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Welcome

Letter from the Editor

Welcome to the inaugural issue of CTX - Combating Terrorism Exchange! We are the very first journal built from the ground up exclusively for the CTFP community, which has grown to over 160 countries, and has thousands of participants serving in the military, government, and private and academic sectors. "CTFP" stands for Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and that's right, if you are receiving this, then you are, in some way, a part of this powerful network.

With headlines like "**Greek Police Arrest Turkish Terror Suspect Wanted In Germany**" earlier last month, the need for us to come together to address the issues of terrorism has become more apparent and pressing than ever. We hope CTX will inspire you to work with your international colleagues by sharing stories with others who are working *in the field* to implement cooperative, effective strategies against terrorism - uniting multiple nations, and multiple sectors of society.

The 21st century offers daring and unprecedented opportunities to push cooperation and partnership to levels never before possible. Will we join together to adapt our systems for the rough road ahead? The choice is ours, and CTX wants to report our progress along the way.

I hope you like the first issue we've pulled together. It represents the first step in building on the potent CTFP network of which we are all part. My hope is that we can shape what CTX offers in the future according to your feedback and suggestions. Photo essays, book reviews, and exclusive interviews are among the many types of content we hope to feature in CTX. Take a look at our "Call for Submissions" on page 56 to see how you can contribute; comments and other feedback about the journal will always be welcome directly at CTXEditor@gmail.com.

We are looking forward to providing a compelling platform for this burgeoning community of CT professionals.

Julia McClenon
Managing Editor

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Special thanks go to **Alis Gumbiner** at the *Homeland Security Affairs* journal, **Eleanor Uhlinger** and **Greta Marlatt** at the Dudley Knox Library, **Sean Costigan** and **Jeannie Callaghan** at the Partnership for Peace Consortium's *Connections* journal, and to **Vlado Azinovic** at *Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe*, for all of their thoughtful input and advice on starting and running a peer-reviewed journal.

Launching CTX has only been possible with the guidance and efforts of **Anna Simons** and **Michael Freeman**, and the unfailing assistance and marvelous work of **Amelia Simunek**. Behind the scenes, **Tammy Ditmore** added incomparable polish. None of this would have come to fruition without their help.

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Content Recon... a sneak peek

First up in this quarter's CTX, "CTFP *In Action*" features **Mr. Shahab Khan** of the Bangladeshi Enterprise Institute, and the Director of CTFP, **Dr. Dennis Walters**, giving an up-close account of how Bangladesh is developing and implementing a CT strategy from scratch.

The misunderstood, if not underestimated, problem of radicalization at the individual level is highlighted by **CTFP Fellow Jahangir Arasli** in his article "Violent Converts: Growing Cluster and Rising Trend". He analyzes dozens of converts' radicalization paths and points to eerily common themes which may prove key to heading off this menacing trend. On the flipside of radicalization, **Rohan Gunaratna** examines the necessity and evolution of terrorist rehabilitation programs, which may be the most "Neglected Secret Weapon" in the CT professional's arsenal.

Almost precisely three years after the deadly terrorist shooting spree in Mumbai that terrorized thousands, **four CTFP Fellows** analyze the overt and covert financial system which continues to empower South Asia's Lashkar-e-Taiba. Combining their regional insider and outsider perspectives, **Geoffrey Kambere, Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar, and Fulgence Msafiri** candidly offer concrete recommendations for how India and her regional partners can eliminate LeT's financial lifelines.

As Anwar al-Awlawki takes up his position as the new leader of al-Qaeda, **Dr. Bruce Hoffman** briefly and simply nails down what AQ strategy has been to date, and may well continue to be, regardless of the leadership change.

Two of our regular columns are also making their debut this issue. Culture is often narrated and defined by its popular arts, and with "The Moving Image," we introduce a departure from the usual analyses of current events and ongoing trends. In the inaugural column, **Dr. Kalev I. Sepp** draws on his special operator background to examine Restrepo, Tim Hetherington's last major film project before his untimely death. Separately, in what will be a regular "Ethics and Insights" column, **George Lober** will aim to help keep our consciences in check. Most appropriately, he's kicking his column off with the ethics of obeying orders - an issue that is achingly relevant for military personnel and civil servants alike.

Lastly, the Resources Page will also be a regular feature, and in this issue we've pulled together the websites of the CTFP institutions from which most of you have graduated. Take a quick look: you may not realize how far-reaching your network is, and just where it can take you.

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CTFP *In Action*: Crafting a National Counter-Terror Strategy for Bangladesh

by Dr. Dennis Walters & Mr. Shahab Khan

The United States published its latest National Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy in June of this year. On page five of the strategic document, a direct link between American national values and fighting terrorism is made. To Americans this comes as no surprise. Americans expect any national strategy to be about protecting the very values that are at the heart of their country. But where do you start in drafting a strategy when no national values have been defined? The answer of course is with the Constitution. But what if the Constitution has been revised 14 times, and lacks a solid judiciary and legal system to enforce it? A complex task now becomes even more daunting. This was the situation facing Bangladesh when it first tackled the problem of drafting a national CT strategy more than two years ago.


Prior to 2009, most counterterrorism efforts in Bangladesh were focused on short-term security and law enforcement measures to the near exclusion of longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. This began to change when Bangladesh reached out to the Defense Institution Reform Initiative.

The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), a security cooperation program of the U.S. government, began working with the Bangladeshi Enterprise Institute (BEI) in 2009 to determine which of a number of national strategies should be the first to be written and published. By overwhelming consensus, the group decided that counterterrorism was the least controversial of any of the areas needing a national level strategy. Work began immediately and it quickly became apparent that differing views of the problem,

not to mention very complex domestic political overtones, made the task quite daunting.

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship (CTF) joined the effort in 2010, and quietly worked behind the scenes with DIRI to help guide the development process. After four sessions spanning three years, a draft strategy was delivered to the Home Ministry by the joint team of BEI, the CTFP, and DIRI. The Home Ministry is now busy finalizing the draft, and it is expected to be ratified by the Prime Minister in the coming days.

Now comes the hard part: implementing the strategy. A strategy is only as good as its implementation, and Bangladesh faces several shortfalls in infrastructure that will make implementing an aggressive CT strategy a challenge. Given the political culture in Bangladesh, consensus and sustained commitment will be required for long-term implementation. Relevant policymakers and stakeholders need training on best practices regarding CT initiatives. Moreover, there is a need to sensitize various stakeholders to the necessity of interagency cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This is where the global CTF network can be put to good use, assisting Bangladesh in achieving a number of key objectives outlined in the strategy. To date, over sixty Bangladeshis have attended some form of CTF training, ranging from regional terrorist finance seminars to graduate degree programs in the United States. In the coming days these individuals will play important roles



“Where do you start in drafting a strategy when no national values have been defined?”

in guiding the draft strategy through the ratification process. These same individuals will undoubtedly play important roles in implementing the broad objectives of the new strategy.

One of these objectives is to establish a National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). In addition to providing intelligence collection and analysis training to center operators, the CTF can link the center to a global network of professionals. India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand all have a number of CTF alumni currently working in various capacities fighting transnational terrorism. Once properly networked with these professionals, the NTAC will be ready to conduct anticipatory analyses on emerging threats confronting Bangladesh. Conversely, the NTAC will be able to share intelligence with their peers in border countries on potential problems headed their way.

Coming in 2012, the CTF hopes to field a training tool that will assist countries like Bangladesh in

training their threat assessment centers. This platform will be a real-time data injection training module designed to test regional networks' responses in thwarting transnational terrorist attacks. CTFP ECCO, the exclusive online CT network due out later this year, and the CTX journal will have the latest information on when this tool will be available and how countries can make use of it once it is online.

Dr. Dennis Walters is the Director of the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program and is a former U.S. special operator.

Mr. Shahab Enam Khan is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. He is widely recognized for his works on counterterrorism, security, and public policy making, and strengthening democratic institutions in developing countries.

Look for "CTFP in Action" in further issues of CTX to follow the progress of your fellow CTFP alumni.

Gain recognition through CTX for your international CT project: if you're endeavoring to leverage the CTFP network for your country's or organization's CT efforts, we want to hear about it: CTXSubmit@gmail.com

The Financing of Lashkar-e-Taiba

by Geoffrey Kambere, Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar,
Fulgence Msafir

“Very few things worry me as much as the strength and ambition of LeT, a truly malign presence in South Asia.”¹

Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator,
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC

Since its formation in 1990, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has evolved from a local threat focused against India to a global jihadist threat. While many experts have addressed the operational facets of LeT, its finances have not received commensurate attention. This article aims to redress that gap. It is divided into four major parts. The first part provides a brief history about LeT, including its ideology, organization, training, and operations. The second part focuses on LeT finances: its primary funding sources, methods of moving money, and trends in spending. The third part presents a brief case study of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks; and in the fourth section, we examine the countermeasures initiated by various actors, weaknesses in the present response, recommendations, and conclusions.

Background

Origins

“In 1984, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi organized a group of Ahl-e-Hadith Muslims from Pakistan to wage jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.”² A year later, “Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, two professors at Lahore University, formed the Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as a missionary group dedicated to the tenets of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam. In 1986, Lakhvi merged his outfit with JuD to form the Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI).”³ Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and the father of modern,

LeT’s commitment to global jihad, connections with Al Qaeda (AQ), and strong state support can be traced back to its very birth as an organization.

¹Daniel Benjamin, “The Obama Administration’s Counterterrorism Policy at One Year,” *U.S. Department of State*, January 13, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/135171.htm>.

²Stephen Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects* (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, 2011), 2, retrieved from http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/lashkar_e_taiba.

³Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 2-3.

global jihad, was one of the cofounders of MDI. MDI enjoyed active support from both the Pakistani Intelligence Services (ISI) and the CIA for fighting alongside the mujahedeen.⁴ After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan appropriated the assets created during the Afghan war to wage a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). In 1990 LeT was launched as a separate military wing of MDI.⁵ Hence, LeT's commitment to global jihad, connections with Al Qaeda (AQ), and strong state support can be traced back to its very birth as an organization.

Violence erupted in J&K in 1989; however, the insurgency there started to wane in a few years. As a result, Pakistan brought in jihadi elements to resuscitate the Kashmir movement in the mid to late 1990s. It is estimated that the ISI spent over \$50 million USD annually to support groups such as LeT, Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). See Figure 1 below, which shows the peak of violence occurring after the slowdown in the early 1990s. Consequently, the conflict in J&K became less of a local insurgency and more of a campaign sponsored by Pakistan through its many proxies. The growing reputation of LeT as a jihadi force fighting to liberate Kashmir enhanced its ability to recruit and raise funds.⁶




Figure 1. Overall Fatalities in J&K.⁷

⁴ C. Christine Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack* (October 13, 2009), retrieved from *Social Science Research Network* website: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753767>; Bruce Riedel, "The Mumbai Massacre and its Implications for America and South Asia," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 115.

⁵ "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview" (December 21, 2008), retrieved from *Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center* website: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/gj_e002.htm; and "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba: A Magnet for American Jihadis," *The Investigative Project on Terrorism*, 2010, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/373.pdf>, 5.

⁶ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 5.

⁷ "Fatalities in Terrorist Violence," from *South Asia Terrorism Portal* website, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm (accessed May 4, 2011).

Ideology

Jihad forms the cornerstone of LeT's ideology. In a publication titled "Why Are We Waging Jihad," LeT leaders exhort Muslims to liberate themselves from persecution by the infidels and identify India, the United States, and Israel as the mortal enemies of Islam.⁸ LeT's motivation toward the Kashmiri cause is not just territorial but ideological; the group argued that once J&K was liberated, it would serve as a base to restore Islamic norms in the Indian subcontinent.⁹ MDI and LeT also aim at transforming Pakistan's entire society toward their radical interpretation of Islam through *dawa* (proselytizing) and *khidmat* (social service).¹⁰

LeT recruits from Pakistani followers of the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, which is Salafist in orientation, and believes that Muslims must return to a "pure form" of Islam. Because the Ahl-e-Hadith movement pales in comparison to the strength of Deobandi organizations in Pakistan, however, and because LeT also alienates many mainstream adherents to the Ahl-e-Hadith movement because of its calls for jihad, the LeT has generally been almost entirely dependent upon the ISI and on Saudi benefactors for its funding.¹¹

...cadres are equipped with weapons ranging from small arms such as AK-47's to... rocket-propelled grenades, and... night-vision devices, global positioning systems (GPS), and satellite phones.

Organization

Hafiz Saeed, one of the founders of JuD, was the *aamir* (chief) of both MDI and LeT. The MDI is functionally organized into separate departments for *dawa*, finance, external affairs, propaganda, and *khidmat*, whereas the LeT has a quasi-military structure organized by various geographic regions in J&K. By 2000, MDI and LeT had at least 70 district offices in Pakistan and a plethora of smaller ones totaling more than 2,000.¹² The organization had its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore Pakistan, in a sprawling compound that houses numerous community services.¹³ Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, LeT is reported to have moved its headquarters to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).¹⁴

LeT is reported to have several thousand members, of which 750 cadres are said to be operating in Kashmir.¹⁵ A sociological profile of 100 LeT cadres found their backgrounds were similar to those of low-ranking officers of the Pakistan Army hailing from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Interestingly, the cadres were better educated compared to

⁸ Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005).

⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 3.

¹⁰ Qandeel Siddique, *What is Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2008).

¹¹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 5, 9.

¹² Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 7.

¹³ "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 8.

¹⁴ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 40.

¹⁵ Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan*, 8.

other terrorist groups in the region, as its leaders emphasize the need for education to be able to wage a modern jihad.¹⁶

The cadres are equipped with weapons ranging from small arms such as AK-47s to heavier weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, and also force multipliers such as night-vision devices, global positioning systems (GPS), and satellite phones. LeT is known for its proficiency in employing improvised explosive devices in Kashmir and Afghanistan.¹⁷

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and LeT attacks on the Indian Parliament steered Pakistan and India to the verge of a conventional war.

LeT's training is divided into three parts: *Daure-e-Aama* (basic training), *Daure-e-Suffa* (religious training and proselytizing), and *Daura-e-Khasa* (specialized training

for guerilla warfare). In addition to the three basic stages, selected cadres may receive special training for specific skills related to espionage, subversion, sabotage, and maritime operations.¹⁸

Operations

An overview of the operations conducted by LeT presents a vivid picture of how the terrorist organization has evolved from a local to a global threat. During the 1990s, most of LeT's operations were conducted in J&K, where the organization was known for targeting civilians, and *fidayeen* attacks (LeT's term for suicide attacks) against security forces. The December 2000 *fidayeen* attack against the Delhi Red Fort was one of the first terrorist attacks by LeT outside J&K.¹⁹ In December 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and LeT attacks on the Indian Parliament steered Pakistan and India to the verge of a conventional war. In response to international pressure, Pakistan's then-President Pervez Musharraf banned the MDI and LeT; however, the actions by the state remained cosmetic with no effect on LeT's capabilities or its financial resources in particular. The July 2006 bomb blasts against the Mumbai local rail network that killed more than 200 people was one of LeT's more recent acts displaying its intent.²⁰ Over the past decade, LeT has established sleeper cells in India and nurtures radical groups such as Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Students Islamist Movement of India (SIMI).²¹

¹⁶ "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 9.

¹⁷ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operation and Future Prospects*, 19.

¹⁸ "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview," 48.

¹⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 13.

²⁰ "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview," 31-32.

²¹ Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan*, 10.

In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, LeT provided active assistance to AQ in the form of safe havens, training, and acting as a gateway for aspiring jihadis to reach AQ.²² Abu Zubayda was one of the most notable AQ members captured from a LeT safe house at Faisalabad.²³ The LeT followed a creative policy to allow its cadres leaves of absence during which they could fight with AQ as freelancers, which allowed for plausible deniability. British forces in Iraq captured at least two LeT operatives in 2004 and handed them over to the Americans.²⁴ Subsequent to this capture, Musharraf came down heavily on LeT, though this incident did not fracture the group's alliance with the state. It is noteworthy that even at the height of violence within Pakistan, LeT did not turn against the state.²⁵

LeT's role in global jihad is not limited to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or training would-be terrorists. It...is deeply enmeshed with global jihadi networks...

LeT's active involvement in Afghanistan can be traced to mid-2005 in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces.²⁶ An attack in July 2008 on a U.S. outpost at Wanat and the Indian embassy in Kabul were credited to LeT.²⁷ LeT also acts as a magnet to Western jihadis for training, funding, and even operational planning.²⁸ A wide array of American, Canadian, British, French, and Australian Muslims (including converts) has been trained in LeT camps.²⁹ The Virginia Paintball Group from the United States, Omar Khayyam from Britain, and Willie Brigitte from France were all trained in LeT camps in Pakistan and were later involved in providing material and operational support to the organization for its global operations.³⁰

LeT's role in global jihad is not limited to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or training would-be terrorists. It has been actively involved in various international terrorist attacks and is deeply enmeshed with global jihadi networks: LeT had varying degrees of involvement in the 2005 London train bombings, the failed plot by Richard Reid to blow up an airplane using a shoe bomb in 2002, and the thwarted attempt to detonate liquid bombs onboard a transatlantic aircraft in 2006.³¹

²² Stephen Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai* (London: The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2009).

²³ Stephen Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat* (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, 2010), from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf (retrieved May 13, 2011); Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 12, 16, 18; "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 10.

²⁴ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*, 16.

