly any type. Our aim is to distribute high quality international analyses, opinions, and reports to military officers, government officials, and security and academic professionals in the world of counterterrorism. We give priority to non-typical, insightful submissions, and to topics concerning countries with the most pressing terrorism and CT issues. We accept submissions from anyone.

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CTX accepts the following types of submissions, and offers the following length guidelines:

- academic analyses (5,000-7,000 words)
- reports or insightful stories from the field (2,000 words)
- photographic essays
- video clips with explanation or narration
- interviews with relevant figures (no longer than 15 minutes)
- book reviews (500-1,000 words); review essays (1,000-3,000 words); or lists of books of interest (which may include books in other languages)
- reports on any special projects

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Submissions to CTX must adhere to the following:

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- you must have received consent from anyone whose pictures, videos, or statements you include in your work;
- you must agree to our Copyright Disclaimer;
- include a byline as you would like it to appear and a short bio as you would like it to appear (we may use either, or both);

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Resources: Publication Announcements

Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism

Stanford Security Studies
An imprint of Stanford University Press


Paul Shemella retired from the Navy at the rank of Captain after a career in Special Operations. He is currently the Program Manager for the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program at The Center for Civil-Military Relations, an arm of The Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

“To defeat the modern terrorist’s methods of aggression we must depart from conventional thinking of past wars and move to a more unconventional, irregular model that requires us to act at the speed of our adversaries. This book addresses those challenges, discussing past attacks, and provides a framework from which governments can act.”  
- Albert M. Calland III, VADM, USN (Ret)

“No government effort is more ‘interagency’ than preventing terrorism or dealing with it when it cannot be prevented. Fighting Back is a surprisingly readable guide for developing ‘whole-of-government’ and multinational strategies against terrorism – for our international partners as well as our own leaders.”
- The Honorable James R. Locher III, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

“Terrorism is a devilish problem. Paul Shemella and his fellow authors – an impressive mix of thoughtful observers and seasoned practitioners – put a range of the pieces together in a way that advances understanding and, especially, provides a comprehensive guide for students.”
- Gregory Treverton, Director, RAND Center for Global Risk and Security

“Based on the experiences of 130 countries that are fighting terrorism within the context of their own laws, capabilities, and security frameworks, Fighting Back provides the first strategic framework for addressing this complex issue in a workable way.”
- John J. Sheehan, General, USMC (Ret)
John Arquilla chronicles the deadly careers of the greatest masters of irregular warfare over the past 250 years. From wilderness rangers to sea raiders, early guerrillas to modern insurgents, the cast of characters comes from many nations around the world.

“Arquilla's perspective enables readers to understand and respect the historical context of the qualities required to wage irregular war and the skills required to master it.”
- Dennis Showalter, Military historian, Colorado College

“Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits is a great overview of irregular warfare for the student, academic, and lay reader. Arquilla adds to his academic muscle with an enjoyable work that reads less like history and more like an adventure story.”
- New York Journal Of Books

“John Arquilla brings to life the accomplishments of “great captains” in irregular warfare, using comparative history, biography, shrewd policy analysis and an uncommon appreciation for military strategy.”
- Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State