The Movers and Shakers of the Lord’s Resistance Army

By: MAJ David Munyua, Uganda People's Defence Force




The Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M or simply LRA), founded in the late 1980s, is a Ugandan insurgent group that operated primarily out of the northern and eastern part of Uganda until 2006. After 2006, under pressure from counterinsurgency operations, the group relocated to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and eventually moved into the Central African Republic (CAR) via the Republic of South Sudan. Based on reports of its activities, the LRA is also suspected to be present in Sudan and southeastern Chad (see figure 1). Most of the LRA's fighters, including leader Joseph Kony, come from the Acholi tribe of northern Uganda, and the insurgents received passive support from tribal communities for many years. Local popular support dried up, however, when the LRA started committing atrocities against its own tribal members. The heinous violence the LRA unleashed against the Acholi earned the insurgents the status of a terrorist group according to both Uganda and the United States' definitions of terrorism.1

By 2014, the LRA's fighting capacity had been largely degraded by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), working jointly with the militaries of South Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC in an alliance called the African Union Regional Task Force (AURTF). The LRA does not pose as great a threat to Uganda as it did 10 years ago. However, it continues to commit atrocities against the people of the countries in which it is currently located. The greatest obstacle in the fight against the LRA is the lack of a front line where the LRA can be located and destroyed.

By operating in scattered groups of three to 12 fighters, each with its own commander who determines the movements and operations of the group, the LRA has effectively become invisible.2 This has made tracking and destroying even the weakened LRA a very daunting task.

The purpose of this article is to identify the most influential players in the current LRA command structure. Knowing the identities of the individuals who are most responsible for the LRA's survival will help counterinsurgency planners devise the best possible strategies to finally end the LRA menace in the region.

This article has five sections. First, I describe the background of the LRA insurgency in Uganda and the reasons it has flourished in central Africa; second, I clearly define the objectives and limitations of my research; and third, I structure, analyze, and evaluate the data that I collected in the course of my research, using social network analysis tools. In the fourth section, I use the results of my analysis to devise strategic options, and in the final section, I draw conclusions and offer recommendations for the way forward. While social network analysis tools are not an end in themselves, their use can contribute important information for crafting winning strategies against intractable problems such as the LRA.

An Abbreviated History of the LRA Insurgency

In 1986, the insurgent National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, overthrew the Ugandan government of Tito Okello. Okello, an ethnic Acholi, fled the country, and many of his tribe members took refuge in neighboring Sudan. These displaced people later regrouped as the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) and launched a counteroffensive against the NRA government in Uganda with the support of the Sudanese government.4

In that same year, 1986, as the NRA was still trying to settle in as a government, an Acholi priestess called Alice Auma formed a separate rebel group. Auma called herself "Lakwena," meaning "messenger," because she proclaimed herself to be a mystical spiritual conduit to the Acholi people. Her Holy Spirit Movement (also called the Holy Spirit Mobile Force) fought against the NRA and captured a substantial part of eastern Uganda. In 1987, however, Lakwena's army was defeated, and Lakwena and some of her followers fled to Kenya, where she died from illness in 2007.5

Meanwhile, the UPDA continued the fight against the NRA government until 1988, when its leaders finally decided to sign a peace agreement that disbanded the UPDA. Per the terms of the agreement, members of the UPDA were incorporated into the government military forces. This agreement also temporarily halted Sudanese support to the Ugandan insurgent group. Some individuals within the UPDA nevertheless did not accept the terms of the agreement and decided to form a breakaway UPDA force. Joseph Kony, who was the commanding officer of the UPDA's so-called Black Battalion and a relative of Alice Auma Lakwena, was one of these dissidents. He formed the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army, which was partly an offshoot of Lakwena's rebel group. In 1992, Kony's rebel army and some of the other UPDA breakaway members decided to form a united front against the NRA. The Lord's Resistance Army thus came into being with Joseph Kony as its leader.6

The LRA reactivated its connection with the Sudanese Armed Forces so as to receive military supplies and special training from the Sudanese government. Ugandan president Museveni was a former classmate of John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese insurgent group called the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the two of them also renewed their ties. In essence, the insurgencies turned into a proxy war, with the LRA and Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Kampala, while the SPLA and Uganda's NRA fought together against Khartoum. This status persisted until 2005, when the game finally changed.7

On 8 October 1995, Uganda enacted a new constitution that transformed the NRA forces into a national military called the Uganda People's Defence Force.8 This was primarily a change of name; the force's operations and routine activities remained unchanged, and it continued the fight against the LRA.