²⁵ Ashley Tellis, "Bad Company: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," testimony to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2010, transcript retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/03/11/bad-company-lashkar-e-tayyiba-and-growing-ambition-of-islamist-militancy-in-pakistan/jln>, 4.

²⁶ Ryan Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India* (2010) from the Strategic Studies Institute website: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=973>; Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective*, 2.; Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 18.

²⁷ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*, 20.

²⁸ "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 14.

²⁹ Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan*, 8, 9.

³⁰ "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 14; "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview," 56.

³¹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 14; "The Rise of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," 14; Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies*, 16.

LeT Financing

This section covers LeT's sources of funds, means of transfer of finances, and how the group spends the funds. Sources of funds include state sponsorship, charities, and businesses. Money is transferred through banks, use of *hawala*, and by couriers. Finally, funds are utilized mainly for *dawa* (preaching), *khidmat* (provision of social services), and jihad (Islamic campaign against non-believers) through recruitment, training, and procurement of equipment and weapons.

State Sponsorship

Most observers claim that the LeT is a terrorist group supported by the Pakistani state. Ashley Tellis believes "it is important to end the farce of treating these entities as if they are truly free agents, acting on their own accord, un-tethered to the state organs from which they derive protection, succor, and support."³²

Likewise, Bill Roggio, a managing editor of *The Long War Journal*, attests that "LeT receives support from Pakistan's military and its intelligence service."³³ In addition, Tankel, writing for the New American Foundation, asserts that Pakistani financial and organizational support to LeT increased significantly during the 1990s.³⁴ Furthermore, Abubakar Siddique argues that LeT was able to expand quickly and launch jihad in the contested area of Himalayan Kashmir in the 1990s because it had been encouraged by Pakistan's army to do so.³⁵ As a final example of state sponsorship, Jyoti Trehan claims that the ISI gives both genuine and counterfeit money directly to LeT.³⁶

JuD officials often travel to Saudi Arabia seeking donations for new schools at highly inflated costs that in turn are directed to fund LeT militant operations.

Despite evidence of Pakistan's support to militant groups including LeT, Pakistan denies the allegations. After 9/11, Musharraf was forced to act against indigenous-based militants in Kashmir; however, his actions were questionable because LeT and JeM continued to operate beyond the "Line of Control (LoC)" in the contentious Kashmir area. As reported:

Pakistan has refused to crack down on homegrown terror groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, despite their covert and overt support for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terror groups. Inside Pakistan's military and intelligence services, which are the real powers in Pakistan, groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are seen as "strategic" depth against India, and are used as instruments of foreign policy.³⁷

³² Ashley Tellis, "Bad Company."

³³ Bill Roggio, "US Designates Lashkar—Taiba's Charitable Front as Terror Group," *The Long War Journal*, November 24, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/us_treasury_designat.php (accessed May 10, 2011).

³⁴ Stephen Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat," New American Foundation, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Lashkar-e-Taiba_in_Perspective.pdf (accessed May 13, 2011);

³⁵ Abubakar Siddique, "Charity Linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba Under the Spotlight," *Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Liberty*, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1358669.html> (accessed May 2, 2011).

³⁶ Jyoti Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir," *Journal of Financial Crime*; February 2002; Vol. 9, no. 3, at <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articles=1650632> (accessed May 9, 2011).

³⁷ Roggio, "US Designates Lashkar—Taiba's Charitable Front as Terror Group."

However, Tankel claims that the Pakistan government's direct support to LeT via ISI started to diminish in 2002 following international pressure and the threat of war with India.³⁸

Charities

LeT exploits JuD's social welfare organization with its more than 50,000 registered members to spread its influence and to raise funds.³⁹ Within Pakistan, donation boxes are placed in many JuD offices and shops spread out all over the country, and at public gatherings, where money is solicited for the continuation of LeT's ideology and to celebrate the martyrdom of fighters.⁴⁰

For example, within Europe, Britain is a major center for fundraising for LeT because of its very large Pakistani immigrant population.⁴¹ But some of the money raised for JuD charitable activities is used to finance LeT's operations; in fact, funding for the plot to use liquid bombs to detonate transatlantic aircraft in 2006 was funneled through the charities that raised funds in British mosques for earthquake victims in 2005.⁴² Additionally, JuD officials often travel to Saudi Arabia seeking donations for new schools at highly inflated costs that in turn are directed to fund LeT militant operations.⁴³

LeT also receives charitable aid directly, especially from donors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. According to Jonathan Figel, Saudi Arabia covertly supports and promotes the "Saudi-Wahabbi political and religious influence in the Sunni Muslim world"⁴⁴ through its worldwide network of charities. LeT is one beneficiary.⁴⁵ In Kuwait, the Revival of Islamic Society has also provided direct support to al-Qaeda and LeT.⁴⁶

LeT controls many legitimate businesses, including fish farms, a hospital, a market, agriculture tracts, mobile clinics, and ambulance services.

Businesses

LeT controls many legitimate businesses, including fish farms, a hospital, a market, agricultural tracts, mobile clinics, and ambulance services.⁴⁷ The "farmers and labor wing" at JuD is responsible for the collection of *ushr*, an Islamic land tax, which is compulsory for farmers who must contribute 10 percent of their total produce to charity for the provision of essential services, especially in areas where

³⁸ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 14.

³⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*, 1-17.

⁴⁰ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 10.

⁴¹ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 25-26.

⁴² "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview," 19.

⁴³ Declan Walsh, "WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding>.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Figel, "Pakistani-Jamal-ud-Da'wah: The Saudi Wahabbi Influence," <http://www.islamdaily.org/wahabism/6987.Pakistanjamat-ud-awal-thesaudi-wahabbi-influence.htm/> (accessed May 13, 2011).

⁴⁵ Figel, "Pakistani-Jamal-ud-Da'wah: The Saudi Wahabbi Influence."

⁴⁶ Walsh, "WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists."

⁴⁷ "Lashkar-e-Toiba," from *South Asia Terrorism Portal* website:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm; Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 7.

the government of Pakistan has failed to provide those social services.⁴⁸ Notably, the group collects hides of most of the animals slaughtered during the holy festivals of Eid al-Adha and sells them for a profit.⁴⁹ This practice has emerged as a big boost to the group's income as it is estimated that during each Eid festival at least 1.2 million animal hides are collected.⁵⁰

Illegal Activities

LeT's illegal fundraising activities include false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, and involvement in the drug trade. With false trade invoicing, the LeT overcharges for its goods or services. For example, the group sometimes adds an extra "5 to 10 Pakistani rupees for the jihad to the bill especially when selling various Jihadi publications."⁵¹ Conversely, under-invoicing occurs when Kashmiri carpet dealers reduce the value of their exports to Gulf countries, and the difference in the true value of the merchandise and the value shown on the invoice returns to India through the *hawala* channel.⁵²

Counterfeiters have enabled LeT to raise money by integrating the genuine money being brought across the border into Kashmir with counterfeit money.⁵³ Extortion of money from the local

population is also common with corrupt officials in the Jammu and Kashmir region.⁵⁴ There are limited reports of LeT direct involvement in drug trafficking. However, given LeT's geographic location, the group is almost certainly

...given LeT's geographic location, the group is almost certainly tempted to be involved in narcotics smuggling.

tempted to be involved in narcotics smuggling because of the huge profit potential, and because there are fewer restrictions than with money received through state sponsorship and donations.⁵⁵ Some sources say increasing trade in narcotics, in addition to state sponsorship, has enabled LeT to maintain its terrorism activities.⁵⁶ In 2002, there was a huge harvest of opium on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that was estimated to be 5,000 tons by international agencies.⁵⁷ This yield was refined into injectable heroin in laboratories and smuggled by ISI narcotic smugglers; the harvest's estimated worth of \$2.5 billion USD is reportedly being used by Pakistan to support the Taliban and terrorism in J&K.⁵⁸

Moving Money

LeT moves money through traditional banks, *hawala*, and cash couriers. Moving money through banks via the account number displayed on the group's website has proved to be the safest

⁴⁸ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 10.

⁴⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 10.

⁵⁰ Clarke, *Fallacy of Subservient Proxies*, 407.

⁵¹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations*, 10.

⁵² Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 207.

⁵³ Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 207.

⁵⁴ Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 208.

⁵⁵ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 407.

⁵⁶ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 407.

⁵⁷ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 407.

⁵⁸ Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 208.

method for LeT. Money from over 400,000 Pakistanis living in Britain moves legally from British banks to Pakistani banks, particularly as funds raised for families in Pakistan or victims of catastrophic events, such as the devastating earthquake in 2005.⁵⁹ However, much of that legally transferred money may get funneled to terrorist organizations. Jayshree Bajoria notes that about \$10 million USD was transferred to Pakistan in 2005, and more than half of that was channeled to LeT activities.⁶⁰ Also, Trehan, an inspector in the Indian police service, further notes that “Jammu and Kashmir banks have played a fairly dubious role in channeling terrorist funding in Jammu and Kashmir.”⁶¹ Harvard’s Jessica Stern asserts that “LeT... has acquired so much capital that they are actually planning to open their own bank.”⁶²

Hawala is an informal way of transferring value and is also a substitute remittance scheme, which operates differently from the established and regulated procedures of banks and other financial institutions.⁶³ Investigations by India’s intelligence agencies after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 revealed that LeT used *hawala* operatives and businessmen to move money from Gulf countries to LeT cells.⁶⁴ The *hawala* network has proved to be effective and cheap. *Hawala* channels were not only used to finance the Mumbai 2008 attacks but also for the Bangalore bombings in July 2008 and other terrorist attacks which have exposed *hawala* operators from Bangladesh and Oman.⁶⁵ These incidents imply that *hawala* is commonly used by LeT, which presents a challenge for Indian counterterrorism measures. If well-built cross-border relations between the *hawaladers* do exist, then curbing financing for terrorism inside India will be more difficult.⁶⁶ *Hawala* is built on trust and strong relationships among dealers so that even if one is arrested, investigators rarely get the desired domino effect; in fact, most *hawaladers* in transnational networks in South Asia are related.⁶⁷

Trehan reports that the Pakistani ISI sometimes directly hands cash to terrorists, whereby the terrorists themselves can carry huge sums of money across the border into the Kashmir region.⁶⁸ This mechanism is good for the terrorists and the ISI as there are no electronic records in case of future investigations. In addition,

If well-built cross-border relations between the hawaladers do exist, then curbing financing for terrorism inside India will be more difficult... in fact most hawaladers in transitional networks in South Asia are related.

⁵⁹ Jayshree Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba),” from Council on Foreign Relations website: <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar-taiba/p17882#p2>, (January 14, 2010); “Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview,” 19.

⁶⁰ Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-Taiba.”

⁶¹ Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 208.

⁶² Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 407.

⁶³ Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network Targets India from the Gulf States,” *Terrorism Monitor*, 7, no 19 (July 2, 2009): 8, from *The Jamestown Foundation* website: [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=35221&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=412&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35221&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1).

⁶⁴ Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6.

⁶⁵ Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6.

⁶⁶ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 406.

⁶⁷ Clarke, *Lashkar-i-Taiba*, 406.

⁶⁸ Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 207.

preachers from JuD move freely while promoting jihad, returning to their bases with money they have collected, becoming, in essence, cash couriers.⁶⁹ At higher levels, money is moved to Kashmir by air transport from Pakistan through Nepal and Bangladesh to India because there are no constraints on moving money from Nepal to India, and this kind of money finds its way into the hands of the terrorist organization.⁷⁰ Additionally, Animesh Roul claims that “LeT has managed to build alternate routes through the porous borders of Nepal and Bangladesh while establishing bases in the Gulf countries.”⁷¹

How LeT Spends

LeT spends funds in three major ways: *khidmat*, *dawa*, and military operations. In the effort to gain popular support, LeT’s social warfare department called Idarah Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) plays a vital role by providing social services to the local populace.⁷² On October 8, 2005, LeT is reported to have been the first to come to the aid of three million earthquake victims in Kashmir and Pakistan’s

Northwest Frontier Province when the Pakistani government was slow in taking immediate action.⁷³

The group has utilized a good amount of money in its efforts to influence society through preaching and social welfare programs...

The group has utilized a good amount of money in its efforts to influence society through preaching and social welfare programs (*dawa*).⁷⁴ This has been done through recruiting and the spreading of ideology in J&K, often using funds donated for its social services work. Almost half of the external aid sent by Pakistani expatriates in the United Kingdom for the earthquake victims was funneled to the growth of the LeT.⁷⁵ Furthermore, “during the last decade, LeT purchased real estate throughout the country to open new offices and had more than 1,500 offices operating full time across Pakistan by the middle of the decade.”⁷⁶ LeT is said to be investing some of the money it has raised in its legitimate businesses and enterprises in Islamic institutions and *dawa* model schools in Lahore and Muridke. These schools, in turn, have been sources of revenue to the terrorist organization through tuition payments.⁷⁷

Almost half of the external aid sent by Pakistani expatriates in the United Kingdom for the earthquake victims was funneled to the growth of LeT.

A hefty amount of LeT’s money goes to its military operations. These operations are mostly efforts aimed at India and the widening of the U. S. footprint in India.⁷⁸ U.S. intelligence reveals that “in 2009, LeT’s annual military

⁶⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 11.

⁷⁰ Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 207.

⁷¹ Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6.

⁷² Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 12.

⁷³ Jan McGirk, “Jihadis in Kashmir: The Politics of an Earthquake,” from the *Qantara.de* website: http://en.qantara.de/wcsite.php?wc_c=6175 (October 27, 2005).

⁷⁴ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 2.

⁷⁵ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 2.

⁷⁶ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 11.

⁷⁷ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 7.

⁷⁸ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 2.

operations budget ... totaled more than \$5 million [USD] per year.”⁷⁹

As part of its operational requirements, LeT recruits “get a certain down payment on recruitment, a certain amount as monthly remuneration and a certain amount of incentives for big acts of terrorism and a certain amount as end of the tenure payment, which is roughly two years.”⁸⁰

Furthermore, considering various estimations “on average Rs 3 lakhs is being spent on funding a Kashmiri terrorist and up to Rs 5 lakhs is being spent on funding a foreign terrorist.”⁸¹ It is estimated that the staggering amount of \$33 million USD is being spent on incentives for operatives and for their leaders, who reportedly get a much higher rate of remuneration. In addition, the terrorist group occasionally pays the families of operatives who are killed and those who take part in martyrdom actions, which also helps win local support.⁸²

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LeT also supports other terrorist groups and individuals. It is reported that LeT financially supported JeM in its attack on India’s parliament in December 2001.⁸³ Other groups that have received LeT support include Indian and Western jihadist organizations. A French prosecutor asserted that LeT’s representative in Paris served as a “compass” and provided logistical and financial support for Richard Reid, who attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes while on board a flight bound for the United States from France in December 2001. And notable terrorist attacks against India, including the Mumbai 2008 attack, have been financed and supported by LeT cells in the Gulf.⁸⁴

2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks

The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks should put to rest any doubts about LeT’s threat to the international community.⁸⁵ The presumed reasons for the attacks were to derail the peace process between India and Pakistan and act as a provocation to push the two neighbors toward war. It was expected that punitive action by the Indian Army would impel Pakistan to move its forces from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to the border with India. This would have relieved the pressure on the insurgents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region who were under attack from the Pakistani military.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 10.

⁸⁰ Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 207.

⁸¹ Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 207.

⁸² Trehan, “Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism,” 207.

⁸³ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 10.

⁸⁴ Roul, “Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Financial Network,” 6.

⁸⁵ Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan*, 6.

⁸⁶ Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*, 25.

Operational Details

Surveillance in preparation for the attacks was carried out beginning in 2006, and the perpetrators of the attack were trained over 18 months at four different locations in Pakistan.⁸⁷ The 10 terrorists departed Karachi on a small boat, transferred to a larger vessel, and eventually hijacked an Indian merchant vessel to sail them to India. Each terrorist had one AK-47, 200 bullets, eight grenades, a cellular phone, and other supplies. The group left a satellite phone behind in the boat, thus providing crucial evidence against LeT and the ISI.⁸⁸ On arrival at Mumbai, the terrorists divided into groups of two men and attacked five main targets: two five-star hotels, a railway terminal, a café frequented by Westerners, and a Jewish community center. In all, 166 people were killed; the death toll included 30 non-Indians, including six Americans and six Jews.⁸⁹

The phone numbers used by the terrorists were linked to an account registered with Callaphonex, a U.S. VOIP provider.

numbers used by the terrorists were linked to an account registered with Callaphonex, a U.S. VOIP provider. Payments for the phone account were made in two installments of approximately \$200 to \$250 USD each, through Money Gram in Pakistan and Western Union in Italy. The e-mail account used to set up the service was traced to 10 different IP addresses in Pakistan, Chicago, Kuwait, and Moscow.⁹¹

The operation was controlled in real time from Pakistan over cellular phones.⁹⁰ The phone

Nine terrorists were killed, and one, Ajmal Kasab, was captured alive. Confessions extracted from this lone captive confirmed that all 10 terrorists were Pakistani LeT cadres. The evidence also pointed toward intimate ISI involvement in the attacks.⁹² Under severe international pressure, Pakistan arrested Lakhvi for his role as the mastermind of the attacks; one of his visitors at the jail was the ISI chief. Hafiz Saeed was put under house arrest but released soon thereafter; JuD was banned but continues to operate under new identities.⁹³ The LeT considered the operation a grand success and is reported to have planned several attacks against Indian and American targets to mark the first anniversary of the operation in 2009.⁹⁴

Costs of the Mumbai Attack

Trehan, a high ranking Indian police officer, has estimated the yearly cost of a Pakistani terrorist fighting in Kashmir to be approximately \$12,500 USD; that figure includes training, monthly payments,

⁸⁷ Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan*, 16; "Lashkar-e-Taiba Overview," 66, 67.

