The Relevance of Technology in the Fight against India’s Maoist Insurgency

By: D. M. "John" Mitra

Large areas of central India have come under the cloud of a violent struggle between government forces and Maoist insurgents. The Maoists are active in at least nine out of the 28 states of India, and are trying to spread their influence into many more states.1 About 5,772 civilians and 2,065 members of the security forces were killed by the Maoists between 2001 and 2012. A majority of the civilians who have died in the violence were local tribal members, killed by insurgents who were enforcing Maoist hegemony over contested areas.2

Law and order are dealt with at the state level in India's federal structure; the national government plays primarily a supporting role in terms of providing men, matériel, and coordination to the states in their fight against the Maoists. Because the Maoist insurgency so far has been a purely indigenous, mostly localized phenomenon, each state has developed its own approach to tackling Maoist violence according to that state government's own experience and political context. In the same way, the insurgency in each state has its unique flavor, composition, and history, and uses the state-specific theater of violence to its advantage. A local group is able to start, escalate, de-escalate, or change strategy in one theater, independent of what is happening in other theaters. It can use one state as a sanctuary while waging guerrilla war in the neighboring state. Groups are also able to transfer men, matériel, and funds between the theaters according to changing needs, and to apply the experience they gained in one theater to improve their operations in other areas. Against this background, this article discusses the importance of inaccessible forested areas as initial niches for the proto-insurgencies to grow in less developed former colonies such as India. As their subsequent conduct has shown, the Maoists seem to have learned from early strategic failures in the state of Andhra Pradesh the value of sticking to inaccessible areas, even as their insurgency has matured. The article also addresses the relevance of technology, or rather the lack thereof, for counterinsurgency in these inaccessible areas.

Characteristics of India's Maoist Insurgency

The communist political movement in India has grown into many branches since it first emerged in 1920. After the Communist Party of India (CPI) began to take part in electoral democracy in 1951, some of the CPI's more radical elements broke away from the CPI in 1964 to form the CPI (Marxist). When the leadership of the CPI (Marxist) also embraced electoral politics, the more radical Maoist factions within CPI (Marxist), inspired by Mao Zedong's takeover of China, broke away to start violent uprisings in the countryside. Although these revolutionary groups have repeatedly fragmented, with some of them opting out of violent revolution to become involved in other activities such as urban trade unionism, several groups have stayed with the violent revolutionary path in remote rural areas of India. As the Indian state grew in strength and its reach extended further into the countryside, the Maoists were forced from the rural interior regions where they began into less accessible forested and mountainous areas.

According to the U.S. government's Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012,

Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations.3

India's Maoists perfectly fit this definition of an insurgent group. This is not to say that the Maoists have not or will not resort to terrorism, given that "most insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic in pursuit of their goal" at different stages of their growth.4 The distinction between an insurgency and a purely terrorist organization, however, is important for understanding the way in which the Indian Maoist movement has grown since its beginning. The Maoists started as a proto-insurgency, like the majority of insurgent movements, in the rural hamlets that were most conducive for their survival, and established their dominance over those areas through armed violence.5 The insurgents gradually expanded the territory under their control, with the ultimate objective to dismantle the local government, take over the entire target area, and bring it under some form of communist rule.

Within the areas they dominate and during armed operations, the insurgents try to impress the local population with their military power, often by wearing combat uniforms. This is unlike terrorists, who do not normally wear distinctive clothes but try to hide their identity and blend in with the local population around their hideouts. A terrorist organization usually starts with a small number of members dotted throughout a geographically large portion of the target area and tries gradually to increase its membership and activities through social contacts, media, and networking. Its terrorist activities may spread far beyond its locality and the target population. Instead of trying to establish and gradually expand its control over limited areas, a terrorist group often indulges in terrorist acts at random across the length and breadth of the target country, in order to weaken and destabilize the central or regional government and shake public confidence in the government's ability to protect its citizens. Terrorist groups grow by increasing their membership and affiliates, and by increasing the intensity and frequency of their acts. The growth and expansion of the Maoists, like most insurgent organizations, can be compared to that of cancer, which takes over an area and then gradually metastasizes in pockets, while the growth of terrorism within the borders of a state can be compared to a virus, which spreads more or less evenly throughout the body. Some insurgent organizations, however, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, have followed both of these models. Maps 1 through 4 illustrate early Naxalite6 expansion in India.