The comprehensive peace agreement that was signed between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in 2005 finally changed the status quo in the proxy war. The LRA not only lost its ally, but the cross-border sanctuary that LRA fighters had been using to escape from the Ugandan military shifted to the control of the SPLA—an enemy of the LRA by extension. LRA leaders thus had to choose between entering into peace talks with the Ugandan government or relocating to yet another safe haven. They chose both options but prioritized relocation. Given how events unfolded thereafter, one may plausibly argue that the LRA used the peace talks to make good their escape.9

While peace talks were being held in Juba, South Sudan, in 2006, attended by the LRA's so-called "external wing," the LRA's fighters quietly relocated to Garamba National Park in the DRC. By late 2007, the peace talks had concluded with an agreement that was to be signed in Juba. To the astonishment of many, including the LRA negotiators, however, Kony decided to abandon the agreement at the last minute. The International Criminal Court had issued a warrant for the arrest of Kony and his top four commanders in July 2005, and Kony wanted the charges against him and his commanders dropped before he put his signature to the agreement. There were also reports that Kony was not actually interested in the peace agreement but was using it to buy time for his forces to regroup. He therefore had to find a reason to avoid signing, and this was the best excuse he had.10

In 2008, Uganda responded by launching a concerted attack, dubbed "Operation Lightning Thunder," on the LRA positions in the DRC. The LRA was dispersed, and some of its members fled into the CAR, Sudan's Darfur region, and parts of Chad. At the time of this writing, LRA members are suspected to be located in these three countries as well as parts of South Sudan.11

The Structure of this Study

There are a lot of data about the LRA in open sources, which makes it easy for researchers to get "lost in the weeds" if they are not very clear on what they want to know about the terrorist group. For this article, I focus on the LRA's commanders (also called actors here) and command structure. Even with the wealth of open-source information about the most influential LRA commanders, however, it can still be difficult to find the most recent roll of their names. Furthermore, the group has been in hiding for so many years that previously important commanders are aging out of their positions, while others may be dead. I therefore suspect that the LRA has developed a new generation of commanders—most likely those individuals who were born and/or raised in the bush as child soldiers. The bad news is that there is very little public information available about these feral younger men, and because the only "normal" life they know is bush life, it will be harder for counterinsurgency forces to deal with them.

I used social network analysis software to process the available data on the LRA command structure.12 My goal was to identify the most influential commanders within the LRA, especially because they are the ones who most likely have been responsible for the terrorist group's survival in the bush over the past quarter century. This kind of data analysis may also provide hints about the next generation of LRA commanders. As a result, CT planners should also be able to derive working strategies to counter and eventually end the LRA insurgency.

Structuring, Analyzing, and Evaluating the Data

Social network analysis tools require the researcher to code and enter the data in a format that is understandable to and can be manipulated by the tools. Once this step is completed, the researcher can analyze the same data in a number of different ways. For this study, I coded two datasets specifically on the LRA commanders. The first set is based on the relationships among the commanders, both the command positions to which they are appointed by the senior LRA leadership, and their relationships to each other through friendship or other affiliation. As in a regular army, LRA commanders do not choose the unit or subgroup they will command; Kony alone decides who will command which group and also assigns the fighters to their units within the LRA organizational structure. Outside of the command structure, however, the commanders tend to form "cliques" based primarily on personal ties of friendship and loyalty. Understanding how these two groups relate and differ will help researchers identify the most influential commanders and their close affiliates.

The second set of data that I coded concerns two specific attributes for each commander. First is the current physical status of the individual commander: alive, dead, alive and captured, or alive and surrendered. Those in the latter categories of captured or surrendered are useful to study because they may still have some influence on their former cadres, especially if they become part of the government's outreach programs. The second attribute is the LRA officer's function within the command structure: is he a field commander or in some non-command–related position such as staff officer? Those who are still alive and are, or were, in positions of command over the fighting forces are the ones I focus on for further study.

The analysis process typically starts with basic descriptive statistics about the LRA command network: first a calculation of correlations between the two relational datasets (command structure and personal cliques), and then an aggregated version derived from the two. The results show that the relational datasets are highly correlated and that all the LRA commanders are linked to each other regardless of how the LRA leadership deploys them. In other words, I should get similar results when I analyze any one of the relational datasets independently of the others.