⁸⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, "Mumbai Investigation: The Operatives, Masterminds and the Enduring Threat," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 19 (January 2009), from the UNISCI website: <http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/english/index.html>.

⁸⁹ Tanel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 1, 16.

⁹⁰ Tanel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects*, 38, 67.

⁹¹ K. A. Kronstadt, *International Terrorism in South Asia* (Library of Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,) (November 3, 2003); available from <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA444986>.

⁹² Fair, *Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan* 12, 13.

⁹³ Tanel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai*, 27, 28.

⁹⁴ Tanel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective*, 4, 6.

awards for a spectacular act, and money to family members.⁹⁵ Similarly, we estimate the following costs in U.S. dollars for various material and activities for the Mumbai attacks as shown below:

▪ Personnel Costs (\$12,500 per person)	-	\$125,000.
▪ Surveillance (money paid to David Headley)	-	\$30,000.
▪ Weapons and equipment (\$1,500 each)	-	\$15,000.
▪ VOIP accounts	-	\$500.
▪ Total		
-		\$170,500

If we add in funds for incidental expenditures, one can estimate that the Mumbai terrorist attack may have cost the LeT around \$200,000 USD. When compared with LeT's overall annual budget (probably in the \$50 million or more range),⁹⁶ it is evident that terrorism remains a low-cost endeavor.

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Counter Measures and Recommendations

We turn now to the actions that have been and should be taken to more effectively constrain this violent wing of LeT. We will first look at the actions that have been taken by international bodies and India, as well as the limitations of those actions. Thereafter, we will offer some recommendations about how the systems could be improved to better combat the financing instruments of LeT.

At this juncture, it is important to highlight that even though LeT has gone global with its aims, it never ceases to use India as a target for two key reasons. One, LeT continues to serve as a proxy for Pakistan, which allows it to be sheltered by Pakistan; and two, its distorted form of Ahl-e-Hadith ideology declares India a mortal enemy. Therefore, it is necessary that we consider India's actions and its system to combat the financing of terrorists (CFT) in this segment as they form a critical part of the whole repertoire of measures that need to be taken against LeT.

International Response against LeT

The main actions taken by international actors to counter or constrain the financing instruments of LeT were to freeze and seize the assets of LeT leaders. Suffice it to note that these actions were targeted mainly at the movement of money.⁹⁷ These measures against LeT and its front

⁹⁵ Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 211.

⁹⁶ Trehan, "Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism," 210

⁹⁷ S. K. Saini, "Problems and Prospects of Combating Terrorist Financing in India," *Strategic Analysis* 33, no. 1 (January 2009): 87; Chiranjeeb Das, "Organized Crime—Changing the Face of the World," from the *Business Crime Bureau* website: <http://www.bcbegypt.com/english/Articles.htm>, 5-6 (accessed May 10, 2011). The only regional body that is relevant to this fight against LeT is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). While SAARC adopted a "Consensus on Terror Protocol" in 2004 as a holistic regional measure to fight terrorism, this protocol has not been efficacious due to deep mistrust between the parties in the body. The countries in SAARC are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. For this reason, this article has excluded the discussion of the regional measures.

organizations such as JuD were carried out either directly by the United Nations and the United States or indirectly through pressure applied to Pakistan. Below are some examples of the measures taken:

- In 2002, Pakistan banned LeT, and the United States labeled it a foreign terrorist organization.⁹⁸
- At the request of India, the United States labeled Dawood Ibrahim an international terrorist in October 2003.⁹⁹ The U.S. government seized his assets found in the U.S. and pressured Pakistan to arrest him.
- In 2008, the United Nations declared JuD a front organization for LeT. Because of this, the government of Pakistan was pressured into taking action. Assets of nine LeT leaders were seized. The main instruments applied were U.N. Resolution 1390 and 1373.¹⁰⁰
- Most recently, as noted earlier, the United States in 2010 exacted an executive order against The Falah-i Insiyat Foundation (FIF), essentially the renamed JuD, and named it a terrorist organization.

India's Responses against LeT

Similar to international agencies such as the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), India has come to regard terrorist financing as a key enabler of terrorist operations in and against India. It has likewise taken steps to address these terrorist-financing concerns. Below are some of the actions that India has taken to combat LeT's financing sources:

- LeT was banned in India in 2001.¹⁰¹
- As noted in the earlier section, through a bilateral arrangement with the United States, India was able to declare Dawood Ibrahim an international terrorist.
- India banned *hawala* as the government knows most terrorist financing in India is done informally rather than through the formal financial system.¹⁰²
- One of the more recent measures taken was to join the FATF as a full member in 2009.¹⁰³ By doing so, India demonstrated its commitment to strengthening its legislative and regulatory system toward money laundering and terrorist financing. It is making those moves with the hope of constricting funding sources not only to LeT, but also to several other terrorist groups operating in India.

⁹⁸ Kronstadt, *International Terrorism in South Asia*, 2.

⁹⁹ Animesh Roul, "Dawood Ibrahim: India's Elusive Most Wanted Man," *Militant Leadership Monitor*, Vol. 1, no. 6 (June 30, 2010): 9.

¹⁰⁰ Siddique, *What is Lashkar-e-Taiba?* 4.

¹⁰¹ Siddique, *What is Lashkar-e-Taiba*, 3.

¹⁰² Saini, "Problems and Prospects," 92. Nevertheless, this move seemed to be controversial as many critics questioned its value. By doing so, India is pushing the hawala system further underground, making it even harder to regulate and monitor. Rather, a more effective way could have been to make it official so that the system can be better regulated.

¹⁰³ Financial Action Task Force, *Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: India* (Paris: FATF Secretariat, June 2010). India joined FATF as a full member in 2009. Since then, India has taken steps to bring its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) system in line with the FATF's standards. Some actions taken: (1) amendment of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), in 2008; and (2) amendment of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in 2009. These amendments are meant to align India's system with the "requirements of the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (FT Convention)." However, the FATF report also noted that there were numerous gaps in India's AML/CFT system that needed to be addressed.

Limitations

Even though both international agencies and India have taken substantial steps against LeT, these measures have not been effective. This is demonstrated by the fact that LeT is still getting its funding not only from the government of Pakistan but also other overseas sources to support its operations. The key limitation in the international anti-money laundering (AML)/CFT system lies in the fact that its measures and recommendations are, by and large, nonbinding in nature, including both U.N.

The key limitation in the international anti-money laundering system lies in the fact that its measures and recommendations are, by and large, nonbinding in nature...

and FATF resolutions. For example, in applying U.N. Resolution 1373, India can do nothing against members of LeT residing in Pakistan. As India has no jurisdiction over LeT, it can only hope to prosecute LeT with Pakistan's cooperation.¹⁰⁴

Unfortunately, Pakistan is not fully cooperative when it comes to fighting LeT, and its actions are often little more than cosmetic in nature. As already mentioned, the reasons for this response are three-fold.

First, the LeT serves a strategic purpose for the government of Pakistan. LeT's goals are aligned with those of the Pakistani government; it has been reported that the Pakistani government considers LeT the most reliable terrorism asset it can wield against India.¹⁰⁵ Second, there are many ties between LeT and the ISI and Pakistan Army, which makes it hard for the latter to act against LeT. This is because the ISI, the Pakistan Army, and LeT all recruit their members from the Punjab and northwest regions of Pakistan, resulting in the members of all the groups having familial ties with one another.¹⁰⁶

...the ISI, the Pakistan Army, and LeT all recruit their members from the Punjab and northwest regions of Pakistan, resulting in the members of all the groups having familial ties with one another.

Third, there could be severe blowback on the government of Pakistan from two main sources if it acts against LeT. The first potential source of trouble is the population that receives social services from LeT/JuD. As LeT/JuD continues to provide crucial social services to the Pakistani populace, any actions the government takes against the former will mean disruption of these services. The second potential source of blowback is from LeT itself. LeT has thus far not turned against the Pakistani government because of the impunity it enjoys in Pakistan. If the situation were to change, it is not hard to see that LeT might well join the rest of its counterparts (other terrorist groups in Pakistan) in fighting against the Pakistani government.

¹⁰⁴ Saini, "Problems and Prospects," 88.

¹⁰⁵ Tankel, Lashkar-E-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects, 5-6.

¹⁰⁶ Tankel, Lashkar-E-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects, 9.

Within India, India's CFT system is fragmented and uncoordinated and has not evolved to the point where it can be used as an effective tool. According to Saini:

Terrorist financing-related information at present is not a priority for the central or state intelligence agencies. ... As a result, intelligence reporting on the issue lacks overall coordinated direction and is incident driven. Moreover, responsibility for the problem is diffused amongst a plethora of agencies, each working in watertight compartments, resulting in lack of accountability.¹⁰⁷

In addition to using the anti-money laundering mechanisms, the entire CFT system is merely an enhancement to India's old methods for combating insurgencies in the past. As a result, terrorist groups such as LeT and its affiliates in India continue to be able to finance their operations in India not only through the formal but also the informal financial system.¹⁰⁸ These deficiencies in India's CFT system are reported in a FATF evaluation undertaken in 2010.¹⁰⁹

Recommendations

The following are some recommendations that will, hopefully, help to mitigate these limitations. In the international arena, regional and global organizations need to continue to pressure Pakistan by

making Pakistan more accountable for the actions of LeT, as well as its support organization and structures. Resolving the issue of Kashmir, clearly a difficult task, would also undermine support for

India should set up a “whole of government” approach...which crosses many domains,...build up dedicated resources to counter terrorism funding not only at the central government and state levels, but also at grassroots levels.

LeT. This would reduce funding from Pakistan's expatriates supporting the J&K cause, and give the Pakistani government more freedom of action against LeT, which should lead to more effective countermeasures.

Internationally, organizations and states need to strengthen the AML/CFT system by adopting a more comprehensive monitoring and tracking system for charities; by making some measures more binding with the help of concrete evidence; by addressing the sources of funding from the Gulf region to LeT; and by putting more pressure on those states from which these sources are flowing, such as Dubai.

India, for its part, should strengthen diplomatic measures since most of India's terrorism problems are funded by external sources. It should continue to seek assistance from agencies like the FATF and the UN to act against supporters of LeT and affiliated groups operating in India. Also, bilateral arrangements with the U.S. will help in pressuring Pakistan. India should also aim to work more cooperatively with Pakistan to resolve the LeT issue.

Internally, India should set up a “whole of government” approach toward CFT, which crosses many domains, and should create an inter-government agency to coordinate and synergize efforts.

¹⁰⁷ Saini, “Problems and Prospects,” 93.

¹⁰⁸ Saini, “Problems and Prospects,” 93-94.

¹⁰⁹ For more information on the weaknesses of India's CFT system, see Financial Action Task Force, *Anti-Money Laundering*. For the purpose of illustration, some examples of these weaknesses are (1) India's ineffective judiciary system toward AML/CFT, (2) poor control of money movement across borders taking into consideration the large volume of human traffic flow as well as India's cash-based economy, and (3) a weak Suspicion Transaction Reporting (STR) mechanism.

India should also: bring the CFT system more in line with FATF standards; regulate NGOs and charities in India, including *hawala* (and perhaps consider lifting the ban on *hawala* so that it is not driven underground); give the intelligence and law enforcement agencies a more active role in CFT; build up dedicated resources to counter terrorism funding not only at the central government and state levels, but also at grassroots levels (e.g. police forces); enforce stronger border control, particularly with Nepal and Bangladesh; increase public awareness about the ills and concomitant effects of terrorist financing to create an environment conducive to building public trust in government policies; and leverage its population's skills in Internet technology, especially as terrorist financing is moving into the cyber domain.¹¹⁰

Conclusion

Today, LeT has global aims. LeT's funding sources have also diversified significantly and are no longer dependent solely on the government of Pakistan. The fact that LeT is still functioning and continuing to receive substantial financial support from various overseas sources means that the international CFT measures in place are not sufficiently effective. India's ineffectual system in constraining LeT's support to its affiliate groups in India further illuminates the gaps in the CFT measures against LeT. Cumulatively, all of this means more needs to be done. To this end, this article has attempted to provide some recommendations for how international and Indian CFT systems could be enhanced to constrict this lifeblood for LeT. More importantly, regardless of what strategy the international bodies and India are to employ, Pakistan must be included as part of the formula because Pakistan is still a strategic shelter for LeT. Without Pakistan's cooperation and active participation, LeT may never be eliminated.

Geoffrey Kambere, from Uganda, Puay Hock Goh, from Singapore, Pranav Kumar, from India and Fulgence Msafir, from Tanzania, are all Naval Postgraduate School CTFP Fellows.

¹¹⁰ Saini, "Problems and Prospects," 91-96.

Al Qaeda's Strategy

by Bruce Hoffman

Al Qaeda's senior leadership is indisputably being pressed to an extent not seen since the opening phases of the war on terrorism ten years ago. Members of the CTFP community should recognize that the systematic killing of well over thirteen key senior al Qaeda commanders in unmanned drone attacks since July 2008 has appreciably thinned al Qaeda's once deep bench of battle-hardened operatives, to say nothing of their loss of Osama bin Laden himself. Reports that U.S. Treasury Department initiatives have seriously impacted al Qaeda's finances are also often cited as proof of the movement's faltering capabilities. At the same time, however, throughout the past few years, al Qaeda has made fresh inroads in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Al Qaeda's success in this respect is the product of an identifiable strategy. More disquieting, its progress in these diverse arenas has again raised the threat of a significant terrorist attack occurring in the United States, Europe or elsewhere. The foiled attempt to blow-up Northwest Airlines flight # 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 was a sober reminder both of the al Qaeda movement's continued vitality and the threat it still poses.

Four Functioning, Longstanding Operational Levels

Al Qaeda's continued survival has been facilitated in large measure by a loose organizational structure that uniquely embodies both top down and bottom up approaches. Unlike most other terrorist groups, which tend to be organized hierarchically—in a rigid pyramidal fashion with a commander at the top, issuing orders to the

individual cells arrayed below—from its beginning, al Qaeda was conceived to function as a flatter and more linear-type network. This bi-furcated structure has served the movement well and likely accounts for its continued longevity despite the significant measures directed against it. The al Qaeda movement thus comprises four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, dimensions. They are:

1. Al Qaeda Central Senior Leadership. This category comprises the movement's core leadership. It is believed that this hardcore remains centered in or around the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders and continues to exert actual coordination, if not some direct command and control in terms of commissioning attacks, directing surveillance and collating reconnaissance, planning operations, and approving their execution.

2. Al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates. This category embraces formally established insurgent or terrorist groups that over the years have benefited from al Qaeda's largesse and spiritual guidance and continue to receive training, arms, intelligence, and other assistance.

Among these groups who are ones who have adopted the al Qaeda moniker (e.g., al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb [aQIM], al Qaeda in Iraq, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula); as well as key allies like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks; or the al Shabaab ("the youth")

group in Somalia, among others. Both the number and geographical diversity of these entities is proof of al Qaeda's continued influence and vitality.

3. Al Qaeda Network. These are sleepers or local, dispersed cells of al Qaeda adherents who have or have had some direct connection with al Qaeda, including training.

4. Al Qaeda Galaxy. These are home-grown Islamic radicals—from North Africa, the Middle East,

"Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess "clean" passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks in Western countries..."

and South and Southeast Asia— as well as local converts to Islam mostly living in Europe, Africa and North America as well, who have no direct connection with al Qaeda (or any other identifiable terrorist group), but nonetheless are prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of al Qaeda’s radical jihadi agenda.

Al Qaeda’s Six Core, Subordinate Strategies

In service to its global strategy, al Qaeda today pursues six separate lines of operation or subordinate strategies:

1. Attrition. Al Qaeda seeks to overwhelm, distract, and exhaust its adversaries. Given both the U.S. and the world’s profound economic travails and attendant financial upheaval, al Qaeda likely perceives the imminent success of this strategy of attrition as more tangible than at any previous time.

2. Division. In tandem with the above, al Qaeda also actively seeks to create, foster, and encourage fissures and divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it. This entails the selective targeting of coalition partners in the U.S.-led war on terrorism both in operational theatres like Afghanistan and at home— through attacks on mass transit and other “soft” targets in the national capitals and major cities of European countries allied with the U.S.

3. Failing states. Meanwhile, al Qaeda continues to conduct local campaigns of subversion and destabilization in critical operational theaters where failed or failing states provide new opportunities for al Qaeda to extend its reach and consolidate its presence. Countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Algeria, the Sahel, East Africa, and Somalia fall within this category.

4. Force Multiplier. Al Qaeda also actively provides guidance, assistance, and other help to local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. Al Qaeda thus works behind the scenes in these theaters “plussing-up” the capabilities of indigenous terrorist groups both in terms of kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic

operations— including information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.

5. Converts and “Clean Skins.” Al Qaeda continues to seek out citizens of enemy countries, especially converts to Islam, who possess “clean” passports and thus can be more easily deployed for attacks in Western countries without necessarily arousing suspicion.

6. Opportunism. Al Qaeda continues to be as opportunistic as it is instrumental: seeking to identify defensive gaps that can be quickly and effectively exploited for attacks.