Choice of a Niche Area for the Maoists

There are many reasons why the Maoists have been forced to shift their violent operations from the rural interiors of states to more remote forested areas, as shown in maps 1 through 4. The chief reason, of course, is that the Maoists have adopted "protracted war" against the lawfully established state as their main form of revolution. This is not the case with most of the other Communist parties in India, which have adopted political mobilization as their main strategy and are active in mainstream liberal democratic politics. The preponderance of left-wing extremist violence in India is perpetrated by the Maoists, who are fugitives in the eyes of the law. The need to protect their fledgling organization from annihilation by government security forces forced the insurgents to establish themselves in inaccessible areas where state power was the weakest. After the Chinese Communist insurgency's initial setbacks in China's urban areas, in 1927 even Mao Zedong's forces famously had to take shelter in the Jinggang mountains of Jiangxi Province. As Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara prescribed, "At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed … having taken up inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy."7

Size of the Organization

One of the many asymmetries of the struggle between a nascent insurgent organization and an established state is the difference in relative sizes. A guerrilla organization starts out as a small group and remains much smaller than the state for a long period. Therefore, guerrilla organizations have often, at least in the early stage of their development, chosen to establish themselves in terrain where small size is not a handicap but rather an advantage. Figure 1 illustrates mathematically why forestland well suits guerrillas' requirement for concealment.

"The trees in a natural forest are randomly placed, as is shown in [figure 1]. The circles represent the tree trunks. Suppose a person stands somewhere in a forest, where his or her vision is limited by tree trunks. The areas that the person can see are shown by the spread of the arrows. … It can be mathematically shown that the average visible area from a point is inversely proportional to the square of the density of the trees and the square of the average radius of the trees."8

This is represented by the equation shown in figure 2,

where A = the area in meters,
n = the number of trees per 1 m2 area, and
r = the average width of the tree trunks in meters.

Thus, on average, only a limited area—which is determined by the density of the forest at any point—can be visible from the viewer's vantage point. Therefore, when a government security party or a guerrilla squad moves in a forest, its capacity to see and detect its enemy is optimal only when all members, except the leader, are spread on the outer limit of the visible area at that point of the forest. On the one hand, if they are spread beyond that limit, the leader of the group will not be able to see all the members of the team, and some of the members will not be able to see the leader. On the other hand, if team members are not spread out to the optimal limit, their combined capacity to see and act will not be at its fullest. Thus, the optimal size of a group operating in a combat situation in a forest is determined according to the area of visibility, which in turn is determined by the density of the forest.9

Similarly, it can be shown that the larger the group that is in hiding, the greater its chance of detection by the enemy. Maoists seem to know this intuitively, because most of the Maoist squads are typically small in number, particularly in the areas where they expect intrusion by government forces.

Isolated Population

One major difference between the demography of developed countries and that of less developed former colonies is the fact that about 80 percent of a developed country's population on average lives in urban areas, whereas in less developed former colonies such as India, less than 30 percent of the people live in urban areas.10 Another difference that often escapes notice is the fact that many less developed former colonies have isolated populations who live in remote, inaccessible areas, and remain essentially disconnected from the mainstream sociopolitical and economic systems of the country in which they are citizens. Developed countries rarely have such isolated populations, and their remote and inaccessible areas are mostly devoid of people (Russian Siberia being one notable exception). The guerrilla's dependence on the local population was emphasized by Mao, who likened the local people to water and guerrillas to fish.11 If an insurgent organization is to survive and grow, it must have "inputs of recruits, information, shelter and food—almost always obtained from the internal environment [the local population]."12 So, although a revolutionary needs remote forests and inaccessible areas in which to hide, he also needs some people nearby for his survival and growth. While remote and inaccessible areas are available in developed countries, their lack of population makes such places unsuitable for proto-insurgent organizations to survive and grow. This combination of isolated population and inaccessibility is only available in the less developed former colonies. This is borne out by the fact that out of the 25 insurgencies since 1945 in which the government lost to the insurgents, 19 belonged to those countries whose urbanization was less than 40 percent.13

Administratively and Politically Bald Areas

It also is often evident that the presence of government progressively lessens as one goes from urban to rural settings, or from densely populated to less populated areas. The strength of the central government's presence in an area is the aggregate of the presence of its agencies in that place. Each agency's presence in an area in turn is a function of population density and the functional necessity of that agency to be in that area. Departments like health services, police, education, and others whose functional necessity relates directly to the needs of local citizens have little or no presence in areas where the population density approaches zero. Many less developed former colonies have isolated populations who live in small hamlets scattered over a large area. In such areas, most of the citizen-centric state agencies are virtually absent. For the same reason, representatives of the state's political parties and of the media and civil society visit these areas only rarely, if at all.