The second step in the analysis is the topographical analysis. This analysis is based on the overall structure of the networks (the relational datasets) and is designed to ascertain the density (interconnectedness) and the centralization (hierarchical arrangement) of the networks. The result of the analysis shows that the LRA's networks

are generally not very dense but are relatively centralized; in other words, the command structure is not closely integrated at the personal level, but it is fairly hierarchical. The sociogram in figure 2 is a summary map of the entire LRA command structure, 48 persons in all, based on the information available from open sources. The blue nodes indicate actors who are no longer a threat, that is, commanders who are either dead, captured, or surrendered. The red nodes indicate actors who are still a threat because they are alive and free. The symbols indicate three things; first, the large "+" sign indicates an actor who is deceased; second, the large red and blue circles denote actors who fill or filled the role of commander; and third, the small "+"and small red and blue circles denote actors who are not (or were not) commanders.

The third step in the analysis process is to determine the centrality of each commander in the network. For this step, I used four different types of centrality measures: (1) degree centrality, which measures the number of other people an actor is linked to; (2) closeness centrality, which measures how close an actor is (based on path distance), on average, to all other actors in the network; (3) betweenness centrality, which measures how "central" each actor is to the network—in other words, the degree to which he lies on the shortest path to all other actors in the network; and (4) eigenvector centrality, which is based on the assumption that actors who are tied to highly central actors are more important than those who are tied to peripheral actors. This analysis, therefore, weighs the sum of an actor's ties to other actors by his centrality scores.14 Table 1 shows the output of the centrality measures from an analysis of an extract of LRA commanders who are known to be alive, regardless of whether they are still in the bush or in custody.

 

Degree

Closeness

Betweenness

Eigenvector

Rank

Actor

Value

Actor

Value

Actor

Value

Actor

Value

1

Joseph Kony

1.375

Joseph Kony

0.716

Joseph Kony

0.523

Joseph Kony

0.519

2

Okot Odhiambo

0.500

Okot Odhiambo

0.487

Okot Odhiambo

0.067

Onencan Aciro Kop

0.219

3

Alphonse Lamola

0.438

Alphonse Lamola

0.477

Dominic Ongwen

0.057

Alphonse Lamola

0.280

4

Onencan Aciro Kop

0.438

Dominic Ongwen

0.468

Alphonse Lamola

0.033

Okot Odhiambo

0.272

5

Dominic Ongwen

0.375

Onencan Aciro Kop

0.468

Onencan Aciro Kop

0.032

Richard

0.248

6

Richard

0.375

Richard

0.458

Richard

0.023

John Bosco Kibwola

0.227

7

John Bosco Kibwola

0.375

John Bosco Kibwola

0.458

Okello Okutti

0.020

Kidega Murefu

0.222

8

Francis Abuchingu

0.313

Okello Okutti

0.449

Caesar Achellam

0.016

Olanya David

0.206

9

Leonard Bwone

0.313

Kidega Murefu

0.441

Kidega Murefu

0.015

Dominic Ongwen

0.190

10

Olanya David

0.313

Olanya David

0.432

John Bosco Kibwola

0.013

Leonard Bwone

0.186

Table 1: Centrality Measures for LRA Commanders' Network15

The seven individuals whose names are marked in red consistently rank within the list of the top 10 actors for all the centrality measures. The first category includes Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen, which is not surprising because these individuals are all LRA commanders who are on the International Criminal Court's wanted list.16 In contrast, the names in the second category, which includes Alphonse Lamola, Onencan Aciro Kop, Richard (no last name), and John Bosco Kibwola, were surprising to me, because the first three in particular had not appeared in news reports about LRA activities. Kibwola only started to show up in the news in 2007, following the collapse of the Juba peace negotiations.

When I narrowed the group of the most influential living LRA actors in table 1 down to those who are active commanders, mostly the same names showed up. The exceptions were Alphonse Lamola, who was excluded because he is not a commander, and Olanya David, a new entrant in the top seven, who is Kony's paternal half-brother. David scored low in betweenness centrality, however. There is a report that he was demoted by his brother Kony after impregnating one of Kony's wives, which may explain his inability to maintain close ties to other important actors.17

One interesting item that emerged from this analysis is the structure of two competing factions that exist within the LRA leadership. One is led by Dominic Ongwen and the other by Joseph Kony. These two fell out after Kony ordered the execution of his longtime deputy, Vincent Otti. Otti had indicated that he was willing to talk peace with the Ugandan government. Kony, who was against the idea, feared that peace talks would cause the LRA to disintegrate. Ongwen had been very loyal to Otti, and many of Otti's followers in turn became loyal to Ongwen.