In sum, al Qaeda stubbornly continues to pursue strategies that, however unrealistic or fruitless, extend its longevity, and sustain its potential to cause death, destruction, and global disruption.

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Ethics & Insights

by George Lober

The form of ethics I am interested in and teach at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California focuses on individual ethical decision-making. Essentially, I am interested in trying to figure out the right thing for an individual to do, squaring that decision with the other choices, ramifications, and possible consequences, and then trying to come to some peace with that decision.

When it comes to military related issues of ethics, such an interest, unfortunately, puts me at odds with certain ethical theorists and military leaders who believe the answers to such issues of our time have been pre-determined, and one need only review the specific article and line from an appropriate manual to remove any doubt. (For example, an American officer once told me he didn't need a class in ethics because his ethical code was the Uniform Code of Military Justice—period.) Seriously?

Unfortunately, I don't see it that way. Taking that position, it seems to me, allows an individual to abdicate ethical responsibility for his or her actions—the old justification,

“I was following orders” . . . or “regulations” . . . or “policy” . . . It also risks reducing every military course in ethics to an exercise in reiteration:

INSTRUCTOR: “What is the rule in this situation, class?”

STUDENTS: “The rule is Article 17, sub section 6, Sir.”

INSTRUCTOR: “Very Good. Let's move on. What is the rule . . .”

And it presumes because a military law or regulation exists, the ethical thing to do is always to follow it. But is that really the case?

An American officer once told me he didn't need a class in ethics because his ethical code was the Uniform Code of Military Justice—period. Seriously?

One of the difficult questions I first explore with my students is whether a civilian law can be unethical? Invariably, the majority of my students conclude, yes, it can. History offers lots of examples: the segregation laws in America, the laws of apartheid in South Africa, etc.

The question then becomes, can a military order (or regulation) that is legal also be unethical? This is trickier, but again, most of my students concur that on rare occasions, an order can be both legal and unethical. An example often

cited is the firebombing of Dresden. The order to carry out that action may have been legal, but the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians—if one buys that targeting civilians is unethical—was certainly morally questionable. Another is the firebombing of Tokyo. Was the order to bomb Tokyo legal? Probably. Was the consequent indiscriminate killing of 100,000 Japanese immoral? Suddenly answering that gets a little dicey, particularly when strong opinions emerge.

Finally, there is the big question: if an order is legal, but following it can be unethical, what's one to do? Follow it anyway? Mitigate the action somehow? Refuse the order and fall on one's sword?

Working through that question and a host of other military and civilian issues with you will be the focus of this column.

George Lober guides U.S. and international military students through the tricky terrain of ethics and critical thinking at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Your honest critiques and genuine curiosities are most welcome at CTXEditor@gmail.com.

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Violent Converts to Islam: Growing Cluster and Rising Trend

by Jahangir E. Arasli

The role of Muslim converts in the context of Islamist homegrown terrorism remains largely below the radar screen for both researchers and policymakers. Despite evidence suggesting that increasing numbers of converts are playing significant roles within terrorist organizations, most conventional wisdom still treats them as a marginal phenomenon rather than a sustained trend.¹¹¹

A person who converts to Islam does not, by default, pose a security problem, and the ability of an individual to convert to Islam should be assured as an essential component of the freedom of belief and expression. Neither Islam nor conversion to it is a threat as such, and only a small minority of Islamic converts actually turns to violence.¹¹² However, although the percentage of violent converts is small, evidence suggests they constitute a growing pool of hundreds, if not thousands, of very dangerous people who represent direct security threats.

This article provides an overview of the issue by reviewing individual cases of converts who have been involved in violence, considers why and how individuals might be converted to a violent strain of Islam, and looks at how these converts are being used by terrorist organizations and in terrorist operations. Of course, this one essay cannot cover all aspects related to the issues of violent converts; rather it aims only to chart the general contours of the problem and provide some initial thoughts on the subject, leaving particular aspects, as well as policy recommendations, for future research. All views expressed in the article are my own, and they do not reflect the official position of any institution.

Definitions

Presented here are some key terms and explanations for how those terms are used throughout the article.

Conversion: In simplest terms, religious conversion might be understood as a change from one faith to another. Conversion can also take place when an individual with no religious faith or a religious identity affiliated chiefly with national or ethnic roots becomes a practicing believer of a different faith.¹¹³

¹¹¹ For example, the issue of violent converts was rarely mentioned in Europol's "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports" (TE-SAT) that were issued before 2010. (These reports are available at the agency's website:

http://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/2). However, the TE-SAT 2010 did address the issue, noting that converts were being used by terrorist organizations, as will be detailed later in this article.

¹¹² Farhad Khosrokhavar, "Jihadism in Europe and the Middle East," in Thomas Olsen and Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Islamism as Social Movement* (Aarhus, Denmark: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 2009), 41; accessed February 1, 2010; http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/H%C3%A6fte2final.pdf.

¹¹³ This definition is compiled from a variety of sources that address the issue of religious conversion.

Violent Islamic converts: Although there is no universally accepted definition of this term, I use it in this article to signify a convert who adopts a new identity based on or linked to a vision of Islam that justifies or encourages violence, including terrorism.

Conversion-radicalization-activation (CRA) loop: The CRA loop includes conversion to extreme interpretations of Islam, which is the first and most important step to allow for further radicalization, and can eventually lead to the activation of violent intentions (i.e. actually carrying out terrorist attacks). Though their individual paths may vary, almost all violent converts perform a CRA loop.¹¹⁴

Violent activity: This term is used primarily to refer to terrorism and terrorist-related activities. In addition to direct actions, it also includes related political and ideological activities, such as recruiting and spreading extremist ideas, as well as fomenting violence through organizational, technical, materiel, or financial means. The term may also be applied to certain “gray area” cases that at first glance appear purely criminal, yet on closer inspection might be linked in some way to Islamic conversion.¹¹⁵

Overview of Links Between Violence and Islamic Converts

Before 9/11

Prior to the 9/11 watershed event, Islamic converts who turned to violence were rare but not unheard of. The first generation of violent converts can be traced back to the late 1960s and early 1970s when a number of young African Americans joined either the radical wing of the Nation of Islam movement, the Black Panthers, or similar violent anti-establishment groups. Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of American converts—white and black—were admitted to the extremist Islamist sect Jamaat ul-Fuqra (JuF), a Pakistan-linked group that was active throughout the United States and often involved in violent operations. In 1980, American convert David Belfield killed a prominent Iranian opposition leader who lived in exile in the United States. Belfield, also known as Dawood Salahuddin, had been recruited by the security services of the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran.

However, this first generation was not embedded into the broader context of global jihad that was emerging. Rather, they mostly represented “protest conversions,” like the Black Panthers who

...the Black Panthers... chose Islam as a tool to assert their racial identity while mixing the religion with a good portion of Marxism.

chose Islam as a tool to assert their racial identity while mixing the religion with a good portion of Marxism. Others were contained within a peripheral trend such as the case of converts who chose to join JuF. Or, in some cases, such as Belfield’s, they acted as operatives of a foreign intelligence service. It is important to note that most converts in those years lacked an elaborate religious justification for violence.

The second generation of violent converts arrived with the wave of global transformation that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s and with the ascendance of radical, political Islamism and associated violence. The war in Bosnia was one of the first

¹¹⁴ I am introducing this notion of CRA loop or a “conversion ladder” for the first time in this essay.

¹¹⁵ An example of such a “gray area” case is John Allen Muhammad, the “Beltway Sniper,” who killed at least 10 people in the Washington, D.C. area in 2002. He was a Gulf War vet who had converted to Islam (“Muhammad a Gulf War Vet, Islam Convert,” CNN.com, January 26, 2004, accessed April 19, 2010, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/10/24/muhammad.profile>).

conflicts to experience this growing phenomenon. The conflict attracted dozens of European converts who were radicalized while fighting on the Muslim side. The notorious “Roubaix Gang,” and particularly a French convert and Bosnian war veteran named Lionel “Bilal” Dumont, serve as an eloquent example of this developing trend,¹¹⁶ which was not really noticed at that time.

Indeed, the armed conflicts of the last decade of the 20th century, including those in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir, produced scores of professionally trained and battle-hardened, violent converts to Islam. Many of those conflicts included direct or indirect participation by al Qaeda (AQ), and before 2001, AQ founded the Al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was used exclusively for military and terrorist training of non-Arabs, including converts.¹¹⁷

Those converts who survived the fighting went back to Europe and North America, taking their violent philosophies and battle experience to migrant communities, which had been growing sharply during these same years. The rise in migrant communities, which occurred partly because of European liberal migration and asylum policies, also provided an expanding pool of Western converts to Islam, some of whom were inclined toward violence.

Another factor influencing the rise of violent converts during this time period was an aggressive preaching of radical versions of Islam, projected and financially supported by certain religious circles and centers in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Arab states of the Gulf via forward outposts located in the West. This worldwide preaching campaign, waged everywhere from official mosques to correctional facilities, and aimed primarily at Muslims from migrant communities, also delivered a byproduct—Western converts to Islam, radicalized and ready to perform violent activities.

All of these factors contributed to the initial development of violent Islamic converts as an integral part of the global jihad movement (GJM).¹¹⁸ Yet violent converts were still seen both by practitioners and scholars as an isolated and marginal phenomenon.

This worldwide preaching campaign... aimed primarily at Muslims from migrant communities, also delivered a byproduct—Western converts to Islam...

¹¹⁶ For more details on the Roubaix Gang, see: “Roubaix Gang,” *Global Jihad*, accessed June 21, 2010, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1701. On Lionel Dumont, see Jim Frederick, “Japan’s Terror Threat,” *Time.com*, May 31, 2004, accessed June 21, 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,644220,00.html>.

¹¹⁷ Jeffrey Cozzens, “Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (online), February 1, 2005, <http://www.janes.com/>.

¹¹⁸ In simple terms, I define the global jihad movement (GJM) as loosely knit but strongly motivated, rooted in radical and politicized interpretations of the Muslim faith. The long-term goals of the GJM are vaguely defined and ultimately irrational. However, on the operational and tactical side the GJM is quite rational, a combination that makes the GJM a threat of worldwide magnitude. The early organizational nucleus for GJM was Al-Qaeda (or Al-Qaeda Central), which struck a blow for GJM by launching the 9/11 attack. Currently, the GJM is based on loosely connected small groups, cells, and individuals that share radical Islamist ideology and a joint vision of the enemy, which includes the United States, Israel, Western civilization in general, and moderate Muslims.

Since 9/11

The 9/11 attack reshaped the entire global political-security landscape. When the World Trade Center towers collapsed, major paradigms decisively shifted. Foremost, it marked the beginning of a new stage of overt, broad confrontation of the GJM against the Western world. Among thousands of other things, it influenced the rapid evolution of violent Islamic converts. The high-visibility attack brought scores of already disgruntled or disenfranchised Westerners under the banner of radical Islam.

In a stunning development, hundreds of Americans—citizens of the nation that had been the victim of the attack—converted to Islam within months after 9/11

In a stunning development, hundreds of Americans—citizens of the nation that had been the victim of the attack—converted to Islam within months after 9/11, most likely to demonstrate disagreement with the public mainstream.¹¹⁹ For instance, several members of the “Toronto 18” terrorist group, which was dismantled in Canada in 2006, admitted after they were arrested that the 9/11 attacks captured their imagination and attracted them to Islam.¹²⁰ The role of 9/11 as an enabler of

conversion demonstrates how 2001 marks the beginning of the third generation of violent converts and how this generation is fully integrated into the GJM.

Cases of Violent Converts

Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that, in the decade after 9/11, a growing number of violent Islamic converts have been considerably involved in terrorist acts. These converts are playing increasingly important roles as part of the GJM, making them a serious security threat in the context of terrorism in general and homegrown terrorism in particular.

The United States

Between 9/11 and June 30, 2010, 42 Islamist, terrorism-related plots and incidents took place or were foiled in the United States, according to my calculations.¹²¹ Violent converts were directly engaged in 26 of those 42 cases, almost 62 percent of the total. Converts operated in myriad ways—in cells, in pairs, as individuals, or as operatives of AQ or other terrorist groups. They performed or attempted to perform acts of direct violence, espionage, and conspiracy. Details of some of the cases are offered below.

* Some violent converts operated within groups or cells of between four and 11 members. Roughly half of these cells were a combination of “native” Muslims and outside converts, including the

¹¹⁹ Brendan Bernhard, “White Muslim: From LA to New York ... to Jihad” (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2006), 12.

¹²⁰ Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18,” *The Star.com*, June 22, 2010, accessed July 1, 2010, <http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.html>.

¹²¹ Other sources report a different number of terrorist-related incidents. For examples of other estimates, see Jena Baker McNeill, James Carafano, and Jessica Zuckerman, “30 Terrorists Plots Foiled: How the System Worked,” *The Heritage Foundation*, April 29, 2010, accessed May 13, 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/30-Terrorist-Plots-Foiled-How-the-System-Worked>; Germain Difo, “Ordinary Measures, Extraordinary Results: An Assessment of Foiled Plots Since 9/11,” *American Security Project*, May 2010, accessed May 29, 2010, <http://americansecurityproject.org/publications/2010/ordinary-measures-extraordinary-results-an-assessment-of-foiled-plots-since-911/>; and Bryan M. Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadi Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

“Portland 7” group, which had three converts out of seven members, and the “Virginia Jihad Network,” which had four converts out of 11 members. The “L.A. Prison” cell included three converts in a group of four and was also led by a convert, as was the “Raleigh Jihad” group, which included four converts out of eight members. Meanwhile, half of the examined cells consisted solely of converts, including the “Miami 6” group, the “JFK Fuel Tanks Plot” cell, and the “New York Synagogue Plot” cell.

At least one convert, Adam Yahye Ghaddan, was engaged in a sophisticated strategic communication campaign conducted by AQ.

* Some violent converts worked as part of a pair with one native Muslim; an example would be James Elshafay and Carlos Almonte. Other converts, such as Derrick Shareef and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad—the “Arkansas Shooter”—acted as a “lone wolf.” Still others, such as Michael Finton and Chris Paul, had formal ties but no clear operational links to any known terrorist structure. One “gray area” case involved Michael Reynolds, a non-Muslim who offered his assistance to AQ but was motivated by something other than religion. All of these cases involved low-profile, amateurish, terrorist intentions and activities that were localized within the U.S.

* In at least three cases, converts were chosen by AQ-affiliated leaders to plan or execute high-profile, mass-casualty attacks in the U.S. or against U.S. targets. These cases involved Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, and Diren Baroth and included plots to use an improvised explosive device against an airborne jetliner and to disperse radiological contaminants in an urban environment.

* Two episodes involved converts attempting to provide classified information to AQ recipients. Both converts were serving in the U.S. military at the time; Ryan Anderson was in the U.S. Army National Guard, and Paul Hall, also known as Hassan Abu Jihaad, was in the Navy.

* In another military-related case, Hassan Akbar, a U.S. Army sergeant, was convicted and sentenced to death for killing two and wounding 14 others in an armed attack against his unit members in Kuwait just after the U.S. invasion of Iraq began in 2003. In his trial, both defense and prosecution lawyers said that Akbar wanted to keep troops from killing his fellow Muslims.¹²²

* Two American women converts, Coleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, conspired within a wider group to kill a Swedish cartoonist for alleged blasphemy.

* Several U.S. converts, including Omar Hammami, Bryant Vinas, and Daniel Joseph Maldonado, were involved in direct fighting in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Somalia, that included battles against other Americans. At least one convert, Adam Yahye Ghaddan, was engaged in a sophisticated

One “gray area” case involved Michael Reynolds, a non-Muslim who offered his assistance to AQ but was motivated by something other than religion.

¹²² Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Army Soldier Is Convicted In Attack on Fellow Troops,” *Washington Post.com*, April 22, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html>.

strategic communication campaign conducted by AQ. A recently detained convert, Barry Bujol, Jr., allegedly provided materiel support to AQ.

* Not included in my count of terrorist incidents involving converts were incidents revealed in the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011, including the cases of Antonio Martinez, accused of plotting a terrorist attack against a military recruitment station; Zachary Adam Chesser and Jesse Curtis Morton, who allegedly issued death threats against the creators of “South Park”; and Joseph Anthony Davis (Abu Khalid Abdul Latif) and Frederick Domingue Jr. (Walli Mujahidh), who are suspected of plotting an attack against the military recruitment facility in Seattle. In addition, Lance Corp. Yonathan Melaku from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve was arrested in the vicinity of the Pentagon in June 2011 with explosives in his backpack; he most likely is also a convert to Islam.

Although these cases share certain similarities with those in the U.S., they also bring differences to light.

All of these cases illustrate the wide range of individuals, activities, and operational patterns that link the actions of American converts to homegrown terrorism and the global jihadist movement. It is also important to keep in mind that this is just the tip of the iceberg; these are cases publicly revealed after the perpetrators had been apprehended. Presumably, many more converts who may be prone to violence are on law enforcement watch lists.

Other Western Countries

In Europe, converts have been part of most of the major known terrorist plots and associated networks that have come to light since 9/11. It is hard to find a country on the European continent, from Spain to Norway, where violent converts did not leave footprints. Violent converts have also been linked to terrorist-related activities in Canada and Australia. Some examples are listed below.¹²³

* A British–Jamaican convert, Germain Lindsay, was one of four suicide bombers who conducted the 7/7 attack on the London Underground in 2005.