For the insurgents, these politically and administratively bald areas, devoid of any threat or competition from the civil administration and political parties, are the most suitable locations in which to weather their vulnerable initial years.

The Growth of the Maoist Insurgency and Its Terrain

Most of what has previously been discussed applies to an insurgency in its proto stage. As an insurgency grows, it typically tries to expand into areas beyond the initial sanctuary, where the terrain often is quite different. However, the Indian Maoists' areas of operation today still resemble those of their proto stage 35 years ago. The following analysis of their activities in Andhra Pradesh from 1978 until now shows why the Maoists have remained restricted to the deep forests.

The Andhra Experience

As described earlier, the Maoist insurgency in any given Indian state can be treated as an independent theater of armed conflict for the purpose of our analysis. Maoist groups are able to start, escalate, and de-escalate conflict, or even change strategy in their theater, independent of what is happening in other places. They also are able to use one region as a sanctuary while waging guerrilla war in a neighboring theater, and bring to bear the experience they have gained to operate more effectively wherever they find themselves. This section analyzes the Maoists' activities in Andhra Pradesh from 1978 to 2012 and the possible lessons they learned and subsequently utilized in other states. Figure 3 illustrates the levels of violence committed by the Maoists from 1978 to 2012 in Andhra Pradesh, as measured by casualties among security forces and civilians. In their bid to enforce Maoist hegemony in the contested areas, it is apparent from the data that the insurgents have killed a greater number of civilians than they have security personnel.

As figure 3 shows, the proto-insurgency that started in Andhra in 1978 as the People's War Group (PWG) had evolved into a formidable insurgent organization by 1997. The Maoists consistently expanded in size and influence through phases of aggression and retrenchment. Figures 4 and 5 offer a closer look at the period by breaking it into phases between peak years.

The Maoists expanded their activities primarily within the forested areas till 1985 (see figures 3 and 4), largely avoiding any public outcry or the attention of the state. They even managed to pass themselves off as friendly neighbors in the remote forested regions, in spite of their violence. In 1982, one top political leader of Andhra Pradesh, N. T. Rama Rao, called the Maoists "patriotic brothers."14

As figure 5 shows, the Maoists started rapidly expanding their activities into rural populated areas after 1985. Rao, who had become chief minister of Andhra Pradesh by then, changed his opinion about the Maoists and banned their organization in 1987. He also created a special operations group within the Andhra Pradesh state police called the Greyhounds. This determination to create the Greyhounds and strengthen the police is cited as a reason for the Maoists' murder of Daggubati Chenchuramaiah, the father of one of Rao's sons-in-law, on 6 April 1989.15 Many of the sustained security operations that more or less flushed the Maoists out of Andhra Pradesh in later years are credited to the Greyhounds.This is not to underestimate the state's concentrated efforts to boost development in the vulnerable areas, but such actions could be undertaken only after the Maoists lost their influence in an area, because the insurgents strongly opposed most of the government's development activities such as building roads and spreading access to education.16 The steady retreat of the Maoists, first back to the forests and later out of Andhra Pradesh, is shown in figure 6. It is interesting to note that although the Maoists were flushed out of the rural areas by 2007, they are still holding on to the forests, though with less use of violence.

Lessons Learned by the Maoists from Andhra Pradesh

It seems that the Maoists learned many lessons from their loss in Andhra Pradesh, and accordingly made course corrections. The first lesson apparently is that they must avoid both overestimating the state's weakness and prematurely expanding their operations to rural and urban areas. As political scholar Colin Gray points out, the insurgent wisely uses time as an asset against the state. However, if "[an insurgent] force enjoys military success, its leaders are always vulnerable to the temptation to … seek to accelerate the pace of history by going directly for political gold by means of a swift military victory. As often as not, such hubris brings them close to military and political nemesis."17 A profile of Maoist violence from 1985 to 1995 illustrates this error of hubris. Since being hounded out of settled rural areas by the police in Andhra Pradesh, the insurgents have been very cautious about expanding again into such areas. The Maoists have generally minimized their activities outside the forests except for some rural areas of Bihar state, where they continue to take advantage of extreme social inequality to win local support.18 In two experimental expansions, Maoists managed to move into settled areas close to the forest in Narayanpatna in the state of Odisha and Lalgarh in the state of West Bengal. The experiments ultimately failed because the states were able to stamp them out.