Strategic Options

Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton, in their paper "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," outlined two broad categories of strategic options that can be used to disrupt a terrorist or insurgent network. The first is a kinetic approach, which is a proactive and aggressive action against enemy combatants and their supporters with the intent to neutralize, capture, or kill them. The kinetic approach targets the key actors directly or uses third-party agents to do the targeting. In both cases, the ultimate goal is to remove central nodes or brokers, or it may involve breaking key ties within the network to disrupt the rest of the network.18

The second approach is nonkinetic, and thus less aggressive. It involves a more subtle and patient use of national power, including diplomacy, information, and economic incentives, with the intent to undermine the dark network through cooperation and collaboration with partners, while emphasizing a flexible rather than prescriptive approach. The overall objective of this strategic approach is to secure the safety and support of the population while undermining the dark network's influence and control over them.

The Kinetic Approach

The LRA commanders who may be considered for targeting are the eight whom I identified as being the most important through the use of social network analysis tools: Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Onencan Aciro Kop, Richard, John Bosco Kibwola, Olanya David, and Alphonse Lamola. Because these individuals are very influential in the LRA network, it is likely that if they were captured or killed, the LRA would not be able to continue the insurgency or even survive. There are two possible approaches to a kinetic solution: the AURTF can continue to hunt the men directly, or it can try sending surrendered LRA fighters back into the bush to "take them out" one at a time. Although many LRA commanders have been killed by regular forces over the past 20 years or so, direct targeting has become less effective since the LRA went into hiding and became "invisible." Without a front line where the AURTF can face off with the LRA, the fight has become a game of hide-and-seek. The option to have surrendered LRA members sneak back in and kill the commanders is a recommendation that is yet to be tested.

The Nonkinetic Approach

The nonkinetic strategies that are applicable in the fight against the LRA are institution building, psychological operations, and rehabilitation.19 Information operations will not work against the group because, since 2009, the LRA has not used any traceable form of electronic communication. The commanders rely on runners to communicate among themselves, which has rendered the use of high-tech systems like satellite tracking to locate them irrelevant.20

Institution building involves empowering local communities with strong administrative systems that can organize citizens to resist the insurgents. It also involves giving the villages the means to call in immediate military help when they need it. One of the difficulties facing villagers in the DRC, CAR, and South Sudan is the lack of any reliable means to quickly report LRA attacks to the AURTF. Most of the time, such information reaches the AURTF long after the LRA has committed its atrocities and disappeared again.21 As part of the institution-building strategy, each village would need to have a minimum of two fast-link communications systems to connect with the AURTF. This also implies that the AURTF should have the capacity to reach every village as quickly as possible. The deplorable roads and dense jungle terrain of the region, however, are likely to impede the implementation of this strategy.

Psychological operations (PsyOps) involve the dissemination of selected information for the purpose of influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and, in the end, the behavior of the targeted individual or group. The ultimate aim here is to align the thinking and behavior of the targeted group or individual with that of the institution projecting the PsyOps.22 This strategy can be used to counter the propaganda LRA leaders use to influence their forces against the Ugandan government. For example, captured LRA fighters have asserted that while in the jungles without access to other sources of information, their commanders would tell the fighters that they would be killed if they surrendered or happened to be captured by the UPDF. To counter this misinformation, Uganda is now using captured and surrendered commanders and fighters to talk to their former LRA colleagues through radio talk shows. The aim here is to discredit the LRA propaganda and at the same time influence LRA fighters to consider surrendering to the UPDF or AURTF.23

As mentioned earlier, my social network analysis identified two rival factions within the LRA. The faction led by Dominic Ongwen could be influenced to push against the Joseph Kony faction, which would thus destabilize the LRA leadership network. This can be achieved by promising Ongwen, a more liberal commander, that he will be given amnesty if he gives up fighting and returns home with his group. Alternatively, the Ugandan government could announce over the radio that it is in contact with Ongwen or Okot Odhiambo, another potential rival. Kony is likely to believe the deception and react by turning against these key commanders, which could result in the disintegration of the LRA. If there is infighting within the LRA leadership, the number of fighters who choose to surrender will likely increase.