* Spanish convert Jose Luis Galan Gonzales (Yousuf Galan) was a member of a jihadist logistic recruitment ring linked to the 9/11 hijackers. Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras supplied 110 kilograms of stolen explosives to terrorists who launched the 3/11 attack on the Madrid mass transit system in 2004.¹²⁴

In Europe, converts have been part of most of the major known terrorist plots and associated networks that have come to light since 9/11.

* A Belgian convert, Muriel Degauge, became the first-ever European female suicide bomber. She died in the attack in Iraq in November 2005.

¹²³ All data below is compiled from information produced by different news agencies between 2001 and the present.

¹²⁴ Christopher Jsparro, “Madrid Attack Points to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (August 2004), 31. The conversion of Trashorras to Islam is still disputed though by those who argue he was involved in the conspiracy purely as a criminal seeking profit.

* A German–Polish convert, Christian Gancharzski, was affiliated with AQ and a mastermind of the April 2002 terrorist attack in Djerba, Tunisia, which left 14 German tourists dead.

* Two of the four members of the Sauerland cell in Germany, which planned a mass-casualty attack against German civilian and U.S. military targets, were homegrown converts.

* Three converts were among the 24 people detained as conspirators in the “liquid explosive plot,” which means 12.5 percent of the people involved were converts. This operation aimed to destroy trans-Atlantic jetliners in summer 2006.

* At least three of 19 members (15.8 percent) of the Hofstaad Islamist terrorist network in the Netherlands that killed filmmaker Teo van Gogh were ethnic Dutch converts. The number might be even higher if converts in the group’s outer circle are included in the count. The network’s second-in-command, Jason Walters, was a convert of Dutch–American descent.

* At least four members of the “Toronto 18” (22.2 percent) terrorist network in Canada were converts.

* Between 2002 and 2006, Australia experienced eight criminal cases related to terrorist activities committed by converts. Included in that count are a female convert’s preparation for an attack with an explosive device; a convert’s participation in a grassroots, self-radicalized cell; and four cases of converts cooperating with foreign terrorist networks.

Many more examples could be provided, but this list demonstrates both the scope of the problem and its diverse patterns. Although these cases share certain similarities with those in the U.S., they also bring differences to light.

The major factor influencing differences between Islamic converts and their rapid radicalization in the United States and Western Europe is the existence of massive, not-fully-integrated Muslim migrant communities steadily growing across the European Continent. Those communities—with their extensive social relations and associated web of mosques, Islamic centers, and clubs—attract nonimmigrant Europeans, particularly those who experience certain problems of alienation or who feel the need for spiritual guidance or social kinship, or who wish to change their way of life. (These ideas will be discussed in more detail below.) The existence of large Muslim communities creates an environment hospitable to conversion, and in many cases, subsequent radicalization of those converts. According to some estimates, more than 400 (about eight percent) of the nearly 5,000 confirmed *Salafi* Muslim extremists put under police surveillance in France were “newborn” Muslims,¹²⁵ grouped mostly around mosques and praying congregations.

¹²⁵ Craig Whitlock, “Trial of French Islamic Radical Sheds Light on Convert’s Role,” *Washington Post*, January 1, 2006.

Another factor that makes the role of Muslim converts unique in Western Europe is the geographic proximity of Europe to the Muslim world, in particular to the Middle East, the Gulf and south Asia. This proximity facilitates relatively easy access to those regions for the primary purposes of studying Islam and participating in armed jihad. The 2007 disclosure of the Sauerland cell and the revelation of the existence of the “German Taliban” group operating in the lawless area of the Afghan–Pakistani border in 2009¹²⁶ were wake-up calls highlighting the real danger of “exchanges” between convert cadres in Europe and the war zones. It is believed dozens of violent converts from Germany,

The 2007 disclosure of the Sauerland cell and the revelation of the existence of the “German Taliban” ... were wake-up calls highlighting the real danger of “exchanges” between convert cadres in Europe and the war zones.

Great Britain,¹²⁷ Canada¹²⁸ and other Western countries have joined the Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many of the surviving converts will return to their homes as battle-seasoned veterans, indoctrinated, and ready to act.

Other Countries Worldwide

Violent converts are not an exclusively Western phenomenon. They may be found in many conflicts involving Islamist movements and organizations around the world. The most notable example is Russia, in the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. Since the start of the Chechen war in 1994, hundreds of ethnic Russians and other Slavs, including military personnel, have converted to Islam and joined the ranks of the insurgency. (In some cases, the sequence of action was the opposite: they joined the insurgency and later converted to Islam). Details of some of the cases are listed below.

* An analysis of search warrants issued by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs against 59 individuals for their participation in the Chechen invasion into Dagestan in 1999 demonstrates that five of them (8.4 percent of the total) were ethnic Russians who were at least nominally Orthodox Christians prior to becoming converts to Islam.¹²⁹

* At least three of 32 terrorists (9.3 percent) who seized hostages in the Beslan school in Russia in September 2004 were converted ethnic Slavs. Among the converts was the group’s alleged leader, Vladimir Khodov.

* A convert, Alexander Tikhomirov, (also known as Said Buryatski) was for more than two years a primary ideologue of the “Caucasus Emirate,” an umbrella for the constellation of the Islamist insurgent groups in the North Caucasus. The example of Tikhomirov, who was killed in March 2010,

¹²⁶ Yassin Musharbash, Marcal Rosenbasch and Holger Stark, “The Third Generation: German Jihad Colonies Sprout Up in Waziristan,” *Spiegel Online*, April 5, 2010, accessed May 13, 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,687306,00.html>.

¹²⁷ “Pakistan: Two British Converts Killed in Drone Attack,” *Islam in Europe*, December 17, 2010, accessed March 4, 2011, <http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2010/12/pakistan-two-british-converts-killed-in.html>.

¹²⁸ “Canadians Enrolled for Jihad in Pakistan: Report,” *NDTV.com*, January 17, 2011, accessed June 6, 2011, <http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/canadians-enrolled-for-jihad-in-pakistan-report-79882>.

¹²⁹ Based on data posted on February 12, 2001, on the website of the РОСИНФОРМЦЕНТР (The Russian Information Centre, <http://www.infocentre.ru/>, in Russian). That website is currently defunct.

indicates that converts are trusted enough to be allowed to occupy high positions in the command hierarchy and act as authoritative sources of jihad ideology.¹³⁰

* Another notable convert, Pavel Kosolapov, a cadet who dropped out of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces' Military Academy and joined the insurgency, allegedly has served as the mastermind behind several major terrorist attacks in mainland Russia.

* Russian-Cossack convert Vitaly Razdobudko allegedly had a role in the January 2011 suicide terrorist attack in the Moscow airport. Two months later, Razdobudko committed a suicide attack against a police checkpoint in Dagestan together with his wife, Marina, also an ethnic Russian convert. Notably, Razdobudko was converted and indoctrinated by an imam who was also an ethnic Russian convert.¹³¹

* Violent converts of Russian or Slav background were detected in several Islamist radicalized cells in mainland Russia, especially in Siberia and the Volga region, and in the ranks of Islamist groups in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The geographic reach of the Slav converts is widespread as is

*Violent converts are not an exclusively
Western phenomenon.*

illustrated by the following cases: in 2005 a Belorussian citizen was arrested for his links to an Islamist cell in Spain; in 2007 a Russian convert was detained trying to cross the Pakistani-Afghani border disguised as a woman; and in the same year an 18-year-old Russian was

apprehended by security forces in the camp of the violent Fatah al-Islam organization fighting against the government of Lebanon.

In addition to the influence of the 15-year conflict in North Caucasus, other factors driving the high rate of violent conversion in Russia appear to be the post-Soviet ideology & identity vacuum, and frustration due to the ongoing severe economic crisis. These factors seem to have influenced many non-Muslims to turn their attention to the "protest potential" of Islam. Although anecdotes such as the ones listed above are plentiful, it is difficult to assess the real role Russian converts play in Islamist activities in Eurasia because information released by official Russian sources makes it difficult to verify facts.

Other remarkable examples of activities of violent Islamic converts are taken from three disparate regions of the world:

* In the Philippines, the underground Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM), which is engaged in an urban insurgency against the government, includes several hundred converts, according to some estimates.¹³² RSM operatives are blamed for the worst incident in the history of maritime terrorism, a February 2004 arson attack aboard a ferry that claimed 116 lives.

¹³⁰ Mairbek Vachagaev, "Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency," *The Jamestown Foundation–Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7, no 48, March 11, 2010, accessed March 17, 2010,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36146.

¹³¹ "Moscow Airport Bomber Converted by Russian Imam: Report," *ABC-CBN News*, January 28, 2011.

¹³² "Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts," *The International Crisis Group*, Asia Report #110, December 19, 2005, accessed November 3, 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/110-philippines-terrorism-the-role-of-militant-islamic-converts.aspx>.

* On the other side of the globe, in Trinidad and Tobago, the extremist organization Jamaat ul-Muslimeen (JAM), consisting of African Caribbean converts, is engaged in a broad range of violent activities, from organized crime to political militancy, including an attempted armed coup.¹³³

* The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group in Uganda, consists mostly of hardcore, violent converts to extreme Islam. Led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, the group fights against the government of this African nation.

Summary

It is safe to state that the cases detailed here display evidence of the rise of violent Islamic converts and their significant roles in both homegrown terrorism and the global jihad movement in the past decade. The vast reservoir of open source information makes it easy to find details of such cases. Harder to determine are the answers to three key questions arising from these findings: who are the converts?; why are they converted and radicalized?; and how does that process take place? I turn my attention to those questions in the next section of the article.

Patterns of Conversion

This section does not examine broad dynamics and structural dimensions, instead it focuses exclusively on the individual level, which is crucial to understanding motivations behind violent conversion and attempts to map its trajectories. Such an understanding is relevant for assessing political and operational implications of violent Islamic conversions and for establishing effective countermeasures, such as profiling, counter-radicalization narratives, de-radicalization strategies, and others. Given the broad scope and complex nature of this segment, I will only highlight some key observations derived from my compilation of convert profiles.¹³⁴ This section also examines the potential link between individuals with military backgrounds and conversion to violent Islamism.

...there is no universal portrait of violent converts. They are all different.

Who?

The first discovery from the study: there is no universal portrait of violent converts. They are all different. A violent convert might come from any nation, race, age, social stratum, family background, or level of education. Such an individual might have had deep roots in any branch of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism; or could have been only nominally religious; or might have professed to be agnostic or an atheist. A violent convert might be a member of parliament and the ruling party, a wealthy businessman in his 50s, and a father of three adult children, as was Abdul Qader from Guyana, who conspired to blow up fuel tanks at the New York City international airport.¹³⁵ Or, the convert could be a mentally disabled, uneducated, and unemployed 22-year-old, like Nicky Reilly from England, who

¹³³ Chris Zambelis, "Jamaat al-Muslimeen: The Growth and Decline of Islamist Militancy in Trinidad and Tobago," *The Jamestown Foundation—Terrorism Monitor* 7, no 23, July 30, 2009, accessed August 11, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35344/.

¹³⁴ I plan to reveal the unified profiles of violent converts in a future publication.

¹³⁵ For more about Abdul Qader's profile and the fuel tank plot, see Gordon French, "Guyana 'Shocked' by Terror Plot to Blow Up JFK Airport," *Caribbean Net News*, June 4, 2007, accessed January 19, 2009, <http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/news-1867/13-13.html>. His story disproved a common misconception that terrorists are always poor and socially deprived.

detonated an explosive device in the shopping mall in his hometown.¹³⁶ These two examples demonstrate the range among converts comprising this pool.

Yet a careful investigation of personal profiles of violent converts does reveal a common characteristic evident in most: a crisis in their lives before their conversions. The problems causing this crisis might be psychological, personal, social, or of a combined nature. But whatever the source of the problem, the individuals came to see conversion to Islam as a remedial solution to their troublesome life experiences.¹³⁷ In simple terms, the pre-conversion crisis creates a trigger factor leading to conversion. Such a move marks the first stage of the conversion-radicalization-activation (CRA) loop.

Several examples of violent converts illustrate this idea. For instance, all three of the most notorious German convert jihadists—Fritz Gelowicz, Daniel Schneider, and Eric Breininger—came from dysfunctional families, and their parents all divorced when the trio were in their early teens. Muriel Deagauge, a Belgian convert “she-bomber,” had experienced both sudden and persistent life crises. Her brother died in a motorbike accident; she had been perpetually employed in low-income jobs; she experienced bad relations with her parents; and she was twice divorced. In these cases, as in most of the others, life crises drove the individuals to seek a solution that eventually led them toward conversion to radical Islam.

Life crises can make individuals who are suffering feel disenchanting, frustrated, alienated, or marginalized. Individuals who are reluctant to blame themselves for the problems will instead—consciously or not—often blame their environment, including their society and state, and fellow citizens who are doing well. Anger generated from these thoughts moves the disgruntled and disenfranchised individuals closer to conversion and to radical interpretations of Islam, allowing them to more quickly bridge the gap between conversion and radicalization inside the CRA loop.

... a careful investigation of personal profiles of violent converts does reveal a common characteristic evident in most: a crisis in their lives before their conversions.

Why?

This begs the relevant question: why do some individuals opt for conversion to Islam to curb their problems? Below are several reasons someone might choose this path, listed in no particular order.

Simplicity. Compared with other religions, Islam is characterized by the simplest and shortest conversion procedure. To become a full-fledged Muslim, a neophyte should vocally articulate a *shahada* statement: “*La Illahi illa’Llah wa-Muhammad ar-Rasool I-Llah*,” or “No God except God, and Muhammad is his Prophet.” This must be verified by two Muslims.

¹³⁶ “Nicky Reilly: Profile of a Failed Suicide Bomber,” *Metro.co.uk*, October 15, 2008, accessed November 8, 2008, <http://www.metro.co.uk/news/357902-nicky-reilly-profile-of-a-failed-suicide-bomber>.

¹³⁷ Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the main electoral slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is *Al-Islam huwa al-Hall* or Islam is the Solution.

Guidance. Islam provides a detailed but simple map both for daily life and for dealing with contingencies. A strict list of prohibitions (clear “can” and “can’t” guidelines) suits many, which is another facet of the ease in converting to Islam.

Identity. What is sometimes referred to as the “post-modern ideas crisis,” is sometimes associated with “losing confidence in the Christian vision.”¹³⁸ Actually, this is not a new phenomenon: the notion of *Gott ist Tot* (God is dead) was a concept put forth by Friedrich Nietzsche as early as 1882. A decline in Christianity and a widening spiritual void results in the deteriorating of identity for at least some Westerners. Seeking identity and feeling “a need to belong”¹³⁹ may eventually lead them toward Islam. As explained by Yvonne Ridley, a British journalist who converted to Islam while in Taliban captivity and became a fierce critic of the West, she chose to become a part of “the best and biggest family in the world”¹⁴⁰ (i.e., Muslim ummah).

Protest. In the current global political environment, radical interpretations of Islam are serving as an “outlet of rebellion”¹⁴¹ against the existing order and realities. This draws a striking parallel with

Actually, this is not a new phenomenon: the notion of *Gott ist Tot* (God is dead) was a concept put forth by Friedrich Nietzsche as early as 1882.

the period of the Cold War when disappointed Westerners, especially young people, turned toward radical leftist ideology. In other words, according to Khosrokhavar, “some of the converts believe in the utopian role of Islam in the same fashion as the middle-class leftist youth in the 1960s

and 1970s believed in Marxism or communism. Islamic terrorism partially feeds on the exhaustion of leftist ideologies that mobilized part of the youth in Europe....”¹⁴² The potential of radical Islam as a tool of anti-establishment, anti-state and anti-societal defiance and militancy¹⁴³ remains one of the most common causes of conversion among the profiled violent converts.

¹³⁸ Michael Nazir-Ali, “Extremism Flourished as UK Lost Christianity,” *The Telegraph*, January 7, 2008, accessed October 15, 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1574695/Extremism-flourished-as-UK-lost-Christianity.html>. For more on this subject, see: “Islamic Radicalism in Europe Reflects Spiritual Void,” Islam in Europe, September 16, 2007, accessed May 23, 2008, <http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/search/label/Converts?updated-max=2007-10-25T08%3A10%3A00-07%3A00&max-results=20>.

¹³⁹ The “need to belong” concept is elaborated by a French–Lebanese philosopher, Amin Maalouf. See Amin Maalouf and Barbara Bray, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and a Need to Belong* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001).

¹⁴⁰ Hannah Bayman, “Yvonne Ridley: From Captive to Convert,” *BBC News*, September 21, 2004, accessed September 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/3673730.stm.

¹⁴¹ Jumana Farouky, “Allah’s Recruits,” *Time.com*, August 20, 2006, accessed November 29, 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1229125,00.html>.

¹⁴² Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Jihadism in Europe and the Middle East,” 37.

¹⁴³ Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, *Terrorism in Perspective* (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 119.

Ego. Adventurism, machismo, and a need to overcome an inferiority complex lead some personalities—primarily young men with no bright life prospects—to drift toward radical Islam, where they can find a whole variety of benefits: new likeminded friends, self-confidence, a feeling of superiority toward “ordinary” fellow citizens, and an adrenaline rush. As noted by Olivier Roy, a prominent scholar in the field of political Islam and Islamism, “they (converts) are people who feel devalued, despised and by becoming terrorists they suddenly become supermen, heroes.”¹⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, the conflict areas in the Muslim world, such as Afghanistan, Waziristan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq or Somalia, serve as a magnet for young and disenfranchised converts.