This does not mean the Maoists have not expanded their areas of operation and influence. Long before their loss in Andhra, the PWG had spread into the border areas of Odisha, Chhattisgarh (then a part of Madhya Pradesh), Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, which have forested regions contiguous with the North Telangana forests on the northern side of Andhra Pradesh. The Maoists maintained a less violent mode in these areas and used the areas as sanctuaries. This relatively low profile, coupled with the remote, inaccessible nature of those areas, allowed the government to ignore the insurgents in that region for some time.19 By 2000, however, as the insurgents' need to expand their operations again became imperative, the Andhra Pradesh police gained the upper hand and started flushing the Maoists out, even from their hideouts in the North Telangana forests.

The economics of expansion into resource-rich areas, however, was positive for the insurgents compared to lying low and defending their bases in Andhra Pradesh, particularly in view of the differences in preparedness and political will between the various state governments at that time. As the Maoists lost their bases in Andhra Pradesh, they gradually made the Bijapur and Dantewada districts in Chhattisgarh their main center of operations, while keeping southern Odisha (particularly Malkangiri) as their main hideaway.20 Meanwhile, two Maoist groups, PWG in the south and the Maoist Communist Centre of India in the north, merged in 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Though the Maoists have escalated their violence and extortion activities outside Andhra, they have generally done so within the forested regions and desisted from expanding into open rural areas.


In open rural areas, the insurgents tend to lose many of the advantages they have in the forests, some of which have already been discussed. Other advantages may be less apparent. For example, because states face considerable difficulty and cost trying to collect intelligence in these remote, isolated pockets of population, they tend to avoid doing it.21

This difficulty can be explained from the practitioner's point of view. An intelligence agency's capacity to collect information from an area can be seen as a product of five factors: (1) the visibility of the target, (2) the relative presence of intelligence operatives in the area, (3) the ratio of possible observers to population in the area, (4) the observers' professional and technical capacity to gather useful intelligence, and (5) the availability of communication channels for the observer to relay collected intelligence. The general lack of roads, communication, infrastructure, and facilities in India's hinterlands makes it difficult for the government to motivate its employees to go to those places or stay there long enough to develop the kinds of relationships with the locals that will yield useful intelligence.

The first factor depends largely on the insurgents themselves. They can decide deliberately to minimize their activities to avoid attention. They may use camouflage and concealment techniques to avoid detection. While the Maoists' armed squads normally wear uniforms and openly carry arms, whenever they find it necessary, they will forego the arms and uniforms and merge with the local population in crowded venues such as weekly markets. As mentioned earlier, the bigger a group moving in a forest is, the greater is its chance of detection by its enemy. Maoist squads typically are small in size, particularly in the areas where they expect intrusion by government forces. Except while directly interacting with the villagers, the squads do their best to avoid detection.

Regarding the second factor, until insurgents move in and become active, the state government's intelligence agencies normally will not have much presence in these isolated areas, which otherwise are of little interest to them. Moreover, once they are established, insurgents will use intimidation to push out whatever little non-military presence the government has in those areas.

The third factor, regarding the ratio of possible observers to the local population, is affected by the fact that these areas have very small numbers of people who are dotted in countless hamlets over huge territories. It is possible to roam around in such areas for days together without being spotted by anyone. The capacity of the observer to observe, which is the fourth factor for intelligence work, again is restricted by the density of the forest, as illustrated in figure 1. This limitation applies to technical gadgets as well. All devices that work in a horizontal direction and depend on line of sight, such as remote cameras, night-vision devices, radar, and the like, suffer the same handicap. Other technical devices such as satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that use vertical line of sight have their own limitations in heavily forested areas.22 The canopy of the trees in tropical forests such as those of eastern India makes it difficult to observe patterns from above. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that the Maoists seem to be aware of such surveillance from above and accordingly adopt camouflage and concealment techniques.