Rehabilitation of captured or surrendered members of the LRA's dark network would help to ideologically reorient the fighters away from extremism and reintegrate them into civil society.24 Uganda is already using this strategy. All of the captured and surrendered LRA combatants who apply for amnesty are given ideological reorientation, trained in vocational institutions to empower them with social survival skills, and assisted with funds to start private businesses, if that is what they wish to do. The Acholi also have a cultural cleansing ritual that the LRA combatants go through before they are reintegrated into tribal society. Those who wish to join the military are taken through military training, a process that includes ideological reorientation, after which they are integrated and deployed just like other UPDF personnel.25

Conclusion and Recommendations

Although social network analysis tools have limitations, they can be used effectively by coupling information derived from the tools with other research and analysis. For instance, intelligence reports are normally inconclusive, but with the support of tools such as those used for this study, a commander would be able to identify the "movers and shakers" of a target organization and develop effective strategies on how to solve a network-related problem. If counterterrorism operators have a plan in place to target individual commanders within the LRA, this paper has clearly defined the priority list.

When it comes to choosing strategies to undermine the LRA, I recommend using the PsyOps and rehabilitation strategies concurrently. The chief problem with the PsyOps strategy is establishing communication with the LRA combatants. Currently, the Ugandan government is only assuming that the LRA actually listens to the radio talk shows it broadcasts. Although captured and surrendered LRA combatants have attested to the fact that active LRA members do listen, only a few of these might actually have access to broadcast radio receivers. Kony's ban on the use of electronic gadgets might also apply to radios. Nevertheless, this option remains the single most potentially effective strategy for Uganda to rely on. Kinetic strategies have been tried before and are still in place, but because the LRA commanders have gone underground, it has become increasingly difficult to implement such strategies.

Another obstacle I foresee will arise when the younger LRA commanders take up the mantle of the LRA from the existing, aging leadership. Kony has already appointed his son, who was born and raised in the jungles, as his deputy, and may be in the process of transforming the leadership of the LRA.26 The bad news about the younger commanders is that most of them were either abducted when they were very young or born in the bush. That means they have no more than a faint idea of what life is like in towns and villages, and it will be that much harder to talk them out of the jungles. Some of them do not have any family members left, so the incentive for them to return home is limited, if not entirely absent. Others simply fear retribution from people they hurt during the conflict if they were to return home.

The open-source literature on the LRA is silent about this younger generation of LRA commanders. As the years go by, the commanders discussed in this paper are becoming older and less effective. It is therefore incumbent upon the CT community to strive to know the next generation of LRA commanders and keep abreast of developments in the LRA structure, so as to develop better strategies to counter them.

As I finished writing this article, I saw press reports that Dominic Ongwen had surrendered to US Army Special Forces working with African forces in the CAR.27 This news is a game changer: as this study makes clear, Ongwen was an influential actor within the LRA who could be used to bring more LRA fighters out of the bush—if the Ugandan government chooses to use him in that way.

About the Author(s):
MAJ David Munyuais a Marine officer in the Uganda People's Defence Force.

This is a work of the US federal government and not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.