In the current global political environment, radical interpretations of Islam are serving as an “outlet of rebellion” against the existing order and realities.

This set of reasons, drivers, and motivations is obviously incomplete and illustrates only some of many possible variations, ranging from technical to spiritual. Any examination of motivations for conversion should include such issues as resistance, revenge, grievances, propensity to violence, cultural influences, personal relationships, and many others, but the limited scope of this article must leave more detailed analysis for the future. Again, what is important to note is that it is impossible to establish a universal motivational pattern

for conversion to radical Islam. In the words of Gen. Wesley Clark, answering a CNN anchor’s question about why a U.S. soldier who was a convert to Islam assaulted his fellow servicemen in Iraq in March 2003, “you can’t imagine what the motivation could be. What could he be thinking?”¹⁴⁵

How?

There are multiple ways people convert to Islam and move into violence. Each convert has his or her own unique conversion and radicalization trajectory, yet it is still possible to identify some the most common paths and tools that enable such a conversion.

The Internet. Tools such as email, chat rooms, Facebook and other social networks, blogs, and websites are huge enablers of conversion and radicalization (C&R), providing access to sources of knowledge, indoctrination, and guidance—not to mention contact with likeminded believers. This last point is crucially important, since contacts are often used to “hook” recruits. An absence of direct physical contact can help create an initially friendly environment that emboldens neophytes who otherwise might abstain from certain decisions.¹⁴⁶ Two early American jihadist converts, John Walker Lindh and Adam Yahee Ghadan, started their C&R trajectory through the Internet.

Mosques. Preaching facilities and congregation communities controlled by radical imams have produced hundreds of radical converts in Europe and the United States. Affiliation with such hubs

¹⁴⁴ Cited from Grim’s Hall blog, October 31, 2005, accessed March 3, 2010, http://grimbeorn.blogspot.com/2005_10_01.archive.html.

¹⁴⁵ “101st Attack: The Investigation,” *CNN.com*, March 24, 2003, accessed October 31, 2009, <http://www.cgi.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/24/se.06.html>.

¹⁴⁶ For more details on jihadist recruitment via the Internet, see Daniel Williams, “Terrorists Seek Next ‘Jihad Jane’ on English-Language Web Sites,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, April 19, 2010, accessed April 27, 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-19/terrorists-seek-next-jihad-jane-on-english-language-web-sites.html>.

becomes a starting point for C&R. For instance, two French brothers, Jerome and David Courtallier, converted and radicalized in the Brighton mosque in the United Kingdom. They later plotted an attack against the American Embassy in Paris in 2001.¹⁴⁷ Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider of the Sauerland cell attended radical gatherings in the notorious *Multikulturhaus* center in Neu-Ulm, Germany.¹⁴⁸ Mosques and similar facilities are very attractive to alienated and disgruntled Western Islam neophytes.

Relationships. Personal relationships can be enablers of C&R. Many future converts learned a radical version of Islam through contacts with “native” Muslims, including people they met in school or college; on sports teams or fitness clubs;¹⁴⁹ or through other common interests, to include friends, marriage, or other partnerships and relationships. Germaine Lindsay, a 7/7 suicide bomber, was converted and radicalized by his ethnic Pakistani schoolmates. By the same token, Russian convert Pavel Kosolapov learned radical Islam from his Chechen neighborhood friends. Jason Walters from the *Hofstaad* network was converted by his convert father and then became radicalized through Moroccan friends, eventually converting his younger brother, who also joined the network. Many violent converts, such as Jack Roche from Australia and Willie Brigitte from France, converted first due to their marriage to Muslim women (a mandatory step to formalize relations in accordance with Islamic tradition), and then radicalized. Some female converts, like Jill Courtney from Australia and Egle Kusaitė from Lithuania, were converted and rapidly radicalized by their Muslim boyfriends.

Travel and study. Examination of convert profiles indicates that some were converted during travels to the Middle East or South Asia. A trip that often began with natural curiosity about another country, culture, and traditions eventually led to conversion. Problems came when the conversion stage was rapidly altered by radicalization after the “newborn” Muslims turned to education in the religious schools (*madrassa*) controlled by radical Islamist centers throughout Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and Pakistan. American convert Carlos Leon Bledsoe, also known as Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, began shooting at a U.S. Army recruitment center in Arkansas, killing one person and injuring another, shortly after completing a brainwashing study in a Yemeni *madrassa*.¹⁵⁰

Incarceration. Prison conversion and radicalization is increasingly being recognized as a real problem.¹⁵¹ Muslim inmates constitute a substantial portion of the European prison population: for instance, in the United Kingdom, Muslims make up about 11 percent as of 2008.¹⁵² Many correctional

¹⁴⁷ An initial motivation for conversion of both brothers was to curb drugs addictions. When visiting a mosque, they were hooked and consequently indoctrinated. For details, see: Anthony Barnett, Martin Bright, and Nick Paton Walsh, “UK Student’s ‘Key Terror Role’,” *The Guardian*, October 28, 2001, accessed September 18, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/28/terrorism.uk>.

¹⁴⁸ Roland Strobele, “Southern German Towns Become Hub of Jihadism,” *World Politics Review*, September 17, 2007, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1142/southern-german-towns-become-hub-of-jihadism> (accessed March 28, 2008).

¹⁴⁹ Scott Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?,” *Perspective on Terrorism*, 2, no. 5: (2008) <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/35/html>.

¹⁵⁰ Joseph Abrams, “Little Rock Shooting Suspect Joins Growing List of Muslim Converts Accused of Targeting U.S.,” *Fox News*, June 2, 2009, accessed June 3, 2009, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,524799,00.html>.

¹⁵¹ For in-depth analysis of prisons as fertile grounds for conversion, see “Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe,” *The European Commission*, December 2007, accessed June 16, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_radicalization_study_on_mobilization_tactics_en.pdf, 39-44.

¹⁵² Richard Ford, “Prisoners Convert to Islam for Jail Perks,” *The Times Online*, June 8, 2010, accessed June 12, 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article7145784.ece>.

facilities in Europe and the United States already have been called “radicalization incubators,”¹⁵³ that are controlled by the radical Muslim gangs and visiting radical preachers who openly proselytize Islamism. Many experts believe that prison’s confined environment and “captive audience” make non-Muslim inmates, especially those who want to break the cycle of their criminal history, more psychologically susceptible to conversion offers.¹⁵⁴ Richard Reid, commonly known as the “Shoe-Bomber,” was converted and radicalized behind bars. Two American homegrown terrorist cells consisting of converts, the L.A. Prison Cell and the Synagogue plot group, originated from prison.¹⁵⁵

Historically, expeditionary warfare and other forms of overseas operations in Islamic-dominated lands resulted in the conversion of some deployed personnel.

Military Backgrounds and Violent Conversion

It is hard to establish a definite link between military service and conversion to violent strains of Islam. However, certain violent converts definitely were influenced by their military experience, which played a vital role in their conversion and radicalization trajectories, whether radicalization came before or after conversion. Table 1 lists some

potential attitudes and motivations specific to individuals with active or past military service, and shows how they might influence C&R.

Historically, expeditionary warfare and other forms of overseas operations in Islamic-dominated lands resulted in the conversion of some deployed personnel. For instance, French General Jacques-Francois Menou, a commander of Napoleon’s troops in Egypt, converted to Islam upon his marriage to a local woman. Dozens of German officers with the Ottoman army during World War I converted as well. Russian experience in Afghanistan (1980s) and Chechnya (1990s) indicates dozens (if not hundreds) of servicemen not only converted, but also joined the other side.¹⁵⁶ Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to military converts among military people once stationed in the Gulf. (Included in this group are John Allen Muhammad, who became the Beltway Sniper, and U.S. Army Capt. Josef Yee, a Chinese-American chaplain later accused of smuggling sensitive papers out of Guantanamo Bay.)

The post-9/11 military operations in the United States' Central Command Area of Responsibility also produced scores of military converts from the United States and other countries. For example, in May 2004, 37 South Korean soldiers converted in Seoul’s mosque prior to their departure to Iraq.

¹⁵³ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007), 20.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵⁵ For more information about the Synagogue plot group, see Joseph Abrams, “Homegrown Terror Suspects Turned towards Radicalism in U.S. Prisons,” *Fox News*, May 22, 2009, accessed May 27, 2009, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,521215,00.html>.

¹⁵⁶ There is a distinction in the patterns of conversion in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In the former case, most of those who converted were held in captivity by the mujahedin; the Russian military’s staunch ideology and tough security control provided sufficient safeguards to prevent conversion via interaction with the local population. In Chechnya, in addition to converts among prisoners of war, many soldiers converted and consequently switched sides via contacts with the Chechen population. The nature of the Chechen conflict, (“war among the people,” as Sir Rupert Smith puts it), with its geographical and linguistic proximity to mainland Russia to increase the rates of C&R as well as R&C.

Contributing to their conversion was apparently the training they received in language and culture in preparation of deployment.¹⁵⁷ In another case, in July 2007, two American service members (a male and a female) stationed at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan converted to Islam and then married.¹⁵⁸ By May 2005, there were four known cases of conversion in the American military in Iraq.¹⁵⁹ One of these Muslim converts, Pvt. George Douglas, changed his name to Mujahid Mohammad and stated that one of his reasons for conversion was his admiration for the “bravery of people of Fallujah.”¹⁶⁰

Cause	Comment
<i>Resistance and Revenge</i>	Certain grievances and negative perceptions related to service in military or civilian life (example: perceived bad treatment from superiors or fellow servicemen) might precipitate an individual to seek revenge. Islam offers potential for a person to partake in resistance and revenge, at all levels, from the global down to individual, particularly on an R&C track.
<i>Propensity to Violence and Adventurism</i>	It is believed that the nature and conditions of military service increase natural aggressiveness. Some individuals who served in the military and were affected by its adventurism or became addicted to the adrenaline rush might trade sides after they leave military service. Violent jihad might also appeal to individuals seeking to appear more brave. These personality characteristics could also lead an individual to become a mercenary fighter. This is largely an R&C track too, as is the one above.
<i>Cultural Influence</i>	The nature of modern conflict, including the blurred lines between combat and military operations other than war (MOOTW), results in broad and diverse interaction between deployed troops and the local population. Such contact might result in the conversion of some personnel who adopt the cultural environment they have been immersed in. Most such conversion cases are “normal”; however, some converts may radicalize eventually, depending on circumstances. This is mostly a C&R track.
<i>Personal Relationships</i>	This is a subset of the previous category. Islam requires conversion of a non-Muslim partner in the case of marriage. Again, in some cases such a conversion may be an initial stage for radicalization. This is also a C&R track.
<i>Combination</i>	Most individuals who convert to Islam are responding to a combination of two or more of the patterns mentioned in this table.

Table 1. Attitudes that Might Affect Military Veteran’s C&R

Note: This matrix is incomplete and currently under further development. The causes shown in Table 1 are limited to the military pool only; beyond that domain, a much broader set of drivers and motivations can be found.

¹⁵⁷ “South Korean Soldiers Convert to Islam before Iraq Tour,” *The Daily Times* (Pakistan), May 29, 2004, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_29-5-2004_pg7_43.

¹⁵⁸ “Two U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Convert to Islam - Paper,” *Reuters*, July 26, 2007, <http://in.reuters.com/article/id/INIndia-28671120070726>.

¹⁵⁹ Hamid Abdullah, “American Soldier Converts to Islam in Fallujah Mosque,” *Watching America*, May 28, 2005, <http://www.watchingamerica.com/iraq4all000007.html>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Douglas's quote might be interpreted as sympathy for the Iraqi insurgency and indicates how easily a convert transcends from a purely religious sphere to a political one. The bottom line here is that protracted overseas campaigns in certain areas of the Islamic world will most likely lead to the conversion of some servicemen. And the concern is that certain individuals from within the pool of military converts may pass beyond mainstream, peaceful, legitimate, spiritual conversions into politicized, violent strains of Islam.

My archive on violent converts to Islam indicates that a number of them had a military background. Table 2 lists some violent Islamic converts and gives details of their military service and their involvement in terrorism.

Given this record, it is safe to anticipate that jihadist ideologues will try to convert military members as a vehicle to undermine military morale, integrity, and cohesion. Zaghoul al-Naggar, one of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders, said proselytizing activities by his movement during the first Gulf War led to the Islamic conversion of "20,000 U.S. servicemen."¹⁶¹ However irrational and exaggerated that claim, the statement clearly indicates the potential of propaganda targeting. The story of U.S. Army Spec. Bowe Bergdahl, who was forced to convert in Taliban captivity, also illustrates that

militant Islamist leaders regard conversion both as a type of psychological operation tool as well as a strategic communication tool.¹⁶²

...militant Islamist leaders regard conversion both as a type of psychological operation tool as well as a strategic communication tool.

Conversion among military members is of concern because conversion to another religion in most cases involves an ultimate change of identity. Change of identity often results in a shift of loyalty. In the military, such a shift may have far-reaching implications for the system, particularly if the change remains unnoticed.

... it is safe to anticipate that jihadist ideologues will try to convert military members as a vehicle to undermine military morale, integrity, and cohesion.

¹⁶¹ "Egyptian Cleric Zaghoul Al-Naggar: Our Way of Dealing with US Military Is by Preaching Islam," *Middle East Media Research Institute*, January 8, 2010, <http://www.memritv.org/clip-transcript/en/2479.htm>.

¹⁶² In much broader terms, conversion to Islam is an inherent program point for many Islamist movements worldwide, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (HUT) and *Tablighi Jamiat* (TJ). In some places in the world, the conversion campaign by Islamists takes an overtly violent form, as is illustrated by the atrocities of the *Boko Haram* group in Nigeria.

Name (Nation)	Military Service, Record	Patterns of C&R/R&C and Nature of Violent Activity
<i>Lionel Dumont (France)</i>	Legionnaire in the French Foreign Legion, 13 th Demi-Brigade, Djibouti	Converted while in real service. Fought in Bosnia on the Muslim side; led a terrorist-criminal gang in France in the 1990s; arrested in Japan in 2004. Believed to be a high-value AQ sleeper asset.
<i>Pavel Kosolapov (Russia)</i>	Cadet in the Strategic Missile Forces Academy, Rostov-na-Dony; was discharged from grad course for alleged barracks larceny	Was converted by Chechen friends upon his return after dishonorable discharge. Currently is believed to be a chief of the subversive service of the “Emirate of Caucasus” although no independent verification for that charge is available.
<i>Hiroshi Minami (Japan)</i>	MSgt in the 1 st AB BDE, JGSDF	Upon his retirement, decided to help “freedom-fighters to resist government atrocities against civilians” in Chechnya. Was converted on the spot. Performed as a foot soldier. Missing in action, most likely killed in action.
<i>Matthew Stewart (Australia)</i>	Royal Australian Army, served in East Timor in 1999, 2000.	An obscure case. Most likely, converted due to cultural influences during his service overseas. Was displayed in some AQ/Islamist propaganda videos. Current whereabouts unknown.
<i>Willie Brigitte (France)</i>	Sailor drafted in the French Navy. Had a bad service record, deserted twice during his three-year term. Probably faced perceived racism during service due to his Afro-Caribbean origin.	Pattern of conversion unclear, most likely came after service and via marriage (was married three times, all three times to Muslim women). Ended up as an operative of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, was detained in Australia for a terror plot, now serving terms in jail.

Table 2. Military service converts who engaged in violence.

Note 1: This list is being developed and law enforcement converts may be added. Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of Jamaat al-Muslimin in Trinidad and Tobago, served as a police officer. Martine van der Oever, a female member of the secondary ring of the *Hofstaad* network, was a police employee as well.

Note 2: Some violent converts had no military service record, but came from military families. Daniel P. Boyd (the Raleigh jihad group) comes from a Marine officer’s family. Jason Walters (second-in-command of the *Hofstaad*) is a son of a former U.S. Air Force airman who served in the Netherlands in the 1980s and is a convert himself. Simon “Sulaymam” Keeler, a British jihadist activist, has a stepfather who is a serviceman or civil servant in the Royal Air Force.

Note 3: U.S. converts are not listed here. However, notable U.S. violent converts with a military background include: Ryan Anderson, Paul Hall (. Hassan Abu Jihaad), Seyfullah Chapman and other associates from the Virginia Jihad Network; Hassan Karim Akbar (Mark Fidel Kloos); Bryant Neal Vinas (joined Army in 2002, dropped out from the recruitment center in Fort Jackson, S.C.).

Additional Observations

Some other observations are relevant in the discussion of conversion and radicalization. The first is related to the factors that enable C&R. The first four of the five factors listed above (Internet, mosques, relationships, and travel and study) are obviously linked to globalization. Globalization, both in its technological and human dimensions, trumps geography, leading to intensifying interaction between civilizations. Air transportation squeezes physical distance, making travel take mere hours, instead of weeks and months as was needed in the not-so-distant past. The Internet makes communication even faster.

Migration changes demography. One does not necessarily need to travel away from Europe any longer to explore and contact another culture—it might be found next door or just around the corner, in the London suburbs, in the Paris *banlieues*, in Milan, or in the Hague. The openness of Western culture makes it easy for Muslims to proselytize others while Islam deflects penetration with strict and prohibitive safeguards.