What is more, regarding the fifth and final factor, the general lack of infrastructure and communication channels in these remote Maoist-affected areas means that even if an observer sees something, it is very difficult and timeconsuming to pass the information on to an intelligence agency. By the time the intelligence reaches the agency, too often it has become stale and useless for undertaking any operation. Maoists are aware of this factor and deliberately destroy roads and ban the use of mobile phones in their operational areas.23 They may even kill people they find using mobile phones, on the suspicion that they are police informers.24 According to one source, "In the past four years, more than 200 mobile towers have been blown up in the nine States by Maoists alleging security forces were being informed about their movements and locations with mobile phones."25

Use of Technology

One more advantage that the Maoists enjoy in the forests but lose in open rural areas also relates to technology. The state's ability to acquire technology and its reliance on technological capabilities is enormous compared to that of the Maoists, who have neither the money nor the infrastructure to incorporate advanced technologies into their operations. Not being able to use mobile phones, surveillance devices, UAVs, and the like in the Maoists' operational areas, therefore, is much more of a disadvantage for the state than it is for the Maoists. The difficulties with visibility and line of sight in a dense forest apply equally to the use of long-range artillery. Because the land where the Maoists operate is often also very hilly, armored vehicles, tanks, and heavy machine guns can become more liabilities than assets.

By the same token, because UAV surveillance over tropical forests is unreliable, the use of aircraft for transporting troops and for aerial attacks can be highly dangerous. Security forces may not be aware of the presence of insurgents in an area, and may come under fire as they fly too close or try to land.26 Further complicating matters, the Maoist problem is one of domestic security for India, in which its own citizens—the insurgents—hide among other citizens. The target population is scattered throughout the forests, making aerial and other area-based attrition approaches counterproductive. Without highly accurate targeting information from intelligence and surveillance, the collateral damage from aerial attacks is unacceptable—a problem made even worse, of course, in more populated localities. In a liberal democracy such as India, the public outcry against any loss of innocent lives from aerial attacks by the state can become deafening, which is a risk that a democratic government cannot afford. In fact, insurgents frequently seek to goad the state into indulging in such overreactions precisely to undermine state legitimacy in the eyes of the population.27 As North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap famously commented, the Vietnam War "was fought on many fronts … [but] the most important one was American public opinion."28 In the same vein, while discussing U.S. involvement in irregular warfare in particular but with regard to any liberal democracy fighting an insurgency, Colin Gray observed that such a war "will not be won or lost in the local barrios and swamps, but in America's sitting rooms."29

It is easy to imagine that access to the internet is a far cry in a place where the use of mobile phones is rare. As would be expected, the level and use of computer technology decreases as one moves away from the urban areas of India into more remote areas. Furthermore, those remote areas already dominated by Maoist violence have the lowest level of access to technology, because the Maoists actively oppose the use and spread of information technology in their areas of influence. It is their "above-ground" supporters and sympathizers who use the internet and social media to influence civil society and reach the sitting rooms of urban populations.30 It is almost impossible, however, to reach the underground Maoist operatives through these above-ground supporters. The insurgents use only a series of trusted couriers for the exchange of letters and money or other communications. In the absence of sophisticated communications technologies, the technique of "big data mining" of social media is not available to intelligence services for counterinsurgency planning.31 Similarly, when insurgents use couriers and hard cash, hunting through financial transactions may not yield any useful results for the state security services.

The Maoist leadership's attitude toward information technology is reminiscent of that of Osama bin Laden, whose avoidance of the internet, telephones, and mobile phones helped him to escape detection for a decade despite the enormous level of effort that was undertaken to find him.32 One wonders about the probability of bin Laden being detected if he had been willing to live in more humble dwellings without modern comforts, and had sanctuaries in the dense tropical forests of a Third World country.


However much the state may wish to use remote, technology-based solutions to fight insurgency, such means may be largely irrelevant or even counterproductive as long as the insurgents stay in the safety of the inaccessible forested areas of a Third World country. If insurgents opt for security over the efficiency of using communications technology, the state needs to look for solutions that are not dependent on exploiting technology. Because the state and its security organizations are heavily dependent on the internet for their everyday activities, however, they are potentially vulnerable to the exploitation of big data analytics by a technologically competent insurgent. Just as in the business world, where "such information can provide competitive advantages over rival organizations," these opponents will have an asymmetric advantage over the state in this regard.33

On a positive note for the state, if officials adopt a strategy of strengthening the vulnerable areas adjacent to those occupied by insurgents through infrastructure development and access to technology, the state can use the same logic to deny an insurgency the ability to further expand. It may look expensive for less developed former colonies to make these structural investments, but a cost-benefit analysis needs to be carried out to determine the future cost of fighting insurgents over a larger area. During a recent field study, I found that the use of mobile phones spread rapidly into remote regions adjacent to Maoist-controlled areas once the construction of new roads improved accessibility. Better roads and communications will make it difficult for the Maoists to expand into those areas, since they will no longer find the security of isolation there.