NOTES:
  1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Terrorism Legislation Database (Uganda: "The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002"): https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6589; Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990): http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I/chapter-113B 
  2. Ledio Cakaj et al., "LRA Commanders," LRA Crisis Tracker, n.d.: http://lracrisistracker.com/command ; The Enough Team, "Kony to LRA: ‘Bring Me Ivory, Gold, and Diamonds,'" Enough Project, 19 November 2014: http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/kony-lra-bring-me-ivory-gold-and-diamonds ; IHS Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)," July 2014 (login required): https://janes.ihs.com/Grid.aspx 
  3. Map created by author using information gathered from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data databases: http://www.acleddata.com 
  4. Christopher Day, "The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda," Comparative Politics 43, no. 4 (July 2011): 439–58; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army"; Timothy Kalyegira, "Uganda after 1986: Insurgencies in the North and East (Part One)," Daily Monitor, 11 December 2012: http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/ugandaat50/Uganda-after-1986--Insurgencies-in-the-north-and-east--Part-One-/-/1370466/1640922/-/r3rf7/-/index.html ; Timothy Kalyegira, "Insurgency in the Northern and Eastern Regions in 1986," Daily Monitor, 12 December 2012: http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/ugandaat50/Insurgency-in-the-northern-and-eastern-regions-in-1986/-/1370466/1642098/-/15dlhhtz/-/index.html 
  5. Day, "Fates of Rebels"; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army"; Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986–97 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
  6. Day, "Fates of Rebels"; The Enough Team, "Kony to LRA"; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  7. Day, "Fates of Rebels"; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  8. The State House of Uganda, "The Constitution," n.d.: http://www.statehouse.go.ug/government/constitution  
  9. Cakaj et al., "LRA Commanders"; Day, "Fates of Rebels"; The Enough Team, "Kony to LRA"; Hilke Fischer and Coletta Wanjohi, "The Lord's Resistance Army: Violence in the Name of God," Deutsche Welle, 17 December 2014: http://www.dw.de/the-lords-resistance-army-violence-in-the-name-of-god/a-18136620 ; Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 9 January 2005: http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369 ; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  10. The Enough Team, "Kony to LRA"; Fischer and Wanjohi, "Lord's Resistance Army"; IRIN, "LRA ‘Weaker than It Has Been in at Least 20 Years,'" 1 August 2013: http://www.irinnews.org/report/98509/lra-weaker-than-it-has-been-in-at-least-20-years 
  11. Cakaj et al., "LRA Commanders"; The Enough Team, "Kony to LRA"; IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  12. For more information on these tools, see the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems website: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php ; and UCINET Software: https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home . Data for the research were gathered entirely from open sources, including the IRIN website: http://www.irinnews.org/irin-africa.aspx ; the Invisible Children Project: http://invisiblechildren.com; and various news sources from Uganda and elsewhere. 
  13. Derived from author's research. 
  14. Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 12–13. 
  15. Derived from author's research. 
  16. IHS Jane's, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  17. Cakaj et al., "LRA Commanders." 
  18. Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks," Journal of Social Structure 12, no. 2 (2011): 1–32: http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf 
  19. Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh, "Stumbling into the Future? The Indirect Approach and American Strategy," Orbis 52, no. 2 (2008): 312–31; Roberts and Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks." 
  20. Fischer and Wanjohi, "Lord's Resistance Army." 
  21. Invisible Children Project, "LRA Crisis Tracker," 2014: http://lracrisistracker.com/#analysis ; Fischer and Wanjohi, "Lord's Resistance Army."  
  22. US Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2003): http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/02_psyop-jp-3-53.pdf ; US Department of Defense, Military Deception, Joint Publication 3-13.4 (formerly JP 3-58) (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 13 July 2006); Roberts and Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks." 
  23. Mats Berdal and David Ucko, eds., Reintegrating Armed Groups after Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2009); IRIN, "LRA ‘Weaker than It Has Been.'" 
  24. Roberts and Everton, "Strategies for Combating Dark Networks." 
  25. Barney Afako, "Undermining the LRA: The Role of Uganda's Amnesty Act," Conciliation Resources, August 2012: http://www.c-r.org/comment/undermining-lra-uganda-amnesty-act-barney-afako ; IRIN, "Rehabilitation Centre for Uganda's LRA Returnees to Close," 18 January 2013: http://www.irinnews.org/report/97276/rehabilitation-centre-for-uganda-s-lra-returnees-to-close ; Berdal and Ucko, Reintegrating Armed Groups; International Committee of the Red Cross, "The Amnesty Act, 2000": https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/7d2430f8f3cc16b6c125767e00493668/$FILE/Ugandan+Amnesty+Act+2000.pdf ; Boniface Ojok, "‘Forgiveness Is Our Culture': Amnesty and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda," Beyond Intractability, March 2014: http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/ojok-forgiveness 
  26. Rodney Muhumuza, "Joseph Kony Names Son Salim as His Deputy in the Lord's Resistance Army," Huffington Post, 20 May 2014: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/20/jospeh-kony-son_n_5357618.html 
  27. See, for example, Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, "Fighter Defects, Citing Ties to the Fugitive African Warlord Joseph Kony," New York Times, 6 January 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/07/world/africa/fighter-defects-citing-ties-to-joseph-kony-fugitive-african-warlord.html ; and "LRA's Ongwen: One-Time Victim Turned Killer," New Vision, 8 January 2015: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/663498-lra-s-ongwen-one-time-victim-turned-killer.html  
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Comments

JAMES KIIZA
The article is scholarly and incisive, the author excellently analyses the genesis of the LRA and suggests effective counter measures to degrade or destroy the terrorist outfit.
Posted on 6/9/16 3:25 AM.