The “dark side” of globalization makes it important to assess the phenomenon of conversion in general and its violent dimension in particular. Increasingly, terrorist cases linked to converts illustrate the “globalized” nature of today’s world. The March 2010 “cartoon” plot involved a cell whose members originated from Algeria, Libya, the Palestinian territories, Croatia, and the United States; three of the seven detainees were converts; the cell was based on both sides of the Atlantic—in Ireland and the U.S.—and the cell’s target was a cartoonist in Sweden.¹⁶³ In another example, Sergey Malyshev, an ethnic Russian convert from Belarus who fought in Chechnya on the rebels’ side, was arrested in 2005 in Spain for his role in a recruitment ring that consisted mostly of Pakistanis and was linked with the Iraqi insurgency.¹⁶⁴

A second observation has to do with the vague nexus between conversion and radicalization. As was noted by Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a French anti-terrorism judge, “the converts are undeniably the toughest. Nowadays the conversions happen more quickly and the commitment is more radical.”¹⁶⁵ Michael Taarnby, an Islamist expert from the Danish Institute for International Studies, echoes him: “It’s striking, the number of converts engaged in terrorist activities.”¹⁶⁶ The question as to why some converts prefer extreme violent interpretations of Islam is one of the toughest to answer. Are they blindly lured and recruited, or do they cross the threshold voluntarily? Did they succumb

Are they blindly lured and recruited, or do they cross the threshold voluntarily?

...Did they succumb to peer-pressure...? Or did they come to Islam already prone to hatred and violence?

¹⁶³ For details, see Jonathan Adams, “Jihad Jane and 7 Others Held in Plot to Kill Swedish Cartoonist,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 10, 2010, accessed March 12, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0310/Jihad-Jane-and-7-others-held-in-plot-to-kill-Swedish-cartoonist>.

¹⁶⁴ Hayder Mili, “Al-Qaeda Caucasian Foot Soldiers,” *The Jamestown Foundation – Terrorism Monitor* 4, no. 21, November 2, 2006, accessed October 12, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bttnews%5D=948&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=181&no_cache=1.

¹⁶⁵ Mark Trevalyan and Jon Boyle, “Al Qaeda Exploits ‘Blue-Eyed’ Muslim Converts,” *New Zealand Herald*, October 16, 2005, accessed June 14, 2009, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid+10350447.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

to peer-pressure, internal group dynamics, a leaders' charisma? Or did they come to Islam already prone to hatred and violence, just comfortably embedding their rejection and prejudice in a pre-existing extremist resistance ideology? Identifying the "missing link" that bridges the gap between conversion and radicalization leaves a broad field for future research.

Summarizing this section, it is necessary to keep in mind that violent conversion is a very nonlinear, complex, and obscure process, as is illustrated by hundreds of personal stories. The centerpiece of each story, however, is a specific problem or problems suffered by an individual. The need to combat the problem causes a reaction, and conversion to Islam is viewed as a solution. In other words, at a certain point, existing long-term causes meet trigger factors, as in the classical "precondition–precipitance" equation by Martha Crenshaw.¹⁶⁷ When conversion is offered in a package with radical ideology, it may lead "newborn" Muslims up a ladder of violent conversion.

Utility

This section examines the value of violent converts in the global jihad movement (GJM). It also touches briefly upon two related aspects associated with converts, their role in the so-called "war of ideas" and female suicide terrorism.

Value

Understanding the place and role of violent converts in the context of homegrown terrorism underlines their multiple levels of utility for the global jihad movement. This utility, which is both practical and symbolic, may be broken down along several functional activity lines, as detailed below.

Direct action. This category includes straight involvement in terrorism, insurgency, and in some cases, associated organized crime. Converts may operate in the violent domain either as members of the ordinary rank and file ("muscle") or as leaders. They might operate in their native environment (the West), conflict zones in the Muslim world, or elsewhere. The scale of their terrorist involvement may vary from high-profile to low-tech and amateurish. Converts involved in direct action include hand-picked, high-profile AQ operatives (such as Lionel Dumont), "expendables" chosen for one high-visibility attack (like suicide bomber Germaine Lindsay), "foot soldiers" fighting in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, or homegrown jihad wannabes who try to commit mostly low-tech attacks in their homeland. Several examples of all kinds of these activities have been discussed in this article. In addition, a selected specific segment—female suicide terrorism—is examined in more detail later in this section.

Ideological support for terrorism. This domain encompasses converts involved in different forms of justification or defense of Islamist terrorism and violent extremism. This support may include participation in Islamist propaganda efforts, proselytism, recruitment and indoctrination of new followers, and related activities. One notable example of an individual engaged in ideological support of terrorism is Trevor William Forest, or Abdullah al-Faisal, a British–Jamaican convert imam, who preached

¹⁶⁷ For more information, see Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no 4 (1981), 379-99.

religious and racial hatred across the U.K. Muslim community, until he was legally banned.¹⁶⁸ The role of converts in the “war of ideas” is elaborated further in this chapter.

Materiel support for terrorism. Many converts have been accused of being engaged in different forms of material and technical support in the context of the GJM, such as fundraising, providing supplies, and sharing expertise. For example, Raphael Gendron, an ethnic French convert and information technology specialist, was maintaining a website of the Malika al-Aroud Islamist network, which was used for jihadist propaganda and recruitment.¹⁶⁹ Some converts are active in Islamic charities, which are controlled by the radical centers.

Intelligence Support. Another way converts contribute to the movement is through “classic” espionage. As was mentioned earlier in this article, two U.S. servicemen were convicted this decade for their attempt to act as AQ “moles.” Another example of how converts may be used for spying is Madhuri Gupta, an Indian diplomatic service employee in Islamabad, who allegedly was recruited by the Pakistani intelligence services.¹⁷⁰

Structural Dimension

In recent decades, converts have been spotted in the ranks or outer circles of major terrorist, insurgent, political extremist, and criminal groups. These groups include AQ, the Taliban (both in its Afghani and Pakistani branches), *Jemaah Islamiyah*, *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Moroccan Combat Islamic Group, *Al-Shabab* in Somalia, and People against Gangsterism and Drugs in South Africa. Converts were also identified in different elements of insurgencies in Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya, and the Niger Delta. Only two organizations with more than 100 members are known to consist solely of converts—the RSM in the Philippines and the JAM in Trinidad and Tobago. Otherwise, violent converts were embedded in small numbers into groups made up mostly of “native” Muslims.

However, even at the lowest organizational levels, the convert-related structural dynamic is disturbing. Violent converts increasingly represent a substantial percentage of members in grassroots, self-radicalized, autonomous cells and groups scattered across the Western urban environment. Most of these structural units are an amalgam, i.e. consisting of “native” and convert Muslims. However, some are made up exclusively of converts (such as the “Miami Six” or “Synagogue plot” groups). To further complicate the landscape, many violent converts demonstrate their willingness and ability to operate as “lone wolves” without formal affiliation with any group. Such a dynamic poses obvious implications for Western security services and law-enforcement agencies.

Operational Dimension

Small groups and loners embedded into increasingly multicultural, diverse, and fluid Western communities are not easily distinguished from moderate Muslims. That difficulty poses a key security challenge from the standpoint of profiling, detecting, penetrating, and dismantling terrorist groups. This fact was openly discussed by Dennis Blair, then the director of U.S. National Intelligence, and Robert

¹⁶⁸ Margaret Ryan, “Cleric Preached Racist Views,” *BBC*, February 24, 2003, accessed May 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2784591.stm.

¹⁶⁹ “Belgium: Al-Qaeda Cell Sentenced,” *Islam in Europe* blog, May 10, 2010, accessed June 5, 2010, <http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2010/05/belgium-al-qaeda-cell-sentenced.html>.

¹⁷⁰ Though the mentioned episode does not involve terrorist actors, it still illustrates the utility of converts for intelligence purposes.

Mueller, the Director of the FBI.¹⁷¹ Such scattered and low-key groups of likeminded and “action-oriented friends”¹⁷² with an unpredictable internal dynamic, no formal hierarchy, and loose outside connections are a real concern for security efforts. If such cells keep a low profile and look and behave “traditionally,” they produce few warning indicators prior to an act of terrorism. An example of such a low-profile group that blended into its community is the 7/7 terror cell, which consisted of three members of Pakistani descent and a convert.

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The current threat from such small groups in some ways is comparable to the challenge of sleeper cells of the Cold War period, and trumps the meaning of strategic intelligence in combating terrorism. Equally, it defeats Sun Tzu's paradigm of penetrating the intent of the enemy's army commander. Instead of an army, there are hundreds of decentralized “platoons” (groups, cells and lone wolves), well-blended into their environment. The threat posed by “white-skinned, blue-eyed, hard-to-detect” converts (a dream of the late terrorist Abu Mus'ab al-Zarkawi)¹⁷³ in such an environment grows even greater.

Female Suicide Terrorism

The use of women as suicide bombers is not unique in the context of Islamist terrorism; women have been used in Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Chechnya, Russia, and other areas. However, the use of converts in this role is a relatively new, but potentially very dangerous trend. It is directly related to a steadily growing pool of Western women who are converting to violent interpretations of Islam. In spring 2010, two American female converts were detained for their alleged role in the “cartoon plot,” and an Australian woman was imprisoned in Yemen for her suspected ties to AQ in the Arabian Peninsula. One fear about this new use of female converts is that they will emerge as willing suicide executioners.

As indicated as early as September 2005, “it is no longer if but when—when will we have Caucasian converts to Islam ... American or Canadian female suicide bombers? It is only a matter of time.”¹⁷⁴ This scary prediction materialized just two months later, when Muriel Degauge, the first known convert “she-bomber,” committed her attack. She was one of up to 47 female converts (most from Germany, Belgium, and Denmark) who reportedly were targeted by recruiters for suicide missions in

¹⁷¹ “Intel Chief: Small Groups are Key Terror Challenge,” *CBS News*, April 21, 2010, accessed May 31, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/21/ap/cabstatepent/main6419040.shtml>; and “Home-Grown, Solo Terrorists as Bad as Al-Qaeda: FBI Chief,” *AFP*, April 15, 2010, accessed May 4, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ilnTgA39LB2g_-Cb2zFH-wN0hwGg.

¹⁷² Scott Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?”

¹⁷³ Hayder Mili, “Al-Qaeda Caucasian Foot Soldiers.”

¹⁷⁴ Debra D. Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers,” 59-60, in Cindy D. Ness (ed.), *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility and Organization* (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), and “Symposium: The She Bomber,” *FrontPageMag.com*, September 9, 2005, accessed June 25, 2010, <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=7310>.

Iraq and Pakistan.¹⁷⁵ Although such reports could not be verified from independent sources, the alarming truth is that many women converts fall under the influence of radical Islamist ideology, subsequently becoming more susceptible to brainwashing, and eventually aimed at suicide missions.

A study of the profiles of Muriel Degauge and Egle Kusaite,¹⁷⁶ another female convert who apparently had agreed to a suicide mission before she was arrested in Lithuania in 2009, reveals some

...the alarming truth is that many women converts fall under the influence of radical Islamist ideology, subsequently becoming more susceptible to brainwashing, and eventually aimed at suicide missions.

striking parallels between the two women. Both experienced crises in their pre-conversion period. Both were converted and radicalized by their Muslim male partners. Neither had

ever been to the Muslim world; their C&R stories took place entirely in Europe. Though Degauge eventually travelled to Iraq and detonated her explosive belt next to an American military convoy, she was the only victim of her attack. However, the next she-bomber may choose a less complex and much more effective method (from the standpoint of the media-political effect) and act in a crowded public place in a European city.

War of Ideas

Analysis of the strategic communication projected by different segments of the GJM indicates its leaders increasingly appreciate the chance to exploit converts for their propaganda value. This is demonstrated by the frequency with which converts appear in jihadist propaganda videos and Internet forums, and other tools of intelligence support.

Converts are skillfully used by jihadist entrepreneurs to send messages to different Western target audiences. Adam Yahyee Ghadan, working for AQ, addresses primarily the American middle class, trying to turn it against the U.S. government's foreign policy. For instance, his speech aired by Al-Jazeera in early October 2008 was devoted to an unfolding financial crisis in the United States. At the other end of the social spectrum, convert Eric Breininger (before he was killed in Pakistan in April 2010) was messaging his peers among lower-class, disenfranchised, German youth urging them to join the ranks of the Taliban. The media images of Breininger, posing in military fatigues, traditional Arab scarf around his neck and a Kalashnikov rifle in his hands, created a very appealing message to those unstable "angry young men" back in Europe, who felt themselves alienated and deprived of life potential. In the same manner, U.S. convert Omar al-Hammammi (presumably killed in 2011) used to recruit disenfranchised young Americans, including Islam neophytes, to join fighting the ranks of the al-Shabab Islamist movement in Somalia.

Many converts are involved in "soft" propaganda and operate legally, both in public and on the Internet.

¹⁷⁵ Karla Cunningham, "The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement," 95, in Cindy D. Ness (ed.), *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility and Organization* (London: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁷⁶ For more about Kusaite, see: "Potential Suicide Bomber Charged in Lithuania," *Baltic Report*, May 4, 2010, accessed May 19, 2010, <http://balticreport.com/?p=16608>.

However, the propaganda utility of converts is not necessarily limited to recruiting others for battle. Many converts are involved in “soft” propaganda and operate legally, both in public and on the Internet. One eloquent example is the above-mentioned British journalist, Yvonne Ridley. Her activities include waging a controversial political activism campaign for the release of the convicted AQ terrorist Aafia Siddiqi, praising Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev as a freedom fighter, and supporting the Kashmiri insurgency.¹⁷⁷

Suffice it to note that those providing intelligence support likewise represent a very diverse pool of characters, including hate-preaching imams, AQ “political officers” (like Ghaddan), drifters (like Ridley) and swingers. The latter are former far-left or far-right political activists who converted to Islam and joined the radical Islamists on the politico-propaganda front. Included in this group are Israeli leftist, pro-Palestinian activist Tali Fahima and former neo-Nazi leaders David Myatt and Ahmed Hubert (from the United Kingdom and Switzerland, respectively).

As a final observation, the use of turncoat Westerners for propaganda purposes by GJM bears yet another resemblance to a Cold War pattern. The growing role of converts as high-value assets in the intelligence support field prompted EU officials to note the trend for the first time in 2010, when they stated: “Western converts are increasingly being used by Islamist terrorist groups for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Native speakers have appeared in videos produced by terrorist organizations and disseminated on the Internet, broadcasting messages to potential recruits in EU Member States in their own language.”¹⁷⁸

Conclusion

In sum, it is important to underline the following key points relevant to violent converts to Islam.¹⁷⁹

Violent Muslim converts represent a rising trend and expanding subset within the domains of homegrown terrorism and the global jihadist movement. This trend is indivisible from the entire issue of homegrown terrorism and should be treated as a “big threat within a great threat.” Converts create a “third element” of homegrown terrorism beyond radical, second-generation Muslims and legal and illegal Muslim, noncitizen migrants.

Violent conversion is a multifaceted phenomenon without universal patterns for conversion and radicalization of its actors. The highly diverse and very individual internal motivations behind C&R represent the most complex segment of this phenomenon.

From the operational standpoint, converts are difficult to detect, scattered, and hard to profile, and as such they pose a sustained security challenge.

¹⁷⁷ Information about Ridley’s views and activities can be found on her webpage: <http://www.yvonneridley.org>.

¹⁷⁸ “EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report - TE-SAT 2010,” *EUROPOL*, 2010, accessed May 31, 2010, http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TE-SAT2010.pdf, 44.

¹⁷⁹ Some of these findings were reported by the author in the meetings of the Counterterrorism Working Group in Tbilisi, Georgia (April 2007) and Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (September 2007); and in the 12th Annual Conference of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Warsaw, Poland (June 2010).

Converts provide value for global jihad in the domains of operations, support, and propaganda. In particular, the role of converts is steadily increasing in intelligence support and propaganda efforts aimed at the Western public. Thus, converts are forming a promising potential recruitment pool and are regarded as an essential force multiplier by the entrepreneurs of global jihad.

...the role of converts is steadily increasing in intelligence support and propaganda efforts aimed at the Western public.

As the AQ core may further decline following the successful elimination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the center of gravity of the jihadist effort may shift even more toward the West and the homegrown terrorist pool that is gradually expanding there.

The role of converts in terrorist activities is evolving. The next generation of violent converts is likely to be more action-oriented and consist mostly of young people, including scores of female converts. As a protracted, global, socio-economic crisis results in growing frustration in the West, the number of Western violent converts to Islam is likely to continue to rise. The problem may continue to gradually move from its previously peripheral position to the very epicenter of the homegrown terrorism domain.

Violent converts should be clearly distinguished from moderates, who represent a majority of the converts to Islam and should not be treated with any prejudice. However, to combat the threat from violent converts effectively, first the threat should be recognized as such and properly identified. The political sensitivities and post-modern ethical values surrounding the issue of violent converts should

...post-modern ethical values surrounding the issue of violent converts should not be allowed to stand in the way of developing effective strategies to counter this phenomenon.

not be allowed to stand in the way of developing effective strategies to counter this phenomenon.

Being an indivisible part of homegrown terrorism, the phenomenon of violent converts still requires special consideration from the standpoint of devising and employing proper counterterrorism policies and practices. To be countered effectively, the trend of rising numbers of violent converts still has to be studied and understood. In this regard, one of the most relevant ways to combat the problem is through scholarly research. This article represents an attempt to provide an initial overview of the problem, and is the first in a series of planned publications on violent converts to Islam.