About the Author(s): D. M. "John" Mitra is the joint director of the National Crime Records Bureau, India. He has held many posts in the Madhya Pradesh Police and the Indian federal government, including superintendent of police in three districts; deputy inspector general of the Special Armed Force, Administration, and Home Guards; and Additional Director General of Railways, Complaints, and Narcotics. Mr. Mitra recently contributed a field study for a research project on the impact of developmental initiatives in Maoist-affected areas. Mr. Mitra earned a BSc in physics (with honors) from Ravenshaw College, Odisha, India, and an MS in Defense Analysis from NPS.


1. For more information on the Maoist insurgency in India, see Srinivas Ganapathiraju, "Maoist Insurgency in India: Emerging Vulnerabilities," CTX 3, no. 2 (May 2013): 75–79.

2. From the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Union Government of India, see the section titled "Background":

3. U.S. Government, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2012), 1:

4. Ibid., 2.

5. Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, occasional paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2007), 5: According to Byman, the proto-insurgency "is a small, violent group that seeks to gain the size necessary to more effectively achieve its goals and use tools such as political mobilization and guerrilla warfare as well as terrorism" (Ibid.).

6. The term Naxalite comes from an early Communist-led uprising in the 1950s that originated in the West Bengali village of Naxalbari. Naxalites were the forerunners of the present-day Maoists.

7. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: BN Publishing, 2012), chap. 1, sec. 2:

8. Durga Madhab Mitra, Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 63:

9. Mitra, Understanding Indian Insurgencies, 64.

10. Population Reference Bureau, 2012 World Population Data Sheet (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau), 11–13:

11. Mao Tse-Tung [Mao Zedong], On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: BN Publishing, 2007), 93.

12. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 32–33.

13. David C. Gompert and John Gordon, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2008), 381:

14. Saji Cherian, "The States of Denial,", 23 August 2005:

15. Chenchuramaiah (also rendered Chenchu Ramaiah) had been accused by the People's War Group of conspiring to attack Dalits in the Andhra village of Karamchedu in 1985. See "SC Convicts 31 in Karamchedu Dalit Massacre," Times of India, 20 December 2008:

16. Satyanarayan Pattnaik, "Maoist Fear Blocks Koraput Projects," Times of India, 25 March 2011: ; "Maoists Cause Mayhem in Malkangiri," Hindu, 24 February 2009:; B Sridhar, "Security Issue Continues to Haunt Contractors after Chawka Incident," Times of India, 4 April 2011:

17. Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters," Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2007): 45:

18. Mitra, Understanding Indian Insurgencies, 84.

19. Durga Madhab Mitra, The Genesis and Spread of Maoist Violence and the State's Handling of It (New Delhi: Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2011), 97.

20. Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Naxal Terror," Frontline 24, no. 18 (8–21 September 2007):

21. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 31–32.

22. Yatish Yadav, "Heron Drone Proves a Dud in Tracking Maoists in Chattisgarh," India Today, 3 January 2012:

23. "Maoists Cause Mayhem"; Sridhar, "Security Issue Continues to Haunt."

24. "Maoists Murder Youth in Koraput District," Hindu, 4 May 2012.

25. Mukesh Ranjan, "State's Naxal-Hit Zones to Get 987 Mobile Towers," Pioneer, 6 March 2013.

26. Yadav, "Heron Drone Proves a Dud."

27. Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 112.

28. Howard Langer, The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), 318.

29. Gray, "Irregular Warfare," 45.

30. In one such case, a party Central Committee Resolution of 11 June 2013 was circulated on the internet, which among other things warned of a possible aerial attack on Maoist positions by security forces. For an example of communist propaganda on the internet, see Ian Paxson, "PSL on Nepal: A Heroic Struggle for Socialism," Kasama Project, 19 November 2013:

31. Big data mining is an analytic process designed to gather and analyze large amounts of data from communications technologies and social media in search of consistent patterns and/or systematic relationships between variables, and then to validate the findings by applying the detected patterns to new subsets of data. For more information, see "Data Mining," StatSoft, n.d.: . Also see James Igoe Walsh, "Big Data, Insider Threats, and International Intelligence Sharing," in this issue of CTX.

32. "Osama bin Laden Killed: Phonecall by Courier Led US to Their Target," Telegraph, 3 May 2011:

33. For an explanation, see "Big Data Applications: Real-world Strategies for Managing Big Data," Business Analytics, 10 January 2012. See the Search Data Management website:

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