Jahangir Arasli works with the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Combating Terrorism Working Group (PfPCTWG). A version of this article is slated for publication as a chapter of a forthcoming book titled "The Dangerous Landscape: Twenty-First Century Terrorism, Transnational Challenges, International Responses". Learn more about the CTWG and other CTFP affiliates on our Resources page.

Terrorist Rehabilitation: a Neglected Secret CT Weapon

By Rohan Gunaratna

During the last decade, the global footprint of terrorism and ideological extremism has grown significantly. Since al Qaeda attacked America's most iconic landmarks on September 11, 2001, the US-led western response to terrorism has been overwhelmingly kinetic and lethal. A review of terrorist attacks in the last decade indicates that the terrorist threat has only grown and not diminished.

It is time for the US, its allies, and their friends to evaluate the effectiveness of their kinetic and lethal strategies and craft a much more comprehensive approach. This should include tackling both ideological extremism and its vicious byproduct, terrorism. Both proactively and reactively, those who participate, support and advocate terrorism need to be dissuaded from violence and extremism, and guided to return to the mainstream. To explain to them that al Qaeda and its associated groups are heretical and deviant, and not true to Islamic teachings, is the challenge. This requires a multifaceted approach and an interagency mechanism where we work with a range of partners. In addition to working with community institutions and the business sector, governments should work with educational and religious establishments, and the media, to engage Muslim communities.

There must be a transformational shift in the approach to how societies and governments manage those persons detained or imprisoned for terrorist offenses.

A New Approach

There must be a transformational shift in the approach to how societies and governments manage those persons detained or imprisoned for terrorist offences. Rather than warehousing, isolating or demonizing terrorist prisoners, governments should at least attempt to engage and rehabilitate incarcerated terrorists. By working with them, not only can governments open the terrorists' minds, but they can also enable rehabilitated ex-terrorists to reach out to peers who may be at risk to radicalization. Starting with immediate family and relatives, then moving to neighbors, friends, and even terrorist cells themselves, a former terrorist released from the custody of an effective rehabilitation program can influence hundreds. By treating them with decency and counseling them to repent, express remorse, and understand and internalize moderate views, a safer and more just world can be built. Otherwise, when released, those detained and imprisoned for terrorist and terrorism-support activity will harbor the same views as

before, and continue the fight - possibly with even stronger inclinations to do so. Unless governments invest in both community engagement and rehabilitation, the threat is likely to continue to grow.

To be effective, rehabilitation should be comprehensive. Comprehensive

rehabilitation can engage terrorists on several levels. The modes of rehabilitation developed in the last decade include:

- religious and spiritual;
- educational and vocational;
- psycho-social;
- recreational;
- social and familial; and,
- creative arts.

Such a multifaceted approach to rehabilitation can work only if there is an interagency mechanism whereby governments can work in partnership with their communities and private sector counterparts. Although traditional rehabilitation starts from the point of capture and follows through to the point of release, rehabilitation will be most successful only if the released terrorist or beneficiary is further guided. Following custodial rehabilitation, there should be a mandatory second phase to reintegrate the beneficiary back into the community. Called "community rehabilitation", this re-entry phase should include providing employment to the beneficiary, addressing other challenges of returning to the community, and continued guidance and counseling.

The Evolution of Rehabilitation:

Although rehabilitation for terrorists began in the 1940s, the contemporary wave of rehabilitation started in the post 9-11 period. Pre 9-11 programs included Greece, Malaya, Kenya, and Egypt. Programs that emerged after 9-11 are the Saudi, Singaporean, Malaysian, Iraqi, Yemeni, Sri Lankan, Afghan, and Uzbek programs. There are also ad hoc programs in India and Pakistan, as well as emerging programs in the U.K., Australia, Bangladesh, and in the Philippines.

Every rehabilitation program is unique, and every program can influence other programs. On a visit to Saudi Arabia in early 2010, I learned that the Saudis have introduced the teaching of history to their terrorists in custody. Because groups such as al Qaeda only permit their followers to read but a dozen books, the worldview of terrorist group leaders, members, and followers is often narrow. In Islam, there are myriad books about math, science, literature, song, dance, and poetry. Islamic civilization has immensely contributed to the sciences, especially to medicine and astronomy. To open the closed minds of terrorists in custody, it is important to share with them a more comprehensive range of

knowledge. Biblio-therapy is a new form of intervention in contemporary terrorist rehabilitation.

Wherever terrorists or suspected terrorists are detained or imprisoned, rehabilitation should be made mandatory.

Although the focus of the world is on Muslim groups, rehabilitation works with non-Muslim groups as well. For instance in Sri Lanka, an admirable rehabilitation program has been created since the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was defeated in May 2009. Largely funded by the business sector and community institutions, the government has released all those who are under 18, the disabled and most of the women. The Sri Lankan rehabilitation program has received wide praise and appreciation from the international community.

Today, the challenge is to make terrorist rehabilitation a global imperative – that is, wherever terrorists or suspected terrorists are detained or imprisoned, rehabilitation should be made mandatory.

The United States of America missed a great opportunity to rehabilitate detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Nonetheless, the US succeeded in building a highly successful program under the leadership of Major General Douglas Stone in Iraq. In Afghanistan, Stone's blueprint was also followed by Vice Admiral Robert Harward.

Every terrorist in custody presents the respective government an opportunity to transform the terrorist's worldview. But unless rehabilitation programs are built into every prison and detention centre, the vicious ideologies that drive terrorism will spread. As the reverse of radicalization is rehabilitation, to prevent both radicalization and re-radicalization in prison, it is essential to invest in building rehabilitation intervention programs. Rehabilitation is a new and worthy frontier in the fight against terrorism.

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The Moving Image

Kalev I. Sepp


RESTREPO Produced by Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington (2010)

There is a saying among soldiers, that combat is long hours of boredom, occasionally interrupted by moments of terror. As true as this may be, it doesn't mean that a wartime documentary should pattern its storyline in the same way. Yet "Restrepo," the true-life story of a U.S. Army infantry platoon fighting in the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, manages to take what should be an intensely interesting subject – men at war in a distant, forbidding land, fighting a tough, elusive enemy – and make it somehow mundane. For a military professional, its lessons call for patience and reflection.

Any criticism of "Restrepo" requires caution, for two reasons: the first is that the duly-celebrated filmmaker Tim Hetherington, who worked with the author Sebastian Junger to produce this film, was recently killed while filming the civil war in Libya in April 2011. One does not wish to diminish Mr. Hetherington's lifetime of accomplishments and contributions by disparaging his last major project, and that is certainly not the intent. This review acknowledges his Sundance Film Festival prize for best documentary, his nomination for an Oscar award for "Restrepo," the

widespread acclaim from movie critics and ordinary moviegoers, and many other awards. This commentary does not challenge the cinematic qualities of the film; rather, it addresses what value military and defense professionals might find in viewing this documentary.

The other reason to take care in analyzing "Restrepo" concerns what a noted American war correspondent has called the "cult of patriotism" in the United States. In the decades following the painful end of the Vietnam War, Americans came to realize that the insults and attacks made by anti-war protesters against the individual soldiers sent to fight in Indochina were fundamentally wrong. The soldiers – both conscripts and volunteers – were only obeying the



Restrepo: Produced by Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington (2010)

laws of the nation, and fulfilling their obligation as citizens. The mature view now held by American society is that it is appropriate to criticize elected leaders and government officials for their policies, but not the troops who dutifully follow their orders. However, some people have

carried this outlook to an extreme: all soldiers, whatever their service or character, are "heroes," and anything said of them or their conduct must be cast in terms of praise and honor. Anything less is "anti-soldier," and wholly unpatriotic. This review recognizes their service and sacrifice – the film takes its title from the solitary outpost named for a fallen U.S. soldier, Private First Class Juan Restrepo – but considers if they are suited, as Americans, to the kind of war they have to fight.

If there is a benefit to watching "Restrepo," it is to see one possible explanation why the United States armed forces had not succeeded by 2009 (when the filming was done) in overcoming the Taliban in the mountains and villages of Afghanistan. The focus of the documentary – 2d Platoon, "B" Company, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment, of the 173d Airborne Brigade – is only one small unit, but in terms of the quality of its members, could be seen as a fair representation of the infantry platoons deployed to the war zone. After almost eight years of counter-insurgency fighting, and declarations by analysts and senior commanders that the United States military had mastered this brand of warfare, there are disturbing scenarios that portray a different view.

Collectively, these incidents, played out in the film both in real-time and in post-deployment interviews, reveal a unit isolated from the population it needed to engage in

order to find and thwart the Taliban guerrillas. Before arriving in the Korengal Valley, the company commander, an infantry captain, casually admits he didn't study anything about the valley or its people – so as to arrive “with an open mind.” He calls the rocky, tree-filled valley, reminiscent of the Sierras and the Rockies, “the ugliest place on earth.” An American patrol passing through a village refuses the hospitality of a local man when he offers them *chai* (tea), and hurriedly marches on.

The American officers do meet with the village leaders, in weekly *shuras*. The paratroop battalion commander visits once, to

There are no cowards or shirkers to be seen. Yet as the whole film reveals, this is not enough for 2d Platoon and “B” Company to prevail against the insurgents.

address the contentious issue of civilian casualties (the film shows destruction of homes by aerial bombing and attack helicopters, soldiers speaking of the women and children who have been wounded, and an Afghan man cradling a baby with fresh burn marks on its body). This colonel, wearing his body armor, speaks to the Afghan elders in English; not in sentences, but in lengthy paragraphs, without pausing for the interpreter. He calls the Taliban “foreigners,” and says his captain will discuss job projects with them. In another *shura*, the captain parlays with the same elders, and tells them in the same rapid English: “... we can make more money, make you

guys richer, make you guys more powerful. What I need, though, is I need you to join with the government, you know, to provide you with that security, or help us provide you guys with that security. And I'll flood this whole place with money and with projects and with healthcare and with everything.” The dictum of the counter-insurgent to never over-promise, against the possibility of under-delivery, doesn't seem to be the captain's concern.

In a particularly telling scene, an Afghan man comes to Outpost Restrepo to ask for compensation for his dead cow. The viewer comes to understand the grazing cow became entangled in the barbed wire around

the small base, where the U.S. troops then killed, dressed, barbecued and ate it (“It was delicious,” recalls a soldier). When the platoon consults their headquarters by radio, an officer is heard refusing to provide a new cow, or to pay a cash restitution. Instead, the voice on the radio offers an amount of rice, beans and sugar equal to the weight of the cow. His face strained with frustration, the Afghan man repeats his claim for compensation, without success. Huge cargo helicopters fly overhead. Troops exercise with gymnasium barbell sets, and practice driving golf balls from their bunker roofs. One strums a guitar, others smoke and play videogames, and

listen to rock music on portable stereos, while their meals are prepared on restaurant-size gas grills. No one is ever shown studying or practicing Pashtu.

There is no question, as the occasional combat footage in “Restrepo” plainly shows, that the American troops are competent and disciplined infantrymen. They move quickly under the heavy load of their body armor and field gear, wear their kit properly, handle their weapons adeptly, and follow orders under fire. There are no cowards or shirkers to be seen. Yet as the whole film reveals, this is not enough for 2d Platoon and “B” Company to prevail against the insurgents. Mundane or not, watching “Restrepo” is worthwhile as an anecdotal study of one American unit and its leaders in combat, after the country that gave it its soldiers, and the Army that trained and deployed it, have been at war for almost a full decade. In this regard, the film is a commendation for Sebastian Junger, and a fitting memorial to Tim Hetherington. The limit of what the United States, and perhaps any nation, can achieve in a counter-insurgent struggle in a culture so different from its own, is the lesson of the battle for Outpost Restrepo.

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- **book reviews** (500-1,000 words); review essays (1,000-3,000 words); or lists of books of interest (which may include books in other languages)
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Resources: CTFP Institutions

Each issue, we'll feature a list of recommended resources on a range of topics from radicalization to terrorist rehabilitation. In this issue, we'll introduce you to the diverse CTFP institutions you can tap into as part of the CTFP network. If you know of a notable resource worth sharing with the CT community through CTX, send your recommendation to CTXEditor@gmail.com with the word "Resources" in the subject line.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)

"Forging Partnerships for Africa's Future"

AfricaCenter.org

With a publicly accessible website, the Africa Center puts out a monthly eNewsletter, Africa Security Briefs, Special Reports, and academic Research Papers, such as the timely new piece on the grassroots evolution of the information environment, "Africa's Evolving Info Systems: A Pathway to Security and Stability". Their dedicated alumni staff coordinate dozens of regional workshops and events throughout the year. Go to AfricaCenter.org to connect.

Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)

"Fifteen Years of Education, Empowering, and Connecting"

APCSSLink.org

Open to graduates of the Asia Pacific Center and affiliates, APCSSLink.org "provides a forum ... to deepen your understanding of security issues, maintain existing relationships, and develop new contacts throughout the Asia Pacific region." They offer APCSS Analytical Reports, News Briefs, and Currents Magazine, as well as specific Communities of Interest for security professionals in the region. Go to APCSSLink.org to connect.

College of International Security Affairs (CISA)

"a focal point for interagency and international security education"

www.NDU.edu/CISA

CISA is the flagship of the Combating Terrorism Fellowship program at the National Defense University. The Master's Degree program prepares military and civilian leaders from around the world "to better address national and international security challenges through multi-disciplinary educational programs, research, professional exchanges and outreach." CISA's robust alumni website is available at www.NDU.edu/CISA under the alumni tab.

Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)

"Fighting terrorism is the ultimate civil-military challenge"

www.CCMR.org

CCMR is dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-military relationships and assisting other nations in making integrated defense decisions. "Our most important objective is to help them build the institutional capacity to fight terrorism. All programs include guidance on building national-level strategies that can guide effective, legal, and ethical operations against terrorists and their networks." CCMR will be publishing a book, "Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism" later this year. Find out more, and go to www.CCMR.org to connect.

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS)

"toward a more cooperative and stable international security environment"

www.NDU.edu/CHDS

The CHDS mission is "to develop civilian specialists in defense and military matters by providing graduate level programs in defense planning and management, executive leadership, civilian-military relations and interagency operation."

Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School (DA)

"to educate the leaders of tomorrow in the challenges of 21st century conflict"

www.NPS.edu

DA's overarching missions is "to develop critical thinkers and capable operators, planners and commanders for the rigors of irregular warfare". They host joint SOF, conventional, and international officers and house the nationally prominent Information Operations Center of Excellence, and the CORE Lab. More information is available through the Naval Postgraduate School website at www.nps.edu under the Graduate School of Operational and Information Studies' departments listing.

Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS)

"exploring new ideas ... and acting as a catalyst for positive change"

www.DIILS.org

DIILS "is the lead defense security cooperation resource for professional legal education, training, and rule of law programs for international military and related civilians globally." They also offer an alumni-only portal on the web. Go to www.DIILS.org to connect.

GCMC (George C. Marshall Center)

"enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe and Eurasia"

www.MarshallCenter.org

"The legacy, goals and ideals of the Marshall Plan continue through the security education initiatives of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies." The Marshall Center publishes its quarterly "per Concordiam" covering regional security and defense issues, in addition to publishing its renowned Occasional Papers, and Security Insights. These are available freely at MarshallCenter.org, where alumni can also connect to their exclusive online portal, offering additional resources.

JSOU (Joint Special Operations University)

"fostering closer relationships with SOF's international partners"

JSOU.SOCOM.mil

JSOU's mission is "to educate Special Operations Forces executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision-makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and outreach in the science and art of Joint Special Operations." Read through their recent publications and learn more about the University at jsou.socom.mil

NAVSCIATTS (Naval Small Craft Instruction Advanced Technical Training School)

"to provide partner nation security forces with the highest level of riverine and coastal craft training" Go to

www.warboats.org/NAVSCIATTS.htm to connect.

National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC)

"to promote understanding of key transnational and geostrategic issues impacting the Intelligence Community"

www.DIA.mil/College

"...the Center for International Engagement co-hosts conferences and symposia on behalf of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. These events bring together Military Intelligence Chiefs to discuss regional security issues in an academic environment of non-attribution and transparency." Online, the NDIC offers unique publications on "Global Perspectives on Intelligence" and collaboration in the intelligence community, as well as insightful analyses. Go to www.DIA.mil/College to connect.

NESA (Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies)

"To enhance security in the Near East and South Asia by building sustained, mutually beneficial relationships..."

NESA-Center.org

"The NESA Center concept is based on the premise that Arabs and Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians and others would come together in a neutral setting for mutually beneficial dialogue about national security issues. This concept has proven itself strong ..." The publicly-accessible website offers regional news, as well as a comprehensive list of U.S. and international online resources freely available, in addition to their alumni-only website. Go to Nesa-Center.org to connect.

PfPC CTWG (Partnership for Peace Consortium Combating Terrorism Working Group)

"Strengthening democracies through knowledge"

www.PfPConsortium.org

"the Combating Terrorism Working Group brings together interested officials, security practitioners and academics from several countries to examine how best to design and apply multinational responses to current international terrorist threats." The Partnership for Peace puts out a professional, quarterly journal, Connections, in addition to a number of other publication products. To read their journal, go to www.PfPConsortium.org and connect.

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